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Abstract 
Since the English Premier League (EPL) commenced in 1992 top flight clubs have seen rapid 
and sustained growth in revenue driven primarily by broadcasting contracts negotiated 
collectively by the EPL.  The most successful clubs also saw a rise in commercial revenue and 
generated additional income from regular participation in European club competitions. 
Growth in revenue and the global audience for EPL matches attracted foreign investors and 
by 2015, 55% of clubs were under foreign ownership.   
Analysis showed that several foreign owners focused on sporting success and provided their 
clubs with a soft budget constraint that allowed significant expenditure on players’ costs. 
This meant where expenditure exceeded revenue owners made available additional funds to 
cover deficits. Despite growth in revenue, excessive spending meant in aggregate terms the 
EPL reported losses in every year from 2004-13, and several clubs became reliant on 
additional funds provided by owners and related parties.  A similar situation was evident in 
football leagues across Europe and led to stricter financial regulation by UEFA and the EPL. 
This study makes use of mixed-methods research to examine how the provision of a soft 
budget constraint impacted on the performance of clubs in the EPL, and whether this 
supported the introduction of stronger financial regulation.  Initial quantitative research 
examined published financial statements for every club that played in the EPL during the 
2003/4-2014/15 seasons, and enabled analysis of financial performance before and 
following increased regulation.  Qualitative research in the form of structured interviews 
with nine elite informants provided valuable information about attitudes to both poor 
financial performance and increased regulation.  Difficulty accessing elite informants has 
limited the use of structured interviews in research into the football sector. 
This thesis finds that during the period under review, the poor financial performance of 
clubs in the EPL was driven by wealthy owners who provided their clubs with a soft budget 
constraint to assist attainment of playing success.  The threat of relegation forced other 
clubs to spend greater amounts just to remain competitive and meant growth in revenue 
was usually accompanied by a corresponding rise in players’ wages.  It was only following 
significant growth in broadcasting revenue accompanied by stricter regulation after 2013 
that financial performance improved.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Overview of chapter 
This chapter explains how football clubs originally formed for social purposes in the late 
nineteenth century were able to develop into business entities with a global fan base.  It 
goes on to provide the rationale for this study; establishes the research aims and objectives; 
and introduces the concept of soft budget constraint. 
1.2 Introduction to thesis 
In June 1992, accountants Touche Ross published a ‘Survey of significant accounting policies 
in football clubs’.  The report was the first of what would later become the ‘Deloitte Annual 
Review of Football Finance’ and showed that during the accounting year ended 1991 the 22 
football clubs playing in England’s top league (Division 1) reported total revenue of £143 
million and an aggregate pre-tax profit of just £52,000 (Touche Ross 1992:25).  This 
represented a profit of just 3.6 pence for every £100 generated in revenue.   
In 1991 neither the English Premier League (EPL) nor the UEFA Champions League existed, 
and revenue from broadcasting was limited through the duopoly enjoyed by the BBC and 
ITV.  The EPL commenced in August 1992 since when broadcasters have paid large amounts 
for the exclusive rights to show live matches.  During 2011 the 20 clubs that made up the 
EPL generated revenue of £2.3 billion (Calculated from aggregated financial statements of 
clubs in the EPL 2011).  Despite this being 16 times greater than in 1991, clubs reported an 
aggregate pre-tax loss of £355 million (Calculated from aggregated financial statements of 
clubs in the EPL 2011).    
Unlike other business sectors in which companies focus on profit maximisation the primary 
objective of a football club is playing success (Sloane 1971), however this should be 
balanced with sound financial management.  For many clubs in the EPL increases in wages 
and transfer fees outstripped growth in revenue resulting in losses and a reliance on debt.  A 
similar picture was seen in football leagues across Europe, and to address financial 
difficulties from 2012 UEFA introduced Financial Fair Play Rules (FFPR).  More recently the 
EPL strengthened its own financial regulations through Short Term Cost Control (STCC) and 
Profitability and Sustainability rules.   
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Before considering the aims and objectives of this thesis it is worth briefly outlining key 
developments that have taken place in English football since the late nineteenth century.  In 
this way it can be seen how football clubs formed primarily for social reasons developed 
into business organisations with a global fan base.  
1.3 From social clubs to global businesses: the development of English football 
1.3.1 The growth of football during the late nineteenth century 
During the nineteenth century football was played in many English public schools to 
encourage teamwork and promote exercise (Mason 1980:11).  However with no standard 
set of rules each school developed its own version of the game which caused problems 
when schools played against each other (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:3).  Football’s 
popularity soon spread to the working classes and was helped by government legislation in 
1874 that gave many workers Saturday afternoons off (Banks 2002:37).  This new leisure 
time provided both an increase in participants and an audience to watch matches, and with 
little equipment needed football became an increasingly popular and cheap form of leisure 
activity.   
Many factory owners encouraged the formation of works football teams believing organised 
leisure activities had a positive impact on morale and productivity (Mason 1980:29, Tranter 
1998:59).  This greatly assisted the rapid growth of football during the 1870s and 80s, 
especially in industrial towns in the Midlands and North West of England.  Three of the EPL’s 
best supported clubs originated from works teams of the late nineteenth century.  Newton 
Heath (which later became Manchester United) was formed in 1880 by the Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway Works; West Ham United in 1885 by the Thames Ironworks; and Arsenal 
in 1886 by workers at Royal Woolwich Arsenal (Mason 1980:29).  
Southampton, Queens Park Rangers (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:3), Aston Villa and Bolton 
Wanderers were set up by local churches to promote healthy living and keep young men out 
of trouble (Mason 1980:25).  The Wanderers and Blackburn Rovers were founded by the 
alumni of public schools and Oxbridge primarily for social reasons that enabled friends to 
retain contact (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:3).  Whilst Sheffield Wednesday, Preston North 
End and Everton were established by cricket clubs whose players wished to meet socially 
during winter (Mason 1980:31). 
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The formation of the Football Association (FA) in 1863 (Banks 2002:36, Holt 1998:85) 
enabled a formal set of rules to be established.  In 1867 just ten clubs were affiliated to the 
FA (Mason 1980:31).  By 1871 this had increased to 50, and by 1905 there were over 10,000 
football clubs in England (1980:31). 
The introduction of the FA Cup allowed clubs to compete against each other.  Fifteen clubs 
entered the first competition in 1871-72 and the final was watched by over 2,000 spectators 
(Dobson and Goddard 2011:140).  
1.3.2 Conversion to limited companies  
Until the 1880s football clubs were managed by elected committees.  However this inhibited 
the growth of clubs since in the event of insolvency, committee members were personally 
responsible for any debts incurred.  As a consequence few committee members were willing 
to allow clubs to take out large bank loans, which restricted investment in players and 
facilities (Buraimo et al 2006:30).  In 1888 Small Heath (now Birmingham City) was the first 
club to become a limited company (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:5).  As well as providing 
access to a wider range of funds, incorporation meant in the event of insolvency the liability 
of shareholders was limited to the amounts they had invested in a club.  By 1921 the 
Football League comprised 86 clubs, 84 of which operated as limited companies (Dobson 
and Goddard 2011:187). 
Conversion into limited companies was accompanied by a rise in commercialism as clubs 
sought to generate a return for shareholders. This was initially frowned on by the FA which 
was predominately run by ‘gentlemen amateurs’ (Buraimo et al 2006:30) who believed that 
limiting opportunities for commercialism ensured resources remained more evenly 
distributed between clubs (Platts and Smith 2010:645). 
Paradoxically Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) argued that the FA Cup was responsible for 
changing the objectives of the largest football clubs.  Once clubs started to compete against 
each other they needed to acquire the best players in order to win matches and attract 
supporters.  This was the beginning of clubs starting to operate as businesses (1999:3).  
1.3.3 Professional football 
Concerned that professionalism would result in clubs being operated for profit, the FA 
initially tried to keep football amateur and under ‘Rule 16’ players were permitted only to 
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receive re-imbursement of travel expenses and compensation for loss of earnings while 
playing in the FA Cup (Banks 2002:38).  However this proved difficult to enforce and 
although it is not known with certainty when players were first paid, Mason (1980) reported 
that by the 1880s a number of clubs were employing professional footballers (1980:70). 
With many clubs having converted into limited companies and large numbers of spectators 
paying to attend matches, the FA came under pressure to remove Rule 16 and accept 
professional footballers.   In 1884 Preston North End was disqualified from the FA Cup for 
paying wages to players (Mason 1980:74).  In protest several clubs threatened to form a 
breakaway league and the FA was forced to either accept professionalism or go the way of 
rugby and have two separate codes – amateur and professional.  In 1885 the FA recognised 
professional football and agreed to the payment of players (Platts and Smith 2010:645).  
This paved the way for the formation of the Football League in 1888 (Dobson and Goddard 
2011:140) and ultimately the structure of English football as we know it today.   
By 1891, 448 professional players were registered with the FA (Mason 1980:89), and in 1893 
Athletic News Football Annual reported that the average professional wage was £3 per 
week in winter and £2 per week during the summer (1980:96). 
1.3.4 The formation of the Football League 
Professionalism and the growing popularity of football meant clubs had to invest in new 
facilities for supporters and incurred regular expenses including players’ wages.  In 1876 
Aston Villa became the first club to charge spectators (Platts and Smith 2010:645), however 
revenue was irregular and limited to gate receipts from friendly matches or participation in 
the FA Cup.  In 1888 the Football League (FL) was founded (Dobson and Goddard 2011:140).  
Initially comprised of 12 teams from the North West and Midlands of England its creation 
allowed the best supported clubs to generate a regular flow of revenue through playing 
competitive matches (2011:140). Despite the FA’s reluctance to embrace commercialism, 
Arnold (1991) noted the clubs that were first invited to join the FL were those with the 
greatest number of spectators as these would generate most revenue (1991:180).   
In 1893 a second division of 12 clubs was established, and by 1924 the FL comprised 88 
clubs organised into four divisions (Dobson and Goddard 2011:140) with promotion and 
relegation between each division.  The league expanded to 92 clubs in 1950 (Szymanski and 
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Kuypers 1999:142).  Despite the popularity of football not all clubs generated a profit and in 
1898-99 the FL asked members to contribute to a fund that would be used to help clubs in 
financial difficulty (Mason 1980:47). 
1.3.5 Rule 34  
As more clubs started to trade as limited companies, the FA initiated measures designed to 
maintain equity and restrict opportunities for individuals to profit from football.  In 1896 the 
FA introduced ‘Rule 34’ which limited the maximum dividend payable to just 5% of the 
nominal value of share capital; prevented the payment of salaries and fees to directors 
(Platts and Smith 2010:646); and stated that in the event of a football club being wound up 
any surplus would be distributed to local sports clubs (Banks 2002:39). 
This greatly reduced opportunities for individuals to profit from investing in football clubs 
and in 1909 Athletic News reported that ‘No-one who is out for a business return would 
look at football shares’ (Arnold 1991:182).  Holt (1989) concurred and noted that during the 
1908-09 season just six out of 62 clubs paid a dividend to shareholders (1989:283).  Tranter 
(1998) and Holt both commented that profit maximisation was unlikely when stadia were 
used infrequently and most revenue was spent on players’ wages (Holt 1989:285, Tranter 
1998:61).  However few shareholders complained suggesting that generating a high return 
was not the primary objective for investing in a football club (1998:61). 
Rule 34 was only relaxed in 1981 when to attract fresh investment and professional 
managers into English football, the FA allowed remuneration of full time directors and 
increased the maximum dividend payable to 15% of the nominal value of share capital 
(Banks 2002:39).  
1.3.6 Increased levels of commercialism 
From the 1880s onwards the number of spectators paying to watch football increased 
rapidly.  The 31 FA Cup ties played during the 1888-89 season attracted over 200,000 paying 
spectators, and the 1897 FA Cup final at Crystal Palace was watched by a crowd of 50,000 
(Mason 1980:141).  The newly formed FL also proved popular and matches played during its 
first season in 1888-89 were watched by 602,000 spectators (Mason 1980:143).  By 1905-06 
total attendances at FL matches exceeded 5 million (Mason 1980:143). 
   
6 
 
As well as increased leisure time Holt (1989) suggested growth in attendances was greatly 
assisted by the development of a cheap public transport network, particularly the railways 
that started to link industrial towns and cities (1989:166).  Mason (1980) noted that during 
the 1880s railway companies provided special trains that carried supporters to watch away 
matches (1980:146).   
As the popularity of football increased the largest clubs started to invest in new facilities.  
Between 1889 and 1910, 58 clubs moved to new grounds (Holt 1989:282) which allowed 
them to start charging a range of prices with higher admission for better standing areas, 
seats, and more attractive matches (Mason 1980:149).  Despite the FA’s reluctance to 
encourage commercialism, by the early twentieth century the largest football clubs in 
England had been transformed from social clubs into limited companies that operated as 
businesses. 
1.3.7 The maximum wage and retain and transfer system 
The formation of the FL also saw the imposition of a maximum wage and the introduction of 
the retain and transfer system that restricted the movement of players between clubs.  
These two developments gave clubs complete control over players and helped limit 
expenditure on wages until the early 1960s.  They also prevented the best players from 
being acquired by just a few large clubs thereby promoting equity of resources.  An example 
of how effectively this worked was shown in 1947 when Third division Notts County paid a 
record English transfer fee of £20,000 to buy Tommy Lawton (Szymanski and Kuypers 
1999:143). 
Under retain and transfer a player’s registration was held by his club. Any player wishing to 
move to another club could do so only with the agreement of his current club and the 
payment of a transfer fee by the new club (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:99).  The system 
remained unchanged until 1961 when George Eastham challenged its legitimacy in court. 
During Eastham vs Newcastle United the Judge described retain and transfer as an 
‘Unreasonable restraint of trade’ (Arnold and Benveniste 1987:197).  Following this case the 
transfer system was changed so that a club could only retain a player if at the end of his 
contract he was offered a new contract on at least the same terms.  The retain and transfer 
system was finally abolished in 1978, after which ‘freedom of contract’ meant a player could 
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move at the end of his contract once a transfer fee was agreed between clubs (Szymanski 
and Kuypers 1999:105).  This system operated until changes following the Bosman ruling in 
1995. 
The first maximum wage of £4 per week was agreed in 1900 (Szymanski and Kuypers 
1999:89) and set at a rate comparable with the highest wages earned by skilled workers 
(Mason 1980:100).  However unlike other skilled workers, retain and transfer meant 
footballers were prevented from moving freely between employers.   
By 1909 the maximum wage had increased to £5 per week (Holt 1989:293), however there 
was no minimum wage and research by Tranter (1998) showed that in 1910 although 6,800 
professional footballers were registered with the FA, just 577 earned the maximum wage 
(1998:69).  Similarly Holt (1989) noted that in 1934-35 Sheffield United had 21 players just 
four of whom earned the maximum wage (1989:293).  When it was abolished in 1961 the 
maximum wage was £25 per week (Banks 2002:163); within a few weeks Fulham was paying 
club captain Johnny Haynes £100 per week (Dobson and Goddard 2011:181). 
Dobson and Goddard (2011) observed that between the 1920s and late 1950s increases in 
ticket prices were in line with rises in the maximum wage (2011:180).  Following its abolition 
players’ wages increased rapidly.  Although between 1961-74 aggregate revenue generated 
by FL clubs increased by 30%, wages increased by around 90% (2011:181). 
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) explained that the maximum wage ensured the differential 
between first and third division clubs remained relatively small.  In 1956 the total wages 
paid by first division clubs was just over double that paid by clubs in the third division (North 
and South) (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:96).  Abolition of the maximum wage meant the 
wealthiest clubs could offer large amounts to attract the best players.  In 2014-15 EPL clubs 
spent £2 billion on wages (Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the 
EPL 2015) compared with £59 million spent by League 2 clubs (Deloitte 2016:25), a multiple 
of 34 times. 
1.3.8 Growing disparities in revenue 
Urbanisation during the late nineteenth century meant clubs based in cities attracted the 
largest numbers of supporters and hence generated most revenue.  During the late 
twentieth century improved transport links and growth of car ownership enabled 
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supporters to travel to larger clubs in urban areas thereby taking away revenue from smaller 
clubs in less populated towns (Platts and Smith 2010:649). 
FL attendances peaked at 41.3 million during 1948-49 after which there followed a steady 
decline to 16.5 million by 1985-86 (Platts and Smith 2010:648).  Dobson and Goddard (1998) 
explained this was due to several factors including a lack of investment in stadia, an 
increasing number of alternative leisure activities, recession, and the impact of hooliganism 
during the 1970s and 80s (1998:768).  Szymanski (2006) observed that by the mid-1970s 
football was a pursuit followed predominantly by young, working class men and hooliganism 
was on the rise (2006:460).   
By 1984-85 FL attendances were just 53% of the 1958-59 level, however increased ticket 
prices meant matchday receipts for first division clubs had grown by 95% (Arnold and 
Benveniste 1987:196).  Over the same period fourth division clubs saw matchday receipts 
decline by 33% (1987:197). 
To help overcome disparities the FA introduced the sharing of gate receipts in the early 
1920s which meant the away team received 20% of match receipts (after allowing for 
matchday expenses) (Dobson and Goddard 1998:780).  In addition all clubs paid 4% of net 
match receipts into a pool that was distributed equally between them (Arnold and 
Benveniste 1987:198).  Money from Pools companies in return for the use of FL fixture lists 
was also divided equally between clubs (Arnold and Benveniste 1987:198).  Until 1988 
broadcasting revenue was also shared equally, despite broadcasters preferring to show 
matches featuring Division 1 clubs (Dobson and Goddard 1998:779).   These measures 
meant larger, better supported clubs in the FL to some extent cross subsidised smaller clubs. 
Declining attendances accompanied by rising transfer fees and wages meant that by the 
early 1980s the wealthiest clubs were increasingly reluctant to cross subsidise smaller clubs.  
The sharing of gate receipts was abolished in 1983 enabling the home club to retain all 
revenue from league matches (Dobson and Goddard 1998:780).  Whilst in 1986 the 4% levy 
fell to 3%, before reducing further still in 1992 when clubs in the newly formed EPL 
withdrew from the scheme (Dobson and Goddard 1998:780). 
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1.3.9 The distribution of broadcasting revenue 
For many years the FA rejected all attempts by the BBC and ITV to broadcast live league 
matches fearing this would lead to overexposure and adversely impact on attendances 
(Platts and Smith 2010:646).  In 1964 the BBC launched ‘Match of the Day’ when it paid just 
£3,000 to screen highlights of matches on Saturday evenings (Banks 2002:104).  In 1965 
competition from ITV forced the BBC to pay £60,000 to retain its highlights package 
(2002:105).  However revenue from broadcasting was divided equally between all 92 league 
clubs.  As a consequence in 1967-68 each club received £1,300 from broadcasting; and by 
1978-79 this had increased to just £5,800 (Dobson and Goddard 1998:777). 
Live league matches were broadcast for the first time in 1983 after the BBC and ITV agreed 
to pay £5.2 million over two years to screen 10 matches each season (Table 1.1).  To 
minimise the impact on attendances televised matches were played on a Friday evening or 
Sunday afternoon (Banks 2002:106).  With revenue shared equally, each club in the FL 
received around £28,000 per season (Dobson and Goddard 1998:779). 
Year Length of 
contract 






1983 2 years BBC - ITV 10 2.6 0.26 
1985 6 months BBC - ITV 6 1.3 0.22 
1986 2 years BBC - ITV 14 3.1 0.22 
1988 4 years ITV 18 11.0 0.61 
1992 5 years BBC - BSkyB 60 42.8 0.71 
Table 1.1: Amounts paid for broadcasting of live televised football 1983-1992 
(Source: Baimbridge et al 1996:314) 
 
By the late 1980s many of the largest clubs in Division 1 were becoming frustrated that 
broadcasting revenue was shared equally between all 92 league clubs.  In 1988 ITV agreed 
to pay £44 million over four years to show 18 live matches each season (Table 1.1).  
However with the top clubs in Division 1 threatening to break away and make their own 
arrangements with broadcasters, it was agreed that revenue would not be shared equally.  
In 1988-89 clubs in Division 1 received almost £8.25 million which represented 77% of the 
total amount paid by ITV; of this £3.5 million (32% of broadcasting revenue) went to the five 
clubs that appeared most often on television during that season (Arsenal, Everton, 
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Liverpool, Manchester United and Tottenham) (Dobson and Goddard 1998:779).  This 
further increased disparity in revenue.  
1.3.10 ‘The Blueprint for the Future of Football’ 
The impact of hooliganism, decades of little investment in stadia, and the death of 
spectators at Bradford (1985), Heysel (1985) and Hillsborough (1989) meant that by the late 
1980s English football was in crisis.  Banks (2002) explained that continued power struggles 
between the FL and FA prevented implementation of a strategy to aid its recovery 
(2002:57).  The situation was not helped by the largest clubs in Division 1 threatening to 
form a breakaway league and negotiate contracts that would enable them to retain all 
broadcasting revenue.  However without FA backing a breakaway league was unlikely since 
clubs required FA support in order to participate in European competition (2002:56).  
In 1990 the FL published ‘One Game, One Team, One Voice’ in which it suggested a merger 
with the FA (Hudson 2001:2).  To prevent the top clubs forming a breakaway league, the 
document proposed that the new body would run football and ensure money from 
broadcasting and commercial sources was distributed in an appropriate way (2001:2). 
In response and in an attempt to gain the upper hand over the FL, in 1991 the FA published 
‘The Blueprint for the Future of Football’ in which it proposed the creation of a Premier 
League (PL) initially comprised of 22 teams (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:255, Banks 
2002:57) with relegation and promotion between the PL and FL.   
The most important proposal in the ‘Blueprint’ was that the PL would negotiate the 
collective sale of its broadcasting rights, and revenue from this would be shared between 
just those clubs in the PL.  The ‘Blueprint’ also suggested that football should seek to gain 
more middle-class consumers (Conn 1999:49), forecasting the PL could generate £112 
million per season through broadcasting and improved marketing (Conn 1997:149). 
Before the start of the 1991-92 season all clubs in the first division gave 12 months’ notice 
of their intention to resign from the FL.  In August 1992 the EPL commenced; reducing to 20 
clubs in 1994 (Banks 2002:59). 
Since its formation the FA had tried to ensure equity of resources between professional 
clubs, and through Rule 34 had tried to reduce opportunities for shareholders to profit from 
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their investment in clubs.  In supporting creation of the EPL Conn (1997) commented that 
‘The FA, to its shame, betraying its historic role as regulator, controller of commercialism for 
the wider good of football, was to put its name to the breakaway, which would make a 
fortune for the owners of the big clubs and open up enormous inequality in football’ (Conn 
1997:17). 
1.3.11 The formation of the EPL and growth in broadcasting revenue 
Szymanski and Smith (1997) concluded that between 1974-89 English football was a mature 
industry in decline (1997:149).  Lonsdale (2004) concurred and suggested that three 
unrelated events aided the recovery of English football.  The Taylor report (1990) led to 
massive investment in all seat stadia (Lonsdale 2004:383) and between 1992-2012 English 
professional clubs invested over £3.3 billion in new facilities (Deloitte 2013:54).  England’s 
performance at the 1990 World Cup finals revived national interest in football; and Rupert 
Murdoch saw the potential to use football as the catalyst for subscription television in the 
UK (Lonsdale 2004:383). 
In 1992 Murdoch’s BSkyB transformed the finances of EPL clubs when it paid £192 million 
for the exclusive right to broadcast live matches for a five-year period (Szymanski and 
Kuypers 1999:59).  Hamil and Walters (2010) noted the formation of the EPL fortuitously 
coincided with the UK economy coming out of recession and a decade of sustained 
economic growth (2010:357), conditions that greatly assisted the expansion of subscription 
television.  
As table 1.2 shows, during the last 20 years BSkyB has been forced to pay large amounts to 
retain the right to broadcast live matches.  During this period football was re-marketed as a 
fashionable and attractive leisure activity (Dobson and Goddard 1998:769) and funded by 
broadcasting revenue, EPL clubs were able to attract high profile players from overseas.  
Although we have seen increases in the price of tickets, and despite up to 154 live matches 
being broadcast each season, attendances have continued to grow and in 2014-15 the EPL 
reported stadium utilisation above 95% for the third consecutive year (Premier League 
2015a:18). 
Using data from the 1993-94 season Baimbridge et al (1996) studied the impact of live 
televised football on attendances at EPL matches.  Their findings showed attendances at 
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matches played on a Sunday were not affected by that match being broadcast live.  This led 
Baimbridge et al to comment that ‘Broadcast fees relating to these fixtures represent pure 
revenue to the clubs’ (1996:330).  Matches broadcast on a Monday evening saw gate 
receipts decline by on average £33,516 (1996:329); with a club receiving around £89,000 
each time it appeared in a match broadcast live on television (1996:329), this more than 
compensated for the decline in gate receipts.  The study by Baimbridge et al was limited in 
that it was based on data from just one season, and in 1993-94 fewer houses subscribed to 
BskyB which broadcast just 60 live matches compared with 168 live matches shown during 
2016-17 (Table 1.2).   
 
Using data from 2003-04 to 2006-07 Buraimo et al (2010) studied the impact of 
broadcasting live matches on attendances in the EPL and Spanish Primera Liga.  They found 
that in the EPL attendances for matches televised at the weekend were reduced by 3%, 
whilst attendances at matches broadcast on weekdays fell by 8% (2010:471).  The authors 
concluded that the scale of EPL broadcasting contracts meant clubs were appropriately 




















1992 5 years BskyB 60 38.3 BBC 4.6 
1997 4 years BskyB 60 167.0 BBC 18.3 
2001 3 years BskyB 66 343.0 ITV 56.7 
2004 3 years BSkyB 138 341.3 BBC 35.0 
2007 3 years BSkyB - Setanta 138 564.0 BBC 57.2 
2010 3 years BSkyB - Setanta 138 594.0 BBC 57.2 
2013 3 years BSkyB - BT 154 1,006.0 BBC 59.9 
2016 3 years BSkyB - BT 168 1,713.3 BBC 68.0 
Table 1.2: Amounts paid for EPL domestic broadcasting rights 1992-2016 
(Source: 1992-2004 Buraimo et al 2006:33; 2007 Live matches BBC News 2006a; 2007 
Highlights BBC News 2006; 2010 Live matches BBC News 2009; 2010 Highlights Gibson 2009; 
2013 Live matches Pearce 2012; 2013 Highlights BBC News 2012; 2016 Live matches Gibson 
2015; Highlights Sale 2015) 
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Surprisingly Buraimo et al made no reference to the global audience that watched televised 
live matches.  This was likely to increase brand awareness and generate further revenue for 
clubs from merchandising and other commercial activities. 
These studies suggested the FA’s original stance against broadcasting live matches was 
incorrect.  Rather than reducing attendances, broadcasting live EPL matches raised both the 
popularity and global profile of English football as well as providing a significant source of 
revenue for clubs. 
1.3.12 Raising capital through the London Stock Exchange 
King (1997), Banks (2002), Beech (2010) and Dobson and Goddard (2011) observed that 
although most football clubs were limited companies, until the mid-1980s the way in which 
they operated had not changed significantly since the late nineteenth century (Banks 
2002:39).  Shareholders and directors were usually wealthy businessmen who invested in 
their local clubs for a variety of reasons including prestige in the local community; because 
they enjoyed watching their local team; or in order to use their influence to win contracts to 
sell their own goods and services to the club (Mason 1980:49, Holt 1989:285).  Although 
directors did not receive a salary, and dividends to shareholders were small, there were 
several examples of directors and shareholders making financial gains from their 
involvement with clubs. 
During the early twentieth century H.E.Mears, a director at Chelsea profited by renting the 
Stamford Bridge stadium to the club and from a concession to sell all food and drink within 
the stadium (Mason 1980:45).  John Houlding profited from his position on the board at 
Everton by renting land and lending money to the club, and from selling food and drink in 
the stadium.  In 1882 the rent became so excessive that a majority of shareholders voted to 
move to a new stadium at Goodison Park.  Houlding’s response was to form a new club - 
Liverpool (Holt 1989:285).  Banks (2002) noted that during the 1950s a company owned by 
Burnley’s Chairman Bob Lord supplied pies to the club.  Lord was very vocal in his opposition 
to the broadcasting of live matches fearing this would adversely impact on attendances and 
hence on sales of his pies (Banks 2002:40). 
Whilst directors provided funds for clubs from personal savings or through acting as a 
guarantor for bank loans, Szymanski and Smith (1997) suggested they often followed non-
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profit objectives and therefore had little incentive to invest in changes and new facilities 
that would be in the general interest of the industry (1997:149). 
Occasionally clubs would benefit from significant investment by a wealthy supporter who 
was more interested in playing success than earning a return on their investment.  
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) referred to Jack Walker who acquired a 62% stake in 
Blackburn Rovers in January 1991. During the next few years he spent £55 million of his 
personal fortune buying players and improving the stadium.  Although the company paid no 
dividends, Walker’s investment saw Blackburn Rovers become EPL champions in 1995 
(1999:17).   
In October 1983 Tottenham Hotspur became the first football club to float its shares on the 
London Stock Exchange, raising £3.3 million (Dobson and Goddard 2011:188).  To 
circumvent FA Rule 34, directors created a holding company with the football club as a 
subsidiary (Hamil and Walters 2010:19).  No football clubs followed Tottenham onto the 
Stock Exchange until 1989 when Millwall raised £4.8 million, and 1991 when Manchester 
United raised £6.7 million (Dobson and Goddard 2011:188).   
The Taylor report in 1990 recommended the introduction of all seat stadia for clubs in 
England’s first and second divisions by 1995, and to raise funds several clubs turned to the 
London Stock Exchange (Banks 2002:41).  With clubs able to circumvent Rule 34; a decline in 
hooliganism; the re-admission of English clubs into European club competition; and the 
broadcasting revenues offered by BSkyB; football was more attractive to investors.  By 2000, 
22 English football clubs had floated on the London Stock Exchange raising in total £167 
million (Hamil and Chadwick 2010:20).   
Investor interest in the football sector was short lived.  Despite increased revenues football 
clubs remained relatively small businesses that often struggled to break-even.  With playing 
success the primary objective for most clubs, dividends and returns to investors were 
relatively low.  In addition share prices were often highly volatile.  Writing in Hamil et al 
(2000), Hawkins noted that shares in Sheffield United and Bolton fell by around 30% when 
the clubs were relegated from the EPL in 1997 and 1998 respectively (2000:142).  Szymanski 
and Kuypers (1999) observed that Manchester United’s share price was adversely affected 
by Eric Cantona attacking a Crystal Palace supporter in 1995, and an unexpected defeat by 
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Galatasaray in the UEFA Champions league in 1994 (1999:74).  As a consequence several 
clubs de-listed after just a few years. 
In 2012 Manchester United’s owners (The Glazer family) raised over $230 million by selling 
16.6 million shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (Ross 2013:2).  Ross (2013) 
explained that $120 million of this was used to reduce debt and the balance taken out of the 
club by the Glazers (2013:3).  The existence of the dual class voting structure in the US 
(2013:22) meant the Glazers gave up just 2% of voting rights (2013:4), and Ross suggested 
the introduction of Financial Fair Play (FFP) might see more clubs raising funds in this way 
(2013:31). 
1.3.13 The Bosman ruling 
When Belgian footballer Jean Marc Bosman’s contract expired on 30 June 1990, his club RC 
Liege offered a new contract that reduced his salary by 75% (Morris et al 1996:893).  After a 
proposed transfer to French club Dunkerque fell through, Bosman took RC Liege and UEFA 
to court for restraint of trade. 
Even before the Bosman case the European Parliament had been highly critical of the 
transfer system employed by European football clubs.  The Janssen Van Raay ‘Report of the 
Committee of Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights on the Freedom of Movement of 
Professional Footballers in the Community’ was presented to the European Parliament in 
1989 and described the football transfer system as ‘A latter day version of the slave trade’ 
(Morris et al 1996:894). 
In December 1995 the European Court of Justice concluded that the transfer system was 
incompatible with Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome which related to freedom of movement 
of EC labour (Simmons 1997:13).  Initially this meant out of contract players were free to 
move between clubs in different EU countries without payment of a transfer fee (1997:14).  
However this was extended in March 1997 when FIFA announced that where a player was 
out of contract, transfer fees in the EU were no longer required (Crolley et al 2002:283). 
Speaking soon after the Bosman ruling, Sir John Hall the Chairman of Newcastle United 
perceptively suggested that any money saved on transfer fees would instead be spent on 
players’ salaries and signing on fees (Simmons 1997:18).  He also believed players would 
receive longer contracts (Simmons 1997:18), all of which placed greater financial pressure 
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on clubs.  Following on from abolition of the maximum wage and retain and transfer system, 
the Bosman ruling completed the shift in power from clubs to players. 
1.3.14 Overseas investment in English football 
During the last fifteen years we have witnessed massive overseas investment in EPL clubs.  
Nauright and Ramfjord (2010) explained that investment in stadia during the 1990s 
accompanied by rising ticket prices, increased merchandising, and corporate hospitality 
changed the make-up of supporters and increased the number of families attending 
matches (2010:436); which was exactly what the FA’s ‘Blueprint’ had suggested.  The EPL 
currently generates more revenue than any football league in Europe and matches are 
watched in 725 million homes in 185 countries (Premier League 2015a:23).  Walters and 
Hamil (2010) suggested that overseas investors were also attracted by the prestige 
associated with owning a club in the EPL and the opportunity to develop a global brand in 
overseas markets (2010:26).  During the 2014-15 season 11 clubs in the EPL were owned by 
overseas investors (UEFA 2015a:54).    
In December 2015 China Media Capital acquired a 13% stake in Manchester City for £265 
million (Wilson 2015).  This valued the club at £2 billion, and although Professor Chris Brady 
at Salford University suggested ‘The investment probably overvalued City’ (Wilson 2015), it 
demonstrated that overseas investors are interested even in acquiring a minority stake in 
EPL clubs.  However there was concern that several clubs in the EPL were over-reliant on 
funds provided by wealthy owners, and in the event of financial support being withdrawn 
these clubs could find themselves in severe financial difficulties (Solberg and Haugen 
2010:340, Hamil and Walters 2010:364).   
1.3.15 Changes in the composition of revenue 
During 1991-92 clubs in England’s top division generated aggregate revenue of £170 million 
(Deloitte 2013:30), of which 48% was from matchday and just 9% from broadcasting (Figure 
1.1).  During the 2014-15 season clubs in the EPL generated total revenue of £3.4 billion 
(calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015), however just 
18% was from traditional matchday receipts (Figure 1.1).  Since 1992 broadcasting has 
grown in importance and in 2014-15 accounted for 53% of aggregate revenue.  The largest 
clubs were able to exploit the EPL’s global fan base and in 2014-15 commercial activities 
made up 29% of aggregate revenue (Figure 1.1).  




1.3.16 Poor financial performance and increased financial regulation 
Hamil and Walters (2010) observed that although between 1992-2007 aggregate revenue 
increased by 900% to £1.5 billion, ‘There has not been a single year since its foundation 
when the combined PL clubs have made a collective pre-tax profit’ (2010:354).  They 
explained this was primarily because, ‘The vast proportion of increased revenue…has been 
transferred to the elite players in increased wages’ (2010:362).    Poor control of costs 
meant aggregate pre-tax losses in 2011 exceeded revenue generated during the first year of 
the EPL; and aggregate debt of £2.8 billion indicated that several clubs were reliant on 
borrowed funds (calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011).  
This situation wasn’t unique to English football and in 2012 FFP was introduced for clubs 
that wished to play in UEFA competitions.  More recently the EPL strengthened its own 
financial rules. 
1.4 The impact of a soft budget constraint 
Previous studies by Sloane (1971 and 2015), Arnold (1991), Storm (2011), Zoccali (2012) and 
others demonstrated that the primary objective of European football clubs was playing 
success.  Although this explained why clubs didn’t report large profits it didn’t make clear why 
so many were able to continue to operate despite large losses and negative equity.  Referring 
to socialist economies including Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, Kornai (1979) explained that 













Figure 1.1: Changes in the make-up of aggregate revenue between 
1992 and 2015 (Source: 1991-92 and 2003-04 Deloitte 2012:30; 
2014-15 Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2015) 
Matchday Broadcasting Commercial
   
18 
 
on it generating sufficient revenue to cover expenses (1979:806); and debt was provided 
under ‘Conservative and orthodox conditions’ (1979:806).  This meant an organisation’s 
growth was organic and relied on how effectively it used resources to generate profits over 
a number of years (1979:807).  
This was contrasted with a soft budget constraint where ‘The state helps the firm out of 
trouble’ (1979:806) through the provision of additional financial resources.  These included 
subsidies, favourable tax conditions (1979:806), and loans on preferential terms (Kornai et al 
2003:1102).  This meant even though an organisation might consistently report large losses, 
‘The paternalistic state guarantees automatically the survival of the firm’ (Kornai 1979:806). 
Kornai (1979) and Kornai et al (2003) explained that under a soft budget constraint financial 
support was not a one-off occurrence, and ‘Once the problems arise, the likelihood of 
continued support is well understood by all parties concerned’ (2003:1100). It was argued 
this changed the behaviour of an organisation since with losses and poor performance 
shielded by the state, cost discipline was reduced; there was little incentive to innovate; and 
an increased probability that poor investment choices would be pursued (2003:1112). 
In support of this argument Kornai et al referred to not for profit organisations, banks and 
poor performing companies that had previously been state controlled, all of which had 
received financial assistance from governments (2003:1097).  Motives for providing a soft 
budget constraint included the impact of failure on employees, suppliers and the wider 
economy (2003:1099); prohibitively high costs faced by tax authorities and banks through 
enforcing closure (2003:1098); and providing continued support to protect previous 
investment that would be lost if the organisation failed (2003:1099). 
Research by Andreff (2007), Storm and Nielsen (2012), Franck (2013) and Franck and Lang 
(2012) showed that several European football clubs benefited from a soft budget constraint.  
This meant if revenue did not fully cover expenses, additional funds would be made 
available by stakeholder groups including central and local government, wealthy owners, 
investors or supporters (Andreff 2007:657).  Although from a financial perspective football 
clubs were not large organisations, supporters and other stakeholders considered them as 
‘too big to fail’ (Storm and Nielsen 2012:190) and provided the funds necessary to cover 
large deficits.   
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Storm (2011) explained that provision of a soft budget constraint reduced cost discipline 
and forced all clubs to spend increasing amounts in pursuit of playing success (2011:742).  
This resulted in what Storm and Nielsen (2012), Franck (2013) and Morrow (2013) described 
as the ‘sporting arms race’.  To address this regulatory bodies including UEFA and the EPL, 
strengthened financial regulations.  FFP did this by requiring clubs to break-even (or achieve 
an acceptable deviation from this), whilst STCC restricted growth in wages from centrally 
allocated funds. 
1.5 Rationale for this study 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the provision of a soft budget constraint and 
stricter regulation impacted on the performance of clubs in the EPL.  Since 1992 the EPL has 
seen rapid and sustained growth in revenue and a movement away from traditional revenue 
streams.   In the accounting year ended 1992 just four clubs in division 1 reported revenues 
in excess of £10 million (Observed from Touche Ross 1993:22).  By 2015, fourteen clubs in 
the EPL earned revenues above £100 million (Observed from financial statements of clubs in 
the EPL 2015).   Growth in revenue was driven primarily by broadcasting contracts.  By 2015 
broadcasting was responsible for 73% of revenue earned by those clubs outside the top six 
in the EPL (Figure 4.5), and there were concerns that several clubs were very reliant on this 
revenue stream.   
Despite growth in revenue poor control of key costs including wages, amortisation, and 
interest payable meant the EPL reported aggregate losses in every year between 2004-13; 
and a review of financial statements for this period showed that 36% reported a loss from 
operating activities (Table 4.14).   
Since 1992 we have seen different types of ownership model employed in the EPL including 
the stock market model (during the mid to late 1990s); wealthy domestic investor model; 
and more recently wealthy foreign investor model (Wilson et al 2013:23).  The wealthy 
investor model was usually accompanied by a soft budget constraint that encouraged 
excessive spending in pursuit of playing success.  Often this was funded by soft debt rather 
than equity and meant that although in 2015 the EPL had aggregate debt of £2.9 billion, 
almost £1.9 billion was soft loans from owners and related parties (Calculated from 
aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015).  The provision of funds through 
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soft loans meant 51% of financial statements published during the period 2004-13 showed 
negative equity (Table 4.14).  Poor financial performance saw stricter regulation by UEFA 
and the EPL. 
1.6 Research aims and objectives 
This thesis will address the research question: 
To what extent did soft budgets and increased financial regulation impact on the 
performance of English Premier League football clubs 2004-2015?  
The following research aims and objectives will enable the thesis to answer this question:  
Research aims 
a) To apply a range of financial measures to assess the financial performance of clubs in 
the EPL. 
b) To establish how soft budgets impacted on the performance of clubs in the EPL 
during the period 2004-2015. 
c) To identify those characteristics most likely to cause financial distress at football 
clubs. 
d) To evaluate the effectiveness of financial regulation and the implications this is likely 
to have on the performance of clubs in the EPL. 
Research objectives 
a) To assess key revenue streams exploited by clubs in the EPL. 
b) To select a number of relevant accounting ratios and use these to analyse 
profitability, control of costs, and reliance on debt for clubs in the EPL.   
c) To examine how clubs in the EPL are funded and assess whether they are dependent 
on owner support. 
d) To examine whether increased regulation improved the financial performance of 
clubs in the EPL. 
1.7 Thesis structure 
To address the research aims and objectives the remainder of this thesis is structured as 
follows: 
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 Chapter two provides a review of relevant literature and details the requirements of 
increased financial regulation by UEFA and the EPL.   
 Chapter three explains the methodology and research methods used in this thesis. 
 Chapter four analyses data used in this study to examine why despite significant 
growth in revenue several clubs reported losses and increasing levels of debt. 
 Chapter five is a discussion of results that considers evidence of a soft budget 
constraint and the impact of increased financial regulation by UEFA and the EPL. 
 Chapter six presents conclusions, contribution to knowledge, limitations of this study 
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Chapter 2 - Literature review 
2.1 Overview of chapter 
The literature review is broken down into four sections.  To develop a better understanding 
of the football sector the first section examines the objectives of football clubs and the 
implications these have for financial performance.  With many clubs reporting losses and 
reliant on a soft budget constraint it is necessary to consider previous studies into the need 
for greater financial regulation and outline the requirements of FFP and EPL rules.  This 
thesis makes use of published financial statements so it important to be aware of the 
framework that underpins the financial reporting system, including the accounting 
treatment of players’ registrations.  To be aware of the uses and limitations of accounting 
ratios it is necessary to appraise previous studies that have used this technique, including 
those that have examined the financial performance of European club football. 
2.2 The objectives of football clubs and the need for increased financial 
regulation of European club football 
2.2.1 The conflict between playing success and financial return 
Football has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other business sectors.  
Sloane (1971:123), Arnold (1991:180), Lago et al (2006:4), Farquhar et al (2005:337) and 
Gratton (2000:11) all commented on the interdependent relationship that requires a 
football club to work with rivals to produce a product that supporters and broadcasters wish 
to purchase.  In addition they suggested that supporter interest was likely to be greater 
when there was uncertainty surrounding the outcome of matches.  As a consequence 
greater financial success was usually dependent on parity between competing clubs. 
In their analysis of the financial performance of clubs playing in Italy’s Serie A, Risaliti and 
Verona (2012) explained that football clubs were not solely interested in profit maximisation 
but had several sometimes-conflicting objectives including those related to sporting 
performance, attracting spectators and prestige in the local community (2012:16).  All of 
which made football clubs unique business entities (2012:16). 
Through the application of economic theory Neale (1964) identified differences (or 
peculiarities) between normal firms operating in a competitive market and professional 
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sport.  Neale suggested that although the best market position for a normal firm was to 
operate with little or no competition, ideally as a monopolist (1964:1), this would not suit 
professional sport where competition was necessary to increase spectator interest (1964:2).  
He identified that a professional sports club could not produce a sports event on its own and 
required the co-operation of competing sports clubs, paying spectators, broadcasters, and 
other media (such as newspapers) to generate interest in the outcome of sporting events 
(1964:4).  He also observed that a highly competitive league generated greater interest and 
hence increased revenue (1964:3). 
Neale explained that usually firms made decisions in order to generate profits (1964:4), 
however in professional sport the ‘firm’ was the league which had a natural monopoly.  So 
although made up of several separate entities, the league made decisions to help maximise 
the profits of member clubs (1964:5).  Although Neale’s analysis was written over 50 years 
ago and focused on North American professional sports clubs (particularly baseball and NFL) 
it remains relevant today and can be applied to the EPL. 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) explained that competing businesses can benefit 
through co-operating with rivals.  They called this ‘co-opetition’ which was a term used by 
Ray Noorda, founder of Novell who explained ‘You have to compete and co-operate at the 
same time’ (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996:4).  Using a database comprised of sporting 
and financial performance indicators for all 40 professional clubs during the 2005-06 season, 
Robert et al (2009) applied the concept of co-opetition to French professional football 
(2009:31).  They explained that clubs competed in league matches with the least successful 
relegated at the end of each season (2009:28). They also competed for additional financial 
resources, including revenue from sponsors (2009:27).  The main revenue stream for clubs 
in Ligue 1 was broadcasting, and collective negotiation of broadcasting rights was beneficial 
for all clubs and relied on co-operation between them (2009:27).  Although an interesting 
application of co-opetition, to increase generalisability of results it would have been useful 
to consider more than one year of data and other European leagues. 
Applying economic theory to clubs in the English Football League, Sloane (1971) examined 
the characteristics of the football industry. Although most clubs were limited companies, 
Sloane believed few shareholders were primarily interested in financial gain (1971:131).  He 
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explained that in March 1969 Aston Villa had offered 20,000 shares for sale at £5 each 
(1971:134).  The club had made large losses during four of the previous five years; was 
unlikely to pay a dividend in the foreseeable future; and under FA rules any dividend was 
limited to just 5% of the nominal value of share capital (1971:134).  Although it appeared to 
be a poor investment the share issue was over-subscribed (1971:134).  
Based on his analysis Sloane concluded that the primary objective for football clubs was 
utility (or win) maximisation (1971:133).  This meant stakeholders including supporters, 
shareholders and directors were most concerned with playing success, however this must 
be achieved within financial constraints (1971:135).     
Sloane also explained that strong competition within a league created uncertainty in the 
outcome of matches.  This led to greater interest in matches which in turn increased 
attendances and matchday revenue.  He observed that financial arrangements in existence 
at the time of his research, including sharing of gate receipts and the equal distribution of 
broadcasting revenue between league clubs helped re-distribute wealth and promoted 
healthy competition (1971:124).  He feared that without this cross subsidisation, smaller 
clubs would either go out of business or there would be a decline in the quality of football 
which would adversely impact on aggregate revenue (1971:127).   
Sloane disagreed with the FA’s stance on broadcasting live league matches.  Writing long 
before the arrival of BSkyB he argued rather than reducing matchday receipts, broadcasting 
live matches provided an opportunity to promote football.  He compared this with the huge 
amounts a manufacturing company would need to spend on advertising to generate similar 
publicity (1971:126). 
Even though Sloane’s article was written over 40 years ago it contained several points that 
remain relevant today.  The equitable distribution of broadcasting revenue between clubs in 
the EPL ensures that matches remain highly competitive.  As a consequence EPL matches 
attract a global television audience, and average stadia utilisation has exceeded 90% in 
every season since 1997-98 (Deloitte 2013:56, Premier League 2015). 
Sloane (2015) revisited the industry to assess whether the formation of the EPL, Bosman 
ruling, and FFP had changed the objectives of clubs (2015:1).  He observed that wealthy 
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owners encouraged ‘riskier investment strategies’ (2015:4) and concluded that European 
clubs remained utility maximisers subject to a break-even constraint (2015:1).   
Using published financial data for four football clubs in West Yorkshire during the period 
1905-85, Arnold (1991) showed the primary objective was sporting success and to achieve 
this clubs invested large amounts in players (1991:184). During the period under review he 
observed that revenue became concentrated in the hands of the largest clubs, and with 
clubs primarily concerned with playing success wages increased significantly (1991:187).    
In considering the reliability of Arnold’s research it must be noted that his findings were 
based on a very small sample of clubs clustered around the same geographic region.  In 
addition the comparison of financial data over such a lengthy period is made difficult 
through changes in the accounting policies adopted by clubs, added to which the quality of 
some pre-war data may not be very reliable. 
Although Kesenne (2000) also observed that the primary objective for most professional 
football clubs in Europe was win maximisation (2000:62), he believed this was changing and 
referred to the EPL where several clubs had raised capital through issuing shares on the 
London Stock Exchange.  As a consequence he suggested that for larger clubs the generation 
of profit was becoming more important (2000:62).  Kesenne argued that a profit motive for 
larger clubs would assist in restoring competitive balance within leagues.  With an eye on 
generating profit larger clubs would be forced to spend less money acquiring players which 
meant the best footballers would not all be purchased by just a few wealthy clubs.  This 
would result in a more equal distribution of playing talent between clubs (2000:63).  
However this argument does not take into account disparities in revenue which have 
enabled the largest clubs to continue to acquire the best players and still generate a profit.  
In addition Kesenne didn’t appear to take into consideration that it was often supporters 
who acquired shares in those clubs that floated on the London Stock Exchange.  These 
investors were usually more concerned with playing success than making a financial return 
on their investments.   
Storm (2010) explained that although previous research had suggested European 
professional sports clubs were primarily focused on win maximisation (2010:93), there were 
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other objectives that clubs had to consider (2010:94). Storm identified six functions that 
impacted on the decisions taken by European professional sports clubs.  These were win 
maximisation; financial objectives; developing successful working relationships with mass 
media organisations; political (compliance with the requirements of domestic football 
associations, UEFA and FIFA); legal (compliance with EU legislation); and science (the use of 
up to date methods to ensure players were properly prepared for matches) (2010:103).  
These diverse and often conflicting objectives made it increasingly difficult for directors to 
manage the day to day activities of professional sports clubs (2010:94) and meant clubs had 
changed from homophonic into polyphonic organisations (2010:98).  A homophonic 
organisation has one primary function (2010:99).  A polyphonic organisation has several 
functions which makes the decision-making process more complex (2010:100).   Storm 
concluded that although professional football clubs were primarily driven by sporting 
success, increased commercialism meant other objectives had arisen which made the 
decision-making process more complex. 
In a review of literature on the objectives of professional sports clubs Storm (2011) 
explained that although football clubs in England, Italy, Spain and Scandinavia had become 
more commercialised, and even though some had floated on national stock exchanges, 
there was little evidence to suggest that profit had replaced winning as the primary 
objective (2011:739).  He explained that in most European leagues there were large 
differences in revenue between first and second tiers, and this encouraged clubs in the top 
tier to spend heavily to avoid relegation, and those in the lower tier to spend heavily to win 
promotion (2011:741).  In this dynamic environment even successful clubs were forced to 
invest significant amounts to ensure continued success (2011:742). 
By reviewing sporting success and pre-tax profit Storm established that just two clubs in 
Denmark’s top league achieved sporting and financial improvement during the period 1997-
2008 (2011:748).  He concluded that although the primary objective of European football 
clubs was playing success, in recent years there had been a greater focus on achieving this 
within financial constraints (2011:737).    Storm acknowledged that using just two variables 
was very simplistic since most clubs had a range of objectives (2011:749). 
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Gratton (2000) observed that in North American professional sport several measures had 
been put in place to ensure matches remained competitive.  These included revenues from 
television and sponsorship being shared equally between clubs; the draft system which 
allowed those clubs that finished in the lowest league positions to have first choice of 
college players at the start of the next season; and salary caps that prevented the richest 
clubs attracting the best players through offering the highest wages (2000:14).  In this way 
the league acted as a cartel that promoted equity and ensured no club became too 
dominant (2000:14).  Gratton suggested that in North America both the league and clubs 
were profit maximisers (2000:15).   However there was potential conflict between the 
objectives of the league which wanted to ensure competitive balance, and clubs that sought 
sporting success (2000:15).   
Gratton observed that until the late 1980s North American sports clubs had little in common 
with English football clubs (2000:17) whose primary aim was sporting success (2000:18).  
During the 1990s the Taylor Report, raising funds on the London Stock Exchange (2000:18), 
and growth in broadcasting revenue all increased the commercial awareness of English 
football clubs (2000:24).  Despite this there remained significant differences between the 
EPL and North American sports clubs including the home club retaining all matchday 
revenue, which favoured those clubs with the largest stadia (2000:26).  He also observed 
that although aggregate revenue generated by the EPL had increased, a large proportion 
was retained by just a few clubs increasing further disparities in resources (2000:22).   
He explained that English clubs had strong links to their local communities whilst franchises 
in North America might move between cities to take advantage of subsidies and other 
financial incentives offered by local government (2000:17).  Gratton also noted a key 
difference in broadcasting agreements.  Whilst NFL matches were shown on free television 
channels, EPL matches were shown on BSkyB and other subscription channels, which didn’t 
necessarily maximise exposure for clubs (2000:26).  He concluded that only a European 
league would allow the full Americanisation of football in Europe (2000:27).   
Using published financial data Andreff and Staudohar (2000) showed that until the mid-
1980s the professional sports model prevalent in Europe was based on Spectators-
Subsidies-Sponsors-Local (SSSL).  This meant the primary source of funds for professional 
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football clubs was matchday receipts.  Television and merchandising were less important, 
with many leagues fearing that broadcasting live matches would adversely impact on 
matchday receipts (2000:259). 
The emergence of new sources of revenue during the late 1980s (especially from 
broadcasting) led to a decline in the importance of matchday receipts (2000:263). By the 
early 1990s many football clubs were being managed by professional administrators who 
were able to access new sources of funds including capital from stock markets (2000:265).  
Whilst advances in technology and growth in cable and satellite broadcasters ended the 
monopolies enjoyed by state broadcasters and increased competition to show live football 
matches (2000:265).  Television also raised the global profiles of leading clubs which helped 
generate further revenue through the sale of club related merchandise.  This led Andreff 
and Staudohar to suggest European football clubs had shifted away from SSSL towards the 
Media-Corporations-Merchandising-Markets-Global (MCMMG) model (2000:266). 
Although this was similar to the model followed by North American professional sports 
clubs, there remained significant differences.  In North America the draft system, absence of 
relegation, and player salary caps (2000:267) provided owners with a greater opportunity to 
generate profit.  This led them to conclude that in North America owners were profit 
seekers, in contrast despite increased commercialism owners of European clubs remained 
win seekers (2000:268).   
Zoccali (2012) agreed that although European football clubs had moved to the MCMMG 
model (2012:83), playing success remained their primary focus.  This meant all clubs would 
over invest in players, with those in the lower half of a division seeking to maximise their 
chances of avoiding relegation; whilst those clubs near the top of a division would aim to 
maximise their chances of qualifying for European competition (2012:84).  This behaviour 
was apparent from growth in players’ wages since the 1990s (2012:84).  Clubs that 
continued to make losses would need regular injections of cash from investors to ensure 
shareholders’ equity covered cumulative losses (2012:84).  
To avoid insolvencies the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) introduced a licensing system for 
professional football clubs.  This required clubs to achieve stated financial objectives that 
were measured by three accounting ratios (2012:88).  These were equity to total assets 
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(which indicated a club’s reliance on debt), revenue to debt, and value of production to 
financial debt (both of which measured by how many times debt was covered by revenue) 
(2012:88)   
Using financial statements for a five-year period, Zoccali applied these ratios to eight Italian 
football clubs that became insolvent and compared his results with eight that were 
financially stable over the same period (2012:89).  His analysis demonstrated that only 
equity to total assets clearly distinguished between insolvent and financially stable clubs 
(2012:91).  
When considering Zoccali’s results it should be noted that his analysis was based on a small 
sample of clubs.  In addition the FIGC’s definitions of revenue and total assets were affected 
by the value of players’ registrations.  Baroncelli and Lago (2006:19) and Zoccali (2012:96) 
observed that several Italian clubs had previously overstated this figure, which would have 
impacted on these ratios. 
Using published accounting information Solberg and Haugen (2010) agreed that North 
American sports clubs operated as profit maximisers, whilst European clubs were win 
maximisers.  This meant European clubs competed more aggressively to sign the best 
players than their North American counterparts (2010:331).  Following the Bosman ruling 
Solberg and Haugen suggested clubs were forced to offer players longer contracts to 
prevent them leaving for no transfer fee.  This placed additional pressures on clubs, since 
players that did not perform became a financial burden (2010:33).  They also explained that 
the advent of wealthy owners determined to buy success at any price had reduced cost 
discipline (2010:340); though this would only become a problem if an owner suddenly left or 
lost interest in their club.   
Solberg and Haugen conceded that implementation of a salary cap was not feasible unless 
introduced simultaneously across European football leagues.  The movement of clubs 
between divisions further complicated this issue since a club relegated from a higher 
division might immediately exceed the salary cap prevalent in the lower division, resulting in 
the forced sale of players at less than market value (2010:339).   
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They concluded that salaries and bonuses that rewarded players based on results would be 
a step in the right direction as this would pass the risk of poor performance onto players 
(2010:340).  Such a move would not be possible without the support of the largest clubs in 
Europe.  Since these are win maximisers there is currently little incentive for Europe’s 
wealthiest clubs to favour anything that might erode their position. 
Vrooman (2007) also believed that owners of European football clubs were win maximisers 
(2007:316).  Using accounting ratios and published financial statements for the period 1996-
2005, Vrooman showed that revenue was flowing to the largest clubs.  In England five clubs 
were responsible for almost 50% of aggregate revenue generated by the EPL.  A similar 
situation had occurred in the top divisions in France and Germany; whilst in Italy and Spain 
the five largest clubs were responsible for almost two thirds of revenue generated by the 
top division (2007:327).  This meant a few clubs were starting to dominate and these 
leagues were becoming less competitive (2007:315).  Several of the dominant clubs also 
competed regularly in the UEFA Champions League and additional revenue from this further 
exacerbated disparity (2007:316).   
Based on his analysis Vrooman suggested that a wages / revenue ratio of 50-55% was ‘safe’; 
60-65% was ‘risky’; and anything above 75% would ultimately result in insolvency 
(2007:327).   His research suggested that clubs fighting relegation or seeking to qualify for 
the UEFA Champions League were most likely to have wages / revenue ratios of 60-65% 
(2007:333), though to ensure success the most extreme win maximisers would spend their 
entire revenue on wages (2007:325).  Vrooman concluded that the largest clubs had 
outgrown their domestic leagues and the only way forward was an elite European league 
comprised of 30 clubs (2007:344).  Although wages / revenue is an important ratio that is 
widely used to indicate how effectively clubs control their largest single cost, Vrooman did 
not provide sufficient detail on how he arrived at his thresholds. 
2.2.2 The objectives of clubs whose shares were publicly quoted 
During the mid-1990s several English football clubs raised funds through issuing shares on 
the London Stock Exchange.   Szymanski and Hall (2003) investigated whether clubs became 
more profit focused following floatation.   Utilising published financial information for the 
five years immediately before and after floatation, Szymanski and Hall analysed four 
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performance indicators for 16 English football clubs.  The performance indicators used were 
pre-tax profit, league position, expenditure on wages relative to league average, and 
revenue relative to league average (2003:7).   
Although results were inconclusive, Szymanski and Hall believed their research had at least 
challenged the view that EPL clubs were utility maximisers (2003:18).  These claims can be 
called into question on both the grounds of their small sample size and narrow choice of 
performance indicators.  In addition their analysis assumed that investors in football clubs 
were profit seekers.  Zuber et al (2005) and others established that most shareholders in 
football clubs were supporters more interested in playing success than return on 
investment.   
Using financial data and end of season league tables during the period 1994-2004, Garcia-
del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009) constructed an econometric model to investigate whether 
clubs in the English and Spanish leagues operated as win maximisers or profit maximisers.  
Their model allowed them to compare the actual league positions of clubs in the top two 
professional leagues in Spain and England with those positions in which each club would 
maximise profit or wins.  
To make clubs more financially aware, in 1992 government legislation forced all but four 
Spanish clubs to operate as limited companies (2009:49), and by the early 1990s most clubs 
in the EPL were limited companies with some listed on the London Stock Exchange.  In 
theory limited companies should focus on generating a return for investors, despite this 
Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski found that clubs in their sample continued to operate as 
win maximisers.  They also found evidence that those clubs threatened with relegation or 
seeking to break into the top six in their leagues often spent more than they could afford on 
purchasing new players (2009:59), a risky strategy if it failed.   
Based on their findings Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski suggested that many shareholders 
were willing to forego financial reward in favour of playing success (2009:64).  They 
concluded that any club that followed a profit maximisation strategy would not invest 
enough money in players and was likely to be relegated, which would in turn result in the 
loss of future profits (2009:65).   
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Following huge overseas investment, Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski speculated whether 
profit maximisers might eventually replace win maximisers in the EPL (2009:65).  However 
this is unlikely since if clubs in the EPL operated as profit maximisers it would in the long run 
damage their ability to remain competitive in the UEFA Champions League, which would in 
turn adversely impact on broadcasting and commercial revenue.  
In a study of clubs whose shares were quoted on the London Stock Exchange between 
August 1997 and July 2000, Zuber et al (2005) investigated whether the behaviour of 
shareholders was affected by the outcome of matches and other information related to 
their investments (2005:307).  Changes in the price and volume of shares traded in 10 clubs 
in the EPL were compared with five non-football companies of a similar size randomly 
selected from the London Stock Exchange (2007:311), and movements in the NYSE 
(2007:310). 
They explained that in most sectors share price was affected by announcements that 
impacted on the ability of a company to generate future cash flows (2005:305).  Since the 
cash flows generated by a football club were affected by playing success, the outcome of 
matches should impact on both share price and number of shares traded (2005:306).  
Furthermore the threat of relegation and competition for a place in the UEFA Champions 
League ensured the EPL remained competitive throughout the season, which meant share 
prices and the number of shares traded should change regularly (2005:307). 
Zuber et al observed that in terms of trading, investors in football clubs were much less 
active than those in other sectors (2005:313); and the outcome of matches and 
announcements that related to potential future cash flows had little impact on share price 
(2005:312).  They concluded that investors were more interested in owning shares in a 
football club than financial return (2005:313).  Although their study was based on a small 
sample of companies the conclusions reached by Zuber et al were consistent with other 
researchers and reinforced the belief that most investors in football clubs were supporters 
more interested in sporting performance than financial return.  
Although primarily examining corporate governance in the football sector, Farquhar et al 
(2005) acknowledged that owners of European football clubs preferred to focus on winning 
rather than profit and drew attention to several factors that impacted on the financial 
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performance of clubs in the EPL.  Empirical studies suggested those clubs that spent most 
heavily on players usually enjoyed playing success.  This in turn would generate more 
revenue.  Farquhar et al believed this might result in owners of smaller clubs spending 
heavily on new players in order to achieve playing success (2005:340).  Whilst this was not a 
problem when a club was owned and managed by the same person, it became of more 
concern when the club was a public company in which directors were responsible for 
generating a satisfactory return for investors (2005:341).  However like Kesenne (2000) this 
analogy ignored that shares in football clubs were often acquired by supporters more 
concerned with playing success than financial return. 
Farquhar et al also explained that the opportunity to earn high revenues had led to 
overspending by those clubs striving to win promotion to and avoid relegation from the EPL 
(2005:343).  In addition those clubs that regularly competed in UEFA competitions 
generated additional revenue which increased disparities between clubs in the EPL 
(2005:344).  Other than increasing the role of corporate governance the authors offered 
little to suggest how these problems might be overcome. 
2.2.3 Reasons for investing in European sports clubs 
Zimbalist (2003) argued that owners of professional sports clubs often had a diverse 
portfolio of business interests and used their sports clubs ‘As a vehicle for promoting the 
owner’s other investments’ (2003:509).   In this way he suggested that what might appear 
to be utility maximisation of a sports club was instead profit maximisation of the owner’s 
entire business portfolio (2003:509).   
He explained that owners did not just seek financial returns and a variety of factors 
including political influence, power, fun, ego, tax advantages, winning trophies, the 
acquisition of star players, and in the long-term the opportunity to make capital gains 
through the disposal of their clubs all represented some form of return on investment 
(2003:507).  Many of these returns were long-term in nature and not easy to show in an 
income statement (2003:508).   
Since supporter groups were often critical of high ticket prices Zimbalist suggested it was in 
the interest of clubs to report financial losses; explaining it was more difficult to chastise a 
loss-making club for exploiting loyal supporters (2003:509).  He concluded that if owners 
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were seeking to maximise global long-term returns from their entire portfolio of businesses, 
this would not be apparent in the profits reported by their sports clubs (2003:510).  
Although Zimbalist raised some interesting points his analysis focused primarily on the 
North American market and as we have already seen (Gratton 2000) this was very different 
to the situation prevalent in European football. 
Hamil et al (2010), Franck (2013), Millward (2013) and Madden (2014) concurred with 
Zimbalist and suggested a number of reasons why wealthy owners were willing to provide 
financial support for their clubs.  These included the publicity associated with owning a club 
which would raise the profiles of individuals and their other business interests (Franck 
2013:18, Millward 2013:402, Madden 2014:5); public acceptance and prestige (Franck 
2013:19, Madden 2014:5); the pleasure derived from watching their club compete in the 
highest league (Madden 2014:5); winning votes in political elections (Hamil et al 2010:376, 
Madden 2014:5); and in some cases the opportunity for money laundering (Franck 2013:19). 
Hamil et al (2010) referred to Italy where Silvio Berlusconi had used ownership of AC Milan 
to support his political career, becoming Prime Minister on three separate occasions after 
he acquired the club in 1986 (2010:376).  Although AC Milan made heavy losses during this 
period, Hamil et al suggested Berlusconi saw the club as a ‘trophy asset’ that greatly 
enhanced his image and each year he provided the cash necessary to meet club debts 
(2010:376).   
Millward (2013) explained that the formation of the EPL had allowed English football to be 
‘repackaged’ (2013:399) and globalised (2013:400) which resulted in growth in revenue. 
Although it was players that appeared to benefit most, and despite several clubs reporting 
losses and negative equity, Millward argued that owners saw a financial return through 
capital gains on the sale of dual class shares that didn’t give new shareholders much 
involvement in decision making (2013:412).  He also suggested there was an opportunity to 
make capital gains through buying an underperforming club in a lower division and selling 
once promoted to the EPL (2013:409).  Though Millward acknowledged this might initially 
require significant investment (2013:409). 
King (1997) suggested that ‘New directors’ saw investment in a football club as an 
opportunity to generate a return in the long run through ‘Exploiting the fans’ monetary 
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potential’ (1997:231).  To do this clubs had to attract families and appeal to more affluent 
groups (1997:234).  However King’s analysis didn’t envisage the ‘arms race’ which has 
resulted in considerable growth in players’ costs.  
 Revenue (a) Operating Profit / 
(Loss) (b) 
Wages as a % of 
revenue (c) 
 €m €m  
England (Premier League) 2,917 121 70% 
France (Ligue 1)  1,136 (67) 74% 
Germany (Bundesliga) 1,872 190 51% 
Italy (Serie A) 1,570 (160) 75% 
Spain (La Liga) 1,765 n/a 60% 
Table 2.1: The financial performance of Europe’s largest five football leagues 2011-12 
(Source: (a) Deloitte 2013:15 (b) Deloitte 2013:23 (c) Deloitte 2013:21) 
 
Based on the preceding analysis of literature we can see that European clubs continued to 
operate as win maximisers which meant sporting success was preferred to financial success.  
This behaviour helped explain why despite growth in revenue, clubs playing in Europe’s top 
leagues were unable to report healthy profits.  Table 2.1 demonstrates that this problem 
was prevalent in each of Europe’s largest leagues and during 2011-12 only the EPL and 
German Bundesliga generated an operating profit.  However with an operating profit of just 
4% (€121m/€2,917m), or €4 for every €100 of revenue generated, few clubs in the EPL could 
offer a satisfactory return to investors.  As we shall discover these aggregate figures hide 
substantial differences in the financial performance of clubs playing in the EPL. 
2.2.4 The need for increased financial regulation of European club football 
Worried about losses and growing levels of debt, regulatory bodies across Europe including 
UEFA and the EPL began to introduce tougher financial regulation.  Although stakeholders 
were primarily concerned with playing success, increased regulation meant this had to be 
achieved within financial constraints.   
Paradoxically Lago et al (2006) believed that financial problems in European football were 
the result of growth in revenue (2006:7).  Using published financial information they 
explained that pursuit of increased revenues encouraged several clubs outside the EPL to 
spend heavily on players’ costs to win promotion, whilst clubs in the EPL spent heavily in 
pursuit of qualification for the UEFA Champions League or to avoid relegation.  Unless clubs 
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achieved their goal or were funded by a wealthy owner, this would ultimately result in 
severe financial problems (2006:8).   
Lago et al noted that tighter regulation of football in France and the ownership structure in 
Germany made it more difficult for clubs to spend beyond their means (2006:8).  English 
clubs were less regulated by football authorities and usually structured as limited companies 
in which shareholders left day to day management to a board of directors.  It was argued 
that by not reining in the actions of directors, shareholders were allowing them to gamble 
on future playing success (2006:9). 
From 2004-05 UEFA had introduced financial criteria necessary for clubs to compete in the 
Champions and Europa Leagues, and these were extended further during 2006-07 
(2006:10).  Despite this Lago et al concluded that tighter financial regulation was necessary 
and clubs that failed to comply should be prevented from earning promotion to a higher 
division and excluded from playing in UEFA competitions (2006:10).  They also suggested 
that European football could adopt North American practices such as salary caps, the 
drafting system, limited promotion and relegation, and increased revenue sharing 
(2006:11).  However it is unlikely that the largest clubs would want to adopt North American 
practices or share revenues with smaller clubs, and few European clubs would favour an end 
to promotion and relegation.   
Buraimo et al (2006) believed wage inflation was the primary cause of financial problems 
prevalent in English football.  They observed that expenditure on wages by EPL clubs had 
increased from around 45% of aggregate revenue in 1994-95, to over 60% by 2002-03 
(2006:38).  They suggested that too many clubs were reliant on the support of a wealthy 
owner (2006:34); and questioned the use of ‘securitisation’ where future revenues from 
broadcasting and the sale of season tickets were used as security against loans, referring to 
problems experienced by Leicester City and Leeds United in using this method of funding 
(2006:34).   
Buraimo et al believed that UEFA’s proposals for greater financial regulation were difficult to 
implement and suggested a more straightforward control would be a wages / revenue ratio 
of not more than 70% (2006:44).  They didn’t explain how they arrived at this figure which 
   
37 
 
was significantly higher than the 60% ratio recommended by accountants Deloitte in Hamil 
and Walters (2010:360). 
2.2.5 ‘Sugar Daddies’ and soft budget constraints 
Despite relatively strict rules, Andreff (2007) was very critical of the financial management 
of football clubs in France.  Through the analysis of 60 sets of published financial statements 
Andreff showed that several French clubs were reliant on the sale of players to reduce 
losses or break-even (2007:653).  He blamed this on a soft budget constraint made available 
by non-profit seeking investors who were primarily interested in sporting success 
(2007:657).  This meant when a club got into financial difficulties, shareholders were often 
prepared to provide further investment which weakened financial discipline and in effect 
gave directors permission to continue to overspend (2007:656).    
Evidence from other researchers showed this was not uncommon in European football.  
Lago et al (2006) noted that local governments in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Belgium had 
often provided funding and other support for clubs that were experiencing financial 
difficulties (2006:8).  Hamil and Walters (2010) showed that in England HM Revenue and 
Customs was often compelled to re-schedule or write off tax owing from clubs forced into 
administration because of overspending. They explained that no state body would want to 
be associated with the forced liquidation of a football club, and this meant clubs were in 
effect subsidised through public funds (2010:361).   
In carrying out his analysis Andreff encountered some problems obtaining financial 
information and observed that rather than publish financial statements on time, loss-
making clubs were often happy to pay a fine for late submission (2007:660).  He concluded 
that French football authorities needed to monitor clubs more thoroughly and suggested 
financial management would be improved through the introduction of a salary cap and 
recommended targets for deficit / revenue, and asset / debt ratios (2007:661). 
Although Andreff was very critical of French football, several authors including Lago et al 
(2006) believed it was better regulated than other major European leagues.  Greater 
explanation of his methodology and the problems encountered in gathering data would 
have enhanced his analysis. He also needed to more clearly explain his rationale for 
selecting the ratios that could be used to assess financial performance.  As we saw from 
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Zoccali’s (2012) analysis of regulation in Italian football, the choice of ratios is crucial in 
identifying a potential insolvency event.  Whilst the implementation of a salary cap in 
French football would address the issue of clubs spending too much on players’ wages, it 
would make it difficult for clubs to attract the best players.  This could ultimately result in 
French clubs being less competitive in UEFA competitions. 
Using published financial data from clubs in Europe’s five largest leagues, Storm (2012) 
acknowledged that regular pre-tax losses, excessive wages and rising levels of debt were 
primarily due to the win maximising objective pursued by European clubs.  He blamed soft 
budget constraints for allowing clubs to operate in this way (2012:23) arguing that with no 
incentive to operate within financial constraints, clubs would spend excessive amounts in 
pursuit of playing success.  Furthermore those clubs that operated within financial 
constraints were in effect penalised for doing so (2012:27).  Storm advocated stronger 
financial regulation and favoured the introduction of FFP (2012:32).  However financial 
regulation will only be successful if regulatory bodies are willing to impose severe penalties 
for non-compliance. 
Building on the work of Storm (2012), Storm and Nielsen (2012) examined why many 
European football clubs remained in operation despite consistently making losses 
(2012:183).  They pointed out that although many European football clubs were 
permanently on the brink of bankruptcy (2012:185) few disappeared altogether, and this 
was primarily due to the intervention of stakeholders that provided a soft budget constraint.  
They highlighted several examples where clubs had received financial support from key 
stakeholder groups including use of the ‘decreto salva calcio’ by the Italian government 
(2012:194); authorities in England writing off tax arrears (2012:191); and local authorities in 
Spain cancelling debt and providing subsidies and stadia for clubs (2012:194).  These offered 
little incentive for clubs to operate within their financial means. 
Pursuit of utility maximisation meant European clubs were involved in a ‘sporting arms race’ 
(2012:192) in which promotion and relegation, disparities in revenue, and the desire to 
participate in UEFA competitions all provided incentives for clubs to overspend.  Although 
winning generated increased revenue, the sporting arms race meant this was usually spent 
on players’ costs (2012:191).  Storm and Nielsen concluded that FFP would be difficult to 
   
39 
 
enforce and the task would be made harder by new and creative types of soft budget 
constraint like Manchester City’s £400 million sponsorship agreement with Etihad 
(2012:197).   
Franck (2013) suggested that clubs were instead involved in a ‘Zombie race’ (2013:9), 
‘Where an entire league operates on the verge of insolvency, chronically spending more 
than its earnings, but being…rescued by external money injections year after year’ 
(2013:25).  Franck explained that soft budget constraints encouraged inefficiency (2013:21) 
and high player salaries (2013:22) whilst reducing innovation since clubs knew financial 
assistance would be available each year (2013:24).   
Franck observed that the Spanish government and tax authorities had on several occasions 
provided financial support for football clubs (2013:13).  He suggested this encouraged 
gambling on playing success since clubs were ‘”Insured” against failure by the state’ 
(2013:16).  In support of this he referred to Atletico Madrid which despite owing €155 
million in unpaid tax spent €40 million on one player (2013:13).  Wealthy private owners or 
‘sugar daddies’ also encouraged a soft budget constraint mentality (2013:17). 
Although some observers were concerned that FFP would reduce external investment in 
clubs (2013:4) and hence ‘Freeze the hierarchy of European football’ (Franck 2013:5), Franck 
explained that regulation would reduce reliance on sugar daddies (2013:6) and encourage 
innovative management which would result in new revenue streams (2013:5).  He also 
explained that under FFP wealthy owners could invest in infrastructure and youth 
academies which would be beneficial in the long-term and help address the ‘Zombie race’ 
(2013:27).  Although an interesting analysis Franck could have been a little more critical of 
FFP.   
Williams (2012) was critical of securitisation and the leveraged buyouts used to acquire 
Manchester United and Liverpool which loaded ‘Huge debt on previously debt free clubs’ 
(2012:27).  However he questioned whether UEFA would be prepared to exclude the best 
supported clubs from European competition for non-compliance with FFP (2012:28). 
Despite the introduction of FFP, Van Rompuy (2012) reported that Spain’s secretary of state 
for sport had suggested his government write off around €1.35 billion owed in tax and social 
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security by clubs in Spain’s top two divisions (2012:2).  High unemployment in Spain meant 
this was not well received; and German newspaper ‘Bild’ questioned ‘How long the German 
taxpayer would be obliged to subsidise the wages of Lionel Messi (€2.5 million per month) 
and Cristiano Ronaldo (over €1 million per month)’ (Van Rompoy 2012:2).   In April 2012 the 
Spanish government agreed that tax owing would be repaid over five years starting in 2014-
15, when clubs would be required to set aside 35% of broadcasting revenue towards 
clearing outstanding tax liabilities (2012:3).  Failure to comply could be punished by a points 
deduction or the forced sale of players (2012:3). 
Van Rompuy suggested this might be seen as a form of state aid that went against the 
principles of FFP (2012:2).  He explained that past leniencies by the Spanish government 
gave clubs little incentive to prioritise the payment of tax (2012:4) and provided further 
evidence of a soft budget constraint.  Since Spanish clubs sold broadcasting rights on an 
individual basis, there were large disparities in revenue earned by Real Madrid and 
Barcelona when compared with smaller clubs.  This led Van Rompuy to question whether 
35% of broadcasting revenue would clear the tax liabilities of all clubs (2012:3).   
Franck and Lang (2012) explained that poor financial performance was partly due to the 
existence of ‘sugar daddies’ who provided funds that allowed clubs to regularly overspend 
(2012:3).  Sugar daddies might be in the form of wealthy individuals (2012:3), or local and 
central government using public funds to support clubs in financial difficulty (2012:3).  
Franck and Lang examined the impact of private and public bailouts on European football 
clubs and considered whether FFP was desirable. 
They explained that clubs funded by a sugar daddy were more likely to choose a riskier 
investment strategy since any overspend would be covered by their backer (2012:3).  This 
encouraged excessive spending in pursuit of sporting success (2012:5) which might 
encourage other clubs to overspend, resulting in industry-wide financial problems (2012:6).   
Whilst revenue from matchday and broadcasting was fairly stable and predictable over a 
number of years, they argued that injections of cash from a benefactor were more volatile 
and would disappear altogether if that benefactor experienced financial difficulties (2012:6).   
They also suggested the support of sugar daddies might result in competitive imbalance 
which could eventually reduce interest in matches (2012:6).  They concluded that although 
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FFP might address the issue of overspending, it was unlikely to improve the competitive 
balance of European football (2012:18). 
Although Franck and Lang suggested that clubs with sugar daddies followed riskier 
strategies, their analysis used a one club model (2012:18).  To fully explore the impact of a 
sugar daddy on the industry the authors recognised that the construction of a more 
sophisticated multi-club model was necessary (2012:19). 
Using published accounting information Frick and Prinz (2006) examined the financial 
positions of clubs in Germany’s Bundesliga.  They explained that German clubs were 
required to submit budgets and other financial information in order to obtain the annual 
license required to remain in professional leagues.  This ensured tighter control of costs and 
meant the wages / revenue ratio for German clubs was significantly lower than in other 
European football leagues (2006:64).  With debt much lower than in England, Italy or Spain, 
Frick and Prinz concluded that because of tight financial regulation German football was in a 
relatively healthy position (2006:72). 
However published financial statements for 2004 indicated that due to heavy spending on 
transfer fees and wages, Borussia Dortmund and Schalke 04 had combined liabilities of €231 
million (2006:68).  Despite this both clubs were successful in obtaining licenses for the 2005-
06 season (2006:68), which suggested regulations were not being enforced as strictly as 
Frick and Prinz had indicated. 
Dietl and Franck (2007) also challenged the views of Frick and Prinz (2006) suggesting that 
financial regulations governing German football clubs were not enforced with sufficient 
rigor.  Dietl and Franck observed that although between 1999-2005, aggregate revenue 
generated by Germany’s 36 professional clubs increased from €818 million to €1.5 billion, 
total debt grew from €350 million to €717 million (2007:663).  The authors explained that 
whilst 17 of these clubs were limited companies (2007:665), the remainder were not for 
profit organisations run by a committee made up of members (supporters) (2007:664).  In 
not for profit organisations liability for debt was not the personal responsibility of members; 
and the distribution of profit to members was not allowed.  This meant there were no 
incentives for these clubs to generate a surplus and instead fans sought to maximise playing 
success which encouraged reckless spending (2007:664).  Even those clubs that operated as 
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limited companies were in effect controlled by supporters, with members holding 50% plus 
one vote (2007:665). 
They also suggested that data used by Frick and Prinz was questionable (2007:668) and 
based on their own analysis of Germany’s licensing system Dietl and Franck found that many 
clubs filed poor quality financial information that was altered through ‘window dressing’ 
(2007:667).  They concluded that club members were willing to gamble financially to 
achieve playing success (2007:668). 
Whilst Dietl and Franck were very critical of the German licensing system they limited 
examples of poor financial management to Schalke 04 and Borussia Dortmund, the two 
clubs heavily criticised by Frick and Prinz.  Better use of examples especially those that 
provided evidence of window dressing of financial statements would have greatly enhanced 
the arguments put forward by Dietl and Franck.  Despite its licensing system, in 2008-09 
eleven of the 18 clubs in the German Bundesliga generated an operating profit, which was 
not dissimilar to the EPL in which 50% of clubs reported an operating profit (Deloitte 
2010:20).   
Using aggregated published accounting information covering the period 1999-2010 Drut and 
Raballand (2010, 2012) examined the likely impact of FFP on Europe’s five largest leagues.  
Their analysis showed that despite poor financial performance and large amounts of debt, 
clubs from the Spanish, English and Italian leagues had acquired the best players and paid 
the highest wages (2010:2) resulting in competitive imbalance in the UEFA Champions 
League.  These clubs were often supported by wealthy individuals or local government 
(2010:12) and benefited from less regulation in their domestic leagues.   They contrasted 
this with France and Germany where leagues exerted greater financial control over clubs, 
though this was at the expense of competitiveness in European competitions (2010:12).   
Drut and Raballand suggested FFP would help improve competitive balance within European 
football, since those clubs backed by wealthy owners would no longer be able to spend 
more than they earned on players’ costs (2010:24; 2012:85).  However they questioned 
whether non-compliance would see the largest clubs excluded from competitions (2010:22; 
2012:84).  They explained that any decision would need to be confirmed by the European 
Court of Justice (2010:22), added to which was the risk the largest clubs might create their 
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own break away competition.  Given the high revenues generated by the Champions League 
this was something UEFA couldn’t allow to happen (2010:22; 2012:85).     
Although an interesting analysis of FFP, Drut and Raballand did not address in sufficient 
detail the criticism that FFP might reduce competitiveness in European club football.  Wilson 
et al (2013) argued the requirement to break-even might actually increase the gap in 
financial resources between the largest six clubs and the rest of the EPL (2013:34).  This was 
because wealthy benefactors were no longer able to spend excessive amounts acquiring the 
players required to compete with those clubs already established at the top of European 
football. 
Morrow (2013) explained that utility maximisation meant clubs were guilty of ‘economic 
irrationality’ since ‘In pursuit of sporting success clubs compete against each other, adopting 
similar strategies in terms of player recruitment and retention’ (2013:300). He also 
suggested that an ‘arms race’ meant many clubs lived beyond their means (2013:300). 
He explained that FFP required clubs to ‘Adopt a more economically rational approach to 
their activities’ (2013:303), and distinguished between ‘good’ debt, which might provide 
long-term benefits in the form investment in infrastructure, and ‘bad’ debt which was short-
term in nature and included expenditure on the acquisition of players (2013:304).  
Geey (2011) explained FFP was an attempt to ensure that in the long-term clubs operated 
within their financial constraints (2011:para 2).  Although wealthy owners were restricted in 
the amounts they could invest in transfer fees and wages, the rules did allow investment in 
infrastructure with amounts spent on this excluded from break-even calculations (2011: 
para 2).   Geey also pointed out that FFP did not prevent clubs borrowing large amounts of 
money as long as annual profits were sufficient to cover interest payable on this (2011:para 
7). 
Geey suggested FFP might bring to an end high transfer fees since the resulting amortisation 
and wages would make it very difficult for a club to achieve break-even without a 
corresponding rise in revenue or the sale of players (2011:para 13).  He also explained that 
clubs excluded from UEFA competition might challenge FFP through the legal system 
(2011:para 28).  Although UEFA had been involved in lengthy negotiations with the 
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European Commission to minimise the likelihood of this happening, the outcome of any 
challenge remained uncertain (2011:para 47).  
Since only those clubs that wished to compete in UEFA competition were required to 
comply, Geey suggested FFP might distort domestic competition (2011:para 57).  This 
situation would not arise if domestic leagues also adopted FFP.  He concluded that FFP 
would encourage organic growth rather than short-term expenditure on players’ costs 
(2011:para 58).   
2.2.6 ‘Financial doping’ 
Several researchers referred to the soft budget constraint provided by wealthy owners as 
‘financial doping’ and compared this with drug taking by athletes to gain an unfair 
advantage over their rivals.  Schubert and Könecke (2015) explained that financial doping 
was where clubs received externally provided funds that did not originate from operating 
activities (2015:70).  This included the provision of equity injections and soft loans from 
wealthy owners, indirect support by local authorities (2015:70), owing money to rival clubs, 
and non-payment of tax and players’ salaries (Olsson 2011:28).  Schubert and Könecke 
feared the provision of excessive amounts of external funds provided clubs with an unfair 
advantage that distorted competition and might ultimately damage sporting integrity 
(2015:73). 
They also believed these funds encouraged clubs to focus on short-term playing success and 
might be less sustainable than normal operating revenues, which could lead to financial 
problems in the long-term (2015:72).  They suggested FFP should be seen as ‘A long-term 
term football governance project’ (2015:78) that sought to address financial doping.  To be 
effective required that penalties for non-compliance were transparent (2015:79). 
Müller et al (2012) argued that the actions of loss-making clubs increased costs for all clubs 
(2012:122) and threatened the ‘Long-term financial stability as well as going concern of 
even prestigious clubs’ (2012:118).  The interdependent relationship meant the insolvency 
of one club would impact on other clubs in a number of ways including being unable to 
complete fixtures which would damage the league’s integrity (2012:121); and being unable 
to pay amounts owed to other clubs in respect of transfer fees (2012:122).   
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Although Müller et al acknowledged that FFP was necessary to address financial doping 
(2012:136), they were critical that several factors softened the break-even requirement.  
These included acceptable deviations from break-even (2012:131), excluding infrastructure 
costs from calculations (2012:130), and a three-year monitoring period which allowed 
surpluses to be offset against losses (2012:132). They suggested there was opportunity for 
creative accounting by clubs and to prevent this, strong penalties needed to be imposed for 
breaches of FFP (2012:136). 
Schubert (2014) used agency theory to examine the need for FFP.  He explained that UEFA 
was the principal since it operated club competitions (Champions and Europa Leagues) and 
clubs were agents (2014:340).  In recent years losses made in pursuit of playing success 
meant several clubs were increasingly dependent on cash injections from investors 
(2014:340). The introduction of FFP encouraged clubs to focus on the long-term and 
compliance was required if clubs wanted to earn revenue through participation in UEFA 
competitions (2014:340).  However excluding clubs for non-compliance was likely to 
damage the quality of these competitions (2014:342).   
He suggested that UEFA should make clear why it didn’t want limited companies controlled 
by private investors to ‘Take entrepreneurial risk’ (2014:343).  This required that clubs and 
supporters were better educated on the potential problems caused by financial doping 
(2014:344).  Schubert recognised this might be difficult since many supporters welcomed 
investment in playing success that was funded by sugar daddies (2014:345). 
2.2.7 Criticisms of FFP 
Madden (2014) was critical that FFP limited the amounts wealthy owners could inject into 
their clubs commenting, ‘It seems strange that an industry should be imposing regulation 
that disbars the provision of willingly supplied funds by investors’ (2014:2).  He argued that 
investment from wealthy benefactors was no different to sponsorship revenue (2014:9) 
which was as likely to reduce or end as injections from a sugar daddy (2014:10).   However 
this argument ignored that for most clubs’ sponsorship revenue was a relatively small 
amount the removal of which was unlikely to cause severe financial distress. 
Budzinski (2014) was also critical that FFP prevented wealthy owners from investing in 
players arguing this penalised smaller clubs.  He contended that FFP allowed those clubs 
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that currently enjoyed high revenues to spend more than clubs with smaller revenues 
(2014:6). This would provide these clubs with a competitive advantage for several years, 
even though a smaller club might have a benefactor who was willing to invest heavily in new 
players (2014:6).  He reasoned this ‘Points to an anticompetitive exclusion of 
entrepreneurial risk’ (2014:6), and prevented clubs funded by wealthy owners growing in 
the same way as Chelsea or Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) (2014:6). 
Although Budzinski acknowledged that FFP was an attempt to prevent ‘Irrational, 
irresponsible and unsustainable (over-) spending’ (2014:8), he explained excessive spending 
was not a problem if losses were covered by wealthy investors (2014:9).  Referring to 
Spanish football he argued that situations where authorities had supported clubs using 
public funds did not justify the introduction of FFP.  This was instead a failure of government 
regulations which was very different to financial support offered by wealthy owners 
(2014:14).   
However these criticisms ignored that FFP allows wealthy benefactors to invest in 
infrastructure, and there is an acceptable deviation of up to €30m (previously €45m) if this 
is matched by a corresponding injection of equity.  In addition this argument overlooked 
that the soft budget constraints enjoyed by some clubs often placed upward pressure on 
players’ costs for all clubs.  
Vöpel (2011) and Geey (2011) both commented it could prove difficult and time consuming 
for UEFA to establish relevant revenues and expenses, and this might allow wealthy 
benefactors to continue to support their clubs.  However this could be overcome by greater 
transparency.  Given the importance of the break-even calculation, Morrow (2014) 
questioned why FFP doesn’t require clubs to provide in audited financial statements a 
reconciliation of reported profit with the figure used for break-even purposes (2014:60).  
The same question could be asked of the EPL for adjusted earnings before tax and reported 
profit before tax. 
Using a sample of 109 clubs operating in the top divisions in 15 European countries, 
Dimitropoulos et al (2016) looked at financial statements covering the period 2008-14 
(2016:466) to investigate whether FFPR had impacted on accounting quality (2016:460).  
Their sample was broken down into pre (2008-10) and post-FFP (2011-14) (2016:466).  
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Dimitropoulos et al argued that clubs with financial problems might employ techniques to 
boost earnings thereby ensuring compliance with FFP (2016:464).  This might include not 
reporting all impairment losses on players’ registrations (2016:469).  It was explained that 
unlisted companies were subject to less regulation and this might assist manipulation of 
earnings (2016:472).  They also suggested clubs might switch audit firm to ensure more 
favourable auditors’ reports (2016:464), including employing smaller audit firms (2016:465).  
Their findings showed that in 2011, 24% of their sample changed from ‘big 4’ to non-big 4 
firms of auditors (2016:473).  In addition cash flows improved significantly for all clubs in 
their sample (2016:473).  They concluded that accounting quality was reduced following the 
introduction of FFPR (2016:477), and suggested greater corporate governance was 
necessary (2016:480).  
However it could be argued that it is good practice for companies to change auditors every 
few years.  This ensures auditors retain their independence and don’t develop a close 
relationship with the directors whose stewardship they are reporting on.  Whilst compliance 
with FFP should improve financial performance including improved cash flows.   
Dimitropoulos et al’s findings would have been enhanced by examining changes in 
performance by country. 
2.2.8 Key drivers that influence the performance of football clubs 
Previous studied identified that the primary objectives of professional football clubs related 
to sporting success and financial performance (Sloane 1971, Kesenne 2000, Storm 2011, 
Risaliti and Verona 2012), and these were influenced by several key drivers.  The most 
important driver of sporting success was investment in players’ costs (Arnold 1991, 
Szymanski and Smith 1997, Hall et al 2002), with those clubs that enjoyed most sporting 
success spending the largest amounts on transfer fees and wages.  However investment in 
players’ costs was up-front and might lead to financial difficulties where sporting success 
was not achieved. 
Owner objectives had a significant influence on the financial and sporting performance of 
clubs (Zimbalist 2003, Hamil et al 2010, Franck 2013). During the period under review 
several clubs in the EPL were acquired by wealthy foreign owners who provided a soft 
budget constraint enabling significant investment in pursuit of sporting success.  Such 
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investment was uncontrolled by regulation, which was in contrast to French or German 
football where there had historically been tighter regulation (Frick and Prinz 2006, Lago et al 
2006, Drut and Raballand 2010).  As a result several clubs reported large losses over a 
number of seasons.  Heavy expenditure by clubs supported by wealthy owners meant other 
clubs in the EPL were forced to spend increasing amounts on players’ costs just to remain 
competitive (Storm and Nielsen 2012, Morrow 2013).  Financial and sporting performance 
was adversely affected where an owner lost interest or did not have the funds necessary to 
sustain investment in a club (Franck and Lang 2012). 
Sporting success is a key driver of revenue.  The most successful clubs play more matches 
leading to an increased share of broadcasting, higher matchday takings, more lucrative 
commercial contracts, and participation in European competition (Andreff and Staudohar 
2000, Baros and Leach 2006, Silva and Filipe 2013, Plumley et al 2017).  Since 1992 clubs in 
the EPL have benefited from collective negotiation for the sale of broadcasting rights, and 
this requires clubs to work with the EPL and media organisations in order to develop an 
attractive product (Neale 1964, Storm 2010).  Significant growth in broadcasting revenue 
and the equitable way this was distributed provided clubs with the funds necessary to 
attract high quality players from overseas, which further increased global interest in 
matches. 
For the most successful clubs regular participation in the UEFA Champions League provided 
significant additional revenue and increased brand awareness, creating further 
opportunities for commercial revenue (Farquhar et al 2005, Peeters and Szymanski 2014, 
Schubert 2014).  Although the largest clubs aspired to participate in the Champions League, 
changes in the way UEFA distributed prize money meant participation in the Europa League 
also became more lucrative.  In 2017 Manchester United received €45 million for winning 
the Europa League (Deloitte 2018b:10). 
Merit payments that linked 25% of domestic broadcasting revenue to final league position 
(Premier League 2015c), the threat of relegation, rising disparities in revenue, and the desire 
to participate in UEFA competitions all provided financial incentives for clubs to overspend 
(Farquhar et al 2005, Storm and Nielsen 2012).  For some clubs sporting success was 
remaining in the EPL.  This meant the threat of relegation was a key driver of financial 
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performance and explained why despite growth in revenue several clubs reported large 
losses and became increasingly reliant on debt (Farquhar et al 2005, Lago et al 2006, Storm 
2011, Zoccali 2012).  Servicing high levels of hard debt can restrict expenditure on players’ 
costs and bring clubs into conflict with supporters.  At the opposite end of the spectrum 
high profits and cash surpluses can also lead to criticism from supporters, more interested in 
sporting success than financial performance. 
Dell'Osso and Szymanski (1991) explained that a club’s history and reputation could attract 
supporters and help generate revenue (1991:113), though in the long run this could not be 
sustained without sporting success (1991:129).  Sass (2016) concurred and called this the 
‘glory hunter phenomenon’ where historical playing success attracted more spectators 
which increased a club’s ‘revenue potential or market size’ (2016:155).   Dell'Osso and 
Szymanski also pointed out that sporting success was influenced by the performance of 
players (1991:129) and the quality of coaching staff (1991:125).  Storm (2010) commented 
that the use of up to date methods was important to ensure players were properly prepared 
for matches (2010:103).  Luck (including injuries to players) also impacted on sporting 
success. 
Increased financial regulation means clubs must ensure costs are more closely aligned to 
revenue and this limits provision of a soft budget constraint from owners.  However several 
researchers have criticised FFP, stating that it negatively impacts competitive balance, since 
acceptable deviations from break-even limit investment and protect the elite of European 
club football in the short to medium term (Madden 2014, Budzinski 2014). 
2.2.9 Salary Cost Management Protocol 
Although the introduction of FFP received huge publicity, clubs playing in League 2 of the 
English Football League (EFL) had been subject to a Salary Cost Management Protocol 
(SCMP) since 2004-05 (Deloitte 2013:46).  This restricted player related expenditure initially 
to 60% (Deloitte 2009:47), and more recently to 55% of relevant turnover and 100% of 
Football Fortune Income (FFI) (EFL Appendix 5:Part 4.1).  Relevant turnover included 
matchday receipts, broadcasting revenue, commercial revenue, and where applicable 
parachute payments received by clubs relegated from the EPL (EFL Appendix 5:Appendix 
A1).  FFI comprised prize monies from cup competitions, net cash receipts in respect of 
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transfer fees, non-returnable donations, accumulated profit, and cash injections by way of 
non-redeemable equity (EFL Appendix 5:Appendix A2).  Player related expenditure included 
gross salaries, bonuses, benefits in kind and signing on fees (EFL Appendix 5:Appendix B). 
From 2011-12 League 1 clubs were also subject to a SCMP (Deloitte 2012:40).  Player related 
expenditure was initially restricted to 75% (Geey 2012) of relevant turnover before reducing 
to 65% in 2012-13 and 60% from 2013-14 (Deloitte 2012:40); and 100% of FFI (EFL Appendix 
5:Part 3.1).  For clubs relegated from the Championship, player related expenditure was 
restricted to 75% of relevant turnover and 100% of FFI for the first season in League 1 (EFL 
Appendix 5:Part 2.12).   
Penalties for non-compliance with the SCMP included a transfer embargo and the EFL 
refusing to register new contracts with a club’s existing players (EFL Appendix 5:Part 10.1.3). 
2.2.10 Financial Fair Play Rules 
Morrow (2014) explained that at the start of the 2004-5 season UEFA introduced licensing 
for all clubs that wished to play in the Champions and Europa Leagues (2014:15).  This was 
based on the licensing system used in German football and required clubs to show they 
were ‘Capable of satisfying their sporting and financial commitments during the season’ 
(2014:15).  UEFA introduced FFP from 2013-14 and the objectives are shown in table 2.2. 
UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (Edition 2015) 
Article 2 – Objectives (Extract) 
Table 2.2: The objectives of UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations 
(Extract) 
(Source: UEFA 2015:2) 
 
This requires that clubs submit their most recent audited financial statements to UEFA 
together with accompanying notes, accounting policies, and a financial review by senior 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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management (UEFA 2012:25, UEFA 2015:27).   In addition at 31 March before the next 
licensing period commences, clubs must demonstrate they have no amounts owing to other 
football clubs (2015:28), employees (2015:30) or tax authorities (2015:30) that relate to the 
period before 31 December of the previous year.  
UEFA (2015) explained that when calculating break-even, financial performance was 
considered over a three-year period (known as a monitoring period) (2015:37).  This meant 
for example that the monitoring period for the 2015-16 season considered financial 
statements for accounting periods ended in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (2015:37).  The only 
exception to this was 2013-14 when financial results for just the two previous accounting 
periods were used.  This meant that although FFP was introduced at the start of the 2013-14 
season, reference was made to financial statements for accounting periods ended 2012 and 
2013 (UEFA 2012:35). 
UEFA (2012) elucidated that break-even was achieved where a club reported a surplus in 
each year; an aggregate surplus over three years; or an aggregate deficit over three years 
that was within the acceptable deviation (2012:38).  Acceptable deviations and monitoring 
periods assessed are summarised in table 2.3, and we can see that in 2013-14 the 
acceptable deviation was €5 million.  However cumulative losses during 2011-12 and 2012-
13 could be as high as €45 million provided any excess over €5 million was funded by a 
corresponding injection of equity.  This reduced to €30m from 2015-16 (Table 2.3).  
Although UEFA (2012) suggested acceptable deviations would be lowered for periods after 




Acceptable deviation where excess 




 € million € million  
2013-14 5 45 2012, 2013 
2014-15 5 45 2012, 2013, 2014 
2015-16 5 30 2013, 2014, 2015 
2016-17 5 30 2014, 2015, 2016 
2017-18 5 30 2015, 2016, 2017 
Table 2.3: Summary of Financial Fair Play acceptable deviation 
(Source: Summarised from UEFA 2012:36) 




UEFA (2012) also explained that for 2013-14 and 2014-15 only, sanctions would not apply 
for losses above €45 million where both of the following conditions were fulfilled: 
 A club reported declining cumulative losses, which demonstrated it was working 
towards compliance (2012:87). 
 Losses were the result of contracts agreed with players before 1 June 2010 
(2012:87). 
The inclusion of acceptable deviations ‘Allows clubs to pass the FFP break-even test without 
actually breaking-even’ (Field Fisher BDO 2014:4), and recognised that given the scale of 
losses reported by many clubs it was not be feasible to immediately enforce break-even 
(Geey 2011:para 8).   
UEFA (2015) explained that a club would be in breach of FFP if: 
 It failed to meet the break-even requirement (2015:39). 
 Financial statements showed worsening negative equity (2015:39). 
 The most recent auditors’ report included ‘An emphasis of matter or qualified 
opinion…in respect of going concern’ (2015:39). 
In addition UEFA can require additional information from a club where employee costs are 
greater than 70% of revenue or net debt is greater than revenue (2015:39). 
Franck and Lang (2012) observed that in 2009 the balance sheets of 37% of the 733 clubs 
playing in Europe’s top leagues had negative equity, the situation where total liabilities 
exceed total assets (2012:2).  By requiring an equity injection for losses above €5 million, 
FFP was trying to ensure this didn’t worsen.   
In calculating break-even clubs compare relevant income and expenses; this differs to 
reported profit as some amounts are excluded from break-even calculations.  A summary of 
relevant income and expenses is shown in table 2.4.  It should be noted that relevant 
income specifically excludes amounts arising from the re-valuation of non-current assets 
and income from related parties at above fair value (2012:75). 
To encourage expenditure on long-term infrastructure, relevant expenses excluded: 
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 Expenditure on youth and community development activities, as long as these costs 
could be clearly identified (2012:73). 
 Finance costs directly attributable to the construction or modification of tangible 
non-current assets (2012:73). 
 Depreciation and impairment of tangible non-current assets and amortisation and 
impairment of intangible non-current assets, except for players’ registrations 
(2015:88). 
FFPR are constantly evolving and in 2015 expenditure on women’s football was also 
excluded from relevant expenses (2015:85). 
Relevant income Relevant expenses 
 Gate receipts including from friendly 
matches and tours 
 Sponsorship and advertising  
 Broadcasting 
 Commercial activities 
 UEFA solidarity and prize money 
 Other operating income, including 
subsidies, rent, dividends and 
income from non-football operations 
 Profit on disposal of players’ 
registrations 
 Profit arising from the disposal of 
non-current assets that are not 
being replaced (though profits 
arising from the disposal of stadium 
or training facilities are excluded)   
 Finance income 
 Cost of sales including catering and 
merchandise costs  
 Employee costs 
 Other operating expenses 
 Amortisation and impairment of 
player registrations 
 Losses arising from the disposal of 
player registrations 
 Finance costs 
 Dividends paid to equity 
shareholders 
 Upward adjustments to expense 
transactions with related parties, 
where these were originally at less 
than fair value   
Table 2.4: Summary of FFP relevant income and expenses 
(Source: Relevant income summarised from UEFA 2012:72-76; Relevant expenses 
summarised from UEFA 2012:72-78) 
2.2.11 Penalties for non-compliance 
Compliance with FFP is monitored by The UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB), which is 
made up of an investigatory chamber and an adjudicatory chamber (UEFA 2015:34).   The 
investigatory chamber reviews documentation and other relevant information from clubs 
and can dismiss the case; ‘Offer clubs settlement agreements…to help facilitate compliance’ 
(UEFA.com 2015:11); with a club’s agreement can impose a fine of up to €100,000; or refer 
the case to the adjudicatory chamber (UEFA 2017).  Settlement agreements indicate the 
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actions required by a club within a specified timescale in order to ensure compliance with 
FFPR together with any penalties imposed (UEFA.com 2015:11).  Where cases are referred 
to the adjudicatory chamber, it can impose penalties for non-compliance including 
warnings, fines, deduction of points, withholding of revenues from UEFA competitions, 
disqualification from current or future competitions, and ultimately withdrawal of a title 
(UEFA.com 2015).   
In February 2014 UEFA announced that 76 clubs were being assessed for non-compliance 
(Conway 2014a), including Manchester City whose aggregate losses of £149 million in 2012 
and 2013 greatly exceeded the acceptable deviation (Conway 2014).  Following a review of 
additional financial information nine clubs were penalised through settlement agreements 
with Manchester City and PSG receiving the most severe penalties (Dima 2015:439).  For 
Manchester City penalties included (UEFA 2017:Manchester City): 
 The maximum acceptable deviation was reduced to €20 million for the accounting 
year ended 2014 and €10 million in 2015. 
 Employee costs for the accounting year ended 2015 were to be the same as in 2014.  
This would continue into 2016 if the acceptable deviations above were exceeded. 
 The club was restricted to using just 21 players in Champions League matches during 
2014-15.  This would continue into 2015-16 if the acceptable deviations above were 
exceeded. 
 Expenditure on players’ registrations was significantly restricted during the transfer 
windows for 2014-15 and 2015-16. 
 Revenue earned from playing in UEFA competitions during 2013-14 and 2014-15 
would be reduced by €20 million (rising to €60 million for non-compliance with the 
settlement agreement).  
The settlement agreement also mentioned that ‘Certain commercial partnerships were 
subject to examination.  In order to avoid dispute and for the avoidance of doubt, 
Manchester City has agreed that for the period of the settlement it will not seek to improve 
the financial terms of two…commercial partnerships’ (UEFA 2017:Manchester City).  This 
suggested that UEFA had investigated sponsorship arrangements between Etihad and 
Manchester City. 
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Up to June 2017 the CFCB had made 28 settlement agreements (including Hull City and 
Manchester City from the EPL) and 26 adjudicatory chamber decisions (UEFA 2017).  In 2015 
FC Dynamo Moscow became the first club to be excluded from UEFA club competition for 
breach of break-even rules after reporting an aggregate deficit of €302 million in the three 
seasons to 2014 (UEFA 2017).  In 2016 Galatasaray was excluded from UEFA club 
competition for two seasons having failed to comply with a settlement agreement decided 
in 2014 (UEFA 2017).  Investigation showed between 2013-15 Galatasaray exceeded the 
acceptable deviation by €134 million (UEFA 2017). 
2.2.12 EPL and EFL financial regulation 
Clubs playing in the English Football League Championship adopted FFP from the start of the 
2011-12 season (EFL Appendix 5:Part 1.1), with an acceptable deviation of up to £4 million 
(EFL Appendix 5: Part 5.2).  However cumulative losses in 2011-12 could be as high as £12 
million so long as these were accompanied by an injection of equity for the amount above the 
acceptable deviation (EFL Appendix 5:Part 5.3).  Penalties for non-compliance were not 
introduced until December 2014 (EFL Appendix 5:Part 6).   
Since FFP applied only to those clubs that wanted to play in UEFA competitions, in February 
2013 the EPL also introduced greater financial regulation (Premier League 2013a).  This 
required all clubs to: 
 Submit to the EPL by 1 March each year their most recent audited financial 
statements and directors’ report together with interim financial statements covering 
the six-month period from the accounting year end (Premier League 2015:104).    
 Provide evidence that no overdue amounts were owed to employees or other clubs 
(for transfer fees) (2015:105). 
 Provide forecast financial statements covering the next season (2015:105). 
 Show that liabilities owed to HMRC for PAYE and NIC did not exceed 28 days 
(2015:105). 
Initially EPL regulations focused on Short Term Cost Control (2015:107) which looked at 
situations where wages exceeded £52 million in 2013-14; £56 million in 2014-15; and £60 
million in 2015-16 (2015:107).  In each year clubs were required to restrict increases in 
wages to £4 million.  Where wages increased by more than £4 million this must have been 
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caused by contracts entered into before 31 January 2013, or funded by increases in a club’s 
non-central revenue (2015:78) and profits arising from player trading (2015:107).  In this 
way STCC limited increases in wages without corresponding growth in commercial or 
matchday revenue, or surpluses from player trading.   
From 2015-16 EPL financial regulations were expanded to cover ‘Profitability and 
Sustainability’ (2015:113).  This meant aggregate losses in excess of £15 million over a three-
year period (2015:114) must be matched by a corresponding injection of equity (2015:87).  
Where cumulative losses exceeded £105 million, a club was considered in breach of EPL 
financial regulations (2015:114) which could lead to a range of sanctions including the EPL: 
 Requiring clubs to agree to a budget (2015:107) 
 Requesting the provision of additional financial information (2015:107)   
 Refusing to register new players or new contracts for existing players (2015:115)  
 Imposing fines (2015:206) 
For EPL monitoring purposes clubs were required to adjust the reported profit (loss) before 
tax to ensure that amounts arising from related party transactions were stated at fair 
market value (2015:114), and to remove: 
 Depreciation and impairment of non-current assets (2015:236) 
 Amortisation and impairment of intangible non-current assets (except for that 
relating to players’ registrations) (2015:236) 
 Expenditure on youth and community development (2015:236).  In this way EPL 
regulations also encourage investment in long-term infrastructure. 
The EPL refers to this as ‘Adjusted Earnings Before Tax’ (2015:113).  The biggest difference 
with FFP is the allowable deviation of £105 million over three years compared with just €30 
million allowed by UEFA.  
2.2.13 Summary of section 2.2 
From the preceding review of literature it is apparent that European football clubs operated 
as utility or win maximisers.  However pursuit of this objective together with the soft budget 
constraint provided by owners and other stakeholders reduced cost discipline and resulted 
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in many clubs experiencing severe financial difficulties.  To encourage clubs to operate 
within financial constraints UEFA and the EPL introduced stronger financial rules. 
2.3 The financial reporting system 
This thesis will make use of financial statements and it is necessary to be aware of the 
accounting principles, rules and regulations that underpin the preparation of high quality 
financial reporting information.  The purchase of players’ registrations has a significant 
impact on both the assets and expenses of a football club and this section will also examine 
the accounting treatment of intangible assets (which includes players’ registrations). 
2.3.1 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
Hines (1989) explained the financial accounting paradigm is based on a number of 
assumptions (1989:52) that are ‘So taken for granted, and considered to be common-sense, 
that everybody “knows” them’ (1989:53).  Leung (2016) concurred and explained that the 
paradigm had ‘Gained universal acceptance throughout the accounting community as valid 
procedures’ (2016:12).  Assumptions and practices were ‘Upheld through academic and 
professional training’ (2016:12), where students were taught about the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) framework, International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs), best practice recommended by professional accounting bodies, and the production 
of financial statements that show a true and fair view (2016:12).  Hendriksen (1977) 
suggested that ‘The most important goal of accounting theory should be to provide a 
coherent set of logical principles that form the general frame of reference for the evaluation 
and development of sound accounting practices’ (Hendriksen 1977 in Alexander et al 
2017:84).   
The preparation of financial statements in developed countries is based on Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Maynard 2017:61).  GAAP is the standardised 
framework of accounting guidelines that determines how entities record transactions and 
events to produce financial statements (Hussey and Ong 2017:7).  It is comprised of 
government legislation (including the Companies Act 2006), accounting standards, stock 
exchange regulations (that apply to any company with shares listed on a stock exchange) 
(Hussey and Ong 2017:8), and ‘Generally accepted conventions and rules followed in the 
preparation of financial statements’ (Maynard 2017:61). 
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Accounting standards provide detailed rules and procedures on the treatment of 
transactions and other items shown in financial statements (Hussey and Ong 2017:10). Their 
main purpose is to bring consistency to the treatment and disclosure of transactions, 
reducing the potential for variations in accounting practice.  In the UK accounting standards 
are issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the IASB (Melville 2015:5).  Prior to 
the issue of accounting standards it had been hoped that judgements made by accountants 
would result in uniformity in the production of financial statements (Elliott and Elliott 
2013:208).  However two cases during the 1960s highlighted the inconsistencies this 
sometimes caused.  In GEC’s takeover of AEI Ltd in 1967 the values of stock and work in 
progress provided by two firms of accountants differed by £9.5 million (Maynard 2017:62).  
Similarly in 1968 an independent investigation by Price Waterhouse suggested profit of £2 
million reported in the audited financial statements of Pergamon Press Ltd should be 
reduced by £1.5 million (Elliott and Elliott 2013:209).  This led to the formation of the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee which issued accounting standards in the UK 
from 1971 until 1990, when it was replaced by the FRC (Maynard 2017:63).   
Although the issue of national accounting standards improved the quality of financial 
reporting there remained difficulties making comparison with entities in other countries.  
For example in 1993 Daimler Benz reported a profit of DM615 million using German GAAP; 
using US GAAP showed a loss of DM1839 million (Hussey and Ong 2017:10).  This led to the 
formation of the IASB which brought about convergence of international accounting 
practices in the preparation and presentation of financial statements (Cotter 2012:35, 
Nobes and Parker 2012:82).   
The financial reporting system is underpinned by a conceptual framework consisting of a set 
of agreed fundamental principles, concepts and good practice that provides a theoretical 
framework for the development of accounting standards (Hussey and Ong 2017:32, Melville 
2015:17, Alexander et al 2017:67).   This helps ensure accounting standards are coherent 
and based on consistent principles and rationale (Elliott and Elliott 2013:236, Maynard 
2017:73).  Over time accounting must evolve to deal with new transactions or changing 
opinions, and the conceptual framework assists in dealing with topics yet to form the 
subject of a standard (Alexander et al 2017:68). 
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The IASB published its conceptual ‘Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of 
Financial Statements’ in 1989 (Nobes and Parker 2012:133).  An updated ‘framework’ was 
published in 2010 and identifies the objectives of financial reporting; elements of financial 
statements, how these are measured and criteria for recognition; and provides 
requirements for presentation and disclosure in financial statements (Cotter 2012:8).  It also 
sets out two fundamental qualitative characteristics that make financial information useful 
to users, relevance and faithful representation (Alexander et al 2017:70).  Faithful 
representation means financial information is neutral, complete, and free from error (Cotter 
2012:13).  Relevance means financial information ‘Is capable of making a difference in the 
decisions made by users’ (Elliott and Elliott 2013:241).  In addition the characteristics of 
comparability, consistency, verifiability, timeliness and understandability enhance the 
usefulness of financial information that is relevant and faithfully represented (Alexander et 
al 2017:71).   International Accounting Standard (IAS) 1 Presentation of Financial Statements 
provides guidance on the structure and content of financial statements and contains several 
of the general principles from the conceptual framework (Melville 2015:38).   
The Companies Act 2006 requires that financial statements show a ‘true and fair view’ and 
are prepared in accordance with accounting standards (McKenzie 2010:4).  Although the 
Companies Act 2006 does not define ‘true and fair’, legal opinion has stated that financial 
statements prepared in compliance with accounting standards will show a ‘true and fair’ 
view (Elliott and Elliott 2013:52, Maynard 2017:60).   However accounting is based on 
judgements and estimates, and this means ‘true and fair’ should be ‘within acceptable 
limits’, and judgements and estimates must be ‘professional, informed and reasonable’ 
(Maynard 2017:60). 
2.3.2 Accounting for the purchase of players’ registrations 
Along with its stadium a football club’s largest asset is usually ownership of players’ 
registrations.  Yang and Sonmez (2005) argued that players provided a unique resource that 
helped attract sponsors, supporters and broadcasters (2005:41) and enabled a club to gain a 
competitive advantage over rivals.   An examination of published financial statements in 
2015 showed the aggregate carrying value of players’ registrations for EPL clubs amounted 
to £1.6 billion and amortisation and impairment of this resulted in an expense of £657 
million (calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015).   
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The IASB defined an asset as ‘A resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events 
and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity’ (Melville 
2014:24).  To provide more detailed guidance on the treatment of intangible assets the IASB 
issued IAS 38 Intangible assets in September 1998 (Deloitte IASPlus) in which it defined an 
intangible asset as an ‘Identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance held for 
use in the production or supply of goods or services, for rental to others, or for 
administrative purposes’ (Cañibano et al 2000:105, Stolowy et al 2001:149).  Examples of 
intangible assets include computer software, brands, capitalised development costs, and 
intellectual property (Austin 2007:64).  For football clubs the amount paid to acquire a 
player’s registration is treated as an intangible asset.  IAS 38 distinguishes between 
intangible assets that are purchased and those that are internally generated, and it is the 
treatment of internally generated intangibles that has caused most debate.   
2.3.3 The treatment of purchased intangible assets 
Høegh-Krohn and Knivsflå (2000) and Powell (2003) explained that IAS 38 allowed an 
intangible asset to be capitalised provided there was a reliable measure of its cost and it was 
probable that future economic benefits would arise from its use (Høegh-Krohn and Knivsflå 
2000:249, Powell 2003:798).  For IAS 38 acquiring an intangible asset in an arm’s length 
transaction provided a reliable measure of its cost (Høegh-Krohn and Knivsflå 2000:245, 
Powell 2003:798).   
IAS 38 required that once capitalised, purchased intangible assets were amortised over their 
useful lives (Powell 2003:802).  In this way the cost of using an intangible asset was matched 
against revenue (and other economic benefits) arising from its use. 
2.3.4 The treatment of internally generated intangible assets 
Cañibano et al (2000) explained the main criticism of IAS 38 related to its treatment of 
internally generated intangible assets which were usually written off as expenses in the 
income statement (2000:110).  Stolowy et al (2001) pointed out that internally generated 
development costs could only be capitalised if they met specific criteria detailed in IAS 38.  
Criteria included the ability to reliably measure the costs incurred in producing an asset, and 
that economic benefits were expected to arise from its future use (2001:155).  This meant 
many items that provided an organisation with a competitive advantage could not be 
capitalised.  These included for example the cost savings resulting from the development of 
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an efficient supply chain (Lev 2003:17), the costs of training employees (Austin 2007:67), 
and costs incurred developing players through a youth academy at a football club. 
Lev (2003) explained that the value of intangibles could be very volatile (2003:18).  Using 
data from Standard and Poor’s 500 companies in the USA Lev noted that in March 2000 the 
ratio of market value to net assets was 7.5:1 (2003:17), which reflected the future earnings 
potential of internally generated intangible assets (2003:17).  However by August 2002 the 
ratio had fallen to 4.2, indicating the volatility of market values (2003:17) and clearly 
demonstrating why IAS 38 was so prudent in its treatment of internally generated 
intangibles. 
Austin (2007) explained that unlike purchased intangible assets which had identifiable costs 
and benefits (2007:63), internally generated intangibles were usually developed by an 
organisation over a period of time.  Due to uncertainty about the future economic benefits 
that might arise from their use, expenditure on these assets was usually written off to the 
income statement as incurred (2007:64).  Referring specifically to expenditure on staff 
training Austin explained that the value of any benefits arising was too difficult to ascertain 
which prevented capitalisation of these costs (2007:67).    Although Austin’s analysis focused 
on New Zealand he clearly explained the requirements of IAS 38 though didn’t suggest how 
perceived limitations could be overcome. 
Powell (2003) also explained that recognising internally generated intangible assets was 
‘Difficult because when the costs are incurred in developing these assets, any future 
economic benefits to the entity are uncertain’ (2003:800). Powell suggested a number of 
ways in which the accounting treatment of intangibles could be improved including that 
companies be allowed to reinstate previously expensed costs associated with an internally 
generated intangible once benefits were probable (2003:807).  However this would require 
companies to re-state figures for prior accounting periods, which is time consuming, 
expensive and sometimes confusing to users of financial statements.   
Based on a review of literature Cañibano et al (2000) argued that the treatment of internally 
generated intangibles meant several key value drivers were excluded from an organisation’s 
financial statements (2000:119).   They suggested that the probability of future economic 
benefits should be taken into consideration when deciding whether to capitalise internally 
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generated intangibles (2000:121).  So for example if the probability of future benefits was 
greater than 50%, costs would be capitalised rather than written off as expenses.  However 
the concern in using this approach is that companies might be less prudent which would 
result in both asset values and profit being overstated. 
Høegh-Krohn and Knivsflå (2000) recognised that IAS 38 made it difficult for companies to 
use internally generated intangibles to inflate reported profits and asset values (2000:258).  
However they argued that the IASB had been too prudent in their treatment of internally 
generated intangibles (2000:261).  Like Cañibano et al (2000) they too suggested that 
internally generated intangible assets should be capitalised where it was reasonably certain 
that future economic benefits would arise (2000:258).  However their recommendations 
were very reliant on how companies defined the term ‘reasonably certain’ which would to 
some extent depend on the attitude of directors to risk and might result in profit and asset 
values being overstated. 
Penman (2009) challenged the idea that internally generated intangibles needed to be 
capitalised (2009:17), arguing that due to their speculative nature it was often difficult to 
arrive at a fair value for these assets (2009:2).  Instead he suggested that the income 
statement reflected any profits generated from using internally generated intangibles and 
this was more useful than any valuation shown in the Statement of Financial Position (SFP) 
(2009:4).   
2.3.5 How football clubs accounted for transfer fees (SSAP 22 Goodwill) 
Research by accountants Touche Ross (1992) looked at how football clubs in England 
accounted for the cost of players’ registrations.  At that time the accounting treatment of 
intangible assets in the UK was covered by Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 
(SSAP) 22 Goodwill (Financial Reporting Council 1997).  SSAP 22 was issued in December 
1984 and allowed companies to either immediately write off goodwill as an expense in the 
income statement (the expense approach), or capitalise it as an asset and amortise this over 
its useful life (the capitalisation approach) (Financial Reporting Council 1997). 
Using the most recent published financial statements for 46 clubs that played in Division 1 
and Division 2 of the EFL, Touche Ross (1992) reported that 40 clubs accounted for transfer 
fees as an expense (or profit) in the income statement in the year in which the purchase or 
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disposal occurred (1992:4).  Although a simple and prudent way to account for the cost of 
players’ registrations this treatment meant profit was subject to huge fluctuation from year 
to year.  Only Tottenham Hotspur and Portsmouth capitalised players as intangible assets 
(1992:5). The four remaining clubs in the sample did not clearly state their accounting 
treatment of players’ registrations (1992:4).  
Touche Ross (1993) recommended that all clubs should capitalise the costs of acquiring 
players’ registrations and amortise these over the duration of contracts (1993:12).  In this 
way the cost of buying a player was spread over the length of his contract and profits were 
not subjected to huge fluctuations from year to year.  If a player suffered loss of form or 
serious injury, his valuation could be adjusted to reflect this.  They reasoned that by using 
this method the financial statements of a football club would provide a more accurate 
reflection of the assets utilised to generate a profit (or loss) (1993:8).   
Rowbottom (2002) demonstrated the impact that capitalising players had on the financial 
statements of several football clubs including Glasgow Celtic which in 1994 increased its net 
assets by £3.8 million, and Sunderland which increased net assets by £4.3 million 
(2002:343).  To put this into context the average net assets of a club in the EPL in 1993 was 
£3.7 million (Touche Ross 1994:25). 
The issue of transfer fees was further complicated by the Bosman ruling in 1995.  Morris et 
al (1996) and Simmons (1997) both suggested that following the Bosman ruling clubs should 
calculate amortisation assuming a residual value of zero.  Prior to this when calculating 
amortisation clubs had estimated a player’s transfer value at the end of his contract (Morris 
et al 1996:899, Simmons 1997:17). 
Morris et al (1996) believed another consequence might be that clubs stopped treating 
transfer fees as assets and instead accounted for them immediately as costs (or profits) 
(1996:898).  They explained this treatment would result in clubs reporting fewer assets and 
annual profits being subject to huge fluctuation due to the timing of player transfers 
(1996:899).  This situation was prevented by the issue of Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 
10 Goodwill and Intangible Assets. 
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2.3.6 FRS 10 Goodwill and intangible assets and IAS 38 Intangible assets 
The introduction of FRS 10 in December 1997 (which was subsequently replaced by IAS 38 
Intangible Assets in January 2005) (ICAEWa) brought consistency to the accounting 
treatment of intangible assets and required that companies followed the capitalisation 
approach.  IAS 38 and FRS 10 presumed the price paid for an intangible asset provided 
reliable evidence about its fair value and meant all football clubs were required to capitalise 
transfer fees and write these off over the length of a player’s contract.   
However Amir and Livne (2005) argued that due to several factors including loss of form and 
injury there was uncertainty as to whether future economic benefits would arise from the 
purchase of a football player.  Given this uncertainty they questioned whether capitalisation 
was the most appropriate policy (2005:551).   
Using financial statements for 58 clubs from the English and Scottish professional leagues 
covering the period 1990-2003, Amir and Livne studied the relationship between the 
accounting treatment of players’ registrations and share price (2005:557).  They found a 
weak relationship between investment in players and future operating cash flows 
(supporting their argument that economic benefits were uncertain) (2005:552). Despite this, 
movements in share prices indicated that investors preferred intangibles to be capitalised 
rather than treated as an expense (2005:553). 
Forker (2005) also questioned whether the accounting treatments outlined in FRS 10 and 
IAS 38 were appropriate for transfer fees.  Forker explained that to be recognised in 
financial statements the IASB required that future benefits arising from an asset were 
probable and would flow to the entity (2005:587).  Like Amir and Livne, Forker believed that 
some assets were highly speculative making it difficult to say with certainty that future 
economic benefits were probable.  As a consequence Forker believed that IAS 38 might 
result in the capitalisation of some intangibles that did not strictly meet the definition of an 
asset (2005:588). 
Using published accounting data covering the period 1991-98, Forker’s findings concurred 
with those of Amir and Livne (2005) and suggested that investors associated spending on 
players with future playing success.  He concluded that this supported the capitalisation 
approach required by IAS 38 and FRS 10 (2005:596).  However he also observed that the 
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financial benefits arising from the acquisition of a player might not last for the duration of 
his contract (2005:597).    It was therefore important that clubs looked at the carrying value 
of players on a regular basis and ensured this was not greater than the recoverable amount 
(estimated market value) (2005:597).   
Writing in Hamil et al (2000) Manning also questioned the capitalisation of players’ 
registrations.  Taking the worst-case scenario he reminded us that under Professional 
Footballers’ Association rules if a club was unable to pay wages it was in breach of contract 
which meant players became free agents and could leave the club for nothing (2000:158).  
He also suggested where a club was in financial difficulty, the value of its players would fall 
as it became desperate to raise the cash necessary to remain in business (2000:158). 
This last point was clearly demonstrated by both Baroncelli and Lago (2006) and Risaliti and 
Verona (2012) in their analyses of the poor financial state of Italian club football.  Risaliti and 
Verona blamed this on what they called a ‘virtuous circle’ in which clubs invested large 
amounts acquiring players in the hope this would result in playing success and increased 
revenue from sponsors and broadcasting (2012:9).  This was a risky strategy that required 
significant investment but carried no guarantee of success, and by the early 2000s several 
clubs were in financial difficulty (2012:1).   
Instead of addressing financial problems through better control of costs Risaliti and Verona 
explained that some clubs covered this up through ‘window dressing’ which usually took the 
form of player exchanges between clubs at inflated transfer values (2012:10).  As clubs 
struggled to remain financially viable several were forced to sell players at less than market 
value which triggered a collapse in transfer prices (2012:12) resulting in large impairment 
charges. 
To prevent insolvencies in December 2003 the Italian government issued the ‘decreto salva 
calcio’ which allowed clubs to spread impairment losses over 10 years (Baroncelli and Lago 
2006:14).   This went against the requirements of both IAS 36 Impairment (which required 
impairment losses to be written off immediately as an expense) and EU provisions on state 
aid and financial reporting.  Subsequent intervention by the European Commission 
eventually overturned the decree and forced clubs to write off impairment charges by 31 
December 2006 (Risaliti and Verona 2012:12).  Although Risaliti and Verona examined 
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financial statements over a 14-year period they limited their analysis to those Italian clubs 
that had qualified for the UEFA Champions League at least five times during the period 
1996-2009.  This provided a sample of just five clubs (2012:2). 
Baroncelli and Lago (2006) observed that although Serie A clubs reported aggregate losses 
of €400 million in 2003-04, without the decreto salva calcio these would have exceeded €1.3 
billion (2006:14).  To put this into context, in 2003-04 Serie A clubs reported aggregate 
revenue of €1 billion (Deloitte 2010:11). 
Risaliti and Verona (2012) and Baroncelli and Lago (2006) clearly demonstrated the potential 
problems attached to capitalising transfer fees.  Ascari and Gagnepain (2006:86) and Bosca 
et al (2008:166) expressed similar concerns about Spanish football where they observed 
that asset values for several clubs in La Liga were over-reliant on players’ registrations, the 
value of which was highly volatile.  As a consequence a collapse in the value of players 
would result in several clubs reporting negative equity. 
2.3.7 The accounting treatment of players developed through youth academies 
Although Forker (2005) and Amir and Livne (2005) each considered how clubs accounted for 
players acquired for a transfer fee, neither looked in sufficient detail at the accounting 
treatment of players developed through a club’s youth academy.  These are classed as 
internally generated intangible assets.  Since it is not possible to clearly distinguish the cost 
of developing each individual player from the youth academy’s total costs, IAS 38 (and 
before it FRS 10) does not allow this to be capitalised.   
This meant that although Manchester United was able to capitalise the transfer fee of £28.1 
million paid for Juan Sebastian Veron in July 2001 (BBC News 2001) (as this represented a 
reliable monetary value of that player), players that came through the club’s youth 
development system such as David Beckham and Ryan Giggs could not be included as 
assets.  Instead the costs of developing these players were immediately charged as 
expenses in the club’s income statement.  
Using the 2002 annual reports of 19 English professional football clubs, Shareef and Davey 
(2005) looked at problems in accounting for internally generated assets including the 
development of youth players, brands and image. Although FRS 10 had standardised the 
accounting treatment of transfer fees Shareef and Davey explained that compliance with 
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FRS 10 meant ‘The balance sheets of clubs which acquire players will look healthier than 
those depending on home grown players’ (Shareef and Davey 2005:86).  They also 
commented that despite merchandising being a major source of revenue for many clubs, 
brands were not recognised as assets (2005:87) as these were usually internally generated.  
They concluded that differences between market capitalisation and net assets meant shares 
in football clubs were trading at large premiums (2005:83). They suggested that a FRS on 
intellectual capital disclosure in the football sector might be a useful way in which to make 
financial statements more meaningful to users (2005:102).  
Yang and Sonmez (2005) concurred and explained that revenue from the sale of club related 
merchandise and corporate sponsorship was becoming increasingly significant for clubs in 
the EPL (2005:41) and was often linked to sporting success and the profile of a club’s 
players, with the largest sponsors wanting to be associated with the most successful clubs.   
Although Shareef and Davey touched on several issues, their sample size was very small and 
focused on just one accounting period.  Also in assessing the level of disclosure of 
intellectual capital the authors used their own disclosure index, and it could be argued the 
way in which weightings and scores were attached to each variable was a little subjective. 
Morrow (2003) explained that following the Bosman ruling and introduction of FRS 10, a 
player acquired on a free transfer would not appear as an asset in the SFP since no 
monetary amount was paid to acquire his registration (2003:154).  In the long run this could 
have serious implications since UEFA Club Licensing was considering making it a 
requirement for all clubs that wished to play in UEFA competitions to report positive net 
assets (2003:154). 
With the introduction of FFP it became increasingly important that a club’s financial 
statements properly reflected the true value of assets.  Oprean and Oprisor (2014) 
considered whether Grojer’s (1991) theory could be used to value players acquired on a free 
transfer.  This involved capitalising total wages payable to a player and writing these off over 
the duration of his contract (2014:6).  However Oprean and Oprisor pointed out that since 
players acquired on free transfers were often able to negotiate higher wages, this might 
over-value intangible assets (2014:7). 
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They also considered whether Flamholtz’s (1985) theory could be applied to value players 
developed through an academy.  This involved capitalising the costs of running the 
academy.  However this also proved problematic since there was no way of identifying the 
costs associated with each player.  Capitalising the entire cost of the academy represented 
the cost of developing all players including those who did not sign professional contracts 
with a club (2014:7) and went against IAS 38.  Although an interesting article on the 
difficulties in accounting for players Oprean and Oprisor didn’t arrive at any answers to the 
problems outlined.  
2.3.8 Summary of section 2.3 
Compliance with GAAP should produce financial statements that show a true and fair view 
about an entity’s financial performance and position.  FRS 10 (and subsequently IAS 38) 
brought consistency to the accounting treatment of players’ registrations and means that 
after wages, amortisation of players’ registrations is usually the largest recurring cost for a 
football club.  The treatment of internally generated intangibles does not allow clubs to 
capitalise players developed through youth academies.   
2.4 The uses and limitations of accounting ratios 
2.4.1 What is an accounting ratio? 
Melville (2014) defined an accounting ratio as ‘A measure of the relationship which exists 
between two figures shown in a set of financial statements’ (2014:354), and explained that 
ratios allow us to compare performance more easily than through using absolute monetary 
figures (2014:354).  Beaver (1966) suggested that ratios were useful predictors of certain 
events (including business failure) (1966:72).   
Bourgen and Drury (1975:39) and Melville (2014:354) explained that accounting ratios could 
be used for time series and cross-sectional analysis.  Time series analysis uses accounting 
ratios to compare a company’s financial performance over a number of accounting periods 
(this also known as trend or horizontal analysis (Holmes et al 2009:74)).  Cross-sectional 
analysis involves comparing performance with other companies operating in the same 
sector or with average figures for that sector (Bourgen and Drury 1975:39).   
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2.4.2 Using ratios for predictive purposes 
In his review of academic literature Horrigan (1968) noted that using accounting ratios to 
analyse financial statements was a recent development.  Although during the late 
nineteenth century managers and creditors used ratios to analyse an organisation’s 
profitability, it wasn’t until the early twentieth century that standards or ‘norms’ (such as 
the 2:1 current ratio) started to appear and for the first-time comparison was made with 
other companies (1968:285).   
Horrigan explained that improvements in the quality of financial statements (1968:285); 
research by the Du Pont Company in 1919 which linked efficiency and profitability ratios 
(1968:286); and the publication of industry average ratios by Dun and Bradstreet in 1933 
(1968:288) all contributed towards the increased use of ratios to analyse and evaluate 
company performance.  During the 1930s and 40s several academic studies examined 
whether ratios could be used to predict business failure.  However results were inconclusive 
and varied greatly depending on the ratios selected (1968:288), suggesting for the first time 
that some ratios were more useful than others.   
Horrigan concluded that ratios provided a relatively simple and quick method for appraising 
company performance allowing comparison with previous years or industry averages.  In 
this way they highlighted specific areas where financial performance could be improved 
which made them useful to both senior managers and external analysts (1968:294).   
Although Horrigan focused primarily on research carried out in the USA, used North 
American terminology (which often differed to UK terminology), and could perhaps have 
been more critical in evaluating the uses of ratios, he provided a clear summary of early 
research into ratio analysis and his article is still referred to by academics almost 50 years 
after it was written.   
Horrigan (1965) had previously used the financial statements of 32 steel companies and 24 
petrol companies covering the period 1948-57, together with the results of several 
academic studies from the 1920s onwards to examine the difficulties involved in 
establishing average or standard ratios for different industries (1965:559).   
Focusing primarily on liquidity and Du Pont ratios he identified that it was necessary to 
calculate only a small number of ratios to analyse a business, so long as these included key 
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variables from financial statements (1965:561).  He also identified that certain ratios could 
be used to predict both business failure several years in advance, and the likelihood of 
companies defaulting on the repayment of loans.  These included interest cover and net 
profit to sales, with higher ratios indicating less likelihood a company would fail or default 
on a loan (1965:567). 
Perhaps the most useful part of Horrigan’s research was that he identified several factors 
that might impact on the ratios calculated.  These included cyclical conditions and seasonal 
factors both of which made it more difficult to make meaningful comparison of financial 
performance over a number of accounting periods (1965:563).  He also observed that ratios 
that included variables which were short-term in nature were more volatile and subject to 
greater fluctuation than those comprised of variables that were long-term in nature 
(1965:562). Most notably he recognised that the accounting policies selected by an 
organisation would have a significant impact on the financial statements produced and 
ratios calculated (1965:566).  Despite these factors he concluded that ratios remained a 
useful way in which to analyse financial data (1965:568).   
Although Horrigan’s research focused on manufacturing companies in the USA, the factors 
that he identified are still important and relevant today.  As long as we are aware of these 
factors, ratio analysis remains a useful technique for analysing the financial performance of 
business organisations. 
Beaver (1966) was one of the first studies to examine whether ratios could be used to 
predict company failure.  Beaver paired 79 companies operating in 38 different industries 
that had failed during the period 1954-64 (1966:73) with 79 non-failed companies of a 
similar size and operating in the same industries (1966:74).  Through the calculation of 30 
ratios (1966:78), the financial performance of companies was analysed for five years prior to 
their failure (1966:77).   To assist analysis the 30 ratios selected were classified into six 
groups covering cash flow, profitability, debt to total assets, liquid assets to total assets, 
liquid assets to current liabilities, and asset turnover (1966:78). 
Like Horrigan (1965), Beaver concluded that not all ratios were equally useful, and a 
complete analysis of financial performance could be carried out using just a few carefully 
selected ratios (1966:101).  Whilst cash flow to total debt was the most useful ratio for 
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classifying failed firms in the year immediately prior to failure (1966:89), Beaver commented 
that the current ratio and acid test were less useful in predicting failure (1966:91).   His 
analysis found that failed companies had lower cash flow; a smaller amount of liquid assets 
(1966:80); and in the years before failure experienced slower growth in their asset bases 
(1966:81). He also observed that companies with worsening ratios found it more difficult to 
obtain funds from banks and other lenders which further exacerbated their problems 
(1966:101).  Beaver agreed with Horrigan (1965) that ratio analysis could help predict 
company failure several years before it occurred (1966:91). 
Perhaps the biggest difficulty that Beaver encountered was not with ratios but the quality of 
accounting data (1966:99) and the accounting policies selected which made like for like 
comparison of companies difficult.  In particular he referred to the different ways in which 
companies accounted for leased assets, which impacted on both profit and capital 
employed (1966:100). 
Although Beaver’s study looked at a relatively small sample of mostly manufacturing 
companies based in the USA, it was a ground-breaking piece of research that clearly showed 
ratios can be used to predict company failure.  One limitation (that Beaver himself 
acknowledged) is that it was not possible to say how many companies in the non-failed 
sample were saved because of the predictive ability of ratios (1966:101).  Although Beaver 
concluded that cash flow to total debt was the best predictor of corporate failure, Altman 
(1968 and 2000) excluded this ratio from his analysis since there was no consistent 
definition of ‘cash flow’ (Altman 2000:8).  Taffler (1983) questioned Beaver’s use of non-
failed rather than solvent companies.  Taffler explained that a sample of non-failed 
companies might include some companies that were near to bankruptcy and would fail in 
the short-term.  By clearly identifying a sample of solvent companies Beaver could have 
instead compared these with his sample of insolvent companies (1983:297). 
Building on the work of Horrigan (1965) and Beaver (1966), using a sample of 63 companies 
whose shares were traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Laurent (1979) calculated 45 
ratios for each company together with the mean and standard deviation for his sample 
(1979:403).  He used this to determine those ten ratios that contained most of the 
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information identified in the full set of ratios (1979:401).  In this way analysts could evaluate 
the financial state of a company using just a few key ratios. 
The final ratios selected covered all aspects of the financial profile of a company including 
profitability, solvency, efficiency and working capital management, and capital structure, 
and Laurent concluded that using just ten ratios did not result in a significant loss of 
financial information (1979:405).  He explained that if initial analysis identified concern with 
a particular aspect of performance, further ratios could be calculated focusing on the 
problem area (1979:412). 
This was useful research as it is much easier to calculate and interpret the findings of just a 
few ratios.  However Laurent’s research was based on a sample of companies from the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange that used different accounting standards to UK companies.  In addition 
his sample excluded those companies that did not have significant levels of inventory which 
might limit the usefulness of his analysis and its application to service sector organisations. 
Gupta and Huefner (1972) demonstrated that ratios could be used to identify basic industry 
characteristics.  Applying six ratios to 20 industries in the manufacturing sector, they were 
able to identify groups of industries that had similar values of a particular ratio (1972:82).  
Their results suggested that companies could compare performance against industry 
averages or adjust to match specific industry average ratios (1972:91).  Although an 
interesting application of ratios Gupta and Huefner’s research was based on manufacturing 
industries in the USA which meant companies with very low inventory levels were excluded.   
Falk and Heintz (1975) selected five ratios and using published accounting data for 1970-71 
calculated average ratios for 41 different industries in the USA (1975:774).  The five ratios 
covered liquidity (total assets / working capital, average accounts receivable / sales), 
efficiency (non-current assets / total assets, average total assets / sales), and debt (debt / 
equity) (1975:764) and were structured so that the higher a ratio, the greater the level of 
risk indicated (1975:769).  Based on ratios calculated Falk and Heintz were able to rank 
industries in terms of the degree of risk attached to them.  
Their analysis produced some interesting results.  Higher levels of non-current assets as a 
proportion of total assets might indicate use of specialist assets.  This made it more difficult 
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for companies to quickly adapt to change thereby increasing the level of risk attached to 
that industry (1975:764).  High debt to equity indicated more cash flow was necessary to 
service debt which again increased risk and might result in the payment of smaller dividends 
to shareholders (1975:765).  
Falk and Heintz concluded that use of these ratios did enable industries to be ranked in 
terms of risk, which might be useful for investors (1975:774).  They also suggested their 
analysis could be expanded to cover more industries.  However their analysis also 
demonstrated that care had to be taken when interpreting accounting ratios.  Ratios that 
used figures for assets were affected by whether non-current assets had been re-valued or 
were held at historic cost (1975:764).  In addition asset values and profit were affected by 
whether companies leased or purchased non-current assets (1975:768).  Finally they noted 
that in some industries compliance with regulation meant companies had no choice other 
than to operate with a specific figure for certain ratios (1975:768).  Although an interesting 
piece of research the authors based their analysis on the results of just five accounting 
ratios applied across 41 different industries in the USA.   
Whittington (1980) explained that the basic assumption of ratio analysis was 
proportionality.  In other words the technique assumed a linear relationship between two or 
more variables (1980:219).  Building on previous research he identified several potential 
problems in using ratios to analyse financial performance.  These included situations when 
the relationship between two variables was non-linear, for example where there were 
increasing or decreasing returns to scale (1980:223).  It followed that ratios were valid over 
only a specific range of variables, so for example to increase sales might require a reduction 
in a company’s profit margin which would be reflected in the ratios calculated (1980:225).  
Of most concern to Whittington was that the calculation of ratios was based on historic 
information which meant past performance was used to forecast future performance.  In a 
dynamic, constantly changing business environment what happened in the past was not 
always relevant in forecasting future performance.  For this reason Whittington commented 
that factors such as high inflation and mergers reduced the effectiveness of ratios 
(1980:226). 
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Like Horrigan (1965) and Beaver (1966), Whittington also concluded that ratios were only as 
good as the accounting information on which they were based.  Biased accounting 
information or errors in financial statements would adversely impact on both the ratios 
calculated and their usefulness (1980:229).  Whittington clearly identified several potential 
limitations in using ratios and these can be taken into consideration when analysing the 
ratios calculated.   
Lev (1969) examined whether companies adjusted their ratios to match industry averages.  
Using a sample of 245 companies in the USA and published financial statements covering 
the period 1947-66, he calculated six ratios representing liquidity, asset turnover, debt and 
Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) (1969:293). 
His research suggested that over time companies adjusted their accounting ratios to meet 
industry averages (1969:298).  Where changes occurred in the industry average Lev 
observed that companies would consider whether these were the result of a short-term 
fluctuation (in which case there was no point in a company adjusting its ratios), or a 
fundamental change that was expected to persist (1969:297).  In addition some ratios were 
based on long-term variables such as sales revenue, equity and debt; these were under less 
direct control by managers and hence more difficult to adjust in the short-term (1969:296).   
Although Lev’s study focused on companies based in the USA and was limited to just six key 
accounting ratios, it remains an important piece of research.  However Lev’s sample 
contained only those companies that remained in operation during the 20 years under 
review and was hence biased.  In addition Lev did not consider whether those companies 
that didn’t change in line with industry averages performed better or worse than those that 
adjusted.   
Barnes (1987) also found evidence that companies tried to achieve industry averages 
(1987:449), and agreed with Laurent (1979) and Horrigan (1965) that the calculation of just 
a few carefully selected accounting ratios was required to establish a complete 
understanding of a company’s financial performance (1987:456). 
Research by Lev (1969), Laurent (1979), and Barnes relied heavily on the current ratio 
(current assets / current liabilities).  Whilst companies that failed often had a current ratio 
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that was below the industry average, research by Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Bird and 
McHugh (1977), Houghton and Woodliff (1987) and others cast doubt on the predictive 
ability of this ratio.  Of more significance is the make-up of an organisation’s liquid assets. 
Building on research by Lev (1969), Bird and McHugh (1977) focused their study on a 
random sample of 50 companies from the food, electrical and accommodation sectors, 
whose shares were quoted on the Sydney Stock Exchange in November 1972.  Using 
published financial data for each company covering the period 1966-71, Bird and McHugh 
calculated the same five ratios for each year to establish whether companies adjusted 
towards industry averages (1977:30).  The ratios selected by Bird and McHugh covered 
liquidity (current and quick ratios), gearing, profitability (ROCE) and efficiency (after tax 
return on assets) (1977:30).  
Their results indicated that mean ratios were different for each industry (1977:31) and 
within each industry companies tried to maintain ratios in line with the industry average 
(1977:43).  They also observed that ratios allowed comparison to be made with a company’s 
closest rivals (1977:43).  Although they recognised that operating at the industry average 
was not necessarily the best position for all companies, Bird and McHugh recommended 
that further investigation was advisable where there were significant differences between a 
company’s performance and the industry average (1978:43).  Bird and McHugh also 
demonstrated that for all industries the current ratio and acid test were well below the 2:1 
and 1:1 levels first suggested by researchers during the early twentieth century (1977:35) 
and cast further doubt on the usefulness of these two ratios.   
Like Whittington (1980), Horrigan (1965) and others they suggested the quality of financial 
data needed to improve (1977:43) observing that accounting terminology and the format of 
financial information were not standardised even within each industry, so when calculating 
ratios it was often difficult to compare like with like.   
Although a valuable investigation into the usefulness of ratios, Bird and McHugh only 
considered companies that remained in business during the whole period under review.  
Their results would have been enhanced had they also made comparison with companies 
that became insolvent during this period. 
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Using financial data from 1975 for 700 companies operating in 45 industries in the UK, 
Bougen and Drury (1980) calculated the mean and standard deviation of seven accounting 
ratios for each industry and used this to establish the position of each company relative to 
these benchmarks (1980:39). 
Their results indicated that the current ratio, acid test, inventory turnover and receivables 
turnover ratios each showed clustering around the mean with some extreme results 
(1980:46).  Gearing is determined by a company’s reliance on debt and so the distribution 
ranged from zero upwards (1980:45).  The ROCE and profit margin each had similar 
distributions which the authors suggested was due to the common variable used in 
calculating each ratio (profit before interest and tax) (1980:45).  Bougen and Drury 
suggested that instead of indicating financial difficulties, ratios that differed significantly to 
the industry mean might instead be the result of different strategies being pursued by a 
company (1980:40).  It was therefore desirable for analysts to have a greater understanding 
of the characteristics of ratio distributions (1980:40).  Although a useful piece of research 
that built on the work of Lev (1969) and focused on UK companies, since their analysis was 
based on just one year of accounting data it is likely that exceptional or one-off items 
impacted significantly on their results. 
Schmidgall and DeFranco (2004) based their research on a random sample of 500 clubs in 
the USA including golf, soccer, swimming, shooting and riding clubs (2004:2).  Although non-
profit making organisations, Schmidgall and DeFranco recognised these must remain 
financially viable whilst providing an acceptable level of service to members (2004:1).  As 
well as requesting copies of the most recent financial statements, they asked general 
managers to rank up to ten accounting ratios considered most useful in assessing the 
financial performance of their organisations.  They received 85 responses, 77% of which 
were from golf or country clubs (2004:4) and on average respondents identified just 5 ratios 
used on a regular basis, with payroll as a percentage of revenue considered the most 
important (2004:5). 
Using the financial statements provided, Schmidgall and DeFranco calculated the same 16 
ratios for each club together with industry mean and median figures.   They suggested these 
could be used to benchmark performance against competitors or industry averages (2004:1) 
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and concluded that ratio analysis could be an ‘Invaluable management tool’ (2004:14).  
Although an interesting study into the use of ratios in the not for profit sector, their findings 
were based on a relatively small sample and just one year of accounting data which would 
make it difficult to identify anomalies caused by the occurrence of one-off items. 
2.4.3 The quality of financial statements 
In establishing the usefulness of ratios several authors including Horrigan (1965), Beaver 
(1966), Bird and McHugh (1977) and Whittington (1980) expressed concerns about the 
quality of financial information and how this might impact on ratios calculated.  During the 
last 50 years accounting standards have brought some consistency to the accounting 
treatment of certain transactions and improved the quality of financial statements. 
However in recent years we have witnessed the growing importance of intangible assets 
and with internally generated intangibles excluded from the SFP, many have questioned the 
usefulness of financial statements.  Beaver et al (2005) looked at whether the development 
of accounting standards and issues concerning the inclusion of intangible assets had 
impacted on the usefulness of ratios (2005:93). 
Using published accounting information from companies listed on the NYSE, Beaver et al 
examined a sample of bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies during the period 1962-2002.  
To improve analysis the sample was split into two periods.  The first period focused on 
1962-93, during which the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued over 150 
accounting standards in the USA.  The second period covered 1994-2002, a time that saw 
huge growth in the importance of intangibles (2005:94). 
Their sample comprised 544 bankrupt firms and 4,237 non-bankrupt firms (2005:97).  
Beaver et al used just three ratios that measured return on assets, cash flow to liabilities, 
and debt to equity (2005:98) calculating these for each failed company in the four years 
prior to bankruptcy.  These results were then compared with the average ratios of non-
bankrupt companies over the whole period (2005:100).  
Beaver et al found that the introduction of accounting standards had enhanced the quality 
of financial statements which in turn improved the predictive ability of ratios (2005:94).  
However through breaking down their sample into two periods they could identify that 
improvements in quality were offset by two factors.   
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The application of a small number of accounting standards allowed some discretion in the 
way a transaction could be recorded (2005:94).  This meant that one company’s application 
of a standard might differ slightly to another’s.  They also recognised that during the period 
1994-2002 intangible assets had become increasingly important.  However as these were 
often excluded from a company’s financial statements, potentially significant variables were 
omitted from the ratios calculated.  Beaver et al suggested that these two factors had offset 
improvements in the quality of financial statements and resulted in a very slight decline in 
the predictive ability of ratios during the period 1994-2002 when compared with 1962-93 
(2005:110). 
Despite this slight decline in the predictive ability of ratios, Beaver et al concluded that the 
ratios of failed companies did show significant deterioration up to four years before 
bankruptcy (2005:100).  It should be noted this research was based on companies in the 
USA that used standards issued by the FASB and although Beaver et al observed some 
discretion in the application of certain accounting standards, they could not be sure 
whether discretion had increased or was simply being better reported than previously 
(2005:95). 
To improve the quality, transparency and comparability of financial statements, IFRSs were 
introduced into the EU from 1 January 2005.    Prior to this each country in the EU had 
issued its own accounting standards so the introduction of IFRSs greatly improved the 
consistency with which transactions were recorded.  Using published financial statements 
for a sample of 91 companies quoted on the Finnish stock exchange Lantto and Sahlström 
(2009) examined the impact of the adoption of IFRSs on the calculation of eight key 
accounting ratios (2009:349).   
One significant change brought about by IFRSs was that purchased goodwill was no longer 
amortised over its useful life and this helped explain why profitability ratios increased by up 
to 19% following the introduction of IFRSs (2009:343).  This in turn increased EPS by a 
similar amount but caused Price-Earnings to fall by around 11% (2009:343).  In addition they 
noted that the use of fair value to calculate some financial instruments increased liabilities 
and hence gearing by almost 3% (2009:343).   
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Lantto and Sahlström based their research on companies that had previously used Finnish 
accounting standards.  In the UK, accounting standards issued during the previous decade 
were closely linked to the requirements of IFRSs.  This meant the introduction of IFRSs 
possibly had less impact on UK companies and hence on ratios calculated.  In addition 
Lantto and Sahlström only used one year of financial information which meant figures for 
some companies might have been distorted by one-off items and other anomalies. 
2.4.4 Summary of section 2.4 
The preceding review of literature shows that accounting ratios are a useful tool with which 
to evaluate the financial performance of an organisation.  Although the usefulness of ratios 
is affected by a number of factors including changes in accounting policies, the issue of new 
accounting standards and the quality of financial statements, research by Beaver et al 
(2005), Altman (2000), and Agerwal and Taffler (2007) indicated the technique had 
remained robust over a number of years.  In addition if we are aware of these factors we 
can take them into consideration in our analysis. 
2.5 Analysing the financial state of European club football 
In our review of literature on the objectives of sporting clubs and need for increased 
financial regulation we established that several authors made use of accounting ratios in 
their research including Arnold (1991), Szymanski and Hall (2003), Andreff (2007), Vrooman 
(2007) and Zoccali (2012).  This section will consider further academic studies that have 
used ratios and published accounting information to evaluate the financial state of 
European club football.  To assist understanding studies are grouped together by country. 
2.5.1 Portugal 
Using ratio analysis and published accounting information provided by Deloitte, Barros 
(2006) examined the financial performance of each club in Portugal’s top division during 
2002.  He explained that in terms of revenue the Portuguese League lagged behind Europe’s 
five largest leagues (2006:97) and as a consequence the sale of players provided an 
important inflow of cash for all clubs.  However, in the long run the sale of its best players 
might adversely affect both the quality and popularity of Portuguese league football 
(2006:98). 
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The pursuit of win maximisation combined with failure to control players’ wages meant 
several clubs made losses (2006:97), and financial assistance from local and central 
government provided little incentive for clubs to improve this position (2006:100). He 
concluded that the relationship between clubs and local and national government needed 
to be more transparent and greater financial regulation by UEFA was necessary.  Although 
Barros clearly summarised financial problems in Portuguese football his analysis was based 
on just one year of information.   
Using annual reports and accounting ratios for the period 2008-12, Silva and Filipe (2013) 
investigated the financial performance of four leading clubs in Portugal.  They used a 
number of accounting ratios including Return On Equity (ROE), solvency (equity / liabilities) 
and financial autonomy (equity / assets) (2013:500) to evaluate how clubs could achieve 
both sporting and financial success (2013:494).   
They concluded that to be successful clubs had to focus on a number of principles 
(2013:496) including control of player costs (2013:496); investment in the development of 
players who could later be sold for a profit (2013:497); and developing teams that would 
achieve sporting success on a regular basis (2013:498). The implication being that sporting 
success enabled clubs to generate higher levels of revenue which could be invested in better 
players to achieve further sporting success.  
Although they raised some interesting points Silva and Filipe’s research was based on a 
sample of just four clubs all of which had achieved sporting success and earned additional 
revenue through participation in European competitions during the period under review.  It 
would have been useful to also consider clubs that did not achieve sporting success.  The 
authors also needed to more clearly explain the rationale behind their choice of ratios. 
2.5.2 Spain 
Ascari and Gagnepain (2006) used accounting information provided by the Liga National de 
Futbol Profesional (LFP) to evaluate the financial performance of Spanish football clubs.  The 
LFP was established during the early 1980s after several clubs had debts cleared by the 
government (2006:78).  To help prevent a recurrence, clubs in Spain’s first and second 
divisions were required to submit budgeted financial statements before the start of each 
season (2006:78).  
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Ascari and Gagnepain explained that clubs were usually run by a President elected by 
supporters.  A President’s term in office was judged in terms of playing success rather than 
financial return, and this would often lead to reckless spending (2006:77).  In addition an 
important characteristic of Spanish football was the regional identity of some clubs 
including Barcelona (Catalonia), Athletic Bilbao (Basque) and Real Madrid (2006:77).  These 
clubs were often backed by regional banks and local authorities (2006:77) which provided a 
soft budget constraint. 
They observed that several clubs were over-reliant on broadcasting revenue (2006:79), 
however with contracts negotiated on an individual basis the best supported clubs received 
most revenue resulting in significant disparities (2006:80).  They also explained that some 
broadcasters overestimated the value of football and faced with their own financial 
difficulties were forced to re-negotiate contracts (2006:80).  This further exacerbated 
financial problems for clubs that had already committed to players’ contracts based on 
revenue expected from their original broadcasting agreements (2006:85). 
Between 1998-2003 players’ costs increased at a faster rate than revenue, resulting in losses 
for many clubs (2006:82).  High amortisation charges reflected the rise in transfer fees 
during this period (2006:83) and meant for several clubs’ intangibles became the largest 
asset on the SFP (2006:86).  Since no club experienced problems in satisfying the financial 
requirements of the LFP, Ascari and Gagnepain suggested that because of continued 
support from local authorities’ Spanish clubs had less severe financial problems than clubs in 
the rest of Europe (2006:87).   
The findings of Ascari and Gagnepain were based on budgeted information provided by 
clubs to the LFP.  Bosca et al (2008) observed this was often very different to actual revenue 
and expenditure reported in published financial statements (2008:166).  Their conclusions 
also conflicted with the findings of Barajas and Rodríguez (2010) who explained that twice in 
the last 25 years the Spanish government had been required to write off significant amounts 
owed by clubs (2010:53).  High levels of debt and disparities in revenue provided further 
evidence that severe financial problems existed in Spanish football.   
Rather than using LFP figures Bosca et al (2008) based their research on information 
collected from the annual reports of all clubs that played in La Liga from 1995-2002 
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(2008:167) and their analysis focused primarily on sources of revenue, control of costs and 
levels of debt.  Boscá et al were very critical of the quality of annual reports explaining these 
were often published late and contained qualified auditors’ reports that questioned both 
the accuracy and reliability of financial statements (2008:165).  Perhaps of most concern 
were large variations between initial budgets submitted to the LFP and actual figures 
reported in published financial statements.  As a consequence budgets tended to 
‘Overestimate income and underestimate expenditure’ (2008:171).   This led them to 
question the findings of both Ascari and Gagnepain (2006) and Lago et al (2006) which were 
based on analysis of LFP budgets (2008:166).   
In 2002-03 expenditure on players’ costs amounted to around 120% of aggregate revenue 
generated by La Liga (2008:171), and several clubs were forced to raise funds through the 
disposal of key assets including stadia and training facilities (2008:168).  With Real Madrid 
and Barcelona receiving around 40% of La Liga’s aggregate revenue (2008:172), there were 
significant disparities in the resources available to clubs (2008:173).  Unlike Ascari and 
Gagnepain (2006) Boscá et al concluded that Spanish football had severe financial problems 
and greater regulation was necessary to resolve this (2008:175). 
Using financial statements and accounting ratios for 2007 and 2008, Barajas and Rodríguez 
(2010) evaluated the financial performance of 19 clubs in La Liga and 16 clubs in the Spanish 
second division (2010:55).  The ratios covered liquidity (current ratio), debt (total debt / 
total assets, total debt / total revenue, interest cover), profitability (ROCE, ROE) and control 
of costs (staff costs / revenue) (2010:56).  Their analysis showed that 89% of clubs in their 
sample reported operating losses; 34% had debt in excess of total assets; and 51% of second 
division clubs were technically insolvent (2010:64). 
Barajas and Rodríguez explained that financial crises were not new to Spanish football.  In 
1985 public authorities had written off debt of €124 million and in 1991 a further €192 
million of debt was cancelled, though in return all but four clubs were converted into 
Sporting Limited Companies (SADs) which resulted in greater financial regulation (2010:53). 
Despite this Barajas and Rodríguez criticised the quality of financial statements in their 
sample, observing that just 20% of clubs had a clean audit report.  The nature of audit 
qualifications related to the valuation of players, levels of shareholders’ equity, and ability 
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of clubs to remain in operation (2010:54). They concluded that from a financial perspective 
Spanish football was in a very perilous state.  Although an interesting piece of research, 
Barajas and Rodríguez considered just two accounting periods which was insufficient to 
properly identify trends in financial performance.     
Using financial and other information covering the period 1994-2005, Barros et al (2008) 
studied how efficiently clubs controlled costs by breaking down the Spanish first division 
into segments comprised of clubs with similar financial characteristics (2008:452).  Their 
analysis focused on the two largest costs, wages and amortisation.  These were compared 
with points attained to identify the most cost-efficient clubs in La Liga (2008:457).  
Their results indicated that the lowest cost efficiency was shown by two clubs each 
supported by wealthy owners more interested in playing success than financial return 
(2008:461).  The most cost-efficient club spent just two seasons in La Liga during which it 
faced tight financial constraints (2008:462).  Based on cost structures Barros et al were able 
to identify different segments of clubs playing in La Liga.  They suggested clubs should be 
aware of which segment they belonged to and choose appropriate cost and business 
strategies so resources were utilised efficiently (2008:462). In this way clubs were more 
likely to operate within their financial constraints.  Like several previous studies Barros et al 
criticised the quality of financial information produced by Spanish football clubs.   
Using multivariate ratio analysis in the form of Altman’s Z-score, Barajas and Rodríguez 
(2014) analysed the financial performance of Spanish football clubs during the period 2007-
11 (2014:5).  Their study was based on a sample of 173 annual reports from clubs in Spain’s 
first and second divisions (2014:23).  They also used univariate ratio analysis to examine the 
causes of worsening total debt / total assets, total debt / total revenue, negative working 
capital, and declining levels of equity (2014:12). 
Promotion and relegation encouraged clubs to spend heavily on players in pursuit of win 
maximisation and meant any club that focused on profit maximisation was likely to be 
relegated (2014:10). Using Altman’s Z-score for non-manufacturing companies showed that 
in 2011 all but one club in the first division and ten second division clubs were at risk of 
bankruptcy (2014:5).  With several clubs unable to meet short-term liabilities, Barajas and 
Rodríguez calculated that an injection of aggregate equity was required amounting to 
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€630m for division 1 clubs and €275m for division 2 clubs (2014:16).  Following a review of 
auditors’ reports they concluded that financial problems might actually be worse than those 
shown in financial statements (2014:17).  Although an interesting application of Altman’s Z-
score (which was not constructed for use with football clubs), Barajas and Rodríguez made 
no reference to the role of soft debt or support from wealthy owners. 
2.5.3 Greece 
Using financial information from 17 clubs that played at least one season in the Greek first 
division between 1994-2004, Panagiotis (2009) examined those factors that contributed 
towards the poor financial performance of football clubs (2009:162).  His analysis made use 
of accounting ratios that examined profitability, liquidity, efficiency and capital structure, 
together with other variables that impacted on financial performance including league 
position and number of wins in a season, each of which affected attendance and hence 
matchday receipts (2009:163). 
Panagiotis observed that profitable clubs had higher levels of cash and were less reliant on 
debt, which in turn meant they had more resources to invest in improving playing 
performance (2009:165).  He concluded that in the short run the financial performance of 
clubs was affected by playing success and levels of uncertainty surrounding the outcome of 
matches, both of which affected attendances (2009:165).  Panagiotis (2010) later expanded 
his study to cover the period 1993-2006 for the same 17 clubs (2010:13).   
Government legislation during the late 1970s meant professional football clubs in Greece 
had to operate as public limited companies (2010:7).  However poor financial performance 
meant few could raise sufficient funds from stock markets which left several reliant on 
support provided by wealthy individuals, the local community and public authorities 
(2010:12). Like other European leagues the focus of Greek clubs was primarily on playing 
success (2010:10), and although they were required to submit budgeted income and 
expenditure figures to the Professional Athletics Committee before the start of each season 
(2010:12), Panagiotis questioned how much notice was taken of this, as analysis of 
published financial statements showed several clubs with negative equity (2010:13). 
Poor control of costs and rising levels of debt (2010:16) meant several clubs struggled to 
remain financially viable (2010:18).  He also suggested that disparities in resources would in 
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the long run adversely impact on the level of competition in Greek football (2010:18).  He 
was critical of both club directors who were willing to gamble on success (2010:20), and the 
Greek government which had provided financial assistance for several well supported clubs 
that found themselves in difficulty (2010:20) 
Panagiotis concluded that there was a need for improved financial management in Greek 
football and suggested clubs would benefit through using accounting techniques including 
ratios to evaluate performance (2010:23), and a balanced scorecard approach to ensure 
playing and financial performance complemented each other (2010:24).  He also 
recommended the introduction of salary caps and revenue sharing to redress competitive 
balance (2010:25).  These recommendations were very ambitious and larger clubs were 
unlikely to accept measures to re-distribute wealth.  
2.5.4 Italy 
Using accounting information from Deloitte and focusing on sources of revenue and control 
of costs, Baroncelli and Lago (2006) argued that pursuit of playing success meant several 
clubs in Italy’s Serie A had invested heavily in players (2006:20).  Without the support of a 
wealthy benefactor this was a risky strategy and clubs that failed to achieve sporting success 
were left with huge debts (2006:22).  Between 1990-2002 aggregate revenue for Serie A 
clubs increased by 216%, however wages increased by 453% (2006:14).  In 2002-03 wages 
amounted to 88% of aggregate revenue (2006:19) and several clubs reported losses.  
Baroncelli and Lago believed that clubs were too reliant on revenue from television 
(2006:18), and with broadcasting rights negotiated on an individual basis most revenue 
went to the largest and best supported clubs.  As financial problems worsened several clubs 
were forced to sell players at less than market value increasing losses further still.  
With stadia usually owned by local authorities the authors noted that many clubs already 
had a low asset base, and this was reduced further through downward pressure on transfer 
fees which adversely impacted on the carrying value of players’ registrations.   This made it 
difficult for clubs to raise new funds through borrowing or issuing shares (2006:16).   
The authors were also highly critical of the quality of financial information suggesting that 
often transfer fees between Italian clubs were not correctly reported, with clubs overstating 
the value of players to avoid bankruptcy (2006:19).   In addition a lack of available funds 
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meant several clubs had paid players’ wages late or ‘Under the table to avoid paying taxes 
on them’ (2006:20).  The financial situation became so critical that in 2003 the Italian 
government was forced to intervene and issued the decreto salva calcio (2006:14). 
To help control costs the Italian League introduced a rule that prevented clubs spending 
more than 70% of total revenue on players’ wages.  However this further increased 
disparities between the largest and smallest clubs (2006:24).  Poor quality financial 
information and the impact of the decreto salva calcio meant the financial crisis in Italian 
football may have been even worse than suggested by Baroncelli and Lago.   
Boeri and Severgnini (2012) explained losses made by Italian clubs were due to an over 
reliance on broadcasting revenue that left them exposed to changes in the amounts 
broadcasters were willing to pay to televise live matches; huge growth in players’ wages; the 
adverse impact of match rigging and betting scandals; and the poor quality of some matches 
which reduced attendances and hence matchday receipts (2012:1).  They also remarked 
that a high prevalence of counterfeit goods meant clubs in Italy generated much less 
commercial revenue than those in other major European leagues (2012:7).  Soft budget 
constraints meant many clubs operated as though they were ‘Too popular to fail’ (2012:11), 
and the true scale of losses was often hidden by manipulation of profits (2012:4).   
2.5.5 England 
Using financial statements for 20 EPL clubs during the period 2001-10, Wilson et al (2013) 
examined the relationship between financial performance, league position and ownership 
model (2013:19).  As well as percentage changes in revenue and profit after tax, Wilson et al 
calculated five accounting ratios that focused on key aspects of financial performance 
including profitability, liquidity and debt (2013:26).  Clubs were ranked in terms of each 
performance indicator (2013:26).  Each performance indicator was given an equal weighting 
and an overall score calculated (2013:26).  The lower the overall score, the better a club’s 
financial performance (2013:26).   
Wilson et al identified three types of ownership in the EPL.  The foreign ownership model 
(2013:23) involved wealthy overseas investors who often operated their club as a loss-
making trophy asset (2013:20).  The stock market model was popular during the mid to late 
1990s when several football clubs were listed on the London Stock Exchange (2013:23).  The 
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third type was the domestic private investor, which was like the foreign ownership model 
though Wilson et al suggested the UK owner ‘Often has an emotional attachment to a 
particular club’ (2013:24). 
Their findings ‘Indicated that better financial performance is moderately associated with 
better sporting performance in the EPL’ (2013:28).  They also pointed out that clubs under 
foreign ownership often had high debt but enjoyed better playing success (2013:29). 
Plumley et al (2017) produced a Performance Assessment Model (PAM) comprised of three 
sporting and five financial performance indicators and applied this to data for 21 clubs that 
played in the EPL during 1992-2013 (2017:12).  Clubs were ranked in terms of each indicator 
and an average overall performance score was established for every club, with a lower score 
indicating better performance (2017:10).  Their results were consistent with the findings of 
Wilson et al (2013) that better financial performance is ‘moderately and positively 
associated with better’ sporting performance (2017:16).  Their analysis showed large 
disparity between the best and worst performing clubs, and that several clubs had wide 
variations in performance during the period (2017:18).  Of most concern was that 13 clubs 
demonstrated neither good sporting nor good financial performance (2017:16).  Although 
their model focused on sporting and financial objectives, Plumley et al recognised that the 
objectives of owners would also impact on clubs, and these were likely to change over time 
especially after a club was acquired by new owners (2017:19).  They also acknowledged that 
their PAM looked at just one football league (2017:21). 
Barros and Leach (2006) looked at how efficiently clubs in the EPL operated during the 
period 1998-2003 (2006:401).    They explained that inputs in the form of players’ wages, 
amortisation, stadium costs and other operating expenses were transformed into outputs 
that they summarised as ‘Points, attendance and turnover’ (2006:392).  Their results 
indicated that clubs could be broken down into four categories.   
Elite clubs were primarily focused on sporting success and had the resources necessary to 
achieve this.  These three clubs generated further revenue from regular participation in the 
latter stages of the UEFA Champions League (2006:392).  Below the elite were four or five 
clubs that aspired to qualify for the Champions League.  The next category comprised nine 
or ten clubs that would neither get relegated nor challenge for participation in European 
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competition.  Finally they identified a category made up of clubs trying to avoid relegation, 
these were often newly promoted with lower levels of resources available to them 
(2006:394).    
Barros and Leach recognised the role of ‘exogenous shocks’ (2006:392) such as the 
acquisition of Chelsea by Roman Abramovich in June 2003.  This type of event radically 
altered both the resources available to a club and its objectives.  They also noted that clubs 
who aspired to join the elite group had sometimes encountered financial problems, 
referring to the high-risk strategy adopted by Leeds United (2006:395). 
They concluded that several clubs were over-reliant on broadcasting revenue which was 
used to fund players’ costs (2006:406).  Since Barros and Leach studied only those clubs that 
remained in the EPL during the period under review their analysis was based on a relatively 
small sample of just 12 clubs, giving a total of 60 observations (2006:401).   
To investigate why increased revenue had not resulted in a corresponding rise in profit, 
Lonsdale (2004) examined the supply chain for clubs in the EPL.  He argued that revenue 
from the sale of tickets and club related merchandise provided evidence that clubs enjoyed 
a profitable relationship with supporters (2004:387). 
He also suggested that clubs enjoyed power over BSkyB, reasoning that retaining the 
exclusive rights to live matches distinguished the broadcaster from rivals and was central to 
its survival.  As a consequence when negotiating new broadcasting contracts BSkyB was 
forced to pay higher amounts in order to retain its monopoly position (2004:386).   
However he recognised that revenue generation was closely related to playing success 
which depended on being able to attract the best players.  These were in short supply and 
sought by clubs across Europe which meant a large proportion of revenue was spent on 
transfer fees and wages.  The Bosman ruling gave players even greater power over clubs by 
allowing them to leave for no transfer fee at the end of their contracts (2004:389).  He 
concluded that increasing debt, wages and transfer fees gave cause for concern (2004:390). 
Szymanski (2010) considered the impact of the global financial crisis on the EPL.   Using 
published information on income and match attendances from both 1929 and the early 
1980s, periods when Britain was in recession, he illustrated the stability of the football 
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sector (2010:33).  In most business sectors high levels of competition and a failure to adapt 
to changing consumer tastes might result in insolvency, however the location of a football 
club meant it would always have a core audience though this would fluctuate depending on 
playing success (2010:37).      
He concluded that the global financial crisis impacted more on owners than clubs and cited 
West Ham as an example due to (then) owner Bjorgolfur Gudmundsson, having lost a 
significant amount of his personal wealth following the collapse of an Icelandic bank in 
which he was an investor (2010:38).  He also explained that due to the way in which the 
purchases of Liverpool and Manchester United were financed, although the owners might 
struggle to meet debt repayments it was unlikely either club would go out of business 
(2010:38).  Given their reliance on broadcasting revenue perhaps the biggest threat for most 
clubs would be the withdrawal of BSkyB.  Surprisingly Szymanski made no reference to this.   
2.5.6 Summary of section 2.5 
Research into the financial performance of football clubs in Europe identified that growth in 
revenue was not accompanied by an increase in profits and this was primarily due to clubs 
spending heavily in pursuit of playing success.  Several studies identified that many clubs 
were heavily in debt; over-reliant on broadcasting revenue; and dependent on the soft 
budget constraints provided by wealthy owners or local government.  Worryingly several 
studies also commented on the poor quality of financial statements.  Although several 
authors recommended that greater financial regulation was required, none agreed on the 
precise form this should take.  Using quantitative and qualitative research methods this 
thesis will address a gap in literature by examining how the prevalence of a soft budget 
constraint and stricter financial regulation impacted on the performance of clubs in the EPL.  
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Chapter 3 - Methodology and data collection 
3.1 Overview of chapter 
This chapter explains the methodology and research methods employed in this study.  It 
considers research philosophies and methodologies traditionally used in accounting 
research and outlines limitations in these.  It explains in detail the quantitative and 
qualitative research methods utilised in this study together with the rationale for these. 
3.2 Research philosophies 
Wisker (2008) explained that ‘Research is about asking and beginning to answer questions, 
seeking knowledge and understanding of the world and its processes, and testing 
assumptions and beliefs’ (2008:51).  Saunders et al (2012) observed that this involved ‘An 
explanation of the method or methods used to collect the data, will argue why the results 
obtained are meaningful and will explain any limitations that are associated with them’ 
(2012:5).  Gordon and Porter (2009) commented that academic research had helped to 
create new knowledge and develop the practice of accounting (2009:3).   
The way in which an individual carries out research is affected by assumptions about how 
they see the world and obtain knowledge (Wisker 2008:65, Gaffikin 1988:16).  Saunders et 
al explained ‘The research philosophy that you adopt can be thought of as your assumptions 
about the way in which you view the world’ (2012:128).  It is important that we are aware of 
research philosophies since these will impact upon our choice of methodology and research 
methods (Wisker 2008:66, Blumberg et al 2011:16).    
To understand research philosophy we must first consider ontology and epistemology.  
Ontology is the assumptions a researcher makes about how the world operates (Bisman 
2010:5, Grix 2001:26) and these can be broken down into objectivism and constructivism 
(Grix 2001:27).  Objectivism assumes that the social world exists ‘Independent of social 
actors’ (2001:27).  This means ‘The world is knowable and we all share the same sense of 
reality’ (Wisker 2008:67).  Constructivism (or subjectivism) assumes that the world is based 
on the actions and interactions of social actors and as such is constantly changing or 
evolving (Grix 2001:27).  Saunders et al (2012) recognised that researchers could make use 
of both objectivism and constructivism (2012:132).  
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Epistemology is the process by which we acquire knowledge (Bisman 2010:5, Ryan et al 
2002:11).  A key factor in epistemology is the way in which we gather information and 
validate or prove our theories.  Grix identified two distinct epistemological perspectives, 
positivism and interpretivism (2001:27).  He explained that each perspective or philosophy 
required the use of a different methodology and would lead to different results (2001:28). 
3.2.1 Positivism 
Positivism takes the philosophy of research in the natural sciences and applies this to the 
social sciences (Christenson 1983:7, Grix 2001:27, Smith 2006:5, Wisker 2008:65, Wahyuni 
2012:71).  Wisker (2008) explained that positivism was based on the belief that ‘Human 
society, like the natural world, is subject to fixed laws; behaviour can be determined; and 
there is little room for choice or multiple interpretations’ (2008:69).  This means that 
research is value free and is not influenced by the opinions of the researcher (Blumberg et al 
2011:17).  
Bisman (2010) explained that positivist researchers used statistical analysis of a sample of 
quantitative data to arrive at generalisations that could be applied to the population as a 
whole (2010:5).  In this way positivists believe the characteristics of the sample reflect the 
population (Blumberg et al 2011:17); and other researchers should be able to replicate 
these tests and arrive at the same conclusions (Wahyuni 2012:71).  In other words 
positivism believes that the world is ‘Describable...provable and measurable’ (Wisker 
2008:65).  Gaffikin (2010) explained that positivist accounting researchers considered 
quantitative methods superior to other research methods (2010:37).   
3.2.2 Interpretivism  
Interpretivists argue that positivism is too simplistic to be useful in a dynamic business 
environment (Saunders et al 2012:137), and due to the complexity of the social world 
generalisations based on the results of the statistical analysis of a sample of data cannot be 
applied to the population as a whole (Blumburg et al 2011:18, Wahyuni 2012:71).  
Interpretivists rely on qualitative research and expand knowledge through ‘Observing and 
interpreting the actions of individuals and groups’ (Blumburg et al 2011:18).  Since 
interpretivists believe the researcher cannot be separated from what is being researched, it 
follows that results are more subjective, and findings may be interpreted in different ways 
by different researchers (Wisker 2008:66, Bisman 2010:5, Blumberg 2011:18). 
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3.2.3 Pragmatism and Critical Realism 
In addition to the extremes of positivism and interpretivism other epistemological positions 
include pragmatism and critical realism (Wahyuni 2012:71, Saunders et al 2012:130 and 
2012:136).  Like positivism, critical realism takes a scientific approach to research and 
believes in generalisations, however it recognises the complexity of the dynamic social 
world and ‘Accepts the existence of subjective interpretations’ (Bumberg et al 2011:18).  
Since the way in which the researcher interprets their findings is influenced by their own 
opinions and background, research is value laden (Saunders et al 2012:140, Wahyuni 
2012:70).   
Unlike other philosophical stances that first establish ontology and epistemology, 
pragmatism starts with the research question and selects the research philosophy best 
suited to answering this (Wahyuni 2012:71).  Pragmatists recognise that the world is 
complex and undertake research combining philosophies and methods.  This means that 
quantitative and qualitative data may be used to answer the research question (Saunders et 
al 2102:130). 
3.2.4 The development of accounting research 
At the start of the twentieth century accounting research focused on book-keeping and the 
consistent treatment of similar transactions (Gaffikin 1987:19).  Standardisation of 
accounting practices was greatly assisted by the formation of professional accounting 
bodies including the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in 1880 
(ICAEW), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1887 (Beattie 2002:97) 
and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants in 1904 (ACCA).    
Gaffikin (1987) explained that Paton’s ‘Accounting Theory’ (1922) was the first attempt to 
state the general assumptions on which accounting was based (1987:19); and following the 
Wall Street crash in 1929, government legislation in the USA and increased regulation by the 
NYSE brought greater uniformity to financial reporting (Beattie 2002:96).   Accounting 
research between the 1930s and early 1970s was mostly normative and focused on 
establishing the general assumptions that underpinned the preparation and presentation of 
financial statements (Gaffikin 1987:22 and 2007:8, Laughlin 1995:63, Baker 2011:211), 
including historic cost, materiality, going concern (Beattie 2002:100), accounting for price 
changes and matching (Bell 1986:344). 
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Research during this period was often carried out by financial economists rather than 
accountants (Gaffikin 1988:20, Beattie 2002:100), and criticised for relying heavily on 
techniques and theories adapted from economics, finance and other social sciences 
(Laughlin 1995:63, Smith 2006:1, Ryan et al 2002:34).   Baker (2011:212), Gaffikin (1988:24 
and 2007:1), Previts et al (1990:144) and Beattie (2002:106) all commented that 
improvements in accounting methodology were greatly assisted by advances in computer 
technology.  This resulted in the development of databases that contained large amounts of 
financial information about companies and meant by the end of the 1970s researchers 
could use positivism and empiricism in financial accounting research.   Beattie suggested 
that the increasing popularity of accounting as a subject studied in universities also assisted 
the growth of empirical research (2002:106). 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, financial accounting research in the UK and USA 
focused on the needs of user groups (Bell 1986:352, Beattie 2002:98).  The creation of the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the UK in 1970 and FASB in the USA in 1973 (Beattie 
2002:98) supported this and brought attention to the importance of issuing accounting 
standards that would enhance the quality of financial statements and assist decision-making 
(Beattie 2002:102).  Whilst publication of ‘The Corporate Report’ by the ASB in 1975 meant 
the development of accounting standards needed to take into consideration a wider 
number of stakeholder groups (Beattie 2002:102).  The most influential piece of research in 
this area was carried out by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) who used positive accounting 
theory to explain that the accounting standard setting process was affected by political 
lobbying through which senior managers aimed to maximise their own utility rather than 
that of shareholders (1978:132).  Their results started a heated debate on positive 
accounting research.      
3.2.5 Criticisms of positivist accounting research 
Positivism has underpinned most accounting research since the 1970s, however Bell 
(1986:348) and Richardson (2011:73) argued this had constrained the range of research 
topics in accounting and discouraged use of some research methods (2011:73).  Bowland 
and Gordon (1992) criticised positivist accounting theory in terms of research methods used 
and its reliance on financial economics theory (1992:156).  Lukka (1995) explained that 
during the 1980s accounting researchers started to question whether samples were always 
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representative of the population (1995:79).  He suggested that accounting should make use 
of alternative philosophies including interpretivism and critical realism (1995:75). 
3.2.6 The use of qualitative methods in accounting research 
Chua (1986) observed that quantitative information was often seen as being more ‘Precise 
and scientific than qualitative evidence’ (1986:617), however this meant ‘soft’ methods such 
as a case study approach were rarely used (1986:608).  She explained that reliance on 
empirical techniques had led to researchers ignoring other methods (1986:613), and 
concluded that accounting research could make better use of interpretivism and critical 
realism though accepted this would not be easy and these also had limitations (1986:626). 
Bisman (2010) noted that although critical realism allowed researchers to use triangulation 
and multiple methods including quantitative and qualitative methodologies (2010:9), it had 
been largely over-looked by accounting researchers (2010:14).  Gaffikin (2010) suggested 
critical realism would encourage innovative new research that would enable accounting to 
develop as a discipline (2010:44).   However Baker (2011) observed that although 
researchers including Chua (1986), Laughlin (1987) and Hopwood (2007 and 2008) had used 
critical realism, many positivists criticised this for not being scientific enough (2011:215).  In 
addition editors of accounting journals showed a strong preference for positivist research 
(Lukka 1995:76, Ryan et al 2002:171, Smith 2003:19, Gaffikin 2007:15, Baker 2011:209).   
3.3 Triangulation and mixed methods research in accounting 
Smith (2003) explained that between methods triangulation could involve quantitative and 
qualitative approaches including interviews and archival data collection (2003:135).  He 
suggested that ‘Quantitative and qualitative data are complementary sources that should be 
combined to take advantage of the richness of qualitative findings, and the potential rigour 
and increased credibility of the quantitative findings’ (2003:136).  Bisman (2010) concurred 
and argued that between methods triangulation enabled a researcher to utilise qualitative 
and quantitative methods to explore a research question thereby providing ‘Confirmatory, 
corroborative and cross-validating checks on data collection, analysis and interpretation’ 
(2010:12).  She explained that although qualitative research was more subjective, reliability 
and validity remained important (2010:11). 
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Vaivio et al (2010) explained that structured interviews with eight research active 
accounting academics in Finland allowed the results of initial quantitative studies to be 
developed further (2010:134).  In this way they believed the use of multiple methods added 
depth to their study and enhanced the validity of results (2010:133). 
Hoque et al (2013) reasoned that quantitative studies couldn’t provide answers to all 
research questions (2013:1171), and using positivist and interpretive approaches could ‘Be 
mutually supportive rather than mutually exclusive’ (2013:1179).  DiCicco‐Bloom and 
Crabtree (2006) explained that ‘Increasingly mixed methods in which both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are integrated are needed to contribute to a rich and 
comprehensive study’ (2006:320). 
Malmi and Granlund (2009) explained that most management accounting research was ‘Not 
known outside academia’ and hence had little impact on the practise of accounting 
(2009:598).  Accounting research was traditionally based on techniques borrowed from 
other fields (2009:602) or based on normative theories (2009:615).  They argued that 
instead the development and use of accounting theories would provide an identity for 
accounting (2009:603).  They also explained that triangulation methods would be a useful 
way in which to enhance the validity of accounting research (2009:614).  Modell (2005) 
concurred that triangulation enhanced the validity of research (2005:232); reduced bias in 
any one method; and provided a better understanding of results (2005:233).    
Mathison (1988) suggested that ‘Good research practice obligates the researcher to 
triangulate, that is, to use multiple methods, data sources, and researchers to enhance the 
validity of research findings’ (1988:13).  She explained that combining different research 
methods enabled researchers to overcome the limitations of each research method, 
thereby improving validity and reducing bias (1988:38).  Although convergence was the 
preferred outcome (1988:15) since this provided further supporting evidence of a 
phenomenon, Mathison acknowledged that triangulation might result in inconsistency, 
where methods didn’t confirm a single proposition; or contradiction where different 
methods resulted in different views that were difficult to reconcile (1988:15). 
Creswell and Tashakkoki (2007) referred to work by Greene et al (1989) in which they 
suggested pragmatists should use at least one quantitative method to collect numbers and 
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at least one qualitative method to collect words (Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1989) cited 
in Creswell and Tashakkoki 2007:303).   
Grafton et al (2011) explained that some researchers believed qualitative and quantitative 
methods were based on different research philosophies and should not be mixed (2010:10).  
However they went on to explain that pragmatists used those research methods best suited 
to answering a research question.  In this way triangulation offered opportunities for 
convergence which would increase the reliability of results (2011:11).  Despite this Grafton 
et al pointed out that there were relatively few examples of triangulation being used in 
accounting research (2011:13), and this was partly due to leading accounting journals being 
reluctant to publish research of this type (2011:18).  
3.3.1 The use of structured interviews in accounting research 
Welch et al (2002) explained that interviews are a ‘Verbal interchange…between researcher 
and informant with the purpose of understanding the latter’s experiences and perspectives’ 
(2002:612). Qu et al (2011) observed that some quantitative researchers were not in favour 
of interviews including Denzin and Lincoln (2000) who suggested that information gathered 
in this way was ‘Unreliable, impressionistic, and not objective’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2000:12 
in Qu et al 2011:239).  Qu et al acknowledged that poorly prepared interviews might provide 
disappointing results (2011:239) and the process relied heavily on interviewees giving 
accurate and truthful responses (2011:241), however overcoming these issues meant 
structured (or standardised) interviews ‘Can provide a rich set of data’ (2011:239).   
To minimise interviewer bias Lilleker (2003:201), Smith (2003:128) and Qu et al (2011:244) 
explained that structured interviews should comprise pre-set questions asked in the same 
order; although this reduced the opportunity for more detailed discussion, it assisted with 
coding and analysis of responses.  Smith outlined several factors that could adversely impact 
on the quality of results including poorly worded questions that caused confusion or 
misunderstanding; memory lapses by the interviewee which would make responses 
unreliable (2003:129); and errors in transcribing which were more likely when interviews 
were not audio recorded (2003:136).  However Berry (2002) explained that problems could 
be overcome through good preparation by the interviewer (2002:681). 
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Graham et al (2005) produced one of the first pieces of financial reporting research to use 
qualitative techniques.  They used a survey emailed to 3,174 members of the Organisation 
of Financial Executives (267 responses) and 20 one-to-one interviews with senior finance 
executives in the USA (2005:9), to obtain information on financial reporting policies.  They 
acknowledged their study had limitations including that respondents might not be 
representative of the population and could provide corporate responses rather than stating 
their own opinions (2005:9).  However Graham et al explained that the information required 
could not be obtained using quantitative data (2005:4).  
Of the 20 interviews six were face to face and 14 by telephone (2005:10).  Interviews were 
structured so that ‘riskier’ questions were asked later, once a rapport had developed 
between interviewer and respondent; and leading questions were avoided (2005:11).   
Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes and Graham et al concluded that responses, 
‘Provided insight and depth to further our understanding of the survey responses’ 
(2005:11). 
3.3.2 The selection and use of elite (or key) informants 
Welch et al (2002) explained that corporate elite informants were ‘(Usually male)…senior or 
middle management…; has functional responsibility in an area which enjoys high status in 
accordance with corporate values; has considerable industry experience and frequently long 
tenure with the company; possesses a broad network of personal friendships’ (2002:613).    
Kumar et al (1993) observed that key informants ‘Are chosen because they are supposedly 
knowledgeable about the issues being researched and able and willing to communicate 
about them’ (1993:1634).  Their research showed the usefulness of information gathered 
from key informants was affected by a number of factors including position in an 
organisation (1993:1634), with those in more senior roles providing more useful information 
(1993:1647); the amount of time spent working in an organisation (1993:1636), with those 
who had been employed longest having greater knowledge of issues; memory lapses and 
inaccurate recollection of past events, or bias in ‘Attempts to maintain self-esteem’ 
(1993:1634).  They suggested that the use of multiple informants would overcome some of 
these issues thereby increasing reliability and validity (1993:1634).   
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Tremblay (1957) suggested that their formal role within an organisation should subject key 
informants to the type of information being sought by the researcher (1957:692).  They 
should be willing to communicate this to the interviewer (1957:692) and keep personal bias 
to a minimum (1957:692). 
DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree (2006) explained that key informants were selected for their 
knowledge (2006:315) and to be of most use the sample of respondents should be fairly 
homogenous and from a background that was related to the research question (2006:317). 
Individual interviews allowed greater depth than group interviews (2006:315), and to 
generate useful responses interview questions should be built around the research question 
(2006:316).  They explained that computer assisted qualitative data analysis software such 
as NVivo could be used to facilitate analysis of responses (2006:318).   
Using data from 127 studies published in six leading marketing and management journals 
Homburg et al (2012) looked at how the reliability of responses from key informants could 
be improved (2012:594).  Their findings included: 
 Reliability was better for key informants in more senior positions in an organisation.  
They reasoned these individuals were involved in decision-making and therefore had 
access to high quality and timely information (2012:597).    
 Key informants that focused on specialist areas were more likely to produce reliable 
answers than generalists (2012:597). 
 Key informants who worked longest for an organisation had greater awareness of 
the most important issues which increased the reliability of their responses 
(2012:597). 
 Reliability of key informants was likely to be greater in small and medium sized 
organisations than in large organisations spread over several sites and countries 
(2012:597). 
 Where organisations were operating in a highly competitive sector, key informants 
were less likely to provide reliable answers to sensitive questions (2012:597). 
To overcome issues related to the reliability and accuracy of responses from key informants, 
Homburg et al suggested interviews should be combined with other research methods 
(2012:595). 
   
99 
 
Joseph et al (1996) used a postal questionnaire to investigate how management 
accountants perceived the relative importance of external financial reporting and 
management accounting (1996:78).  Based on a sample of 308 qualified accountants who 
were members of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (31% response rate) 
(1996:76), Joseph et al established that responses were affected by the length of post 
qualification experience and time spent with current employer, both of which were 
associated with seniority in an organisation (1996:91).  
Phillips (1981) explained the main criticisms related to use of interviews centred on the 
validity and reliability of results (1981:396).  He explained that when selecting key 
informants, researchers should consider both the number of years an individual had worked 
for a company (knowledge), and their participation in the decision-making process 
(seniority) (1981:398). 
Welch et al (2002) highlighted the challenges interviewing elite informants.  Analysis was 
based on the results of four projects in Finland and Australia that used in depth interviews 
with 90 corporate elites (2002:616).  Their findings suggested it was sometimes difficult to 
gain access to elite informants however this was often overcome by a researcher’s 
professional credentials or standing, or through an influential sponsor who endorsed a 
project.  However endorsed research might lead to bias in the types of questions asked or 
responses to questions (2002:614), and this was particularly evident when a sponsor 
provided funding (2002:620).   
Other problems included elite informants having power due to seniority in terms of age 
which sometimes resulted in the researcher being patronised or criticised for the type of 
questions being asked (2002:621); the interview being conducted in the informant’s office 
(familiar territory); the informant dominating the interview or unwilling to answer questions 
that were perceived as being critical in nature; and the researcher overestimating the level 
of knowledge actually possessed by the informant (2002:615).   
In answering questions senior managers would sometimes conform to their organisations’ 
stance on certain issues, which meant an interview might provide little more information 
than a corporate press release (2002:615).  Concerns about anonymity might also impact on 
the depth and quality of responses, especially regarding what might be perceived as 
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sensitive issues (2002:621).  Despite this Welch et al commented that several researchers 
were surprised with the frankness of responses (2002:616) and concluded that elite 
informants from senior management provided rich data (2002:622). 
Delaney (2007) discussed his experiences interviewing elites in North America including 
owners of professional sports clubs, politicians and corporate elites (2007:209). He 
acknowledged that access could be difficult and stressed the need for a well-structured 
letter of introduction that explained both the research being undertaken and ‘unique’ 
contribution the respondent would bring to the project (2007:212).  Delaney warned that 
due to their perceived status and power, elites might control the interview (2007:215) or 
cause the researcher ‘To be seduced and lose objectivity’ (2007:217).    
In his analysis of interviewing political elite in the UK, Lilleker (2003) also stressed the need 
for a letter of introduction that outlined the research area; what an elite informant would 
add to the study; and broad types of question that might be asked so informants were 
better able to prepare for interviews (2003:209).  Although structured questions might limit 
discussion, they allowed answers to be more easily compared (2003:210).   
Lilleker also explained it was useful that the interviewer had a good knowledge of both the 
topic under discussion and elite informant, which meant interviews often took place 
towards the end of a research project (2003:212).  Although accessing elites was often time 
consuming and difficult (2003:213), he concluded that using a well-structured approach 
ensured ‘Data was reliable, relevant and usable’ (2003:214).   
Stephens (2007) compared interviewing elites face to face and by telephone (2007:203).  In 
each case he used semi-structured interview questions (2007:205).  Telephone interviews 
were cheaper and quicker to conduct (2007:209) but required ‘clearer articulation’ of 
questions (2007:210).  He advised that questions should be ‘Written in advance to ensure 
they are clearly spoken and direct the respondent accurately’ (2007:211).   Stephens 
explained that his elite informants were all from the same academic background as himself 
(macroeconomics) and this helped with telephone interviews (2007:212).  He concluded 
that ‘My experience of telephone interviewing was a successful one…attained a friendly 
rapport equal to any of my face-to-face interviews’ (2007:211) and provided important data 
(2007:213). 
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Moore and Stokes (2012) conducted semi-structured interviews on elite informants in the 
football sector.  They explained that ‘Gaining access to football industry elites provides a 
rare and valuable opportunity to explore unique accounts and insights’ (2012:441).  
However clubs were under ‘intense media scrutiny’ added to which elites were approached 
on a regular basis to take part in research projects.  This made accessing elites in the 
football sector ‘challenging’ (2012:439), and reduced opportunities for interviews 
(2012:454). 
Moore and Stokes interviewed 34 participants over a four-year period (2012:451).  
Interviews lasted between 30-90 minutes; were recorded and later transcribed; the same 
questions were used which encouraged validity and reliability (2012:451); and ‘The data 
were analysed through intensive reading and re-reading in order to allow prevalent themes, 
issues and phraseology to crystallise’ (2012:451).   
King (1997) focused on the EPL and observed ‘Elite groups often made themselves 
unavailable for interview…especially…the most important…directors at the biggest 
clubs…interviews that were conducted proved useful’ (1997:226).  King interviewed five 
directors and reached the point where they confirmed what he established in his review of 
secondary sources (triangulation) (1997:226).  
3.4 Research methods used in this thesis 
The literature review showed that several studies adopted a positivist approach in which 
accounting ratios and econometric models were used to analyse secondary data.  Some of 
these studies can be criticised for their small sample sizes including Silva and Filipe (2013), 
Barajas and Rodríguez (2010), Barros and Leach (2006), Szymanski and Hall (2003), Arnold 
(1991), Zoccali (2012) and Risaliti and Verona (2012).  Given that the EPL is comprised of just 
20 clubs, sample size will always be much less than is available in other industries.  For 
example, Beaver et al (2005) used a sample of 82,953 observations from companies on the 
NYSE (2005:98). 
It was also established that some studies into European club football focused on just one or 
two years of accounting data which is not always sufficient to establish trends, including 
Barros (2006), Shareef and Davey (2005) and Yang and Sonmez (2005).  Several studies 
didn’t explain in sufficient detail the methodology used, or the rationale for their selection 
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of ratios including Andreff (2006), Forker (2005) and Barros (2006).  There was also little 
evidence of qualitative techniques being used in research into the football industry.  
This project uses mixed methods research in the form of sequential explanatory research 
design (Saunders et al 2012:167).  Initial quantitative analysis examined published financial 
statements for all clubs that played in the EPL during the 2003-4 to 2014-15 seasons.  
Qualitative research involved structured interviews with nine elite informants from the 
football industry.  Full details are provided in the next sections. 
3.5 Quantitative data collection 
3.5.1 Sources of quantitative information 
The first stage of this study involved the collection and analysis of quantitative secondary 
data.  This included published financial statements for all clubs that played in the EPL during 
the sample period, together with accounting data from reliable sources including UEFA, The 
Premier League and the Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance.   
Every club that played in the EPL during the 2003-4 to 2014-15 seasons was a limited 
company (see Appendix 1).  This meant each produced an annual report that included 
audited financial statements.  Annual reports are public documents that are filed at 
Companies House (McKenzie 2010:536).  Copies of annual reports for all clubs that played in 
the EPL between 2003-4 and 2011-12 were obtained from the Financial Analysis Made Easy 
(FAME) database.  In June 2015 Companies House launched its beta service 
(https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk) which gives free access to annual reports filed at 
Companies House.  Annual reports for all clubs that played in the EPL between 2012-13 and 
2014-15 were downloaded from this website.  Key accounting information was extracted 
from each annual report and using Microsoft Excel a database was constructed. 
When constructing the database accounting information was initially entered for each club 
that played in the EPL between the 2006-7 and 2010-11 seasons.  Once formulae had been 
checked and the database reviewed to ensure it contained all necessary information, the 
sample was expanded to cover all clubs that played in the EPL during the 2003-4 to 2014-15 
seasons. With 20 clubs playing in the EPL each season this should have provided 240 sets of 
audited financial statements.  However Portsmouth entered administration and didn't 
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publish financial statements for the years ended 31 May 2009 and 2010.  This reduced our 
sample to 238 sets of financial statements which was sufficient to evaluate financial 
performance both before and following the introduction of FFP and STCC. 
When extracting accounting information from financial statements, care was taken to 
ensure that items were treated consistently in the database.  For each club revenue was 
broken down between matchday, broadcasting and commercial; the largest costs incurred 
by clubs were itemised including wages and salaries, amortisation and impairment of 
players’ registrations, surpluses and deficits arising from player trading, termination 
payments to coaching staff, and interest payable; current and non-current debt was broken 
down between soft and hard loans; and the book value of players’ registrations was shown 
separately from other non-current assets.  Each item was aggregated to give EPL totals for 
every year under review.  A sample of spreadsheets from 2012 is shown in Appendix 6. 
Although the annual report contains a huge amount of accounting information, it is not 
always easy to evaluate performance using just monetary amounts.  To assist analysis in 
each year for every club 29 accounting ratios were calculated covering profitability and 
control of costs, efficient use of assets, reliance on debt, and ability to meet short-term 
obligations (liquidity).  The same ratios were also calculated using aggregated figures.  
Formulae used are summarised in Appendix 2.  For each ratio the standard deviation and 
minimum and maximum values were calculated indicating the spread of financial 
performance in each year.   
This enabled this study to analyse and evaluate the financial performance of each club, and 
the EPL in aggregate terms during the accounting periods ended 2004-15.  Due to the nature 
of the football industry and objectives of shareholders not all the ratios calculated assisted 
our understanding of financial performance.  Detailed analysis focused on disparities in 
revenue and the importance of broadcasting revenue, poor control of key costs, low or 
negative shareholders’ equity, and increasing reliance on debt since these were the most 
worrying aspects of financial performance. 
3.5.2 Limitations of financial statements 
The application of IFRSs and the conceptual framework is based on principles that rely on 
informed judgements to determine what constitutes a true and fair view.  Maynard (2017) 
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explained that true and fair meant financial statements were ‘Accurate as far as reasonably 
possible, with professional, informed and reasonable judgement exercised’ (2017:70).  
However there are several examples where financial statements have not provided a true a 
fair view, and accounting scandals have often been followed by improvements in financial 
reporting (Elliott and Elliott 2013:228).  Although its financial statements were audited, 
Enron collapsed in 2001 having overstated earnings and concealed off-balance sheet loans 
(Elliott and Elliott 2013:209).  In 2010 the auditors of Northern Rock were criticised by the 
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee for not making greater reference to risks and 
uncertainties surrounding going concern (Maynard 2017:152).  In 2014 an accounting error 
meant Tesco overstated half year profit by £208 million (Vandevelde 2017).  Following 
investigation by the FRC and Serious Fraud Office Tesco had to pay compensation and fines 
amounting to £214 million (Vandevelde 2017). 
Fort (2000) and Fort and Quirk (2004) identified difficulties in using financial statements of 
sporting clubs even where these were produced in compliance with GAAP.  Fort pointed out 
that to minimise tax sporting clubs would prefer to keep reported profits as small as 
possible (2000:441), and this was often achieved through payments to related parties and 
parent companies (2000:441).  Dietl and Franck (2007) found evidence of window dressing 
in German football and use of ‘Creative accounting to inflate assets and hide liabilities’ 
(2007:667).  Boscá et al (2008) were critical of Real Madrid, which offset revenue from the 
sale of its training complex against transfer fees paid to acquire players, something that was 
not allowed under IFRSs (2008:168).  Hamil et al (2010) commented that Italian clubs had 
manipulated financial statements to show ‘The most favourable possible presentation’ 
(2010:393).   Morrow (2014) suggested that to comply with FFP’s break-even requirement, 
clubs might incorrectly classify certain items of expenditure as infrastructure improvements 
(2014:92). 
Previous studies including Gaganis et al (2008) and Iatridis (2010) showed the preparation of 
financial statements in accordance with accounting standards improved quality through 
increasing disclosure requirements (Gaganis et al 2008:137, Iatridis 2010:195), and this 
reduced opportunities for earnings management and other creative accounting practices 
(Iatridis 2010:200).   However regulatory bodies including the IASB, must be aware of factors 
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that motivate creative accounting and introduce legislation and accounting standards that 
reduce the likelihood of its occurrence. 
This thesis is reliant on the accuracy of financial statements.  All clubs in the sample were 
limited companies whose financial statements were independently audited, which lessened 
the scope for errors and omissions.  An unqualified auditor’s report provides assurance that 
financial statements have met minimum accepted standards of preparation and 
presentation (Gaganis et al 2008:125).  This means we can assume they are free from 
material misstatement; have been properly prepared in accordance with accounting 
standards and the requirements of Companies Acts (1985 and 2006); and show a true and 
fair view of a company’s financial position and performance (Cotter 2012:44).   
Accounting information was extracted from company or consolidated financial statements 
of the legal entity incorporated and registered in the UK, and nearest to the top of the 
ownership structure.  In some cases care had to be taken to identify the financial 
statements most relevant to this study.  For example the parent companies of Hull City and 
Stoke City are Allamhouse Limited (Hull City Tigers Ltd 2015:17) and Bet 365 (Stoke City FC 
Ltd 2015:26). Financial statements produced by these parent companies included significant 
amounts derived from non-football activities and as a consequence analysis was based on 
the financial statements of Hull City Tigers Limited and Stoke City Football Club Limited, 
which enabled this study to focus on football related activities. 
Using accounting information that covered a 12-year period reduced the impact of 
anomalies and one-off items.  Formulae used to calculate ratios and other performance 
indicators were clearly defined and consistently applied.  Formulae and data used in 
spreadsheets were checked and re-checked for accuracy, and items extracted from financial 
statements were treated in a consistent way, all of which enhanced the reliability and 
validity of quantitative research.   
3.5.3 Difficulties analysing quantitative data 
A few clubs that were acquired by new owners during this period changed their accounting 
year end including Aston Villa, Liverpool and Manchester United.  So for example in 2012 
Liverpool changed its reporting period from 31 July to 31 May in order ‘To align with the 
football season’ (Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds 2012:1).  This meant financial 
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statements in 2012 covered the 10-month period ended 31 May 2012.  Since accounting 
ratios express the relationship between numbers, it was considered beneficial to include 
these financial statements in our sample. 
Arsenal’s financial statements included revenue and costs from property development.  This 
related to the building and sale of 655 residential apartments on and around the site of their 
Highbury stadium (Arsenal Holdings plc 2009-10:14).  Examination of Arsenal’s segmental 
report meant adjustments could be made to exclude amounts related to property 
development from the income statement. 
Revenue reported by Bolton Wanderers and Chelsea included amounts earned from hotels 
in their stadia.  Although Bolton and Chelsea clearly identified revenue from these non-
football activities, the associated costs were not separately disclosed.  Revenues and costs 
related to these activities were included in the database, and their impact on financial 
statements was not considered to be significant. 
Several clubs had loans from owners’ and related parties on which low or no interest was 
payable (soft debt).  However treatment of soft debt varied between clubs.  A few clubs 
classified these loans as current liabilities.  Although this meant loans were in theory short-
term and repayable in the next 12 months, these were usually rolled over from one year to 
the next.  Other clubs classified soft debt as non-current liabilities, which are long-term in 
nature and repayable in more than 12 months.  For our analysis total debt comprised all long 
and short-term loans, hire purchase and finance lease creditors, bank overdrafts, and 
preference share capital.  In this way all soft debt was treated consistently, and even those 
loans from owners and related parties that were classified as short-term in nature were 
included in total debt and capital employed.  Notice also that total debt and capital 
employed were not distorted by accounting adjustments related to current and non-current 
liabilities including deferred tax and provisions. 
A number of ratios used variables from the statement of financial position.  In calculating 
these ratios it was assumed that year end balances were representative of amounts 
maintained throughout the year.  This consistent approach allowed the study of trends over 
a number of accounting periods. 
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3.5.4 Analysis of ratios 
To assist analysis clubs were broken down into two distinct categories comprised of those 
that reported a: 
 Profit Before Interest and Tax (PBIT) 
 Loss Before Interest and Tax (LBIT) 
Aggregate ratios were also calculated for those clubs owned and funded by a wealthy 
benefactor (or ‘sugar daddy’).  This enabled us to examine the financial characteristics of 
each category; establish if there were significant differences in terms of financial 
performance and whether the provision of a soft budget constraint impacted on this; and 
investigate whether financial performance changed following the introduction of stricter 
financial regulation.  
Analysis of directors’ reports and financial statements indicated whether clubs were 
provided with a soft budget constraint.  This meant that even though for example Liverpool, 
Newcastle United and West Ham United received loans from owners and related parties, 
there was a stated intention by directors to run these clubs within financial constraints 
(Liverpool FC Ltd 2015:3, Newcastle United Ltd 2012:2, West Ham United FC Ltd 2015:10).  
This was very different to for example Manchester City, Chelsea and Fulham, where owners 
and related parties regularly provided the funds necessary to cover large losses. 
It should be noted that in each year clubs were included in the category they were best 
suited to.  This meant the make-up of each category changed every year because of 
promotion and relegation; changes in financial performance; and occasionally changes in 
ownership.  For example Manchester City played in the EPL throughout this period and at 
different times appeared in all three categories.  In 2006 and 2015 the club reported a PBIT; 
in every other year it made a LBIT; and from 2008 onwards was funded by wealthy owners 
who invested significant amounts in pursuit of playing success. 
3.5.5 Periods covered by this study 
This study focused on clubs in the EPL since reliable financial and other information was 
more readily available than for clubs in other English leagues.  The scale of revenue 
generated, and costs incurred by clubs in the EPL made comparison with English clubs 
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outside the EPL less useful.  In addition clubs in the EPL were under most scrutiny regarding 
compliance with financial regulation. 
Since all clubs in the EPL operated as limited companies, financial statements were prepared 
in compliance with UK or International Financial Reporting Standards and the requirements 
of the Companies Acts (1985 and 2006).  All financial statements were independently 
audited which provided assurance that accounting information was reliable and similar 
transactions were treated consistently over several accounting periods, allowing horizontal 
and cross-sectional analysis.  
This study focused on the accounting periods ended 2004-15.  Before Companies House 
launched its beta service in 2015, payment was required to access each annual report.  To 
avoid this, annual reports were initially obtained for no charge from the FAME Database 
which was available through Coventry University’s library services.  When this study 
commenced, FAME provided access to financial statements from 2004 onwards. 
The sample period provided sufficient data to examine the impact of a soft budget 
constraint on the financial performance of clubs in the EPL; evaluate the need for increased 
financial regulation; and establish whether this impacted on the financial performance of 
clubs.  Accounting periods 2004-11 allowed analysis of financial performance pre-FFP; the 
period 2012-15 enabled analysis following the introduction of FFP.  
3.5.6 Investor ratios 
The literature review established that investors in football clubs were more interested in 
sporting success than generating a financial return (Sloane 1971:133, Arnold 1991:181, 
Storm 2010:93).  For this reason and since so few clubs in the EPL generated a satisfactory 
return for investors or paid a dividend to shareholders, there was little to be gained in 
calculating investor ratios such as earnings per share, dividend cover or price-earnings, and 
these were excluded from this study. 
3.5.7 Revenue 
A number of ratios make use of revenue and it is important to understand what this 
comprises.  When preparing annual financial statements companies must follow the 
requirements of IAS 18 Revenue, which defines revenue as ‘The gross inflow of economic 
benefits during the period arising in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity when 
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those inflows result in increases in equity, other than increases relating to contributions 
from equity participants’ (Melville 2014:210). 
A football club’s revenue comes from several sources including matchday receipts, 
broadcasting, and commercial activities.  Notice that any surplus arising from the sale of 
players’ registrations is not included in revenue since the sale of intangible assets is not 
classed as part of a club’s ordinary activities.  Instead any surplus (or deficit) arising from the 
sale of players’ registrations is shown separately in the income statement, usually 
immediately after the profit from operating activities.   
Published financial statements are prepared using the accruals (or matching) concept.  This 
means revenues and costs that relate to the current accounting period are taken into 
consideration regardless of whether cash has been received or paid by the end of the 
accounting period (Melville 2014:21).  Revenue received that relates to future accounting 
periods is excluded from the current period’s revenue and is instead treated as deferred 
income (where it is shown as a current liability in the SFP) (Morrow 2003:156).  If it meets 
the requirements of IAS 18, deferred income will be transferred to revenue as it is earned 
during future accounting periods.   
For example in its financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2012 Tottenham 
Hotspur’s current liabilities showed accruals and deferred income amounting to £52 million 
(Tottenham Hotspur Limited 2012:24).  This included revenue arising from the sale of season 
tickets for the 2012-13 season which commenced in August 2012 (2012:24).  This was not 
treated as revenue in the year ended 30 June 2012 as it represented an advance payment by 
supporters for matches that would be played during the following accounting period.  
From 2011 all clubs in the EPL provided a note to their financial statements in which revenue 
was broken down between matchday, commercial, and broadcasting activities.  Prior to this, 
where analysis of revenue wasn’t included in financial statements it was obtained from the 
Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance.  Using this information it could be seen how the 
make-up of revenue changed during the sample period, and whether clubs were over-reliant 
on any revenue stream.   
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3.6 Accounting ratios  
The next section will consider the accounting ratios used in this study in more detail (see also 
Appendix 2). 
a) Profitability and control of costs 
Wages and amortisation as a percentage of revenue (ratios 1, 2 and 3) and Wages as a 
percentage of non-broadcasting revenue (ratio 7) 
Wages and amortisation represent the two largest costs faced by football clubs.  A useful 
way in which to measure control of these costs is by expressing each as a percentage of 
total revenue and looking at changes in this relationship over a number of years.  In this way 
control of these costs can be examined regardless of changes in the monetary value of each 
variable.  Deloitte (2012:39), Morrow (1999:43), Barros (2006:101) and others have made 
use of these ratios.  
Staff costs include all wages and salaries together with associated taxation and national 
insurance contributions, and companies are required to provide this information in a note to 
the financial statements (McKenzie 2010:282).  Unfortunately players’ salaries were not 
shown separately in financial statements so the figure for staff costs included salaries paid 
to all full and part time employees including administrative staff, coaching staff and 
directors.  However since players’ salaries made up the largest proportion of staff costs, this 
did not significantly distort analysis over a number of accounting periods.  Under FFPR UEFA 
can require additional information from a club where staff costs amount to greater than 
70% of revenue (UEFA 2015:39). 
Analysis of annual reports showed that during the period 2004-15 clubs in the EPL reported 
aggregate amortisation of £4.8 billion and impairment of £309 million (Calculated from 
aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15).  The introduction of FFP and 
EPL rules mean clubs must tightly control wages and amortisation if they are to remain 
within acceptable deviations, and for this reason wages and amortisation (combined) as a 
percentage of revenue was also calculated.   
To establish whether clubs were over-reliant on broadcasting revenue, wages as a 
percentage of non-broadcasting revenue was also calculated.  This was adapted from wages 
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as a percentage of revenue (above) and takes into consideration only revenue generated 
from non-broadcasting activities.  For example, in 2012 Wigan’s staff costs amounted to 
580% of non-broadcasting revenue (Calculated from Wigan Athletic AFC Limited 2012:15), 
indicating the club was very reliant on broadcasting revenue.  However it was found that 
expressing broadcasting as a percentage of total revenue provided similar information and 
allowed a more user-friendly presentation. 
Profit from operations as a percentage of revenue (4), Profit Before Interest and Tax (PBIT) 
as a percentage of revenue (5), Profit Before Tax (PBT) as a percentage of revenue (6) 
The income statement shows several different profit figures including Profit From 
Operations (PFO), PBIT, PBT, and profit for the year.  PFO excludes amortisation of players’ 
registrations, surpluses or deficits arising from player trading, and interest payable on debt. 
Surpluses and deficits arising from player trading may vary greatly from one accounting 
period to another.  For example in the year ended 30 June 2009 Manchester United 
generated a net surplus of £81 million from player trading, which contributed significantly to 
a PBIT of £90 million (Red Football Ltd 2009:9).  In 2010 the club generated a surplus of £13 
million from player trading and a PBIT of £27 million (2010:9).  To fully evaluate financial 
performance it was therefore necessary to look at profit before and after player trading.  
By excluding interest payable on debt, the financial performance of clubs could be 
compared regardless of how they obtained long-term funds (since a club that was reliant on 
debt would usually incur higher interest payments than a club funded by equity). 
Examination of PFO allowed us to consider whether a club was controlling costs arising from 
its usual day to day business activities, the largest of which was staff costs.  A club that 
reported only a small PFO (or worse still a loss) would be unlikely to meet the break-even 
requirement of FFP without the profitable sale of players’ registrations.  
PBIT is after taking into consideration all operating expenses, amortisation of players’ 
registrations, and surpluses or deficits arising from player trading.  Notice this profit figure 
also ignores interest payable, enabling comparison of performance regardless of how a club 
is funded. 
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PBT as a percentage of revenue takes into consideration all business expenses together with 
net interest payable on debt (including interest payable on bank overdrafts).  
Ratios that express profit as a percentage of revenue are widely used to evaluate financial 
performance.  For the purpose of this study the ratios used (4, 5 and 6 above) were adapted 
from Holmes et al (2008:75). 
Return on capital employed (ROCE) before (8) and after player trading (9) 
ROCE (adapted from McKenzie 2012:329) indicates how efficiently a company uses the funds 
(capital employed) at its disposal.  There are several definitions of ROCE each using different 
accounting variables and care must be taken to ensure that once selected definitions and 
variables are applied consistently.   
In this study capital employed was defined as shareholders’ equity and total debt.  Total 
debt was defined earlier in this chapter; shareholders’ equity comprised all ordinary share 
capital and reserves including retained earnings (or losses), share premium and revaluation 
reserves.  This definition of capital employed was consistent with that used by Holmes et al 
(2008:180) and McKenzie (2010:304).   
By calculating ROCE using PFO and PBIT, it was possible to look at performance before and 
after player trading.  Using these definitions of profit and capital employed also meant ROCE 
was not affected by interest payable which enabled comparison regardless of whether clubs 
were funded primarily through equity or debt.  However, with many clubs reporting losses 
and several operating with negative equity, ROCE was often distorted making it less useful in 
our analysis. 
 
Calculating profitability and control of costs ratios enabled this study to look at trends over a 
number of accounting periods.  The introduction of FFP and EPL financial rules mean clubs 
need to tightly control costs in order to remain within acceptable deviations.  These ratios 
indicate how likely a club is to achieve this and help identify where problems exist. 
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b) Capital structure and reliance on debt 
Interest cover and net interest payable as a percentage of revenue (ratios 10 and 11) 
During 2004-15 several clubs in the EPL became increasingly reliant on debt and it was 
important that they generated sufficient PBIT to cover net interest payable on this.  Interest 
cover (adapted from McKenzie 2010:307) indicates how many times net interest payable 
during the current accounting period can be paid from PBIT.  A ratio of less than one means 
a club has not earned sufficient PBIT to meet all interest payable in the current accounting 
period.  A club in this situation will be forced to draw on retained earnings, and once these 
are exhausted will require an injection of funds to meet any shortfall.   
In calculating the figure for net interest payable (or receivable), interest receivable was 
netted off against interest payable.  In a few cases clubs with little or no debt had a positive 
net interest figure indicating that interest receivable exceeded interest payable, including 
Stoke City and Wolverhampton Wanderers in 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Stoke City Football Club 
Limited 2010:18, 2012:18; WW (1990) Limited 2010:15, 2012:15) and West Bromwich Albion 
(WBA) in 2012 (WBA Football Club Limited 2012:6). 
To gauge its significance and enable comparison with wages and amortisation, net interest 
payable was also expressed as a percentage of revenue.  This presentation was consistent 
with ratios 1, 2 and 3.  
Gearing (12) 
Gearing indicates an organisation’s reliance on borrowed funds, expressing total debt as a 
percentage of capital employed.  For consistency the same definitions were used for total 
debt and capital employed as were previously outlined when discussing ROCE.  These are the 
definitions and variables most commonly used to calculate gearing (Holmes et al 2008:180, 
Melville 2014:365, McKenzie 2010:304).   
In 2015 WBA had a gearing ratio of 15% (Calculated from WBA Football Club Limited 
financial statements 2015), indicating that just 15% of capital employed was made up of 
borrowed funds with the remaining 85% provided by shareholders.  Gearing usually has an 
inverse relationship with interest cover since a higher gearing ratio indicates greater reliance 
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on borrowed funds, more interest payable, and lower interest cover.  Although interest 
cover can be distorted through owners providing soft loans to clubs on which little or no 
interest is charged, gearing does not distinguish between soft and hard loans and as a 
consequence clearly shows a club’s reliance on debt.  
During the period 2004-15 the scale of cumulative losses meant several clubs had negative 
shareholders’ equity.  When combined with loans this resulted in gearing ratios in excess of 
100%.  For example in 2015 negative equity and soft loans meant Stoke City had a gearing 
ratio of 162% (Calculated from Stoke City FC Ltd financial statements 2015).  Under FFP and 
EPL Profitability and Sustainability rules, maximum equity contributions will restrict growth 
of negative equity.  This might also require owners to convert soft loans into equity, 
providing clubs with a more secure source of long-term funds whilst at the same time 
improving the gearing ratio. 
Revenue / Total debt (13) 
Football authorities in Italy used revenue / debt as an indicator of how many times total 
debt could be paid out of annual revenue (Zoccali 2011:88).  Zoccali (2011) explained that 
revenue included amounts from broadcasting, matchday, sponsorship and commercial 
activities, together with net income arising from the sale of players; and debt included all 
long and short-term liabilities though these were reduced by cash and cash equivalents 
(2011:88).   
In their study into the financial performance of Spanish football Barajas and Rodríguez 
(2010:57) used the inverse of this ratio, calculating debt / revenue to establish a club’s 
reliance on debt.  Unfortunately Barajas and Rodríguez did not provide a detailed 
breakdown of their definitions for revenue or debt. 
This study adapted Zoccali’s (2011) formula since its presentation was consistent with 
revenue / players’ registrations and asset turnover ratios.  However since gains arising from 
the disposal of players’ registrations was not guaranteed a more prudent approach was to 
exclude this from revenue, leaving those amounts that recurred on an annual basis.   Hence 
revenue included all monies earned from broadcasting, matchday, sponsorship and 
commercial activities; and our definition of total debt was consistent with that used to 
   
115 
 
calculate gearing and ROCE.  These variables were clearly identified in financial statements 
produced by clubs.  
Under FFPR, UEFA can require additional information from a club where this ratio is less 
than one (UEFA 2015:39). 
Profit from operations / Total debt (15) 
In his study into bankruptcy in the US restaurant industry Gu (2002) used PFO / total 
liabilities (2002:34).  This showed how much profit was left to repay liabilities once all 
normal business expenses had been taken into consideration.  Gu explained that a higher 
ratio indicated less likelihood an organisation would default on repayment of loans 
(2002:38).    
Although Gu used total liabilities, this figure comprised all current and non-current liabilities 
including accounting adjustments such as deferred tax which may not involve an actual 
movement of cash. This study focused on total debt rather than total liabilities.  The 
variables that made up total debt were clearly identified in the SFP and our treatment was 
consistent with other ratios calculated.   
Total assets / Total liabilities (16) 
Gu (2002) also made use of total liabilities / total assets (2002:37).  This study used the 
inverse formula (total assets / total liabilities) which was consistent with presentation of the 
revenue / total debt and current ratios.  A ratio less than 1 indicated that liabilities exceeded 
assets and an organisation was operating with negative equity.  During our sample period 
several clubs in the EPL had a ratio less than one and were reliant on continued support from 
wealthy owners and related parties. 
Players’ registrations (NBV) / Total assets (17) 
This ratio indicates the proportion of total assets represented by players’ registrations and 
was adapted from Zoccali’s (2011) equity / total assets ratio (2011:88).  There is a danger in 
clubs being over-reliant on the value of players’ registrations since a fall in market values 
might result in liabilities exceeding assets.  This situation occurred in Italy during the early 
2000s (Risaliti and Verona 2012).   
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Equity / Total assets (18) 
Zoccali (2011) explained that Italian football authorities made use of equity / total assets to 
establish whether clubs had sufficient equity (2011:88).  This ratio indicates how much of an 
organisation’s total assets are funded by shareholders’ equity.  The smaller this figure the 
more reliant an organisation is on borrowed funds.  With several clubs in the EPL reporting 
large losses during 2004-15, shareholders’ equity was often dangerously low or in some 
cases negative. 
Total debt / Equity (19) 
This ratio (McKenzie 2010:305) indicates a company’s reliance on debt, and a ratio above 
one means debt exceeds equity.  Our definition of debt is consistent with that used for 
ROCE and gearing.  This ratio is also known as ‘leverage’ in some countries (Holmes et al 
2008:180). 
Focusing on hard debt 
Although our initial analysis showed that many clubs in the EPL were over-reliant on debt, 
ratios calculated didn’t distinguish between soft debt provided by owners and related 
parties at low or no interest, and hard debt from outside the organisation.  It could be 
argued that repayment of soft debt was less likely to become a problem.  To reflect this a 
number of ratios were adapted to examine reliance on hard debt. 
Revenue / Hard debt (14) and Hard debt / Equity (20) 
Revenue / total debt (ratio 13) and total debt / equity (ratio 19) were adapted so that soft 
debt was excluded.  Hard debt included all short and long-term debt including bank loans, 
overdrafts and hire purchase and finance leases but excluded loans provided by the owners 
of clubs and related parties.  This enabled us to establish dependence on borrowed funds 
from outside the organisation.   
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Hard debt gearing (21) 
This ratio was adapted from gearing (ratio 12) and treated soft debt as quasi-equity.  The 
definition of capital employed was the same as used in calculating ROCE and gearing ratios.  
Hard debt included all short and long-term debt (including bank overdrafts and finance 
leases), but excluded loans provided by the owners of clubs and related parties.  This again 
indicated whether a club was too reliant on borrowed funds from outside the organisation.  
In addition it showed how a club’s financial position would improve if soft loans were 
converted into share capital. 
c) Liquidity 
Cash / Total assets (22) and Working capital / Total assets (23) 
In his study of the financial performance of Greek football Panagiotis (2009) looked at cash 
flow / total assets as an indicator of how quickly football clubs could convert assets into 
cash (2009:163).  Horrigan (1968) referred to working capital / total assets as a good 
indicator of solvency (1968:289).  Both ratios evaluated whether a company had sufficient 
liquid assets to pay debts when they became due.  This study used Horrigan’s ratio (working 
capital / total assets), where working capital was current assets less current liabilities and 
total assets comprised all non-current and current assets.  Altman (2000) explained there 
was no consistent definition of ‘cash flow’ (2000:8) hence Panagiotis’s ratio was adapted to 
cash / total assets, where cash comprised the year-end figure for cash and cash equivalents. 
Current ratio (24) 
Altman (1968), Bird and McHugh (1977) and others criticised the usefulness of the current 
ratio. However Panagiotis (2010) used the current ratio in his analysis of Greek football and 
this study also included it in initial calculations.  Since few football clubs carry significant 
amounts of inventory the acid test (quick ratio) was not calculated.  
Cash flow from operations (CFO) / Profit from operations (PFO) (25) and Cash flow from 
operations (CFO) / Revenue (26) 
Ryu and Jang (2004:18) used both ratios in their analysis of casinos and hotels in the USA.  
CFO / PFO indicates the cash flow generated from each £1 of PFO; and CFO / revenue 
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indicates how much cash flow is generated from each £1 of revenue.  In both cases a higher 
ratio indicates better liquidity.   CFO is shown in the statement of cash flows and is not 
distorted by player trading activities.  Analysis showed a high correlation between PFO and 
CFO. 
d) Use of assets 
Revenue / Players’ Registrations (NBV) (27) 
Revenue / players’ registrations (adapted from McKenzie 2010:361) indicates how much 
revenue is generated for each £1 spent acquiring players’ registrations.  Clubs that spend 
heavily on players may over time achieve sporting success which will increase revenue. 
This ratio is easily distorted since for example players acquired at the end of an accounting 
period may be included as intangible assets but will not have significantly contributed 
towards revenue.  Notice also that a collapse in the general value of players’ registrations 
will cause this ratio to improve.  Despite this, over 12 years the impact of these anomalies is 
less significant allowing trends to be observed. 
Asset turnover (Revenue / Capital employed) (28) 
Asset turnover (McKenzie 2010:358, Melville 2014:361) takes into consideration all capital 
employed indicating how much revenue is generated for every £1 invested in a company 
(McKenzie 2010:358).  For consistency the definition of capital employed is the same as used 
previously.  This ratio is again easily distorted by significant additions to capital employed, 
since some investments may take several years to generate a corresponding increase in 
revenue (Melville 2014:361).  
Stadium utilisation (29) 
Deloitte and The Premier League provide data on stadium utilisation and this indicates how 
full stadia are for EPL league matches played during each season.  Football clubs use stadia 
on relatively few occasions each year.  For example during the year ended 30 June 2012 
Manchester United reported that Old Trafford staged just 27 events (including 25 home 
matches) (Red Football Limited 2012:2).  It is therefore important that each time an event is 
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staged, stadium utilisation is as high as possible.  Notice also that due to segregation of 
supporters 100% attendance is not possible.  
3.6.1 Player trading activities 
The purchase of players’ registrations represents a huge investment and it is important to 
understand how this impacts on financial statements.  On 26 August 2014 Manchester 
United acquired Angel Di Maria for a then British record transfer fee of £59.7 million (BBC 
News 2014).  Manchester United’s annual report stated that ‘The costs associated with the 
acquisition of players’ registrations are capitalised…Costs are fully amortised using the 
straight-line method over the period covered by the player’s contract’ (Red Football Ltd 
2014:26).   Di Maria was purchased on a five-year contract (BBC News 2014) which meant 
the transfer fee was capitalised as an intangible asset and written off in equal instalments 
over the duration of his contract giving an annual amortisation charge of £11.94 million 
(£59.7m / 5 years). 
A full 12 months of amortisation is usually charged on all intangible assets held at the 
accounting year-end, and no amortisation is charged in the year in which an asset (player) is 
sold.  This meant that Di Maria’s acquisition would have impacted on financial statements 
for the year ended 30 June 2015 as follows:  
Income statement for the year ended 30 June 2015 (extract) £m 
Amortisation of players’ registrations (11.94) 





Net Book Value 
(NBV) 
 £m £m £m 
Intangible assets – Players’ registrations 59.70 (11.94) 47.76 
 
If a club sells a player for more than his Net Book Value (NBV), the surplus will be reported as 
a profit in the income statement.  A player sold at less than NBV will generate a loss, which is 
again reported in the income statement.  Di Maria was sold to PSG for £44.3 million in 
August 2015 (BBC News 2015a).  Comparing the transfer fee received by Manchester United 
with Di Maria’s NBV resulted in a loss on disposal of £3.46 million, and this would have been 
included in the income statement for the year ended 30 June 2016:   
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Income statement for the year ended 30 June 2016 (extract) £m 
Loss on disposal of players’ registrations (£44.30 - £47.76)  (3.46) 
3.6.2 Analysis of ratios 
Detailed analysis focused on those ratios that most clearly assisted in evaluating financial 
performance and identified whether clubs were able to meet the requirements of FFP and 
EPL financial rules.  This corresponds with previous studies by Horrigan (1965), Beaver 
(1966), Altman (1968), Lev (1969), Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) and Laurent (1979) which 
showed that a complete analysis of financial performance could be carried out using just a 
few ratios, as long as these contained key variables from financial statements.   
3.7 Structured interviews 
The next stage of this project involved the use of qualitative research in the form of 
structured interviews with elite informants from the football industry.  Each elite informant 
had substantial experience in the football sector; seven were from an accounting 
background and two had provided advice to UEFA when it was drawing up FFP rules.  All 
informants were males, reflecting that at senior management level this is a male dominated 
industry.  Since they were involved in making high level decisions each had access to good 
quality and timely financial and other information, and possessed an excellent 
understanding of FFP and key issues related to the financial performance of clubs in the EPL.  
It was hoped interviews would add depth to this study (Welch et al 2002:622, Moore and 
Stokes 2012:441) and augment findings from the quantitative analysis; providing 
information about attitudes towards disparities in revenue, financial performance, the 
provision of soft budget constraints, and increased financial regulation.   
During the period October 2015 to April 2016, 22 elite informants in the football industry 
were contacted by email.  The sample comprised 17 executive directors from clubs that 
played in the EPL for more than one season during the period 2004-15; a director of finance 
for a football league; a CEO of a football league who had previously been CEO of a club in 
the EPL; and three industry experts.   
There was the possibility that elite informants who were involved in the day to day running 
of a football club might be more critical of increased regulation since this impacted on their 
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autonomy.  To overcome this, it was reasoned that industry experts were likely to provide 
an alternative perspective which would reduce bias against increased regulation and result 
in a more balanced series of answers to questions. 
Contact details were obtained from company websites or the Premier League Handbook 
2015/16.  Initial correspondence comprised a letter of introduction that explained the 
researcher’s background; the nature and purpose of this project and progress to date; how 
discussions with informants would contribute to this study; and that interviews would be 
recorded, transcribed and anonymised (Delaney 2007:212, Lilleker 2003:209). 
Nine didn’t respond despite follow up emails and letters.  Thirteen responses were received 
(59%).  Three declined to be interviewed (two directors of finance stated they were too 
busy; one club advised that due to the high number of requests received, it did not engage 
with projects of this type); ten agreed to be interviewed though unfortunately one resigned 
his position as CEO on the morning we were due to meet, leaving nine interviews (41%).  
Full details of elite informants are provided in Appendix 3. 
Gaining access to elite informants was time consuming and due to their busy schedules, 
interviews often occurred six to eight weeks after initial email contact.   Once a mutually 
convenient interview date and time was arranged further details of the research project 
were sent to informants by email, including participant information and informed consent 
forms together with general themes for discussion.  This allowed informants to prepare 
more thoroughly for interviews (Lilleker 2003:209) which promoted validity and reliability 
(Kumar et al 1993:1634, Saunders et al 2012:385). 
Interviews took place during the period November 2015 – May 2016 and lasted from 30-60 
minutes.  Seven interviews were by telephone and two were face to face.  Since informants 
were based in locations around the UK, telephone interviews were effective in terms of cost 
and time.  Occasionally unforeseen circumstances meant elites were required to re-arrange 
interview times, and telephone interviews provided greater flexibility for this to happen.  
Email and telephone correspondence prior to interview allowed trust to be established. 
Informants were asked the same questions which related to key findings from our 
quantitative analysis and focused on disparities in revenue and reliance on broadcasting; 
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rising levels of debt and attitudes to soft budget constraints; and opinions on increased 
financial regulation (see Appendix 4).  In addition everyone except for the three industry 
experts was asked about control of costs (questions 9-11); these questions related to the 
use of budgeting in the day to day financial management of clubs. 
Before each interview commenced the informant was asked whether our conversation 
could be recorded.  All informants agreed to this request.  Interviews were audio recorded 
using voice recorder software on an iPad.  Audio files were password protected and backed 
up to iCloud. 
A short pre-amble introduced each series of questions.  The first questions focused on 
revenue and addressed reliance on broadcasting, disparities in commercial revenue, and 
whether clubs budgeted for funds from player trading activities.  Where applicable, 
discussion next considered control of costs including whether clubs budgeted to achieve 
profit.  With so many clubs spending heavily in pursuit of playing success, informants were 
asked about their attitudes towards negative equity and the provision of soft budget 
constraints.  Informants’ opinions were sought on whether stricter financial regulation was 
necessary; potential difficulties including attaching fair values to related party transactions 
and penalties for breaching FFP and EPL rules; and whether regulation was sufficient to 
improve financial performance.  Finally informants were asked whether aggregate profits in 
2014 and 2015 would have been achieved without increased regulation. 
 Questions were written in advance ensuring clear articulation (Stephens 2007:211), and 
leading questions were avoided so as not to influence responses (Graham et al 2005:11).  
Interviews were data anonymised and transcribed immediately following interview thereby 
reducing the potential for misinterpretation of discussion (see Appendix 5 for a sample 
transcript); and analysed using NVivo software. 
Coding for NVivo was based around interview questions, which assisted with analysis of 
responses.  Transcripts were read several times to ensure themes were correctly coded 
(Moore and Stokes 2012:451).  Results were compared with findings from earlier 
quantitative analysis to establish the primary causes of poor financial performance and 
whether further financial regulation was necessary. 
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Moore and Stokes (2012:439) and King (1997:226) commented on the difficulties accessing 
elite informants in the football sector and although it would have been helpful to obtain 
access to a greater number of informants, especially from the largest clubs, discussions 
were open and honest; provided data that enhanced quantitative analysis; and in their 
responses to questions informants seemed keen to share their knowledge of the football 
industry. Analysis of responses suggested that data saturation was reached (Saunders et al 
2012:283).  
3.8 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity demonstrate ‘The rigour of research proceedings and the 
trustworthiness of research findings’ (Roberts et al 2006:41). Reliability refers to consistency 
of results and the extent to which data collection and analytical techniques used would 
generate similar results if repeated by another researcher (Roberts et al 2006:41, Saunders 
et al 2012:192, Smith 2003:40).  This requires that the research process, including any 
assumptions, is carefully documented, clearly stated, and logical (Ihantola and Kihn 2011:44, 
Saunders et al 2012:194).   Threats to reliability include researcher error, which may occur 
when ‘Two researchers…take slightly differing approaches to collecting the same data, 
which may result in different responses’ (Gratton and Jones 2010:86); researcher bias in the 
interpretation of data (Roberts et al 2006:43); participant error which is anything that 
affects responses provided by participants (Roberts et al 2006:43); and participant bias 
which might result in false responses, or responses that participants think the researcher 
wants to hear (Saunders et al 2012:192). 
Validity is concerned with the extent to which ‘Our research achieves what it sets out to do’ 
(Smith 2003:40), so that ‘We can draw valid conclusions from a study given the research 
design and controls employed’ (Ihantola and Kihn 2011:41).  There are various types of 
validity.  Internal validity looks at reasons for the outcomes of a study ‘Or the credibility of 
causal explanations’ (Modell 2009:210).  Roberts et al (2006) explained that ‘Criterion-
related validity is…established when a tool such as a questionnaire can be compared to 
other similar validated measures of the same concept or phenomenon’ (Roberts et al 
2006:43).  In this way using more than one research method will enhance validity. Construct 
validity is the strongest form of validity and ‘Involves demonstrating relationships between 
the concepts under study and the construct or theory that is relevant to them’ (Roberts et al 
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2009:43), where the construct is the initial question or hypothesis that determines the data 
that will be collected, and the methods used to collect this (Golafshani 2003:599).  External 
validity looks at whether research findings can be generalised or transferred to other 
situations, time periods and settings (Ihantola and Kihn 2011:42, Roberts et al 2009:43, 
Smith 2003:54).    
To reduce interviewer bias and increase generalisability of findings interview questions were 
written in advance and based on empirical findings and previous studies into this industry, 
and informants were asked the same questions in the same order (Qu and Dumay 
2011:244).  Berry (2002) explained there was a risk of finding the arguments and opinions of 
one elite informant very persuasive which would strongly influence the researcher’s 
understanding of topics under discussion (2002:680).   There was also a danger that 
responses could include personal bias, lack objectivity, or be affected by memory lapses 
(Berry 2002:680), and that elites might provide standard club or EPL responses especially to 
sensitive questions (Moore and Stokes 2012:446).  To address these issues interviews took 
place after quantitative data had been analysed which meant the researcher had a good 
understanding of issues under discussion (Lilleker 2003:212, Mikecz 2012:491).  Nine elite 
informants were interviewed, and responses were cross-checked with empirical findings and 
published literature.  Previous studies showed use of multiple informants improved the 
reliability and validity of qualitative data collected (Berry 2002:680, Kumar et al 1993:1634, 
Roberts et al 2006:44).   Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed immediately 
following each interview, and transcriptions were compared with audio recordings to ensure 
accuracy and improve reliability (Roberts et al 2006:43, Ihantola and Kihn 2011:44), and 
analysed using Nvivo software.   Previous studies have shown use of computerised software 
such as NVivo assists reliability, helping maintain an audit trail and adding greater rigour to 
the interview process (Roberts et al 2006:43, Siccama and Penna 2008:102). 
Previous studies showed the reliability of informants was greater when these were senior 
managers in small and medium sized organisations (Homburg et al 2012:606), and from a 
background related to the research question (DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree 2006:317, 
Homburg et al 2012:597).  The sample of elite informants all operated at board level and 
possessed the knowledge and experience required to answer interview questions and 
contribute to this study.   
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Although every effort was taken to improve the reliability and validity of qualitative data, it 
should be noted that individual responses by elite informants were influenced by their own 
backgrounds, attitudes and biases towards the topics under discussion.  As a consequence 
responses did not always correspond with those of their peers or findings from quantitative 
analysis. 
3.9 Summary 
This thesis incorporates elements of positivism and interpretivism.  It would be relatively 
straightforward for another researcher to replicate extraction of financial information and 
calculation of accounting ratios used in this study.  However interpretation of these, 
together with interpretation of responses by elite informants is affected by the background, 
experiences and biases of the researcher.  This thesis is reliant on the accuracy of financial 
statements.   Although the preparation of financial statements is based on judgements and 
estimates, the conceptual framework means this is underpinned by an agreed set of 
principles, concepts and good practice, and compliance with GAAP should result in financial 
statements that show a true and fair view. 
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Chapter 4 - Analysis of data 
4.1 Overview of chapter 
This chapter will identify key revenue streams, examine how these changed during the 
period under review, and establish causes of disparities in revenue.  Accounting ratios will 
be used to analyse financial performance, examine how soft budgets impacted on this, and 
consider whether increased regulation addressed the most worrying aspects of financial 
performance. 
4.2 Growth in revenue 1992-2015 
In 1992 the 22 football clubs playing in England’s top league (Division 1) reported aggregate 
revenue of almost £170 million (Deloitte 2012:30).  The EPL commenced in August 1992 and 
accompanied by favourable broadcasting agreements was the catalyst for transforming 
revenue earned by clubs in England’s top league.  In 2015 the 20 clubs in the EPL generated 
aggregate revenue of £3.35 billion (Table 4.1).  
  2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Revenue (£b) 3.35 3.25 2.55 2.35 2.30 2.12 1.97 1.92 1.51 1.37 1.34 1.36 
Annual % change 3% 27% 9% 2% 8% 8% 3% 27% 10% 1% -1% -  
% change on 2004 146% 139% 88% 73% 69% 56% 45% 41% 11% 1% -1%  - 
Ave revenue (£m) 168 163 128 117 115 112 104 96 76 69 67 68 
No. of clubs with 
revenue > average 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 5 
Table 4.1: Summary of EPL aggregate and average revenue 2004-15  
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
Between 2004-15 aggregate revenue increased by over 146% (Table 4.1) which is particularly 
impressive given the economic climate after 2008.  By 2015 the average revenue generated 
by clubs in the EPL was almost £168 million.  However further analysis showed that in each 
year no more than six clubs earned revenue above the average, resulting in large disparities. 
Table 4.2 shows that aggregate revenue generated by the five largest football leagues in 
Europe increased from €5.7 billion in 2004 to €12.1 billion in 2015.  Throughout this period 
the EPL was responsible for over one-third of revenue reported by the five largest leagues. 
 
 



















England (Premier League) 4,400 36 1,977 35 
France (Ligue 1) 1,418 12 655 11 
Germany (Bundesliga) 2,392 20 1,058 19 
Italy (Serie A) 1,792 15 1,052 18 
Spain (La Liga) 2,053 17 953 17 
Total  12,055 100 5,695 100 
Table 4.2: Revenue generated by Europe’s largest five football leagues 2004 and 2015  
(Source: (a) Deloitte 2016:9; (b) Deloitte 2013:13) 
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that growth in revenue was driven primarily by broadcasting.  In 
1992 the year immediately before the EPL commenced, 48% of aggregate revenue was from 
traditional matchday activities and just 9% from broadcasting (Deloitte 2012:30).  By 2004 
broadcasting had become the most important revenue stream responsible for 45% of 
aggregate revenue (Figure 4.2).   
The stepped increase in broadcasting revenue shown in figure 4.1 demonstrates growth in 
successive broadcasting contracts.  From August 2013 the importance of broadcasting 
increased further after BSkyB and British Telecom (BT) agreed to pay £3.02 billion over three 
years for the domestic rights to broadcast 154 live matches per season (Pearce 2012).  This 
was a 70% increase on the previous contract (Gibson 2015) and meant by 2014 broadcasting 
made up 54% of aggregate revenue, whilst matchday had fallen below 20% (Figure 4.2).   
To put this into perspective in 1983 Arsenal received just £28,000 from broadcasting 
(Dobson and Godard 1998:779) which represented 1% of the club’s total revenue (Banks 
2002:104).  By 2015 broadcasting of £125 million made up 36% of Arsenal’s total revenue 
(Arsenal Holdings plc 2015:44).   





Competition between broadcasters for the rights to domestic football meant, ‘Every time they 
come back to re-negotiate, the broadcasting revenue way exceeds the expectations of the 
market place…Part of that is because of the likes of new players such as BT wanting to come 
into the market place and they are willing to stir things up a bit’ (Informant 6). 
From August 2016 Sky and BT agreed to pay £5.14 billion over three years to show 168 live 
EPL matches each season (Gibson 2015).  This amounted to £1.71 billion per season, an 
increase of 70% on the previous agreement (Gibson 2015).  The most successful clubs in the 
EPL generated additional broadcasting revenue from playing in European competition, 
particularly the UEFA Champions League.  In 2012 Chelsea received almost £51 million from 
UEFA for winning the Champions League (Deloitte 2013: Appendix 9).   
Informant 3 explained that the scale of recent broadcasting contracts had significantly 
changed the relative importance of revenue streams, ‘When I joined 14 years ago we would 
look at the stats of how many people bought programmes, how many people bought pies.  



















Accounting year ended 
Figure 4.1: Breakdown of EPL aggregate revenue by revenue stream 
2004-15 (Source: 2004-10 Deloitte 2012:30; 2011-15 Calculated from 
aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011-15) 
Broadcasting Commercial Matchday
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several clubs in the EPL, ‘The reality is…broadcasting revenue is all important, everything else 
pales into insignificance’ (Informant 1).    
With matches broadcast in 185 countries (Premier League 2015a:23) Informant 4 explained, 
‘The global popularity…is driven by the fact that football, like all sport at the very top 
end is entertainment...Secondly it’s to do with the growth in all media forms and the 
availability of hand held devices and the development of smart TV’s, generally the 
whole perpetuation of new media…Thirdly…It is considered fashionable to follow a 
club…The final reason is that the EPL has been very successful in ensuring that 
performance on the field of play is constantly improving through re-investing some 
revenue.’ (Informant 4) 
This global fan base enabled the largest clubs to attract high profile corporate sponsors and 
by 2011 commercial revenue exceeded matchday (Figure 4.2).  
 
Table 4.3 shows a similar pattern across Europe’s five largest leagues with a decline in 
traditional revenue streams and growing importance of broadcasting and commercial 
activities. This corresponded with the findings Andreff and Staudohar (2000) who observed 

























Accounting year ended 
Figure 4.2: Relative importance of key revenue streams as a % of EPL 
aggregate revenue 2004-15 (Source: 2004-10 Deloitte 2012:30; 2011-15 
Calculted from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2011-15) 
Broadcasting Commercial Matchday
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 Matchday Broadcasting Commercial Total 
 €m % €m % €m % €m 
England (Premier League) 768 18 2,337 53 1,295 29 4,400 
France (Ligue 1) 165 12 628 44 625 44 1,418 
Germany (Bundesliga) 521 22 731 31 1,140 47 2,392 
Italy (Serie A) 210 12 1,099 61 483 27 1,792 
Spain (La Liga) 435 21 975 48 643 31 2,053 
Total 2,099 17 5,770 48 4,186 35 12,055 
Table 4.3: Breakdown of revenue generated by Europe’s largest five football leagues 2015 
(Source: Deloitte 2016:9) 
 
Let us consider in more detail what each of these revenue streams comprises.  In its 2015 
annual report Manchester United defined matchday as ‘Revenue receivable from all 
domestic and European matchday activities from Manchester United games at Old Trafford 
together with the Group’s share of gate receipts from cup matches not played at Old 
Trafford...and fees for arranging other events at the Old Trafford stadium’ (Red Football 
Limited 2015:22).  Other events included revenue from conferences and admissions to the 
club museum (2015:22).   
Commercial comprised ‘Revenue receivable from the exploitation of the Manchester United 
brand through sponsorship and other commercial agreements…and fees for the Manchester 
United first team undertaking tours’ (2015:21).  Beech explained that commercial activities 
included revenue from sponsorship (including shirt sponsorship and the sale of stadium 
naming rights) (2010:129) and the sale of replica kit and other merchandise to supporters 
(2010:130). 
Finally Manchester United defined broadcasting as ‘Revenue receivable from all UK and 
overseas broadcasting contracts, including contacts negotiated centrally by the FA Premier 
League and UEFA’ (2015:21).   
 
































By club (ranked largest to smallest in terms of revenue generated in each year) 
Figure 4.3: Total revenue generated by each club in the EPL from football activities in the accounting 
periods immediately following new broadcasting agreements 2005-14 (Source: Financial statements of 
clubs in the EPL 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014) 
2005 2008 2011 2014





4.3 Disparities in revenue 
Figure 4.3 shows total revenue reported by each club in the accounting periods immediately 
following a new broadcasting contract.  It clearly illustrates in monetary terms both growth 
in revenue and increasing disparities, particularly between the six largest revenue earning 
clubs and the rest of the EPL.   
Table 4.4 shows disparities by revenue stream.  We can see that in 2015 Arsenal generated 
£100 million from matchday (the highest amount reported in the EPL) which was almost 17 
times greater than the £6 million earned by Burnley (the lowest matchday receipts in the 
EPL).  The multiple was even larger for commercial revenue with Manchester United 
generating almost 32 times more than the £6 million earned by Burnley.  The collective 
negotiation and equitable distribution of broadcasting revenue meant the multiple was 
much smaller, and in 2015 Chelsea’s broadcasting revenue was just 2.1 times greater than 
that reported by Queens Park Rangers (QPR).   
 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 
 £m £m £m £m £m 
Matchday      
Highest Revenue 100.4 108.1 109.1 98.7 110.8 
Lowest Revenue 6.0 7.0 4.6 3.6 4.1 
Multiple 16.7 15.6 24.0 27.5 27.1 
      
Broadcasting      
Highest Revenue 135.6 139.9 105.4 111.0 117.2 
Lowest Revenue 65.9 64.0 43.0 41.1 42.3 
Multiple 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.8 
      
Commercial      
Highest Revenue 196.9 189.3 152.4 121.1 103.4 
Lowest Revenue 6.2 4.5 3.4 2.9 2.0 
Multiple 31.8 42.5 44.7 41.4 52.0 
Table 4.4: Comparison of disparities by revenue stream 2011-15 
(Source: Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011-15) 
 
In 1993 the six largest clubs were responsible for around 50% of aggregate revenue (Table 
4.5).  The formation of the EPL combined with expansion of the UEFA Champions League 





and increased commercialism meant from 2010 onwards the six largest clubs generated 
around 60% of aggregate revenue.  Although average revenue increased rapidly during 
2004-15, the rising standard deviation indicated in monetary terms growing disparities 
between clubs.  By 2015 average revenue for the six largest clubs was £317 million; the 
remaining 14 clubs shared almost £1.5 billion resulting in average revenue of £104 million. 
 2015 2014 2012 2010 2008 2006 2004 1993(i) 
 £m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m 
Aggregate revenue for 
EPL 
3,354.9 3,249.4 2,346.4 2,118.8 1,920.0 1,369.3 1,364.4 201.6 
Average revenue per 
club 
167.8 162.5 117.3 111.5 96.0 68.5 68.2 9.2 
Number of clubs 
exceeding average 
6 6 6 6 6 6 5 7 
Standard deviation 104.4 104.3 79.2 89.1 62.4 41.1 41.1 n/a 
 
Revenue generated by 
largest 6 clubs  
1,904.5 1,841.6 1,364.0 1,304.0 1,062.7 737.0 725.7 100.7 
Average revenue of 
largest 6 clubs 
317.4 306.9 227.3 217.3 177.1 122.8 121.0 16.8 
 
Revenue generated by 
remaining clubs 
1,450.4 1,407.8 982.4 814.8 857.3 632.3 638.7 100.9 
Average revenue of 
remaining clubs 
103.6 100.6 70.2 58.2 61.2 45.2 45.6 6.3 
 
% of aggregate revenue 
















Highest revenue 395.2 433.2 320.3 286.4 256.2 173.2 169.1 25.2 
Lowest revenue 78.8 83.1 52.6 43.1 42.8 34.9 38.0 3.6 
Multiple 5.0 5.2 6.1 6.6 6.0 5.0 4.5 7.0 
Table 4.5: EPL Key revenue indicators 1993 and 2004-15 
Note:  
(i) In 1993 the EPL comprised 22 clubs; 2004-15 the EPL comprised 20 clubs. 
(Source: 1993 Touche Ross 1993:25; 2004-15 Calculated from aggregated financial 
statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
4.4 Commercial revenue 
From Table 4.4 we can see that the largest revenue multiple consistently related to 
commercial activities.  For many years shirt sponsorship and kit supply have been important 
sources of commercial revenue, and more recently some clubs have generated large 





amounts from the sale of stadium naming rights.  Let us examine why these sources of 
revenue differ so greatly between clubs. 
4.4.1 Shirt sponsorship 
The FA relaxed its rules on shirt sponsorship during the late 1970s (Siegle 2013) allowing 
clubs to generate additional revenue by having the names of corporate sponsors displayed 
on shirts.  The success of shirt sponsorship in raising the profile of corporate brands meant 
contracts became more lucrative.  In 1981 JVC paid £500,000 to sponsor Arsenal’s shirts for 
three years (Rosson 2001:10); by 1997 Chelsea received £1.5 million per year from 
Autoglass (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:70).   
Rosson (2001) explained that the most successful clubs generated the highest amounts from 
shirt sponsorship (2001:8).  These clubs were likely to attract the best players (2001:10); be 
most often involved in live televised matches; and play in the later stages of cup 
competitions including the UEFA Champions League (2001:12); all of which helped raise the 
global profiles of shirt sponsors (2001:12).  In addition replica kit and other merchandise 
often included the shirt sponsor, and it was the largest and best supported clubs that had 
the highest sales of club related merchandise (2001:9).  Jensen et al (2012) observed that 
when Aon agreed to sponsor Manchester United’s shirts in 2009 its directors stated that 
‘Our brand will be showcased to over 330 million fans of Manchester United as well as 
countless followers of football worldwide’ (2012:516).  In 2010 Sharp’s Marketing 
Communications Manager admitted that ‘Since we stepped away from Manchester United 
the awareness of Sharp has fallen’ (Goss 2010). 
Sports marketing research company Repucom (2015) calculated that during 2014-15 EPL 
clubs earned €213 million from shirt sponsorship (Repucom 2015).  This represented 33% of 
shirt sponsorship revenue generated by the five largest leagues in Europe and was 
significantly higher than amounts received by clubs in Germany’s Bundesliga (€139 million) 
and Spain’s La Liga (€113 million) (Repucom 2015).  The global appeal of the EPL was further 
demonstrated with 75% of revenue coming from overseas sponsors (Repucom 2015).  
 





Figure 4.4: Shirt sponsorship by club 2013-14 and 2014-15 
(Source: Miller and Harris 2014)  
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version 
can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.





Figure 4.4 shows the huge amounts generated by the largest clubs during 2014-15, with 
Manchester United (Chevrolet) receiving £47 million, Arsenal (Emirates Airlines) £30 million, 
and Liverpool (Standard Chartered) and Manchester City (Etihad Airlines) £20 million each.  
Figure 4.4 also shows that during 2014-15 Burnley, Leicester, Southampton and Crystal 
Palace earned less from shirt sponsorship than Chelsea received in 1997.   
Table 4.6 summarises the findings of Miller (2010, 2013) and Miller and Harris (2011, 2014) 
and clearly demonstrates recent growth in shirt sponsorship whilst highlighting significant 
disparities in the amounts received by clubs.  Although during 2009-15 aggregate revenue 
from shirt sponsorship increased by 165% to £191 million, around three quarters of this 
amount was consistently earned by just six clubs.   
The multiple in table 4.6 highlights differences between the highest and lowest amounts 
generated from shirt sponsorship.  For example during 2009-10 Manchester United received 
£14 million from shirt sponsorship which was 70 times greater than the £200,000 generated 
by Blackpool.  This multiple continued and during 2013-14 Arsenal received more from shirt 
sponsorship in one week than Cardiff earned in 12 months.   
In October 2004 Emirates Airlines paid £100 million to become Arsenal’s shirt sponsor from 
2006-13 and for stadium naming rights during 2006-21 (Gibson 2004).  The shirt sponsorship 
element was estimated to be worth around £5.5 million per season (Miller 2013) which was 
at the time the largest in the EPL (Gibson 2004).   
We can see from table 4.6 that over a relatively short period of time the amounts shirt 
sponsors were prepared to pay the most successful clubs increased significantly and by 
2012-13 Arsenal lagged behind its rivals.  This was remedied in November 2012 when 
Arsenal and Emirates agreed a new contract for shirt sponsorship until 2019 and stadium 
naming rights until 2028 (Arsenal Holdings plc 2013:11). 
In 2011 Manchester United became the first club in the EPL to sell shirt sponsorship on its 
training kit when DHL paid £40 million over four years (Gibson 2011).  This meant DHL paid 





more to advertise on Manchester United’s training kit than all but five sponsors paid for 
advertising on first team shirts (Gibson 2011).   
Club / Season 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 2010-11 2009-10 
 £m £m £m £m £m £m 
Arsenal 30.0 30.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Chelsea 18.0 18.0 13.8 13.8 13.8 9.9 
Liverpool 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 7.5 
Manchester City 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 7.5 7.3 
Manchester United 47.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 14.0 
Tottenham Hotspur 16.0 19.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.5 
Total 151.0 127.0 89.3 89.3 76.8 52.7 
As a % of EPL total 78.9% 76.6% 60.1%(i) 76.0% 76.2% 72.9% 
 
Everton 5.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.6 2.6 
Stoke City 3.0 3.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 
West Bromwich Albion 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.8 n/a 
Wigan Athletic n/a n/a 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 
 
Aggregate for EPL 191.4 165.8 147.1 117.5 100.5 72.3 
Annual % increase 15.4% 12.7% 25.2% 16.9% 39.0% - 
Cumulative % increase on 
2009-10 
164.7% 129.3% 103.5% 62.5% 39.0% - 
 
Highest (£m) 47.0 30.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 14.0 
Lowest (£m) 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 
Multiple  63 60 40 50 40 70 
Table 4.6: Shirt sponsorship in the EPL 2009-2015 
Note:  
(i) Miller (2013) explained his original figures for 2012-13 were overstated with Sunderland 
earning much less than the £20 million estimated in August 2012.  This is why during 
2012-13 shirt sponsorship earned by the six largest clubs amounted to just 60% of the 
EPL aggregate compared with over 70% in every other year.  
(Source: 2014-15 and 2013-14 Miller and Harris (2014); 2012-13 Miller (2013); 2011-12 and 
2010-11 Miller and Harris (2011); 2009-10 Miller (2010)) 
 
However following negotiations with General Motors over sponsorship of first team shirts, 
Manchester United believed it had undervalued its training strip and in October 2012 
announced the agreement with DHL would come to an end on 30 June 2013 (Anon 2012).  
In an announcement to the New York Stock Exchange the club outlined the reasons behind 
this stating ‘The significantly increased value of agreements concluded since entering into 
this agreement, such as our recent $559 million world-record shirt sponsorship with General 





Motors, leads us to believe that there should be strategic opportunities to further optimise 
the value of these rights’ (Anon 2012).  This was proved correct when UK insurance broker 
Aon agreed to pay £15 million per annum to sponsor training kit and have Manchester 
United’s training ground renamed the Aon Training Complex for an eight-year period from 1 
July 2013 (Joy 2013).  
The most successful clubs often enjoyed lengthy contracts with shirt sponsors.  From 1981-
99 Arsenal was sponsored by JVC (Rosson 2001:10), and Emirates recently extended shirt 
sponsorship until 2019 (Arsenal Holdings plc 2013:11).  Danish brewing company Carlsberg 
sponsored Liverpool for 17 years until 2010 (Liverpool FC 2013), and Japanese electronics 
company Sharp sponsored Manchester United from 1982-2000 (Goss 2010).   
However clubs outside the top six struggled to develop lasting relationships with shirt 
sponsors,  
‘Generally you are looking at probably two to three years.  It’s unusual to go any 
longer than that.  As long as you’ve got clauses in there where the income reduces if 
you do get relegated then the sponsors are quite happy to go for a two or three-year 
deal.’ (Informant 8) 
During the 2008-09 and 2009-10 seasons WBA had no permanent shirt sponsor and instead 
agreed sponsorship on a match by match basis (Anon 2010).  During 2009-14 Sunderland 
had four different sponsors and Aston Villa, Fulham and Newcastle each had three different 
sponsors (Miller 2010, Miller and Harris 2012 and 2014).  Miller (2010) explained that 
without the arrival of online gambling and payday loan companies, several clubs would have 
seen a decline in revenue from shirt sponsorship.  He also suggested these organisations 
were interested only in short-term sponsorship to raise brand awareness (BBC News 2010).  
This reflected that clubs outside the top six had less bargaining power with sponsors and 
were more likely to accept a short-term arrangement with the highest bidder.   It also meant 
these clubs were very reliant on broadcasting revenue, ‘Luckily for us when it comes to 
broadcasting it’s still collective bargaining.  On the sponsorship side it’s very evident how the 





big clubs can sign really big deals, even for training kits.  Significantly higher than any income 
we could receive for our main kit’ (Informant 9). 
Despite these disparities, there was consensus among elite informants that broadcasting had 
improved the global profile of every club in the EPL and this impacted favourably on shirt 
sponsorship, 
‘Being a PL club attracts big name sponsors whoever the club is and it really does allow 
you to generate revenue that you certainly can’t do in the Football League…The actual 
step…from a media exposure point of view when you get into the PL is absolutely 
enormous and that makes you a very marketable commodity as a football club.’ 
(Informant 8) 
‘Most sponsors look at whether you are going to be in the EPL or not since that is 
where the exposure is going to be.’ (Informant 9) 
However this meant contracts usually included clauses that greatly reduced commercial 
revenue in the event of relegation from the EPL, 
‘Typically shirt sponsor deals would have a differential level of fee dependent on 
whether it’s EPL, Championship or League 1.’ (Informant 1) 
‘We’ve always had to sign a tiered agreement where even if it is a multi-year 
sponsorship agreement it’s going to be based on, if we are in the EPL it’s going to be a 
certain amount; and if you’re not it’s going to go down to an amount that is 
significantly lower. Not just a bit lower but significantly lower.’  (Informant 9) 
4.4.2 Stadium naming rights 
Crompton and Howard (2003) observed that although shirt sponsorship was common in the 
EPL few clubs had explored stadia naming rights as a revenue stream.  This was the reverse 
of what had happened in US sporting leagues where only discrete shirt sponsorship was 
permitted (2003:213) but stadia naming rights were common (2003:212).  However the 
success of shirt sponsorship led Crompton and Howard to conclude that whilst there were 





opportunities for clubs in the EPL to generate revenue from the sale of stadia naming rights, 
the amounts realised were unlikely to match those in the US (2003:225). 
In 2013 global valuation consultants American Appraisal estimated that clubs in the EPL 
could generate aggregate revenue of around £75 million each season from the sale of stadia 
naming rights (De Menzes 2013).  However their report highlighted significant disparities 
between clubs, with 80% of revenue going to Manchester City (£18.2 million), Manchester 
United (£16.9 million), Arsenal (£6.6 million), Liverpool (£6.1 million), Tottenham (£5.8 
million) and Chelsea (£5.5 million) (De Menzes 2013).  This left the remaining 14 clubs with a 
share of £15.4 million of which it was forecast Cardiff would receive less than £300,000 and 
Crystal Palace and Norwich around £400,000 each (De Menzes 2013).  Based on these 
figures Manchester City would receive 61 times more than Cardiff (£18.2m / £0.3m), a 
multiple comparable with shirt sponsorship.   
Arsenal became the most high-profile club in the EPL to sell naming rights when the newly 
build Ashburton Grove was re-named the Emirates Stadium from the start of the 2006-07 
season (BBC News  2004).  From Arsenal’s perspective this was particularly attractive since 
Emirates paid the whole amount up front in the form of a discounted lump sum (Scott 2011) 
which the club used towards the cost of building its stadium.  
In July 2011 Manchester City‘s stadium was renamed the Etihad in a 10-year sponsorship 
agreement with the Abu Dhabi based airline (BBC News 2011a) that was worth around £400 
million (Miller 2011:24).  With Manchester City’s owner Sheikh Mansour and his family 
represented on the Etihad board, the scale of this transaction came under scrutiny to ensure 
it was not an attempt to bypass FFPR (UEFA 2017:Manchester City), 
‘At the time the immediate response was “Wow” that seems like a significant amount.  
There are a couple of things to note.  One Etihad is not directly controlled by Sheikh 
Mansour...from a legal perspective and an accounting perspective they are not related 
companies…No one has actually queried the £400 million because everything that’s 
followed has put that into some perspective.  It wasn’t long after that Manchester 





United got £50 million sponsorship for their training kit.  So what is a market rate?’  
(Informant 6) 
Several other clubs in the EPL have raised funds through the sale of stadia naming rights 
including Bolton Wanderers, Coventry City, Hull City, Leicester City, Middlesbrough, 
Southampton, Stoke City, Swansea City and Wigan Athletic (BBC News 2011a).  However 
these clubs sold naming rights for recently built stadia.  Referring to sporting clubs in the 
USA, Crompton and Howard (2003) observed that ‘A change of venue helps to sever the 
emotional allegiance tied to the memories, heritage and traditions which fans have to 
existing facilities’ (2003:225).  Elite informants explained it was more difficult for clubs with 
long established stadia to exploit this revenue stream, 
‘The difficulty is the so called…iconic names that have been attached to some of the 
stadia…We do get feedback that it would be difficult to re-name a stadium such as 
ours and we’re quite a small club with very limited history so to speak.  Even a club like 
Spurs faces difficulties, as a more established club trying to sell stadium naming rights.’ 
(Informant 9) 
‘We’ve considered it.  Because of the age of the stadium…it would always be “The Club 
B ground” even in the media…Even a sponsor is going to realise that, so it’s never 
going to carry the same sort of value a new stadium will have.’ (Informant 3) 
This was clearly illustrated in November 2011 when supporters criticised Newcastle United 
after its stadium was re-named the ‘Sports Direct Arena’ (BBC News 2011).   
It was also recognised that even a relatively new stadium might struggle to attract 
sponsorship once the original sponsor withdrew,  
‘The Reebok [Bolton Wanderers] was one of the first.  When you are building a new 
asset they can be far more meaningful as the name sticks.  Macron have recently 
taken over the sponsorship of that stadium, it will be very interesting to see to what 
extent that name sticks.’ (Informant 1) 





Aon’s sponsorship of Manchester United’s training ground suggests the sale of stadia 
naming rights might prove an important revenue stream particularly as clubs strive to meet 
the requirements of FFP.  However it is likely that the six largest clubs will continue to 
attract the most lucrative sponsorship which will widen further disparities in the financial 
resources available to clubs.  
4.4.3 Kit supply 
Demand by supporters for replica kit has generated another important source of revenue.   
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) reported that in 1996 Reebok paid Liverpool £6.5 million per 
year to supply kit (1999:71).  During the first year of that contract Reebok generated 
revenue of £40 million from the sale of replica shirts (1999:71).  In 1996 Umbro agreed to 
pay Manchester United £42 million over six years and during 1996-97 alone supporters 
purchased around 850,000 replica shirts (1999:71).  However these paled in significance 
when compared against Manchester United’s next kit supply contract.  From August 2002 
Nike became Manchester United’s official kit supplier in a 13-year agreement that was 
worth up to £303 million (Manchester United plc 2002:20).  During the first 12 months Nike 
sold 2.5 million replica Manchester United shirts, with 40% of sales outside the UK 
(Manchester United plc 2003:7). 
With the EPL having players from around 60 different countries (Vojdinoski 2013) 
sportswear manufacturers were quick to recognise the global appeal of replica shirts and 
during 2012-13 clubs received £117 million from kit suppliers (Repucom 2013).  This was 
more than any other European league and reflected the popularity of EPL clubs which sold 
over 5 million replica shirts during 2012-13, double the amount sold by Budesliga clubs 
(Bensch 2013).   
The largest kit supply agreements are summarised in table 4.7 and show that new suppliers 
have entered the market including US companies Under Armour (Tottenham), and Warrior 
(Liverpool).  These demonstrate the amounts that suppliers are prepared to pay to access 
the global fan bases of the EPL’s most successful and best supported clubs.   





Despite the scale of recent agreements the contract between Manchester United and Nike 
remained competitive.  It was rumoured that Nike offered to pay Manchester United a 
world record £60 million per annum to continue as kit supplier until July 2020 (Kent 2013).  
However with Manchester United seeking an amount nearer to £70 million (Jackson 2014), 
in July 2014 Nike announced, ‘The terms that were on offer for a renewed contract did not 
represent good value for Nike’s shareholders’ (Wilson 2014).  It was subsequently 
announced that Adidas would supply Manchester United’s kit for ten years from July 2015 in 
a deal worth around £75 million per season (Wilson 2014).  This was significantly more than 
the £31 million per year agreement between Adidas and Real Madrid, which was previously 
the world’s largest kit supply contract (Wilson 2014). 
Manchester United’s contract with Adidas also illustrated the importance of regular 
participation in the Champions League to the largest clubs and their sponsors.  Although the 
club receives bonuses for winning competitions, the annual amount is reduced by 30% if 
Manchester United doesn’t play in the Champions League for two successive seasons (Red 
Football Ltd 2014:59). 
Club Sponsor Duration Estimated annual 
amount 
Manchester United (a) Adidas 10 years (from July 2015) £75 million 
Arsenal  Puma 5 years (from July 2014) £30 million 
Chelsea  Adidas 10 years (from July 2013) £18-30 million 
Liverpool  Warrior 6 years (from July 2013) £25 million 
Manchester City Nike 6 years (from July 2013) £12 million 
Tottenham Hotspur Under Armour 5 years (from July 2012) £10 million 
Manchester United (b) Nike 13 years (from July 2002) £23 million 
Table 4.7: Recent agreements between EPL clubs and kit suppliers  
(Source: Manchester United (a) Wilson 2014; Arsenal BBC News 2014a; Chelsea Happe 
2013; Liverpool Bensch 2013; Manchester City BBC News 2013; Tottenham Hotspur 
Anon 2011 and Tottenham Hotspur 2011; Manchester United (b) Manchester United 
plc 2002:20).  
 
Despite being one of only seven clubs that played in the EPL in every season from 1992-
2015, Aston Villa’s four-year kit supply contract with Macron which commenced in July 2012 
was worth just £3.75 million per year (Kendrick 2012).  Whilst in 2011 WBA agreed a three-
year contract with Adidas worth around $2.4 million per year (£1.5 million) (SportsPro Media 





2011).  Informant 7 explained, ‘There is polarisation in the sponsorship market.  People want 
the big brands and therefore you are going to get Manchester United with £70 million kit 
sponsorship per annum and Bournemouth who might struggle to get £2 or £3 million’ 
(Informant 7).   
4.4.4 Establishing the fair value of transactions  
Prior to their introduction there were concerns that clubs might circumvent FFP and EPL 
acceptable deviations through inflated sponsorship or commercial transactions with related 
parties (Miller 2011:23, Vöpel 2011:58).  Elite informants explained, 
‘When they [UEFA] want to question market values or are looking at related party 
transactions, it is very subjective…It’s a difficult process to look at each and every 
single transaction to see if it’s market based or not.’ (Informant 9) 
It was suggested that the scale of recent commercial transactions made it more difficult for 
UEFA to question whether these represented fair value, 
‘Two or three years ago you would never have foreseen that there would be that level 
of sponsorship available.  So it’s very difficult to start to attack some of those and as 
you know they are not even related parties…No-one would ever have thought that 
you could commercialise Manchester United’s content the way that they’ve done.’ 
(Informant 7) 
In addition it was pointed out that challenging fair values might bring UEFA into conflict with a 
club’s auditors, 
‘Where I have a difficulty is that you can have your accounts signed off by a big four 
auditor saying this isn’t a related party transaction, and yet UEFA could actually turn 
around and say it is.  So what are you saying? That the accounts are not true and fair?  
So it’s fraught with huge difficulties in terms of attacking those related party 
transactions.’ (Informant 7) 





This was contrasted with EPL rules where, ‘The EPL won’t look into…a…transaction if the 
club’s auditors don’t believe that it is a related party transaction’ (Informant 5).   
In 2015 UEFA employed accountants PWC and sports research company Repucom to evaluate 
whether sponsorships paid by Russian bank VTB to FC Dynamo Moscow represented fair value 
transactions (UEFA 2017), 
‘One that has actually become available is the Dynamo Moscow case.  They [UEFA] 
wrote down their sponsorship amounts by a considerable number…UEFA…are 
adjusting those sponsorship figures downwards where they believe there are related 
party transaction issues.’ (Informant 5) 
VTB owned 74% of share capital in FC Dynamo Moscow and was also the club’s primary 
sponsor (UEFA 2017).  The investigation resulted in sponsorship received from VTB during 
2012-14 being adjusted downwards and meant FC Dynamo Moscow reported a cumulative 
deficit that was €257 million greater than the acceptable deviation (UEFA 2017).  The CFCB 
adjudicatory chamber banned the club from UEFA club competition for four years (UEFA 
2017), demonstrating how seriously UEFA takes this issue.  
It was agreed that the key factor in calculating fair value was transparency, ‘As long as there’s 
a sensible asset backing it [sponsorship] up, you can understand it’ (Informant 6). 
4.5 Changes in the relative importance of revenue streams 
During the last few years clubs in the EPL have provided a note to their financial statements 
that breaks down total revenue between matchday, broadcasting and commercial activities.  
Figure 4.5 summarises this information in percentage terms and showed that in 2015 
broadcasting amounted to more than 70% of revenue reported by 10 clubs including 
Burnley (84% of total revenue), Crystal Palace (78%), Stoke City (78%), Swansea (83%) and 
WBA (81%).  From figure 4.5 we can also see the growing importance of commercial 
revenue for the six largest clubs.   
Let us consider each revenue stream in more detail. 



































































































Figure 4.5: Breakdown of total revenue (%) for each  club in the EPL 
2015 (Source: Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2015) 
Broadcasting Commercial Matchday






Deloitte (2013) reported that in every season between 1997-8 and 2012-13 stadium 
utilisation in the EPL exceeded 90% (Deloitte 2013:10).  Attendances at EPL matches 
continued grow and the Premier League (2015b) reported that ‘The 2014-15 season marked 
a record level of occupancy in Premier League grounds, with 95.9% of tickets available 
sold…It also marked the third season in a row that occupancy exceeded 95%’ (Premier 
League 2015b).  Consistently high stadium utilisation saw total matchday receipts increase 
by 15% during the period 2011-14 (calculated from table 4.8).  Despite this, the relative 
importance of matchday continued to decline and by 2015 it amounted to just 18% of 
aggregate revenue (Table 4.8). 
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As a % of 
aggregate 
revenue 






As a % of 
aggregate 
revenue  






As a % of 
aggregate 
revenue 
2011 362.4 28 69 162.3 16 31 524.7 23 
2012 363.5 27 72 142.6 15 28 506.1 22 
2013 390.3 26 69 176.3 17 31 566.6 22 
2014 420.2 23 70 183.7 13 30 603.9 19 
2015 405.3 22 69 181.2 12 31 586.5 18 
Table 4.8: Breakdown of matchday receipts 2011-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011-15) 
 
Further analysis of table 4.8 showed that in each year the six largest clubs earned around 
70% of total matchday receipts.  This group included Arsenal and Manchester United who 
accounted for around 36% of matchday receipts generated by EPL clubs during 2011-15 
(Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011-15).   
Throughout the last decade Manchester United (average attendance 75,538 (Premier 
League 2015:550)) and Arsenal (59,930 tickets sold for each home match (Arsenal Holdings 
plc 2015:8)) owned the two largest stadia in the EPL and this provided a financial advantage 
in terms of matchday receipts (Table 4.9).  Regular participation in the UEFA Champions 
League increased matchday further still.  In 2014 matchday receipts reported by 
Manchester United exceeded the total revenue of 11 clubs in the EPL, whilst Arsenal’s 
matchday was greater than the total revenue of nine clubs. 





 Matchday Commercial Broadcasting 
 2015 2004 2015 2004 2015 2004 
 £m £m £m £m £m £m 
Arsenal 100.4 33.8 103.3   21.0 124.8 59.8 
Chelsea 70.8 n/a 113.1 n/a 135.6 n/a 
Liverpool 59.0   26.4 116.4  31.7 122.6   33.5 
Manchester City 43.3   17.1 173.0  19.3 135.4   25.5 
Manchester United 90.6   61.2 196.9   45.3 107.7   62.5 
Tottenham 41.2   19.8 59.9   22.7 95.3   23.9 
       
Aston Villa 13.8 10.9 27.9   17.8 71.4   27.2 
Burnley 6.0 n/a 6.2 n/a 66.6 n/a 
Everton 17.9   15.6 26.0     8.3 81.7   20.8 
Leicester City 10.7 8.5 20.1 9.8 73.7 21.3 
Newcastle United 26.8   33.9 24.9   22.6 77.2   33.7 
QPR  8.1 n/a 11.8 n/a 65.9 n/a 
Sunderland 10.8 n/a 17.2 n/a 69.1 n/a 
WBA 8.0 n/a 10.8 n/a 77.5 n/a 
West Ham  19.9 n/a 21.8 n/a 79.0 n/a 
Table 4.9: Comparison of revenue streams for a sample of clubs in the EPL 2004 
and 2015 
(Source:  Financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004 and 2015) 
 
Stadium capacity meant several clubs generated relatively small amounts from matchday 
including Burnley (average attendance 19,158 (Burnley FC Ltd 2015:3)), Hull City (23,557 
(Hull City Tigers 2015:4)) and WBA (25,100 (WBA FC Ltd 2015:3)).  Although Aston Villa and 
Everton could each accommodate around 40,000 supporters (Premier League 2015:550), in 
recent years both struggled to fill their stadia on a regular basis which represented a large 
amount of lost revenue.   
The amounts earned by Manchester United and Arsenal explain why Manchester City 
(Manchester City 2014:4), Liverpool (Hunter 2014), Tottenham (Anon 2014) and Chelsea 
(BBC News 2015) have announced plans to increase the capacities of their stadia.  Once 
completed these developments will significantly increase matchday receipts for the largest 
six clubs and widen further disparities with the remainder of the EPL.  With Chelsea and 
Tottenham building new stadia there is also the potential to raise revenue from the sale of 
stadium naming rights. 






During the period 2011-15 commercial revenue increased by a staggering 75% (calculated 
from table 4.10).  By 2015 commercial amounted to £983 million and made up 29% of 
aggregate revenue (Table 4.10).  However growth was driven by the six largest clubs and in 
2015 these received 78% of commercial revenue (Table 4.10).  Informant 9 explained, ‘Most 
sponsors now are looking at it globally and looking at so called global brands which are 
Manchester United, Liverpool, Arsenal and those kinds of clubs.  Whereas a club of our size, 
even in the EPL it was fairly difficult and challenging to attract sponsors’ (Informant 9).  
A review of table 4.9 indicates that five of the six largest clubs saw huge growth in 
commercial revenue between 2004-15.  Chelsea only started to provide analysis of revenue 
from 2011 onwards, since when its commercial revenue almost doubled from £63 million 
(Fordstam Ltd 2012:15).   
The introduction of FFP and EPL rules has seen commercial revenue become an increasingly 
important source of additional funds. In 2015 lucrative commercial contracts worth £197 
million made up 50% of Manchester United’s revenue (Figure 4.5).  This increased further 
when the new kit supply contract with Adidas commenced in July 2015.  Shirt sponsorship 
and stadium naming agreements with Etihad Airlines meant commercial revenue of £173 
million accounted for 49% of Manchester City’s turnover (Figure 4.5).  The scale of 
Manchester City’s commercial and broadcasting revenue meant that in 2015 matchday 
amounted to just 12% of revenue (Figure 4.5).   
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aggregate 
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As a % of 
aggregate 
revenue 
2011 404.4 31 72 156.7 16 28 561.1 24 
2012 478.6 35 75 160.9 16 25 639.5 27 
2013 596.0 39 78 164.5 16 22 760.5 30 
2014 693.0 38 78 194.1 14 22 887.1 27 
2015 762.6 40 78 220.8 15 22 983.4 29 
Table 4.10: Breakdown of commercial revenue 2011-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011-15) 
 





Although there was initially debate about whether the amounts paid by Etihad Airlines for 
shirt sponsorship and stadium naming rights represented fair market values, Manchester 
City’s recent playing success accompanied by regular participation in the UEFA Champions 
League has greatly enhanced the club’s appeal to sponsors, ‘Etihad has gone from something 
like the 20th largest airline in the world to…fifth or sixth…so would they say it’s good value?  I 
think they would and subsequent transactions have meant that no-one has gone back and 
questioned it’ (Informant 6).  
Playing success raised the global profiles of the six largest clubs in the EPL enabling them to 
attract corporate sponsors on a long-term basis, and this has provided them with a 
significant financial advantage.  A review of financial statements showed that in 2015 Aston 
Villa’s commercial revenue of £28 million was the highest amount reported by any club 
outside the top six (Table 4.9).   
4.5.3 Broadcasting 
Broadcasting revenue comes from the sale of domestic and overseas broadcasting rights 
and is shared between clubs as follows: 
a) Revenue from the sale of domestic broadcasting rights (currently Sky, BT and BBC)  
This is broken down into three elements: 
 A basic award, divided equally between all clubs in the EPL which amounted to 
£22 million per club in 2014-15 (Premier League 2015c). 
 A facilities fee that reflects the number of live matches that each club is involved 
in during a season.  In 2014-15 this ranged from £9 million to £22 million 
(Premier League 2015c).  
 A merit payment that reflects each club’s final position in the EPL.  In 2014-15 
Chelsea received £25 million in prize money for winning the EPL.  This fell by 
£1.25 million per league position, with bottom club QPR receiving £1.25 million 
(Premier League 2015c).  





b) Revenue from the sale of overseas broadcasting rights and central commercial 
revenue  
The sale of overseas broadcasting rights by the EPL together with central commercial 
revenue is divided equally between clubs and in 2014-15 amounted to £28 million 
and £4 million per club (Premier League 2015c). 
c) Parachute payments  
To assist financial stability the EPL provides a fixed amount to relegated clubs for a 
period of up to three years.   For example this meant that in 2012-13 Bolton, 
Blackburn and Wolverhampton who were relegated from the EPL in 2012 each 
received £16 million made up of £8 million from UK broadcasting and £8 million from 
overseas broadcasting revenue (Premier League 2013); Blackpool and Birmingham 
who were relegated in 2011 each received £12 million (Premier League 2013); and 
Burnley, Hull and Portsmouth who were relegated in 2010 each received £6 million 
(Premier League 2013). 
During 2014-15 Chelsea won the EPL, appeared in 25 matches that were broadcast live on 
television, and received £99 million from EPL broadcasting agreements (Premier League 
2015c).  Despite finishing bottom of the EPL, QPR received almost £65 million from 
broadcasting (Premier League 2015c), a differential of just 1.5 (£99m / £65m). 
From Table 4.11 we can see that 59% of broadcasting revenue went to clubs outside the top 
six; and the scale of the most recent contract meant from 2014 broadcasting amounted to 
almost three-quarters of revenue earned by these clubs. 
The equitable distribution of broadcasting revenue meant the club finishing bottom of the EPL 
often earned more than the largest clubs in other European leagues,  
‘The differential…between the top club and the bottom club is relatively small so we 
end with small clubs in an EPL context earning much more than they might expect and 
bigger clubs perhaps earning less out of the league system; and that what’s led to the 
situation that very, very big clubs in other leagues where the leagues are not as well 





off, Celtic, Rangers, Porto, Ajax being good examples, despite having big support are 
not able to capitalise on this.’ (Informant 1) 
It also meant clubs had sufficient resources to ensure matches were unpredictable, which in 
turn made the EPL attractive to global audiences, 
‘The collective element of the PL ensures…that there is more competitiveness 
and…the possibility of clubs in the PL over-achieving as we saw yesterday with 
Leicester winning the PL…that is one of the qualities that ensures that the 
attractiveness and popularity of the PL continues and grows.’ (Informant 8) 
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aggregate 
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As a % of 
aggregate 
revenue 
2011 514.9 39 44 658.9 67 56 1,173.8 51 
2012 514.2 38 43 672.5 68 57 1,186.7 51 
2013 502.6 33 42 681.8 67 58 1,184.4 46 
2014 725.2 39 41 1,030.0 73 59 1,755.2 54 
2015 721.4 38 41 1,048.4 73 59 1,769.8 53 
Table 4.11: Breakdown of broadcasting revenue 2011-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011-15) 
 
Regular participation in UEFA competition (including the Champions League) provided 
Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and more recently Tottenham Hotspur and 
Manchester City with significant additional broadcasting revenue.  Even though Manchester 
City failed to go beyond the group phase of the Champions League in 2011-12, the club 
received €28 million from UEFA broadcasting agreements (Deloitte 2013:Appendix 19).  
Remember also that participation in the Champions League increased commercial and 
matchday revenues, all of which provided these clubs with a financial advantage over rivals 
in the EPL. 
4.5.4 Reliance on broadcasting revenue 
A review of financial statements showed that in 2004 broadcasting amounted to more than 
50% of revenue for six clubs in the EPL.  From figure 4.5 we can see that by 2015 
broadcasting made up at least 60% of revenue for every club outside the top six.  There was 
consensus among elite informants that a number of clubs were increasingly reliant on 





broadcasting revenue.  These were usually clubs that didn’t have large stadia and were unable 
to attract the most lucrative commercial and sponsorship contracts.  
‘Certainly at the lower end of the PL clubs can become reliant on broadcasting 
revenue.  Over the last few years clubs have become more focused on driving revenue 
in addition to broadcasting rights.  However the money that clubs receive centrally 
from the PL funds the vast majority of the costs of running a club…which are mainly 
players’ costs.  Certainly for ourselves the PL income which includes not just 
broadcasting rights but also prize money, made up around 83% of our total 
turnover…As you can see it’s a huge element of our income.’ (Informant 8) 
Informant 9 concurred, ‘We are a fairly small club in London; our stadium size is about 18,000 
capacity…we are very dependent on broadcasting income…We do not have much exposure to 
generate sponsorship income compared to a bigger club’ (Informant 9). 
The EPL’s ‘Symbiotic relationship with pay television’ (Informant 4), and increased 
competition between broadcasters for the rights to show live EPL matches meant informants 
expected revenue would continue to grow.  As a consequence reliance on broadcasting was 
not considered a problem in the short to medium term,   
‘If a large majority of your revenues are being driven by one revenue source that’s 
obviously a slightly riskier business model.  But that itself goes back to the query over 
whether BSkyB and BT keep fighting among themselves for the auction rights for the 
UK market and that is more to do with where BSkyB and BT are with their quad play 
offerings of trying to tie in premium TV with on demand services, with broadband, 
with phone lines, and with mobile.  So long as the premium football rights is the driver, 
the battering ram for the quad play market, I still think there’s quite a lot of value in 
the EPL product which in turn means auction prices stay at very high levels at least 
domestically.’ (Informant 5) 
‘What they’re [the clubs] seeing is exponential rise in media revenues which I can’t see 
declining, not in the short-term with the competition for those rights...What I think it 





has done is create unbelievable competition within the EPL, which is why everybody 
wants it.’ (Informant 7) 
‘Everything has a potential to plateau out at some point.  For the foreseeable future 
we still feel there is growth available internationally to be able to at least maintain if 
not increase these revenues.’ (Informant 4) 
It was also recognised that the EPL had benefited from recent developments in the way 
individuals accessed communication media,  
‘It’s far more digital, media, commercial rights now than someone coming through the 
turnstiles and buying a programme…People want instant access and the EPL can give 
them that.  So it’s fulfilling its own delivery in that it’s a media product.  It’s benefiting 
from this moment in time really.’ (Informant 3) 
Since growth in wages and transfer fees was driven by broadcasting revenue, it was 
reasoned that any decline in this would be accompanied by a corresponding fall in players’ 
costs, ‘The [broadcasting] deals are structured over a three-year period so that really marries 
in with what player contracts are’ (Informant 3).  Informant 6 concurred and explained, 
‘The EPL has historically continued to spend what revenue they are getting…So 
actually there is just a correlation between that increase in broadcasting revenue and 
expenditure on purchasing players and wages.  So if that broadcasting revenue came 
down, I think there’d be a similar reduction in wage costs and the cost of 
players…Where over reliance does come in is where clubs get relegated…Those 
parachute payments go away so it can be a real issue for them.’  (Informant 6) 
Only Informant 1 expressed concern that at some point changes in the external business 
environment might adversely impact on broadcasting revenue,  
‘So should there be a shock to the market, whether that’s trends, tastes, whether 
that’s technological, whether it’s legal…at that point that over reliance on 
broadcasting income I think spells problems.’ (Informant 1) 





4.5.5 Collective negotiation of broadcasting contracts 
Although our quantitative analysis highlighted disparities in revenue, informants preferred 
to focus on the collective negotiation and equitable distribution of broadcasting revenue 
which they believed provided the financial resources necessary to ensure clubs remained 
competitive. 
‘I think it is about that collective competition and the way it’s been set up and the way 
broadcasting rights are split in such a way that there is sufficient funding going into 
even the lower level clubs, that they can get some quality players or can get 
collectively a high-quality team…I don’t think those disparities in revenue will make a 
lot of difference because for the last 10 years or so the EPL has been fantastic 
competition and that disparity has been there.’ (Informant 6) 
The competitiveness of EPL matches helped attract a global audience and meant broadcasters 
continued to offer lucrative contracts for the right to televise live matches.  
‘There’s always going to be disparities in the marketability of clubs for their 
commercial offering, and some will have a regional, local offering and footprint and 
others will have global. That’s just to do with success on the pitch which then drives all 
of those markers.  I think that at the moment because there is a disproportionate 
amount of revenue which makes up each club’s total revenue which is distributed 
through the central distributions, you have the EPL as a very attractive place for…elite 
players that participate for top teams in other countries, coming to mid-level EPL 
teams and being offered more money.  So…clubs can still afford quite big transfer fees 
and wages, which still provide at least that semblance of competitive balance.’ 
(Informant 5) 
‘It is an exciting league, particularly this year.  With the new media rights coming in, 
if they keep the financial distribution like it is at the moment, it will be even more 
competitive.’ (Informant 3) 





It was also recognised that the way in which revenue from domestic broadcasting was 
distributed rewarded both playing success (through merit payments) and those clubs that 
appeared most often on television (facilities fee), 
‘One of the great strengths of the EPL is the way funds are shared amongst clubs.  
There is something for everyone…the bigger clubs get a bigger share partly because 
50% is distributed depending how many times you are on television…and where you 
finish in the league.  So the so called bigger clubs that have traditionally finished higher 
in the league tend to get a bigger portion of the UK broadcasting revenue; the rest 
benefit from the fact that everything else is split equally.  So in a sense if the big clubs 
turn around and say we want more of the pot overall, the smaller clubs can say you’re 
already getting more because of the way UK broadcasting is split.’ (Informant 4) 
Ultimately the most important factor was how effectively clubs used broadcasting and other 
revenue, 
‘It comes down to how you spend the money and a lot of clubs including us in the last 
few years have spent money badly.  You have to remember that media income is 
almost 100% margin.  That’s the equalisation between clubs and it’s how you spend 
that money…Your recruitment policy delivers a successful club.’ (Informant 3)    
With so much reliance on broadcasting revenue, elite informants were asked whether they 
were concerned the largest clubs in the EPL might seek to negotiate broadcasting contracts on 
an individual basis.  Whilst it was acknowledged that clubs did occasionally discuss the 
distribution of broadcasting revenue, informants thought it unlikely the largest clubs would 
seek to negotiate on an individual basis, 
‘In a sense the very strong glue within the founding members agreement on sharing 
revenue doesn’t mean that from time to time clubs don’t have a problem and say how 
about doing it another way, but frankly in the time I’ve been here we’ve had many 
debates about this, but everyone comes around to the idea “leave everything as it is.”  
The revenue share agreement absolutely encourages competition and at the end of 





the day makes the EPL a much more attractive proposition…and that benefits 
everyone.’ (Informant 4) 
‘I definitely don’t think that will happen in the EPL because they’re extremely 
protective of the overall brand, and I think they recognise that the ability to attract the 
levels of broadcasting income is because they are collectively negotiating…I think that 
if they fragment it, the level of income will reduce.’ (Informant 6) 
‘I think it will always be collective bargaining by the EPL and for me that’s the best way 
forward, that’s the best model…Increased competitiveness will keep the EPL exciting 
which will keep future broadcasting revenue high.’ (Informant 9) 
Despite this it was recognised that domestic broadcasting revenue might at some point be 
allocated using a different formula, ‘You could bargain collectively and then outside of 
that…have a bigger differential for finishing 1st, 2nd and 3rd’ (Informant 6). 
Liverpool had publicly raised the issue of changing the way in which overseas broadcasting 
revenue was distributed,  
‘What Ayre [CEO, Liverpool]…said was that he thought the overseas money should be 
split according to performance.’ (Informant 5)   
‘When Liverpool said people are paying to watch Liverpool not Bolton, we had an 
EPL meeting about a month later; it was a frosty meeting.’ (Informant 3) 
It was acknowledged that at some point overseas broadcasting might be distributed in a 
different way, 
‘The international rights are absolutely equal because back in 1992 no-one ever 
expected international rights to be of this size…everyone realises that with the size of 
the new media deal every club in the EPL will be in the top 30 in Europe. It’s going to 
be a big issue for some of the bigger clubs and I get a feeling that maybe some of them 
will be flexing their weight and saying we want a different distribution and the easiest 





way would be to say let’s have a look at the international rights and distribute those in 
a different way.  I think that might come.’ (Informant 3) 
However it was reasoned that overseas broadcasting revenue had grown partly because EPL 
matches remained competitive, 
‘Overseas broadcasting revenue is split evenly between PL clubs…and I think that’s 
only right…some of the bigger clubs have a view that the international broadcasting 
rights bring in so much money because of the top clubs.  But I also think there is the 
unpredictability of the PL where anybody can beat anybody generally.  I think that 
adds to the popularity of the league.’  (Informant 8) 
4.5.6 Analysis of the spread of revenue by category 
In 2004 only Arsenal, Chelsea and Manchester United reported revenues in excess of £100 
million (Arsenal Holdings plc 2005:27, Chelsea Ltd 2005:5, Manchester United plc 2005:4); by 
2015 fourteen clubs in the EPL reported revenues in excess of £100 million (Observed from 
financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015).  Over the same period average revenue 
increased from £68 million to £168 million, however the standard deviation increased from 
£41 million to £104 million (Table 4.5) indicating the wide spread of revenue in monetary 
terms.  
To allow analysis of the spread of data in relative terms the co-efficient of variation was 
calculated for aggregate revenue in each year during the period 2004-15 (using the formula 
standard deviation / average revenue (Waters 2011:155)), and for matchday, commercial 
and broadcasting revenue over the period 2011-15.  It was only from 2011 that published 
financial statements for all clubs in the EPL provided a breakdown of revenue between 
matchday, commercial and broadcasting. 
The co-efficient of variation (Figure 4.6) confirmed the wide spread of revenue between 
clubs in the EPL.  Further analysis (Table 4.12) showed that commercial had the widest 
spread of values, which was consistent with the preceding analysis and reflected growth in 
commercial revenue for the largest clubs in the EPL. The co-efficient of variation for 





broadcasting revenue was much smaller and declined from 2014, reflecting the impact of 
the broadcasting contract that commenced in August 2013 and the equitable way in which 
this was distributed between clubs.  The scale of broadcasting meant the spread of 
aggregate revenue also reduced slightly from a peak of 0.72 in 2013 to 0.62 in 2015 (Table 
4.12). 
 
This supported earlier findings that many clubs in the EPL were very reliant on broadcasting 
revenue.  It also suggested that the way in which broadcasting was distributed provided the 
resources necessary to ensure all clubs were competitive.   
Using the same data the co-efficient of skewness was also calculated (using the formula 
[3(mean-median)]/ standard deviation (Waters 2011:156)).  This indicated the distribution of 
revenue about the average for each year.  The high positive co-efficient of skewness showed 
that average revenue was higher than the median and there was a long tail to the right.  This 
can be seen clearly in figure 4.3 where in each year, just six clubs earned revenue above the 
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Accounting year ended 
Figure 4.6: Coefficients of variation and skewness for total revenue 
of  clubs in the EPL 2004-15 (Source: Calculated from financial 
statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
Co-efficient of variation Co-efficient of skewness





skewness and this declined following commencement of the broadcasting contract in August 
2013, reflecting its equitable distribution. 
 




Matchday Commercial Broadcasting 
Aggregate 
Revenue  
Matchday Commercial  Broadcasting 
2011 0.67 1.12 1.00 0.35 1.60 1.97 1.41 1.63 
2012 0.68 1.15 1.10 0.34 1.42 1.81 1.62 1.54 
2013 0.72 1.02 1.19 0.32 1.41 1.78 1.59 1.54 
2014 0.64 0.99 1.22 0.28 1.43 1.64 1.69 1.25 
2015 0.62 0.96 1.16 0.26 1.19 1.46 1.53 1.04 
Table 4.12: Spread of revenue by category 2011-15 
(Source: Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011-15) 
 
Reliance on broadcasting is not a problem as long as clubs remain in the EPL; broadcasters 
continue to pay large amounts for the rights to televise live EPL matches; and the EPL 
continues to negotiate broadcasting agreements collectively.  If in the future the largest and 
most successful clubs decide to negotiate individual broadcasting contracts, the preceding 
analysis together with evidence from Spain and Italy suggests it will be the smaller, less 
fashionable clubs that lose out (Ascari and Gagnepain 2006:80, Baroncelli and Lago 2006:18, 
Bosca et al 2008:173).  This would further widen disparities in revenue and might threaten 
the survival of some clubs. 
The two most recent domestic broadcasting contracts have each grown by 70% (Gibson 
2015).  Given recent financial problems reported by BT and Sky, it seems unlikely increases 
of this magnitude will continue.  In January 2017 BT announced that incorrect accounting 
practises over a four-year period meant profits in its Italian business had been overstated by 
up to £530 million (Dean 2017).  The resultant profit warning saw the company’s market 
value immediately fall by £7.2 billion (19%) (Dean 2017).  This followed news in May 2016 
that the company’s pension deficit had increased to £10.6 billion (Palmer 2017).  In the nine 
months ended March 2017 Sky reported that operating profits of £1 billion were 14% lower 
than the same period in 2016, and this was blamed on the increased cost of the most recent 
EPL broadcasting contract (Bond 2017).   





Growth in revenue and the global profile of the EPL attracted wealthy investors and during 
the 2014-15 season 55% of clubs were under foreign ownership (UEFA 2015a:54).  The 
preceding analysis showed that revenue was closely linked to sporting success.  The merit 
award meant 25% of domestic broadcasting revenue related to a club’s final league 
position.  The most successful clubs were likely to appear most often in televised matches 
which earned a higher facilities fee, and they received additional revenue from participation 
in European club competitions.  Even though clubs relegated from the EPL received 
parachute payments, the huge differential between the EPL and EFL meant a significant 
decline in revenue.  These factors encouraged wealthy owners to invest heavily in pursuit of 
sporting success. Often wealthy owners provided their clubs with a soft budget constraint, 
which meant other clubs were forced to spend a rising percentage of revenue on players’ 
costs in order to remain competitive.  The next section will examine why clubs were unable 
to turn growth in revenue into profit. 
4.6 Overview of financial performance 
Table 4.13 summarises aggregated accounting information for the EPL during the period 
2004-15.  Although revenue more than doubled it was only after 2013 that clubs were able 
to turn this into pre-tax profit.  PFO fluctuated and by 2013 was just £16 million higher than 
in 2004.  Of further concern was that a Loss From Operations (LFO) was reported by 36% of 
financial statements published during the period 2004-13 (Table 4.14).  In aggregate terms 
the EPL reported a LBIT in each year up to 2013, and interest payable on debt worsened 
losses (Table 4.13). 
From figure 4.7 it is evident that until 2013 growth in aggregate revenue was usually 
accompanied by an even greater increase in wages and amortisation.  These results 
suggested owners were primarily interested in playing success, and several provided their 
clubs with the funds necessary to attain this objective.  As we have already established the 
domestic broadcasting contract from August 2013 saw significant growth in revenue, and 
stronger financial regulation by UEFA and the EPL meant this was accompanied by better 
control of costs which enabled clubs to report aggregate profits in 2014 and 2015. 














Total debt Hard debt Equity 
 £m £m £m £m £m £m £m 
2004 1,364.4 126.0 (118.0) (36.4) (1,017.5) (526.9) 271.3 
2005 1,343.0 154.2 (45.3) (77.8) (1,350.9) (975.1) 103.1 
2006 1,369.3 98.3 (108.0) (185.8) (1,917.7) (1,491.2) 237.7 
2007 1,510.2 83.5 (92.9) (220.7) (2,515.2) (1,503.7) 110.3 
2008 1,920.0 115.6 (55.1) (188.5) (2,887.3) (1,562.1) (46.5) 
2009 1,974.6 69.5 (48.4) (171.8) (3,073.9) (1,421.3) (127.0) 
2010 2,118.8 68.2 (206.0) (384.8) (2,644.6) (1,216.1) 564.8 
2011 2,296.9 31.8 (273.1) (355.1) (2,768.9) (1,094.6) 465.0 
2012 2,346.4 98.6 (126.6) (202.9) (2,592.3) (1,041.3) 712.9 
2013 2,549.1 142.1 (170.9) (285.8) (2,818.5) (1,025.4) 536.9 
2014 3,249.4 604.0 266.6 196.4 (2,751.2) (924.8) 1,047.2 
2015 3,354.9 542.8 200.5 113.7 (2,915.1) (1,041.7) 1,281.7 
Table 4.13: Summary of aggregated accounting information for clubs in the EPL 
2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
Since the FFP monitoring period for 2013-14 considered accounting periods ended in 2012 
and 2013, it is surprising that clubs in the EPL continued to report aggregate losses in these 
years.  However it should be remembered that reported profit differs to the adjusted profit 
used by UEFA to monitor break-even.  In addition for 2013-14 and 2014-15 sanctions were 
not imposed for exceeding the acceptable deviation where this was due to players’ 
contracts entered into before 1 June 2010, or where cumulative losses were declining (UEFA 
2012:87).  This enabled clubs to gradually move towards compliance with FFP. 
Traditionally football clubs in England were medium sized organisations that had relatively 
few shares in issue and made small profits or losses each year.  Growth in revenue and 
players’ costs since 1992 meant the scale of operations had changed beyond recognition.  
However for several clubs’ shareholders’ equity had not increased sufficiently and 
cumulative losses further eroded this.   
  










No. of clubs 
with wages 
/ revenue 
ratio > 70% 









2004 5 25 8 40 5 6 
2005 3 15 7 35 3 6 
2006 5 25 10 50 6 7 
2007 10 50 10 50 10 11 
2008 7 35 11 55 7 10 
2009 (i) 10 53 12 63 10 11 
2010 (i) 9 47 11 58 10 7 
2011 8 40 10 50 12 9 
2012 9 45 9 45 12 7 
2013 6 30 12 60 11 6 
Total 
2004-13 
72 36 100 51 86 80 
2014 1 5 10 50 2 3 
2015 3 15 7 35 5 5 
Total 76 32 117 49 93 88 
Table 4.14: Summary of key financial indicators for clubs in the EPL 2004-15 
Note: 
(i) Excludes Portsmouth 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
In 2008 and 2009 aggregate equity was negative (Table 4.13) indicating that liabilities 
exceeded assets (by £47 million and £127 million) and several clubs were wholly reliant on 
continued support from banks and other lenders.  From table 4.14 we can see that during 
the period under review, 49% of financial statements published by clubs showed negative 
equity. 
New issues of share capital combined with retained earnings meant by 2015 aggregate 
equity was £1.3 billion (Table 4.13).  However analysis of financial statements showed seven 
clubs in the EPL continued to operate with negative equity (Table 4.14) and this ranged from 
£19 million at Everton (Everton FC Ltd 2015:66) to £698 million at Chelsea (Fordstam Ltd 
2015:10). 






From table 4.13 we can see that although total debt increased from just over £1 billion to 
£2.9 billion, a significant proportion was soft debt provided by owners and related parties.  
By 2015 hard debt amounted to just over £1 billion.   
4.6.1 The need for increased financial regulation 
Poor financial performance was not unique to the EPL.  Although in 2010 the 734 clubs playing 
in Europe’s top divisions generated aggregate revenue of €12.8 billion (UEFA 2011:16), 61% 
reported losses from operations, and pre-tax losses amounted to €1.64 billion (UEFA 
2011:18).  Most worrying was that one in eight auditors’ reports raised concerns about 
whether clubs had the financial resources necessary to remain in operation for the next 12 
months (UEFA 2011:18).   
It could therefore be argued that UEFA and the EPL were slow to introduce stronger financial 


















Figure 4.7: Key aggregated accounting variables for the EPL 2004-
15 (Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of 
clubs in the EPL 2004-15)  
Revenue Wages and amortisation
Wages Amortisation and impairment
Profit / (Loss) before tax





accounts’ (Informant 4).  From 2004 UEFA introduced licensing for clubs that wanted to 
compete in the Champions and Europa Leagues (Lago et al 2006:10), 
‘When licensing was first introduced across Europe it really had very little in it apart 
from requiring clubs to prepare audited accounts and submit them, and for the 
licensor to ensure that there was no overdue debt.  It was very basic, but it was a 
start…Over the years UEFA developed the licensing rules a little bit further…so if for 
example your auditor’s report carried a qualification of some sort, or if there was an 
increase in net liabilities then you had to provide evidence that you had enough 
finances.’ (Informant 4) 
Declining financial performance led to the introduction of FFP which sought ‘Sustainability of 
the entire football sector…balancing revenues with expenses and…boosting investments for 
the long-term health of the game’ (UEFA 2011:3).   Although not all elite informants were in 
favour of increased financial regulation they could appreciate the rationale that underpinned 
this, 
‘In too many cases those losses were to the extent…that it actually threatened and, in 
some cases, led to the unsustainability, the insolvency of clubs not just here in England 
but around Europe as well.  And so the rules are a way of helping the clubs to help 
themselves, their own behaviours, and the market…What this intervention has 
enabled is that more clubs are able to get a better balance between the revenues they 
achieve and the levels of costs that they incur.’ (Informant 2)   
It was recognised that even those clubs supported by wealthy owners might get into financial 
difficulties, 
‘Ultimately it seems the right thing to do, to restrict football clubs from making huge 
losses.  Even now, outside the PL we’re seeing with Bolton Wanderers just this year for 
example…If the owner decides to stop putting money in, the football club is really in 
trouble and FFP rules are there to try to reduce the risk of that happening.’ (Informant 
8) 





Given the poor financial state of European club football UEFA recognised that requiring clubs 
to immediately break-even was not a realistic proposition.  However the inclusion of an 
acceptable deviation was criticised by some, ‘I think it’s…astonishing…when there’s a rule 
called FFP and you’re still allowing clubs to make huge losses’ (Informant 8). 
Year 





Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Total 
   PBIT LBIT  
2004 11 9 1 2 20 
2005 14 6 1 2 20 
2006 8 12 1 4 20 
2007 7 13 0 6 20 
2008 10 10 1 7 20 
2009 (i) 7 12 0 10 19 
2010 (i) 6 13 0 8 19 
2011 8 12 1 7 20 
2012 9 11 1 8 20 
2013 10 10 1 7 20 
2014 15 5 3 5 20 
2015 15 5 4 4 20 
Table 4.15: Number of clubs in each category 2004-15 
(i) Excludes Portsmouth 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-
15) 
 
4.7 Financial analysis and results 
The next section will identify and examine the most worrying aspects of financial 
performance and evaluate whether this improved following increased regulation by UEFA 
and the EPL.  As explained in the data collection section in order to facilitate analysis of 
financial performance, for each year clubs were broken down into two groups comprised of 
those that reported a PBIT and those that reported a LBIT.  Aggregate ratios were also 
calculated for those clubs owned and funded by a wealthy benefactor (or ‘sugar daddy’).  
Table 4.15 shows the number of clubs in each category for every year under review, and 
clearly indicates that the number of clubs reporting a PBIT increased after 2012. 





4.8 Profitability and Control of costs 
4.8.1 Wages as a percentage of revenue 
Wages was the largest regular cost incurred by clubs in the EPL and in aggregate terms 
expenditure more than doubled from £802 million in 2004 to £1.8 billion in 2013 (Figure 
4.7).  Expressing wages as a percentage of revenue showed the scale of growth.  Between 
2004-13 expenditure on wages increased from 59% to 70% of aggregate revenue (Table 
4.16).  Deloitte (2010) suggested thresholds as ‘55% for effective cost management, 70% as 
a warning level and 100% as a stark danger level’ (2010:37) and explained that where this 
ratio exceeded 70% clubs ‘Were likely to require funding outside of their revenue to sustain 
their operations’ (Deloitte 2013:44). 
Year 


















 % % % % r r² 
2004 52 67 76 59 0.78 0.61 
2005 53 72 73 58 0.87 0.76 
2006 57 67 73 63 0.84 0.71 
2007 48 74 76 62 0.81 0.66 
2008 53 74 76 62 0.81 0.66 
2009 48 76 80 63 0.83 0.68 
2010 43 78 85 63 0.87 0.75 
2011 53 83 87 69 0.89 0.80 
2012 60 77 79 69 0.82 0.66 
2013 61 79 84 70 0.83 0.69 
2014 56 63 61 58 0.80 0.63 
2015 57 71 66 60 0.88 0.78 
Table 4.16: Wages as a % of revenue split by category of club and the relationship 
between expenditure on wages and EPL points attained 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
From table 4.16 we can see that breaking down this ratio showed that clubs supported by 
sugar daddies spent a significantly higher proportion of revenue on wages.  This suggested 
that sugar daddies were prepared to spend heavily in pursuit of playing success. 





Discussions with elite informants ascertained that wages as a percentage of revenue was 
widely used by clubs to control costs, ‘It’s not complicated to run a PL football club because 
the key numbers are so big and so significant that ultimately if you control your wage costs 
and drive your turnover then you’re going to increase your profitability’ (Informant 8).  
However there were differing opinions on what this ratio should be, 
‘Really you should be working towards 50-60% wages to revenue.  That’s generally 
acceptable as a basic norm.’ (Informant 7) 
Generally we ran around 82% salary to turnover level, which is quite high.  Ideally we’d 
look to try to get down to around 70% which we…did manage in 2012.’ (Informant 8) 
‘Key indicators are wages to revenue, but the underlying scenario is controlling costs 
overall and ensuring that we are at break-even.’ (Informant 9)  
Despite the importance of this ratio Informant 3 had a different outlook and explained ‘I 
don’t really use wages / revenue because as revenue increases the overheads stay the 
same, and we use the increased revenue for wages and transfer fees’ (Informant 3).  
Informant 3’s club was not supported by a wealthy owner and reported a PBIT in each year 
that it played in the EPL.  Using growth in revenue to fund increased players’ costs provided 
further evidence that playing success was prioritised above financial return. 
The player acquisition strategy employed by a club also impacted on this ratio.  Although 
players acquired on free transfers were often paid higher wages, the duration of contracts 
was usually shorter which offered clubs greater flexibility, 
‘We’ve taken Bosmans [players on free transfers] but we’ll pay higher wages than 
perhaps other clubs.  If you’ve paid no transfer fee and at the end of his contact that 
player moves on, there’s no loss…When you buy a player the average contract is three 
to four years, on a Bosman it can be two or one.’ (Informant 3) 
Wherever possible clubs tried to include clauses in players’ contracts so that wages 
decreased following relegation from the EPL, ‘Playing and coaching staff do have 





contingencies built into their contracts…so that in the event of relegation costs can be 
controlled’ (Informant 9).  Alternatively players were rewarded if their club remained in the 
EPL, ‘We have player bonus scheme which is only paid if we stay up. It is becoming more the 
norm’ (Informant 3). 
 
However these types of clause weren’t always easy to implement and those clubs that tried 
to be financially prudent were sometimes at a disadvantage when negotiating with players, 
‘If you’re in the EPL signing a player there’ll be an EPL rate, it will be a much lower rate 
that you’ll want to pay him in the Championship, but the player will have a number of 
offers from various other clubs who might be happy not to have a Championship rate 



















Final position in EPL 
Figure 4.8: Expenditure on wages and final league position for EPL 
clubs in the accounting period immediately following each new 
broadcasting contract 2005-14 (Source: Calculated from financial 
statements of clubs in EPL 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014) 
2005 2008 2011 2014





‘In the past we have lost players because they wouldn’t accept a step-down clause.’ 
(Informant 3) 
‘It’s hard because when you’re attracting some of the top players, there’s no way 
they’d accept those clauses.’   (Informant 6) 
The introduction of FFP enhanced the importance of this ratio since UEFA can request 
additional financial information from a club where wages amount to more than 70% of 
revenue (UEFA 2015:39).  During the period 2004-13, 86 out of 198 financial statements 
(43%) published by clubs in the EPL showed wages / revenue ratios above 70% (Table 4.14); 
of these 73% also reported losses from operations (Calculated from financial statements of 
clubs in the EPL 2004-13). 
It is clear from table 4.16 why clubs spend so heavily on wages.  Analysis for each year 
showed a strong linear relationship between playing success measured in terms of points 
attained by each club in the EPL, and expenditure on wages (Table 4.16).   Further analysis 
focused on the period 2011-15, and a coefficient of correlation of 0.83 confirmed the strong 
relationship between points attained and expenditure on wages. 
Figure 4.8 graphically illustrates the close relationship between expenditure on wages and 
final league position attained by each club, with those clubs that spent the smallest amounts 
usually struggling to remain in the EPL. Each year is the first accounting period immediately 
following a new broadcasting contract, and we can clearly see the growth in wages that 
accompanied this. 
Although both average wages and standard deviation increased significantly in monetary 
terms, the coefficients of variation and skewness indicated that the spread of data around 
the average improved slightly and the distribution became less skewed following the 
introduction of FFP and STCC (Table 4.17).  Stricter regulation forced those clubs supported 
by wealthy benefactors to improve control of players’ wages; and analysis of wages / 
revenue ratios showed significant improvement for most clubs in 2014 and 2015 (Table 
4.16).  



















 £m £m £m   
2005 786.6 39.1 22.6 0.58 1.83 
2008 1,188.7 59.4 35.8 0.60 1.90 
2011 1,582.1 79.1 47.8 0.60 1.20 
2014 1,884.7 94.2 54.8 0.58 1.29 
2015 2,027.3 101.4 55.9 0.55 1.11 
Table 4.17: Coefficients of variation and skewness for wages 2005-15 
(Source: Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 
2015) 
 
Since FFP applied only to those clubs playing in UEFA competitions the EPL recognised, ‘The 
get out…is for clubs that say, “I don’t think I’ll be playing in Europe, so why should I apply for 
a license?”’ (Informant 4).  This prompted the EPL to strengthen its own financial regulations 
through STCC and there was consensus that restricting growth in wages in this way was 
beneficial, 
‘What they did that I think was good and quite clever was that they effectively 
said…you can’t increase your overall wage costs by say more than £4 million, unless 
you are bringing in the commercial revenues…to cover that uplift.  The EPL rules came 
in fairly quietly; I’ve not seen a lot of kickback from EPL clubs.’ (Informant 6)   
‘Short term cost control is probably a sensible thing…because that is…trying to avoid 
all the incremental TV revenues going to the players…So I can understand those 
regulations more than the very strict break-even interpretation of UEFA.’ (Informant 7) 
Although aggregate wages exceeded £2 billion in 2015 (Figure 4.7), the introduction of FFP 
and STCC meant control of wages improved noticeably after 2013 with just seven out of 40 
financial statements (18%) reporting a wages / revenue ratio above 70% (Table 4.14). 
4.8.2 Amortisation as a percentage of revenue 
Amortisation (and impairment) remained at around 20% of aggregate revenue throughout 
the period (Table 4.18), however in monetary terms it increased from £279 million in 2004 
to over £657 million in 2015 (Figure 4.7) reflecting the rising cost of players’ registrations. 












Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
 % % % % 
2004 14 28 37 20 
2005 15 33 42 20 
2006 12 25 33 20 
2007 12 25 29 19 
2008 17 25 28 20 
2009 15 28 28 22 
2010 12 29 32 22 
2011 14 30 34 22 
2012 14 25 26 20 
2013 14 26 27 20 
2014 17 24 24 19 
2015 19 22 20 20 
Table 4.18: Amortisation as a % of revenue split by category of club 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
Breaking down this ratio by category again showed significant differences in performance, 
with those clubs that reported a PBIT demonstrating consistently tighter control of costs 
throughout the period. 
4.8.3 Wages and amortisation as a percentage of revenue 
Combining wages and amortisation went a long way towards explaining why EPL clubs 
generated an aggregate LBIT in every year between 2004 and 2013.  It also showed why 
governing bodies were keen to introduce stricter financial regulation. 
In monetary terms aggregate expenditure on wages and amortisation increased from £1.1 
billion in 2004 to £2.3 billion in 2013 (Figure 4.7).  Expressing this as a ratio showed that in 
2004 expenditure on wages and amortisation amounted to 79% of aggregate revenue (Table 
4.19).  Poor control of these costs meant in 2013 for every £100 generated in revenue, clubs 
spent £90 on wages and amortisation leaving little to cover other costs or generate a return 
on investment.  This was largely driven by those clubs supported by sugar daddies; in every 
year from 2004-13 aggregate expenditure on wages and amortisation by these clubs 
exceeded revenue (Table 4.19).  Any other expenses simply worsened losses.  Such poor 
control of costs was not sustainable without a soft budget constraint in the form of regular 





injections of cash from wealthy backers.  It also confirmed that throughout this period 
wealthy owners spent heavily in pursuit of playing success.   
Year 





Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
 % % % % 
2004 66 95 113 79 
2005 68 105 115 78 
2006 69 92 106 83 
2007 60 99 105 81 
2008 70 99 104 82 
2009 63 104 108 85 
2010 55 107 117 85 
2011 67 113 121 91 
2012 74 102 105 89 
2013 75 105 111 90 
2014 73 87 85 77 
2015 76 93 86 80 
Table 4.19: Wages and amortisation as a % of revenue split by category of club 
2004-15  
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-
15) 
 
Further analysis of financial statements showed the large amounts these clubs were 
spending.  In 2010 Manchester City’s wages and amortisation was 164% of revenue, and of 
the remaining seven clubs in this category only Fulham (97%) had a ratio below 100%.  
Despite the introduction of FFP, in 2013 six of the eight clubs funded by wealthy owners 
reported expenditure on wages and amortisation that exceeded revenue, including QPR 
(157%), Stoke City (130%) and Aston Villa (123%).   
By way of comparison, in 2013 nine of the 10 clubs that reported a PBIT had ratios 
significantly below the EPL aggregate of 90%, though only Manchester United (61%) was 
below 70%.   
The soft budget constraint provided by wealthy owners meant their clubs were often forced 
to pay inflated wages and transfer fees, ‘Manchester City saw that when they went for a 





player suddenly there was a 40-50% premium on the price of that player’ (Informant 6).  It 
was argued this placed upward pressure on players’ costs for all clubs in the EPL,   
‘Certainly when you are trying to buy players as a PL club everyone knows the 
financial power that clubs have and all of a sudden players become more expensive.’ 
(Informant 8) 
‘I think the major problem for other clubs is the wage inflation it creates.  If you have a 
player on £100,000 a week at a top club, you might get a basic EPL player saying “Hang 
on, if he’s worth £100,000 I must be worth at least £30-40,000”…So it does create a lot 
of tension and wage inflation with other clubs.’  (Informant 7) 
‘The other downside of a club making losses is spending more and therefore forcing 
others to spend more to keep up with them.’ (Informant 4) 
This agreed with the findings of Andreff (2007), Storm (2012), Franck (2013) and Morrow 
(2013) of an ‘arms race’ in European football, with many clubs in the EPL using growth in 
revenue to fund expenditure on short-term investment in players’ costs. 
Although several elite informants favoured a free market approach and were critical that 
increased regulation would restrict investment by wealthy owners, their argument ignored 
that, 
‘Clubs…subsidised by benefactor owners are continually ramping up the price for 
players and wages.  Free market economists may say “That’s just the free market.”  
My argument is…it’s a distorted market because the incentives of profit maximising 
businesses are completely disrupted by those of success maximisers.  Until some type 
of regulations were brought into force which effectively curbed that spending…then 
that spiral would have just continued’ (Informant 5) 







Figure 4.9 clearly illustrates differences in control of wages and amortisation by each 
category, and that clubs supported by sugar daddies showed better control of expenditure 
following the introduction of stricter regulation and growth in broadcasting revenue after 
2013. 
4.8.4 Profit from operations as a percentage of revenue 
Failure to control wages meant PFO as a percentage of revenue remained low during 2004-
13 (Table 4.20).  Although consistently higher than the EPL aggregate, profit making clubs 
saw a decline in this ratio from 22% in 2004 to 14% in 2013 which corresponded with 
growth in wages during this period. 
Clubs backed by sugar daddies made an aggregate LFO in every year between 2004 and 
2013 and this adversely impacted on amounts reported by clubs in the loss-making 




































Accounting year ended 
Figure 4.9: Wages and amortisation as a % of revenue by category 
of club 2004-15 (Source: Calculated from aggregated financial 
statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
Profit making clubs Loss making clubs
Clubs with a sugar daddy EPL Aggregate





control of costs.  The club’s wages of £78 million (QPR Holdings 2013:13) exceeded revenue 
(£61 million) and contributed towards a LFO of £49 million (2013:7).   QPR was relegated 
from the EPL in 2013 and its continued operation was reliant on interest free loans of £166 
million from owner Tony Fernandes (2013:16).  
Year 












 % % % % r 
2004 22 (7) (11) 9 (0.67) 
2005 20 (11) (13) 11 (0.77) 
2006 12 4 (3) 7 (0.80) 
2007 20 (6) (9) 6 (0.89) 
2008 19 (10) (12) 6 (0.79) 
2009 15 (6) (11) 4 (0.83) 
2010 17 (7) (17) 3 (0.64) 
2011 22 (17) (20) 1 (0.88) 
2012 16 (5) (8) 4 (0.89) 
2013 14 (4) (7) 6 (0.88) 
2014 20 12 14 19 (0.76) 
2015 21 (2) 8 16 (0.90) 
Table 4.20: Profit / (Loss) from operations as a % of revenue split by category of club  
and relationship between PFO (%) and wages as a % of revenue ratio 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
Although the performance of clubs supported by sugar daddies did improve after 2013, an 
aggregate profit from operations of just £8 for every £100 generated in revenue in 2015 was 
too small to cover amortisation and interest payable. 
Table 4.20 also shows the strong negative linear relationship between PFO and wages as a 
percentage of revenue, indicating that poor control of wages left clubs reliant on funds from 
the disposal of players or continued support from sugar daddies and other lenders. 
4.8.5 Liquidity 
Losses from operations also impacted adversely on liquidity.  Cash Flow from Operations 
(CFO) is shown in an organisation’s Statement of Cash Flows (SCF) and indicates the cash 
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 r £m £m £m £m 
2004 0.96 113.2 183.0 15.6 68.7 
2005 0.67 124.6 213.9 46.1 68.1 
2006 0.87 76.6 208.5 33.5 54.4 
2007 0.77 86.7 216.3 (16.2) 42.8 
2008 0.80 131.2 147.5 17.5 45.1 
2009 0.90 77.9 230.1 (46.7) 26.7 
2010 0.90 77.4 228.1 (60.6) (71.8) 
2011 0.84 4.2 297.4 (170.9) 50.1 
2012 0.93 98.0 70.3 (13.7) (64.3) 
2013 0.87 113.3 189.8 (13.8) (11.6) 
2014 0.75 570.4 657.7 376.7 375.9 
2015 0.91 533.5 753.2 327.5 414.8 
Table 4.21: Relationship between aggregated Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) and Profit 
From Operations 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
From table 4.21 we can see that Pearson’s coefficient of correlation (r) shows a strong linear 
relationship between CFO and PFO.  It should be noted that not all clubs provided a SCF, 
however 195 observations during the period 2004-15 gave a coefficient of correlation of 
0.84 and a coefficient of determination (r²) of 0.71. 
For each year table 4.21 also shows aggregated PFO and CFO for all clubs that published a 
SCF. These figures included Arsenal, Manchester United and Tottenham, which were the 
only clubs to generate a PFO in every year from 2004-15.  Removing these clubs showed a 
very different position, with cash outflows exceeding inflows during 2010, 2012 and 2013.    
Although clubs received regular inflows of cash from matchday, broadcasting and 
commercial activities, excessive amounts spent on players’ wages resulted in LFOs and 





liquidity problems for several clubs.  More detailed analysis showed that in 2010 Manchester 
City’s day to day business activities resulted in a net cash outflow of £84 million (Manchester 
City Ltd 2010:14); an injection of equity amounting to £136 million ensured the club had 
sufficient cash to operate (2010:17).  During 2013 Aston Villa made a LFO of £24 million 
(Reform Acquisition Ltd 2013:8), which resulted in a negative CFO of £20 million (2013:11).  
Liquidity problems eased only after owner Randy Lerner provided soft loans of £42 million 
(2013:29). 
4.8.6 Profit (Loss) before interest and tax as a percentage of revenue 
Analysis by category highlighted losses made by clubs supported by sugar daddies (Table 
4.22 and Figure 4.10).  Financial performance improved after 2013 as compliance with FFP 
and STCC restricted growth in players’ wages and meant 75% of clubs reported a PBIT 
(Calculated from table 4.15). 
Discussions with elite informants established that clubs set budgets at the start of each season 
and these usually forecast a small surplus or at least achieving break-even, ‘What we do is 
plan the budget in March and we stick to that…our budget is always to break-even or make a 
small profit’ (Informant 3).     
Stronger financial regulation made it increasingly important that clubs operated within their 
budgets,  
‘The bottom line for any football club whilst it doesn’t have to run like a [normal] 
business in that it doesn’t have to generate returns for shareholders, we have to 
ensure that we are as close as possible to break-even…However we must ensure that 
we remain competitive.  At the start of every season…we have a set budget in place 
pretty much for everything.  The running costs of the football club, the stadium, 
training ground…transfer fees and salary costs…It’s quite important for everyone now 
especially with FFP, that we need to set out what we are going to be incurring for the 
year.’ (Informant 9) 






In most cases budgets were linked to playing success in the form of a target finishing position 
in the EPL,  
‘As a PL club we assume a finishing position of 17th and we’ll budget accordingly.  Our 
club always aimed to break-even over the season.  Any profit that we make would be 
re-invested…in buying new players or re-contracting existing players on increased 
salaries.’ (Informant 8) 
Although clubs endeavoured to adhere to original budgets, unforeseen circumstances 
including the threat of relegation might lead to an increase in spending mid-way through 
the season.  This often followed the appointment of a new manger which resulted in 

































Accounting year ended 
Figure 4.10: PBIT / (LBIT) as a % of revenue 2004-15 (Source: 
Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2004-15) 
Profit making clubs Loss making clubs
Clubs with a sugar daddy EPL Aggregate





‘It’s so easy for clubs to over extend themselves and if you are in the bottom three at 
Christmas it’s very easy for owners, encouraged by the managers to invest in players 
that will keep you in that division because the rewards now for maintaining your 
status are huge.  So there is that temptation to improve your squad…Our strategy 
was always…to use the PL income to pay the going rate for players but not to over 
extend ourselves to the situation where we were incurring significant losses.’ 
(Informant 8) 
Overspending might also occur where a club gambled on achieving a higher league position 
than had been anticipated when the original budget was set.   
‘Now if you’ve got a lot of football clubs that are taking too big a risk from a financial 
perspective, and I saw this first hand…particularly in January transfer windows there 
was a clear gamble going on.  Clubs were saying…let’s potentially spend more than 
we’ve got, to try and get us through this season…I think the mind set of even the 
smaller clubs is very similar.  Everybody is striving to get this success.’ (Informant 6) 
Year 





Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
 % % % % 
2004 12 (34) (45) (9) 
2005 13 (44) (59) (3) 
2006 13 (20) (29) (8) 
2007 16 (24) (31) (6) 
2008 12 (22) (25) (3) 
2009 22 (23) (27) (2) 
2010 14 (28) (42) (10) 
2011 16 (37) (43) (12) 
2012 14 (20) (23) (5) 
2013 11 (26) (28) (7) 
2014 14 (11) (4) 8 
2015 12 (17) (5) 6 
Table 4.22: Profit / (Loss) before interest and tax as a % of revenue split by category 
of club 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 





Incentives for finishing higher in the EPL included additional broadcasting merit payments 
and the opportunity to qualify for European competition.  However acquiring players’ mid-
way through the season was a risky strategy with no guarantee of playing success, 
particularly if rivals were doing the same thing, 
‘If you budget for say a 17th place finish and you’ve got a certain level of revenue, that 
almost dictates that you might finish 17th.  If you budget for 10th place, you’ve got 
seven merit payments more; you could have an incremental gain of £10-12 million 
which does make a difference in terms of your wages budget.  So it’s quite difficult to 
balance the two and of course it gets distorted because you get injuries; you might 
want to buy players before you’ve actually sold players…During the season you might 
change your manager and that’s increased costs; a new manager will want different 
players; so it all becomes quite tricky.’ (Informant 7) 
Despite his earlier comments on ‘sticking’ to budgets, Informant 3 admitted that the scale of 
the August 2016 broadcasting contract meant his club overspent in 2015 to maximise its 
chances of remaining in the EPL, 
‘We did make a small loss this year because of the new broadcasting deal coming up 
next year…So we did go further than we would normally…on transfer fees, though it 
was a conscious decision.   In hindsight I don’t think it was worth the risk and money 
was not well spent.’ (Informant 3) 
Since the primary objective of a football club is playing success it was reasoned that, ‘Football 
clubs don’t need to generate profits.  They just need to avoid big losses that threaten the 
viability and sustainability of the club’ (Informant 2).  It was also noted that supporters were 
often critical if they perceived financial prudence was adversely impacting on playing 
success, 
‘Look at Arsenal and the hassle they’re getting for running a proper, prudent, financial 
ship.  People are saying you should be spending because they want success on the 
pitch.  So it’s incredibly difficult to hold anything back in reserve which is why it’s 





difficult for a club to be a plc and pay dividends.  People are always going to say, “Well 
you should be investing that in your team.’’’ (Informant 7) 
It was explained that the scale of broadcasting revenue meant for many clubs playing 
success was measured as becoming established in the EPL, 
‘Our objective is stability in the EPL.  To be a financially well-run club established in 
the EPL… Success would be over achieving against our wages bill…our wages bill…it’s 
around 12th or 13th or 14th in the EPL.  To finish above that would be a success...A cup 
run is good for the fans, it’s good for the profile of the club…but it’s not part of our 
budgeted financial plan.  It’s financially not lucrative but it’s the intangible on the 
back of a cup run; more Facebook followers…more media attention.   The focus is all 
about staying in the EPL and the broadcasting money that comes from that.’ 
(Informant 3)   
Club B had finished as high as eighth in the EPL and informant 3 went on to explain, ‘To get 
into the top seven, the amount of investment that you would have to do for the return is 
huge.  European football would be an added pressure that the club doesn’t really need or 
want’ (Informant 3).   
4.8.7 Player trading activities 
Further analysis indicated how player trading activities impacted on the profitability of 
several clubs.  So for example in 2013 without surpluses from player trading Arsenal (£47 
million surplus from player trading (Arsenal Holdings plc 2013:23)), Everton (£16 million 
(Everton Football Club Company Ltd 2013:54)), and Wigan (£8 million (Wigan Athletic AFC 
Ltd 2013:10)) would each have reported a LBIT.   
Perhaps of greater concern was that in 2010 losses reported by Blackburn (£11 million 
surplus from player trading (Blackburn Rovers plc 2010:11)) and Liverpool (£23 million 
(Liverpool FC Ltd 2010:9)) would have been much larger without surpluses from player 
trading.   





Although buying and selling players is part of the business of a football club, generating 
surpluses in this way cannot be relied upon and results in a one-off inflow of cash and the 
loss of a valuable asset.  Elite informants mostly agreed this was not something they 
budgeted for, ‘If you built in player sales as part of your business model that is a risky 
strategy.  So we don’t budget for player sales’ (Informant 3).  Informant 8 concurred and 
explained that although his club had generated large surpluses from player trading this was 
not necessarily through choice and players that were sold had to be replaced,  
‘Our first aim was survival in the PL and to maintain our position there, and if you plan 
to sell your better players then that’s a very difficult strategy to maintain because 
ultimately you’re not necessarily successful every time you buy a player.’ (Informant 8)   
He went on to explain that player trading had been greatly assisted by better player 
recruitment which provided his club with a competitive advantage,  
‘As…we became a more established PL club, our recruitment of players became 
stronger and we were able to buy players from overseas, South America and Europe, 
and we were able to develop those players...For lower fees than our competitors we 
were able to produce players that became top players...and sell them for quite 
significant sums.  That helps you to invest in future players.  It also helps to balance the 
books.’ (Informant 8) 
It was also explained that a club relegated from the EPL might be forced to sell players for 
less than market value, ‘There aren’t enough clauses where if there’s relegation the wages 
will immediately reduce…There’s also a fall in the value of players so we can have distress 
sales’ (Informant 6). 
FFP and EPL rules encouraged investment in youth academies and elite informants suggested 
this could potentially provide a lucrative source of funds.  However to be effective it required 
up-front investment in infrastructure,  
‘There are a lot of clubs whose business plan…is to generate income or profits from 
the sale of players.  Not many clubs have managed to pull this off successfully.  This is 





mainly because to put such a business plan in place, the underlying investment has to 
go in first with regards to the academy, the scouting system, and the coaching.’ 
(Informant 9) 
Analysis showed that during the period 2004-15 the book value of players’ registrations 
made up between 20-25% of aggregated total assets and in monetary terms increased in 
value from £546 million in 2004 to £1.6 billion by 2015 (Calculated from aggregated financial 
statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-2015); reflecting the rising cost of players’ registrations.   
4.8.8 Interest cover 
In 2004 Aston Villa’s net interest payable was £95,000 (Aston Villa plc 2005:22) which 
amounted to just 0.2% of total revenue.  However the club reported a LBIT of £11 million 
(2005:22), so even this relatively small amount of net interest payable worsened losses and 
resulted in negative interest cover.  Although in 2010 Arsenal’s net interest payable 
amounted to £18 million, a PBIT of almost £74 million (Arsenal Holdings plc 2010:31) meant 
there was sufficient profit to pay this four times over. 
Year 





Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
2004(i) 7.3 2.2 / (7.9) (8.3) 1.4 / (2.3) 
2005 6.6 (11.8) (13.5) (1.4) 
2006 4.6 (2.7) (6.7) (1.4) 
2007 1.3 (4.9) (6.2) (0.7) 
2008 1.5 (3.8) (4.1) (0.4) 
2009 2.9 (4.6) (5.1) (0.4) 
2010 1.0 (7.1) (16.7) (1.2) 
2011 3.5 (14.2) (16.4) (3.3) 
2012 2.2 (24.6) n/a (i) (1.7) 
2013 1.4 (21.5) (27.7) (1.5) 
2014 5.4 (13.5) (5.7) 3.8 
2015 4.3 (10.6) (3.5) 2.3 
Table 4.23: Interest cover ratio split by category of club 2004-15 
Note: 
(i) In 2004 clubs reported aggregate interest receivable 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2004-15) 





An aggregate LBIT meant the EPL’s interest cover ratio was negative in every year between 
2005 and 2013 (Table 4.23).  It should be noted that interest cover for 2004 was distorted 
favourably by amounts written off by Leeds United’s lenders.  Removing Leeds United from 
aggregate figures for 2004 resulted in net interest payable of £34 million and negative 
interest cover (of -2.3).   
From figure 4.11 we can see that rising levels of debt meant aggregate net interest payable 
exceeded £120 million in each year from 2007-10.  Figure 4.11 also indicates that since clubs 
supported by sugar daddies benefited from soft loans, the burden of net interest payable 
fell on those clubs that reported a PBIT.  Further analysis showed that Arsenal and 
Manchester United incurred highest net interest payable during the period under review. 
Arsenal borrowed heavily to build the Emirates stadium and in 2007 had loans of £340 
million (Arsenal Holdings plc 2008:45).  Although net interest payable and re-financing costs 
on this amounted to £37 million (2008:37), increased matchday combined with tight control 
of costs meant Arsenal could report a PBT of £6 million (2008:29).  By 2015 Arsenal’s debt 
had fallen to £235 million (2015:55) and its PBIT was sufficient to cover interest payable of 
£13 million (2015:52) almost 3 times over,  
‘So where you have debt restructures at Arsenal which paid for fantastic facilities and 
a stadium, then whilst it’s quite high debt I don’t think anyone would consider that to 
be an issue for Arsenal since they are a club that generates a level of profitability that 
means you can service that debt and make the repayments as they are due to be paid.’ 
(Informant 2)   
This was contrasted with the leveraged buyout model used by the Glazer family to acquire 
Manchester United, 
‘The original Manchester United model was horrific.  They went out and borrowed 
something like £600 million and effectively bought the holding company and the 
club…They got this New York Stock Exchange listing, I think they had to do something 
to reduce the debt of the holding company.’ (Informant 6) 





In 2004 Manchester United had no long-term debt.  However the way in which the Glazers 
funded their acquisition through loans secured against the club’s assets, meant that 
between 2007-10 borrowings exceeded £500 million (Red Football Ltd 2010:29).  Servicing 
this proved expensive and in 2010 net interest payable and the cost of re-structuring loans 
amounted to £107 million, turning a respectable PBIT of £27 million into a pre-tax loss of 
£80 million (2010:9).  By 2015 long-term debt had fallen to £411 million (2015:44), however 
interest payable on this amounted to £35 million resulting in interest cover of just 0.93 and 
a LBT of £2 million (2015:12). 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) explained that the leveraged buyout model had been in use 
since the 1980s and involved the acquisition of a company ‘Using a relatively small portion 
of equity and a relatively large portion of outside debt financing’ (2009:121).  This meant 
debt was serviced through profits generated by the company being acquired, which could 
be risky if forecasts were too optimistic.  Although leveraged buyouts were not unusual in 
some North American sports they were relatively new to England (Millward and Poulton 
2014:2), and the acquisition of Manchester United drew criticism from supporters 
concerned that funds would be spent servicing debt rather than being invested in playing 
success.  
Despite criticisms of the leveraged buyout model, Manchester United has continued to 
perform strongly on and off the field of play.  Since 2005 the club has won five EPL titles, the 
Champions League, four League cups, the FA Cup, Europa League and World Club Cup.  
Alongside this strong period of playing success, the Glazer family has exploited the club’s 
global brand to generate £280 million in commercial revenues in 2017 (Deloitte 2018b:10).  
In comparison the club generated just £42 million from this income steam in 2005 
(Manchester United 2005:10).  Growth in all revenue streams has enabled Manchester 
United to acquire players and service significant debt, and by 2015 the club had the largest 
value of players’ registrations in the EPL (Observed from financial statements of clubs in the 
EPL 2015). 





The positions of these clubs can be juxtaposed with Chelsea which from 2006 onwards had 
debt in excess of £500 million (Calculated from Financial Statements of Fordstam Ltd 2006-
15).  By 2015 Chelsea’s debt amounted to £1.1 billion (2015:24).  However since this was an 
interest free loan from owner Roman Abramovich, Chelsea’s income statement showed net 
interest receivable of £98,000 (2015:8). 
 
By 2015 aggregate net interest payable by clubs in the EPL amounted to £87 million (Figure 
4.11), of which £48 million was incurred by Arsenal (Arsenal Holdings plc 2015:37) and 
Manchester United (Red Football Ltd 2015:12). 
From table 4.23 we can see that for profit making clubs rising levels of debt (driven by 
Arsenal and Manchester United) meant interest cover declined and by 2010 PBIT was 
exactly equal to interest payable.  The position recovered and by 2015 profit making clubs 
















Accounting year ended 
Figure 4.11: Net interest payable / (receivable) 2004-15 (Source: 
Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2004-15) 
EPL Aggregate Profit making clubs
Loss making clubs Clubs with a sugar daddy





By 2015 loss making clubs had aggregate net interest payable of just £12 million (Calculated 
from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015). This category included most 
of those clubs backed by sugar daddies, and as we have already established a number of 
these had loans from owners and related parties at low or no interest.  
4.8.9 Interest as a percentage of revenue 
As with wages and amortisation it is useful to express net interest payable as a percentage 
of revenue (Table 4.24).  Excluding Leeds United from 2004 figures showed net interest 
payable amounted to 2.6% of aggregate revenue.  This ratio peaked at 8.5% in 2007 when 
aggregate hard debt exceeded £1.5 billion (Table 4.13).  Although by 2015 aggregate debt 
had increased to £2.9 billion (Table 4.13) a large proportion was soft loans, and growth in 
revenue meant net interest payable had fallen to 2.6% of aggregate revenue. 
Year 





Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
 % % % % 
2004 1.6 (15.4) / 3.8 5.4 (6.0) / 2.6 
2005 1.9 3.7 4.4 2.4 
2006 2.8 7.3 4.3 5.7 
2007 12.8 4.9 4.9 8.5 
2008 7.8 5.8 6.0 6.9 
2009 7.7 5.0 5.3 6.2 
2010 14.5 3.9 2.5 8.4 
2011 4.6 2.6 2.6 3.6 
2012 6.4 0.8 (0.2) 3.3 
2013 7.5 1.2 1.0 4.5 
2014 2.5 0.8 0.7 2.2 
2015 2.9 1.6 1.4 2.6 
Table 4.24: Net interest payable / (receivable) as a % of revenue ratio split by 
category of club 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-
15) 
 
Soft loans meant that in 2015 interest payable by loss making clubs amounted to just 1.6% 
of revenue.  Of those clubs that reported a LBIT only Everton didn’t have the support of a 
wealthy owner. Everton’s debt of £40 million was secured against future season ticket sales 





and broadcasting revenue (2015:80) and was manageable as long as the club remained in 
the EPL.    
Loans taken out by Manchester United and Arsenal meant that throughout the period 
profitable clubs had the highest net interest payable as a percentage of revenue.   Analysis 
of Manchester United’s financial statements demonstrated the burden this placed on the 
club.  In 2013 net interest payable of £69 million (2013:11) amounted to 19% of Manchester 
United’s revenue, and exceeded revenue reported by seven clubs in the EPL (Observed from 
financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2013). 
4.8.10 The impact of financial regulation on control of costs  
Although not everyone had been in favour of their introduction, it was recognised that FFP 
and STCC had encouraged better cost discipline,   
‘There’s been a change in terms of their desire to…break-even…and potentially move 
into profits.  You can argue that there are all sorts of reasons why that’s happened, but 
I definitely do think it’s a mixture of both the UEFA FFP and EPL rules coming in, but 
also the increase in broadcasting revenue which has helped.’ (Informant 6) 
STCC meant increased broadcasting revenue could no longer be used to fund corresponding 
growth in wages, and it was suggested clubs had used this to their advantage when 
negotiating recent contracts with players and agents, ‘It’s probably restrained behaviour 
and…clubs have used it as a means of trying to control costs with wage negotiations, so it 
undoubtedly has had an effect’ (Informant 7). 
During the period 2004-13 clubs in the EPL earned cumulative aggregate revenue of almost 
£19 billion; however £16 billion was spent on wages and amortisation, and pre-tax losses 
exceeded £2.1 billion (Table 4.25).  This confirmed that several clubs were provided with a 
soft budget constraint that encouraged pursuit of playing success.  Without increased 
financial regulation it is likely that excessive spending on players’ costs would have 
continued,   





‘You don’t have that wage inflation that you have had in previous broadcasting cycle 
rounds.  That coupled with the latest two sets of broadcasting rights deals which went 
up exponentially by over 70% each time, then you’ve got a perfect mix of cost control 
mixed with inflated revenues…and by explaining to players and agents that they only 
have this amount of leeway otherwise they’ll be in trouble for FFP purposes, that 







Profit / (Loss) 
before tax 
  £m £m % £m 
2004-13 18,792.8 (16,015.2) 85% (2,109.6) 
2014-15 6,604.2 (5,187.8) 79% 310.1 
     
Total 2004-15 25,397.0 (21,203.0) 83% (1,799.5) 
Table 4.25: Wages and amortisation as a % of cumulative revenue 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
The introduction of FFP and STCC meant expenditure on wages and amortisation fell below 
80% of revenue in 2014 and 2015 (Table 4.25), and clubs reported cumulative profits of £310 
million (Table 4.25),  
‘In the past each time the broadcasting income went up you would see a 
corresponding increase in players’ wages and agents’ fees…the EPL has put into place 
short-term cost control which helps clubs when it comes to negotiating with players 
and agents about how to keep costs at a certain level.  These elements have helped to 
keep most clubs on the right side of profitability.’ (Informant 9) 
‘What we’ve seen in the last couple of years is the sheer amount of increase in income 
from central funds from the PL, aligned with a higher emphasis on FFP and control of 
costs...and that can only be a good thing for the financial health of the football clubs.’ 
(Informant 8) 
Furthermore it was expected that profitability would continue, 





‘The scale of the revenues…together with cost regulation are two factors combined 
that help those clubs generate profits.  The upcoming scale of agreements from 2016-
17 and further uplifts in TV money for EPL clubs means I’d expect them to continue to 
be profitable.’ (Informant 2)   
4.8.11 FFP focus on profit 
Despite improved financial performance several elite informants argued that FFP focused too 
heavily on profit and should have instead restricted levels of debt.  Sustainability of long-term 
funds was fundamental in ensuring clubs didn’t get into financial difficulties,  
‘If you really wanted to…protect clubs for their communities in the long-term, you 
would just say you can’t put any debt into a club.  You can run whatever deficit model 
you want, but it has to be financed by equity.  Long-term you have to produce 
forecasts for three to five years and if that shows deficits then you have put in a bond 
that covers that period.’ (Informant 7) 
It was also argued that FFP ignored that some owners weren’t concerned with generating a 
profit from football activities and instead used clubs to promote their global business 
interests, 
‘They don’t necessarily come into it to make a profit.  Look at Manchester City for 
instance. The owner’s motivation is to put Abu Dhabi on the map…Before Manchester 
City was taken over how many heard of Etihad?’ (Informant 4) 
Others were more sympathetic about what FFP was trying to achieve, recognising that leaving 
football to market forces hadn’t worked, 
‘We believe to a certain extent it should be left to the shareholders of the club to run 
the financial system how the club feels, but…boundaries need to be put in place to 
ensure that certain things that happened in the past…for example administration, do 
not recur.’ (Informant 9) 





Financial regulation would have the greatest impact on those clubs that relied on soft budget 
constraints provided by owners and it was recognised these clubs were most likely to be 
critical of FFP, 
‘You’re always going to get that difference of opinion between the people who are 
trying to run football clubs on a balanced financial structure where the club…maintains 
a healthy profitability or break-even position, against club owners who say “Well if I 
want to spend my money on investing in my football club and buying players and 
paying huge salaries, then why can’t I because you can in any other business?”  I do 
think there is an obligation to put in some form of protection for supporters, for the 
integrity of the competition, to protect clubs from perhaps owners who look too short-
term…without really considering the consequences long-term.’ (Informant 8) 
Now let us turn our attention to the problems of rising levels of debt and negative equity. 
4.9 Shareholders’ equity and reliance on debt 
We have already established that several clubs in the EPL operated with low levels of equity.  
This was due to a combination of losses and how these clubs were funded.  Rather than 
increasing share capital several owners provided loans at low or no interest.  This worsened 
the financial positions of clubs since loans increased liabilities, whilst excessive spending 
resulted in cumulative losses that reduced equity further still.  By 2015 Roman Abramovich 
had provided Chelsea with soft loans of £1.1 billion (Fordstam 2015:24) resulting in negative 
equity of £698 million (Table 4.26).  Removing Chelsea significantly improved the EPL’s 
aggregate position, though by 2015 seven clubs (including Chelsea) operated with negative 
equity (Table 4.26). 
The provision of funds in this way was one of the ‘softening instruments’ described by 
Kornai et al (2003:1102).  In the EPL it meant that even though a club might consistently 
report large losses, a benevolent wealthy owner would make available sufficient funds to 
cover deficits.  However over time this reduced cost discipline, and the continued operation 
of a club might be threatened where the provision of soft loans was no longer sustainable.  





The Bank of England described shareholders’ equity as ‘The highest form of capital’ (Bank of 
England) and explained that high levels of equity meant owners had a greater incentive to 
operate an organisation more ‘prudently’ (Bank of England). 
 Shareholders’ equity 










 £m £m £m  
2004 271.3 (17.9) 289.2 8 
2005 103.1 (174.1) 277.2 7 
2006 237.7 (255.3) 493.0 10 
2007 110.3 (331.1) 441.4 10 
2008 (46.5) (414.9) 368.4 11 
2009(i) (127.0) (462.3) 335.3 12 
2010(i) 564.8 (540.1) 1,104.9 11 
2011 465.0 (617.9) 1,082.9 10 
2012 712.9 (622.4) 1,335.3 9 
2013 536.9 (678.1) 1,215.0 12 
2014 1,047.2 (664.6) 1,711.8 10 
2015 1,281.7 (697.6) 1,979.3 7 
Table 4.26: Aggregate shareholders’ equity (£m) for clubs in the EPL 2004-15 
(i) Excludes Portsmouth 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2004-15) 
 
4.9.1 Shareholders’ equity / Total assets ratio 
Our calculations in table 4.27 provided further evidence that several clubs were reliant on 
borrowed funds, and by 2011 equity funded just 9% of aggregate assets.  It was only after 
Abu Dhabi United Group Investment and Development (ADG) acquired Manchester City and 
funded its investment through share capital that this ratio improved for clubs with a sugar 
daddy.  However soft loans at Chelsea, Fulham, QPR, Stoke City and Sunderland meant this 
ratio remained negative for this category throughout the period under review.  A 
combination of new issues of share capital and rising retained earnings meant the equity of 
profit making clubs increased significantly. 





 Shareholders’ equity / Total assets 




Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
 % % % % 
2004 17 8 (38) 13 
2005 25 (39) (64) 4 
2006 16 2 (78) 7 
2007 27 (31) (78) 3 
2008 19 (37) (51) (1) 
2009 26 (43) (55) (3) 
2010 42 (24) (40) 12 
2011 35 (31) (49) 9 
2012 43 (24) (36) 15 
2013 36 (31) (32) 11 
2014(i) 13 39 (18) 18 
2015 (ii) 41 (93) (12) 20 
Table 4.27: Shareholders’ equity / Total assets ratio split by category of club 2004-15 
Note: 
(i) The improvement for loss making clubs and corresponding decline for profit 
making clubs was because Chelsea reported a PBIT in 2014.   
(ii) Manchester City reported a PBIT in 2015 removing its equity from the LBIT 
category.  This meant the large amounts of soft debt that funded Chelsea and QPR 
adversely impacted on the LBIT figure for 2015. 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
4.9.2 Going concern and soft loans 
Worsening negative equity and an auditors’ report expressing reservations about going 
concern are each classed as a breach of FFPR (UEFA 2015:39). Reservations about going 
concern might include an emphasis of matter paragraph or a qualified auditors’ report.  An 
emphasis of matter paragraph, 
‘Refers to a matter appropriately presented or disclosed in the financial statements 
that, in the auditor’s judgment, is of such importance that it is fundamental to users’ 
understanding of the financial statements.’ (Financial Reporting Council 2010:2) 
When preparing financial statements several clubs made reference to being dependent on 
continued financial support from owners and related parties including Chelsea (Fordstam 
Ltd 2013:12), Manchester City (Manchester City Ltd 2015:41), Newcastle United (Newcastle 





United Ltd 2013:9), QPR (QPR Holdings Ltd 2013:11), Stoke City (Stoke City FC Ltd 2013:12), 
Sunderland (Sunderland AFC Ltd 2013:9) and Wigan (Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd 2013:15). 
This was further evidence of a soft budget constraint and it was explained that, 
‘Auditors…would need to be satisfied that those debts won’t be called in…A significant 
proportion…are soft debts with the owners so it isn’t an issue because there was 
sufficient comfort being obtained by both the directors and the auditors to confirm 
that effectively it was quasi-equity.’ (Informant 6)  
A review of financial statements indicated that despite assurances from owners and other 
providers of debt, auditors had occasionally referred to uncertainties and events that might 
threaten the continued operation of clubs.  In 2004 Leeds United reported an operating loss 
of £30 million (Leeds United AFC Ltd 2004:6) and negative equity of £14 million (2004:8).  
The auditors’ report commented that going concern was reliant on the accuracy of financial 
forecasts prepared by directors up to June 2006 (2004:5), which showed the club had 
sufficient resources to meet short-term liabilities (2004:9).   
In 2006 Fulham’s SFP showed negative equity of £144 million (Fulham Football Leisure Ltd 
2006:9) and meant the club was reliant on continued financial support from Mohammed Al 
Fayed (2006:12).  The auditors’ report commented that this ‘May cast significant doubt 
about the group’s ability to continue as a going concern’ (2006:7).   
In 2011 Birmingham City’s auditors explained that financial forecasts prepared by directors 
did not provide sufficient evidence that the club remained a going concern (Birmingham City 
plc 2011:8).  This followed the arrest of the club’s owner Carson Yeung on allegations of 
money laundering in Hong Kong (2011:3).  The auditors were concerned that soft loans of 
£22 million from Yeung might be recalled by Hong Kong Authorities (2011:3) and this would 
threaten the club’s survival (2011:7). 
Gillett and Hicks funded their acquisition of Liverpool through loans secured on the club’s 
assets (Liverpool FC Ltd 2008:9).  In 2008 Liverpool’s directors explained that the club’s 
ability to remain in operation was dependant on replacing a credit facility of £105 million 





from Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) that was due for repayment by 31 July 2009 (2008:9).  
The state of the global economy made raising new finance ‘challenging’ (2008:9) and the 
auditors’ report explained this ‘Cast significant doubt on the company’s ability to continue 
as a going concern’ (2008:5).  Failure to repay this debt resulted in RBS forcing Gillett and 
Hicks to sell Liverpool to Fenway Sports Group in October 2010 (2010:5). 
Conversely in 2008 Portsmouth reported losses of £17 million (Portsmouth City FC Ltd 
2008:7) and negative equity of £48 million (2008:8).  Despite the club being reliant on 
continued support from owner Alexandre Gaydamak (2008:10), the auditors’ report made 
no reference to uncertainties related to going concern. 
A review of financial statements published by clubs in the EPL during 2012-15 showed no 
qualified auditors’ reports and just one emphasis of matter related to going concern. In 
2014 Baker Tilly, the auditors of Crystal Palace included a paragraph that explained going 
concern was ‘Dependent on the continued support of the ultimate controlling parties’ (CPFC 
2010 Ltd 2014:7).  The financial statements showed a profit after tax of £18 million (2014:9), 
shareholders’ equity of £15 million (2014:10), and long-term debt of £11 million in the form 
of interest free loans from the company’s four shareholders (2014:25).  It seems 
inconsistent that the auditors of other clubs that owed much larger amounts of soft debt did 
not also include an emphasis of matter paragraph in their reports. 
Rather than providing soft loans ADG instead funded Manchester City through share capital, 
so despite heavy losses by 2015 the club had shareholders’ equity of over £676 million 
(Manchester City Ltd 2015:39).  More recently the owners of Wigan, Fulham and Aston Villa 
converted soft debt into equity.  Fulham’s 2011 SFP showed negative equity of £178 million 
and a loan of £200 million (Fulham Football Leisure Ltd 2012:10) from Mohammed Al Fayed 
(2012:13).  In June 2012 Al Fayed converted this loan into equity (2012:24) after which 
assets exceeded liabilities by almost £16 million (2012:10).  He sold Fulham in July 2013 
(2013:4). 






Analysis of gearing (Table 4.28) showed that in 2004 debt made up 79% of aggregate capital 
employed, increasing to over 100% in 2008 and 2009.  To put this into context Melville 
(2014) suggested that ‘As a rule of thumb, a capital gearing ratio in excess of 50% might 
generally be regarded as high’ (2014:365). 
For profit making clubs gearing improved during the period and by 2015 debt made up 39% 
of funds with the remainder provided by shareholders’ equity.  Negative equity 
accompanied by debt meant clubs backed by sugar daddies had gearing above 100% 
throughout the entire period.  However it was explained that,  
‘A lot of the debt for EPL clubs…tends to be to the owner so sometimes it can be 
described as “quasi-equity”…I’m not sure Mr Abramovich will ever get his £1 billion 
back should he decide to move on from Chelsea.  There’s relatively little debt to third 
party bankers and financiers…whether debt is an issue or not is more about how a club 
is able to service that debt if it is required to service it at all, by way of interest 
payments.’ (Informant 2) 
This was contrasted with those clubs that were required to service large amounts of hard 
debt and the impact this might have on operating activities,  
‘It’s Liverpool-Gillette-Hicks…at what point do loans that are effectively attached to 
the club inhibit the club’s ability to be able to spend accordingly.  And at what point do 
the interest payments…mean that the club is financing those interest payments and 
capital repayments, rather than actually being able to invest in other football related 
activities…As soon as that happens, and the fans start realising that money is being 
taken out for financing reasons, then it gets a little tricky to put it mildly.’ (Informant 5) 
FFP’s equity contribution for losses above €5 million (up to a maximum of €30 million) 
(UEFA 2015:38) will limit the availability of soft loans, though this won’t address existing 
levels of negative equity. 
  






 Gearing ratio 




Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
 % % % % 
2004 71 87 166 79 
2005 58 159 203 93 
2006 74 97 231 89 
2007 63 150 218 96 
2008 73 165 185 102 
2009 63 170 192 104 
2010 45 140 163 82 
2011 52 156 186 86 
2012 42 142 159 78 
2013 49 151 150 84 
2014(i) 79 50 125 72 
2015(ii) 39 252 116 69 
Table 4.28: Gearing ratio (%) split by category of club 2004-15 
Note: 
(i) The improvement for loss making clubs and corresponding decline for profit 
making clubs was because Chelsea reported a PBIT in 2014. 
(ii) Manchester City reported a PBIT in 2015 removing its equity from the LBIT 
category.  This meant the large amounts of soft debt that funded Chelsea and QPR 
adversely impacted on the LBIT figure for 2015. 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
4.9.4 Revenue / Total debt ratio 
In 2004 aggregate revenue was 1.3 times greater than aggregate debt (Table 4.29). Although 
between 2004-13 revenue increased by 88% (Table 4.1), debt increased at a faster rate and 
by 2013 this ratio had declined to 0.9 (meaning revenue amounted to 90% of debt).  The 
ratios for profit making clubs were adversely affected by loans taken out by Arsenal and 
Manchester United, though by 2015 aggregate revenue was 1.9 times greater than debt. 
Although this ratio remained mostly below one for loss making clubs and clubs supported by 
sugar daddies, a large proportion of debt comprised soft loans from owners and related 
companies.  This was not necessarily a problem so long as these funds were sustainable. 
  






 Revenue / Total debt ratio 














2004 1.6 1.1 0.5 1.3 6 
2005 1.8 0.5 0.4 1.0 6 
2006 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.7 7 
2007 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 11 
2008 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 10 
2009 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 11 
2010 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.8 7 
2011 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.8 9 
2012 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.9 7 
2013 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.9 6 
Total 2004-13  80 
2014(i) 1.1 1.7 0.8 1.2 3 
2015(ii) 1.9 0.5 0.7 1.2 5 
Total 2004-15  88 
Table 4.29: Revenue / Total debt ratio split by category of club and number of clubs 
where debt exceeded annual revenue 2004-15 
Note: 
(i) The improvement for loss making clubs and corresponding decline for profit 
making clubs was because Chelsea reported a PBIT in 2014.   
(ii) Manchester City reported a PBIT in 2015 removing its equity from the LBIT 
category.  This meant the large amounts of soft debt that funded Chelsea and QPR 
adversely impacted on the LBIT figure for 2015. 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of EPL clubs 2004-15) 
 
The introduction of FFP gave greater emphasis to this ratio since UEFA can request 
additional financial information from a club where net debt is greater than revenue (UEFA 
2015:39) (ie: a ratio of less than one).  Calculations showed that between 2004-13 this ratio 
was below one for 80 out of 198 financial statements (40%) published by clubs in the EPL 
(Table 4.29). After 2013 just eight out of 40 financial statements (20%) showed a ratio below 
one (Table 4.29).   





4.9.5 Sugar daddies and the sustainability of funds 
We have established that clubs supported by wealthy owners frequently incurred heavy 
losses in pursuit of playing success and this was often funded by soft debt.  However this 
strategy could threaten the continued operation of a club if an owner became unable or 
unwilling to continue to provide financial support, 
‘Because the fundamental principle of success is guided not by profit but by success on 
the pitch, it leads to very different business success measures or outcomes.  Because 
of that you will have people who may be very successful businessmen in other 
sectors…getting into football and then spending lots of money which in any other 
industry would not make any type of business sense whatsoever.  So people have 
seen...instances where owners will come in; spend a lot of money; realise it’s not quite 
sustainable enough and do one of a few things.  One is to stop funding the club. A 
second…is to try and keep funding it until their money runs out, which can lead to 
administration…or even worse.’ (Informant 5) 
Portsmouth should serve as a warning to all clubs that rely on a sugar daddy, ‘The club went 
out and committed to up to five-year contracts for their players.  There wasn’t funding put in 
at that stage to cover five years, so…it wasn’t sustainable’ (Informant 6).  Alexandre 
Gaydamak’s business interests were adversely affected by the global financial crisis which 
meant he could no longer continue to provide funds (Conn 2010), and in February 2010 
Portsmouth became the first club to go into administration whilst playing in the EPL 
(Deloitte 2010:9).   
West Ham experienced severe financial difficulties when owner Bjorgolfur Gudmundsson 
lost much of his personal fortune following the collapse of an Icelandic bank in which he was 
a significant investor (Szymanski 2010:38).  He was forced to sell West Ham in 2010, and 
although the club avoided going into administration it was relegated from the EPL, 
‘Even if it is soft debt…if that continuous investment…stops…the football club can be in 
trouble because costs and expenses are still being incurred.  When a major source of 





cash flow into the club is restricted it becomes very difficult to continue in the short-
term.’ (Informant 8) 
Manchester City potentially faced a period in administration when owner Thaksin 
Shinawatra had personal assets of £800 million frozen during an investigation into alleged 
criminal activities in Thailand (Hamil and Walters 2010:365).  The club was saved when it 
was acquired by ADG in August 2008 (2010:365).   
These situations showed the importance of sustainable funds, 
‘Negative equity isn’t necessarily a problem for a business as long as they…can meet 
their debts as they fall due…The real issue is whether it’s for the long-term.  Are they 
[providers of soft debt] coming in and committing to long-term contracts, particularly 
for players?  Are they able to effectively commit to the funding that’s going to be 
required to meet those wages costs in the future as well as the normal on-going 
running costs of a club?...Are they coming in with a 10-year plan rather than a one or 
two-year plan?’ (Informant 6) 
There was consensus that owners should fund clubs through equity, with elite informants 
observing that, ‘Debt by its very nature if it becomes re-callable can leave the club with a long-
term problem where the owner may walk away.  So equity absolutely, is my preferred 
mechanism for putting in money’ (Informant 1). 
Although not everyone was in favour of increased financial regulation, there was agreement 
that FFP and EPL rules would in the medium to long-term greatly improve levels of equity, 
‘Where owners’ injections are required to cover tolerable levels of losses, those 
injections must be by way of equity…Owners at Aston Villa, Manchester City and 
Fulham have converted debt to equity which is part of the reason why the debt figure 
across EPL clubs has come down over recent years…more money is coming in via 
equity rather than debt…So I guess that’s been another positive influence of FFP.’ 
(Informant 2) 






4.9.6 Hard debt 
The gearing and revenue / total debt ratios included all hard and soft debt.  However figure 
4.12 indicates that growth in debt throughout this period was primarily due to increasing 
levels of soft debt (particularly at Chelsea).  To properly evaluate the EPL’s reliance on hard 
debt we removed all loans provided by owners and related parties (soft debt) and re-
calculated these ratios.   
4.9.7 Hard debt gearing 
Treating soft loans from owners and related parties as equity rather than debt significantly 
improved gearing and by 2015 hard debt made up just 25% of capital employed (Table 
4.30).  We can also see that removing soft debt meant clubs with sugar daddies had the 
lowest gearing ratios.  This was not surprising since the provision of soft debt reduced the 
need for these clubs to obtain bank loans and other forms of hard debt.  Removing soft debt 
also improved gearing for other categories albeit to a lesser extent.   
In 2015 clubs reported aggregate hard debt of just over £1 billion (Table 4.13).  Further 
















Accounting year ended 
Figure 4.12: Breakdown of total debt for the EPL 2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs 
in the EPL 2004-15) 
Total Debt Hard Debt Soft debt





(£411 million (Red Football Ltd 2015:44)), Arsenal (£235 million (Arsenal Holdings plc 
2015:55)), Manchester City (£67 million (Manchester City Ltd 2015:55)) and Tottenham (£31 
million (Tottenham Hotspur Ltd 2015:26)).  Of those clubs that played in the EPL throughout 
the period 2004-15, only Arsenal, Manchester United and Tottenham generated a profit 
from operations in every year.  Whilst Manchester City’s hard debt was manageable given 
the club’s growing revenue and wealthy backer. 
 Hard debt gearing ratio 




Clubs with a 
‘sugar daddy’ 
EPL Aggregate 
 % % % % 
2004 43 39 27 41 
2005 46 48 25 67 
2006 64 43 29 69 
2007 58 56 48 57 
2008 58 49 49 55 
2009 58 33 32 48 
2010 44 29 20 38 
2011 37 29 18 34 
2012 35 26 13 32 
2013 37 18 16 31 
2014 27 15 10 24 
2015 24 28 13 25 
Table 4.30: Hard debt gearing ratio (%) split by category of club 2004-15  
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2004-15) 
 
4.9.8 Revenue / Hard debt ratio 
From table 4.31 we can see that throughout the period this ratio was lowest for profit 
making clubs.  This group included Manchester United, Arsenal and Tottenham, and 
although these clubs had large amounts of hard debt they also had growing revenues and 
demonstrated tight control of costs.      
Analysis showed this ratio was below one in just 28 out of 238 (12%) financial statements 
published during this period (Table 4.31).  This again highlighted that the financial positions 
of several clubs would have significantly improved if owners had converted soft loans into 





share capital.  However it was explained that, ‘Whilst debt appears on the balance sheets, I 
think it’s a lot of the time because it suited the tax position or the financial position of…the 
owners’ (Informant 6). 
 Revenue / Hard debt ratio Number of 
clubs where 













2004 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.6 3 
2005 2.2 1.6 3.0 1.4 3 
2006 1.0 1.5 2.9 0.9 4 
2007(i) 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.0 4 
2008(i) 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.2 4 
2009 0.9 2.9 2.8 1.4 3 
2010 1.1 3.3 4.3 1.7 1 
2011 1.4 4.0 5.6 2.1 2 
2012 1.4 4.3 8.1 2.3 2 
2013 1.6 5.7 5.8 2.5 1 
2014 3.2 5.7 9.7 3.5 0 
2015 3.0 4.5 6.6 3.2 1 
Total  28 
Table 4.31: Revenue / Hard debt ratio split by category of club and number of clubs 
where debt exceeded annual revenue 2004-15 
Note: 
(i) We can see that in 2007 and 2008 this ratio declined significantly for those clubs 
supported by sugar daddies.  This was due to Middlesbrough’s owner Steve Gibson 
replacing a short-term intra group loan of £69 million with bank loans repayable 
between 2009 and 2014 (Middlesbrough Football and Athletic Company (1986) Ltd 
2007:20).  In 2009 the club repaid £50 million of bank loans and Gibson replaced 
this with an interest free loan (2009:20), causing the aggregate ratio to improve.   
(Source: Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
In recent years several owners and related parties have increased levels of share capital and 
often this involved converting soft debt into equity.  Table 4.32 summarises equity 
contributions for the period 2012-15 which saw £749 million raised from new share issues 
(including £603 million of new investment by ADG), and £540 million of soft loans converted 
into share capital.  Surprisingly Roman Abramovich had not converted any of his £1.1 billion 
soft loans (Fordstam 2015:24) to Chelsea into equity.   
 











2012   
Aston Villa  £5m Issue of ordinary share capital (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 
2012:26) 
Fulham £212m Conversion of debt to equity (Fulham Football Leisure Ltd 
2012:25) 
Manchester City £169m  Issue of ordinary share capital (Manchester City Ltd 
2012:27) 
Wigan £48m Conversion of debt into preference share capital (Wigan 
Athletic AFC Ltd 2012:20) 
2013   
Manchester City £190m Issue of ordinary share capital (Manchester City Ltd 2013:23) 
Manchester United £68m Issue of ordinary share capital (Red Football Ltd 2013:15) 
Southampton £26m Issue of ordinary share capital (Southampton FC Ltd 
2013:19) 
Sunderland £33m Conversion of debt to equity (Sunderland AFC Ltd 2013:19) 
2014   
Aston Villa  £90m Conversion of debt to equity (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 
2014:27) 
Cardiff £3m Conversion of debt to equity (Cardiff City FC (Holdings) Ltd 
2014:28) 
Manchester City £160m Issue of ordinary share capital (Manchester City Ltd 2014:24) 
Tottenham £40m Issue of preference share capital (Tottenham Hotspur Ltd 
2014:34) 
2015   
Aston Villa  £92m Comprised of new issue of ordinary share capital (£7m) and 
conversion of debt to equity (£85m) (Reform Acquisitions 
Ltd 2015:27) 
Liverpool £69m Conversion of debt to equity (Liverpool FC and Athletic 
Grounds Ltd 2015:27) 
Manchester City £84m Issue of ordinary share capital (Manchester City Ltd 2015:57) 
Total £1,289m  
Table 4.32: Funds raised through issue of share capital by clubs in the EPL 2012-15 
(Source: Financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2012-15) 
 
4.9.9 Concerns that FFP would restrict investment 
Under FFP, the acceptable deviation meant wealthy owners were no longer able to invest 
unlimited amounts trying to quickly achieve playing success.  Elite informants were concerned 
this would adversely impact on investment in clubs, ‘They are few and far between the people 
who want to invest in football, so if you put a constraint on them it could have a long-term 





damaging effect on the game’ (Informant 7).  Although informants were in favour of 
restricting debt, they were critical that FFP also constrained investment funded by equity, 
‘I can see the issue with owners…using debt to finance ambition, because if it fails then 
they can walk away…but the club is saddled with debt…but when it stops people from 
putting money in by way of equity, then I think we’ve gone down the wrong route.’ 
(Informant 1) 
‘There has to be an amount of business foresight in how you operate because you 
don’t want to restrict [investment] to the point where it hampers growth of the 
industry.’ (Informant 4) 
In this way it was argued that FFP didn’t consider whether investment was sustainable, ‘If 
there was willingness for the sugar daddies or the big benefactors to put their money in then 
why restrict that as long as it’s sustainable, and that’s the key’ (Informant 6).  Informant 9 
concurred,  
‘There have been situations in the past where owners have provided soft loans that 
they do expect to be repaid, or owners who cannot really afford that amount of loan 
then stop the funding without any proper plan in place to see how the club can 
sustain.  It’s those situations where something needs to be looked at.  The other side 
of the coin are owners who genuinely can provide loans to the club; who want to 
ensure that the club is sustainable going forward; and are not looking for repayment 
of the loan…in the next three, five, ten years.’ (Informant 9) 
It was explained that restricting investment in this way might also cause problems for a new 
owner eager to make a good impression with supporters, 
‘There’s quite a lot of pressure on new owners when they come in to actually put their 
money where their mouth is…So you rarely see new owners coming in and not putting 
in any money at all, because they’d quickly fall out of favour with the fans.’ (Informant 
6) 





Informant 6 also pointed out that sustainable investment by a wealthy owner could have a 
positive impact on a club and its local economy, 
‘Whatever people feel about the investment by Abu Dhabi in Manchester City, it’s 
been fantastic for this region.  You wouldn’t see Manchester City Council complaining 
about it…Whilst these clubs are all making huge losses they pay massive amounts in 
PAYE and NIC.  Manchester City is one of the biggest tax payers in the region.  Not to 
mention VAT as well on £300 million of investment in infrastructure.’ (Informant 6)  
4.9.10 Maintaining the status quo in European club football 
The introduction of FFP meant expenditure was constrained by revenue regardless of how 
much an owner was willing to invest in a club.  Even with the acceptable deviation and 
maximum equity contribution several informants were concerned this would make it difficult 
to challenge the existing ‘Hierarchy of European football’ (Franck 2013:5), ‘We felt UEFA’s 
requirements of a €45 million loss over three years going down to €30 million was too 
restrictive and locked the established order’ (Informant 4).  As a consequence use of the word 
‘fair’ was criticised, ‘FFP rules…don’t create a level playing field…as it locks in the old order.  
Not every club can spend the same amount of money. FFP is not fair play, it’s a misnomer’ 
(Informant 3). 
Several suggested FFP favoured the largest clubs in Europe and in the short to medium term 
this would have an adverse impact on competition, 
‘I think the aim of FFP is not a competitive balance one…It is one where if you are an 
established club that has large revenue streams and you can balance that against a 
large cost base, then you are at an advantage.’ (Informant 5)   
‘As soon as you…limit the ability of ambitious clubs to spend, then what you’re doing is 
to put in concrete the pecking order because the most successful clubs always have 
the most income which enables them to spend most.    As soon as you stop the ability 
of the aspiring clubs to spend you’re limiting competition.’ (Informant 1) 





It was suggested this had been a deliberate strategy by UEFA to make FFP more acceptable to 
Europe’s largest clubs, 
‘I’m sure some of the big clubs had an influence, Barcelona, Real Madrid, potentially 
Manchester United.  And that’s not a surprise to some extent, because for want of a 
better description, the regulator is trying to protect their brand so it’s important that 
they keep those big clubs onside.’ (Informant 6) 
These arguments ignored that it was often smaller clubs with aspirations to play in the EPL or 
European competition that experienced severest financial difficulties.  These were the clubs 
that FFP was trying to protect through break-even and acceptable deviations.  It was also 
explained that, 
‘In FFP competitive balance is not one of the stated objectives.  I guess over time if you 
get more clubs that are stronger and have great facilities and strong youth 
development systems then more well-run clubs should encourage better, broader, 
competition…between clubs.  But there is no stated objective to level the playing field 
or achieve some extra degree of competitive balance.’ (Informant 2) 
During our conversation Informant 9 explained that his club was in discussion with UEFA for 
breaching FFPR.  He pragmatically reasoned that,    
‘It will take a while before they [UEFA] get the right set of rules and guidelines in place 
and before everybody agrees that it’s fair, in that clubs that do want to compete and 
do have the resources to compete are allowed to compete effectively with a club 
that’s already established.’ (Informant 9) 
4.9.11 Investment in youth development and infrastructure 
Since investment in infrastructure is excluded from FFP calculations, it was pointed out that 
wealthy owners were still able to invest significant amounts so long as they took a long-term 
perspective, 





‘The rules allow certain costs to be unlimited in terms of investment in facilities…There 
is also a tolerable level of losses…So owners can still invest considerable amounts of 
funds…and remain within these rules…the rules are just trying to direct some of that 
funding more towards longer term development of individual clubs and their facilities 
rather than all the cash being splashed on short-term players’ wages and transfer 
fees.’ (Informant 2) 
However it was argued that a wealthy owner would not want to spend heavily on 
infrastructure without first being allowed to invest in playing success, 
‘You’re not going to invest in facilities if you have no success on the pitch, are you?  
You are going to invest your money where it makes the biggest impact, and that of 
course is on the pitch.  So you have to have playing success before you can start to 
build the infrastructure around it.’ (Informant 7) 
Informants expressed differing opinions about whether FFP had encouraged investment in 
youth development, 
‘It has helped…that expenses or costs incurred in relation to youth expenditure is 
exempted from FFP…That’s one of the reasons why we realised that we need more 
emphasis on the academy side of things to ensure that we generate the revenues and 
profits from player sales going forward.’ (Informant 9)  
It was also explained that relying on youth development rather than buying in proven players 
was a risky strategy, 
‘For all clubs that type of policy of recruiting externally and not developing your own 
players has been reversed but there is still huge emphasis on buying the finished 
product rather than managers in the PL risking putting in younger players...FFP and PL 
rules allow you to lose a fairly significant sum, so the actual element of youth 
development is fairly small in comparison to the rest of the costs.  But certainly by 
removing it from the FFP calculation encourages clubs.’ (Informant 8) 





Concern was expressed that the current system favoured the largest clubs who could 
purchase players from youth academies too cheaply.  It was argued this didn’t encourage 
smaller clubs to invest in youth development, 
‘We train the players up and they’ve all got a price tag on their heads and the big clubs 
can just come in and pay the price, and the price is too low and we lose a player.  If 
there was a more realistic figure then we would significantly invest…So at the moment 
the system is not right.  There needs to be an adjustment to the compensation…it’s 
around £200,000 that another club can pick up your player for.  It’s not a lot of money 
for a player because the academy (gross) costs around £3 million per year and we are 
probably the lowest spenders in the EPL.’ (Informant 3) 
There was also criticism that FFP didn’t require clubs to disclose more information related to 
expenditure on youth academies, ‘There isn’t a public disclosure as a requirement about how 
much clubs spend on youth development…How much does it cost to run the youth scheme? 
What if a coach does half his time with the first team and half his time with the youth team?’ 
(Informant 2)  
It was also pointed out that a club might get into financial difficulties through spending too 
much on infrastructure projects,  
‘I find that a bit bizarre though.  You can spend as much as you want on infrastructure 
and the academy; that still might make you financially insecure.  So it’s slightly counter 
intuitive in terms of the way that’s operated, but you understand what they [UEFA] 
are trying to do.  They’re trying to just flip it around a bit to get that sensible strategy 
for the future.  And it does allow sugar daddies to invest in clubs as long as they take 
the long-term view.’ (Informant 6) 
4.10 Penalties for non-compliance with FFP 
Even before the introduction of FFP a huge amount of discussion centred on whether UEFA 
would exclude the best supported clubs from European competition for non-compliance, ‘You 
need your star names in those competitions so restricting them playing…is a really difficult 





decision for them to take and I’m not sure that it’s the right thing to do’ (Informant 1).  Elite 
informants concurred with this view and explained that exclusion of the best supported clubs 
might adversely impact on spectator interest in European competitions and could result in 
lengthy legal battles,   
‘It’s an impossible situation where you might have Real Madrid, Barcelona, 
Manchester United, Manchester City all being effectively embargoed.  It just defies 
belief that they [UEFA] would allow that situation.’ (Informant 7) 
‘If you have a jewel in your crown you’re not going to throw it away…you wouldn’t do 
it because it will devalue your asset.  Secondly it’s going to be fraught with legal 
difficulties.’ (Informant 4)   
For these reasons elite informants believed UEFA was more likely to impose financial 
penalties, 
'It’s difficult because you want strong penalties for breaching the rules, but at the 
same time you also need those teams in the competition.  So financial penalties…they 
have got to be sufficient but once you start suspending clubs from competitions it 
becomes very difficult and the consequences could be significant.’ (Informant 1) 
‘I don’t think they would exclude them from a competition…it would be counter-
productive for UEFA.  We’ve seen what they’ve done with PSG and Manchester 
City…So I don’t think they would go so far as to ban the elite teams.’ (Informant 9) 
It was also acknowledged that excluding the best supported clubs from European competition 
might lead to these clubs breaking away and forming their own European super league, 
‘If all the clubs got together and said…“We’ll set up our own competition.”  That’s the 
difficulty.’ (Informant 7) 
‘There’s even the possibility of…a break away European League that’s not sanctioned 
by UEFA.  I don’t think it will happen but if that’s the case there’s no UEFA FFP 
anymore.’ (Informant 5) 





‘They’ve been talking about that for about 10 years…I personally can’t see it, but who 
knows? Money talks.  I suppose when the EPL was set up and broke away from 
Division 1, people were a bit shocked at that and didn’t think it would happen, but it 
did.’ (Informant 6) 
Settlement agreements meant there were several types of penalties for non-compliance with 
FFP and exclusion from competition was the last resort, 
‘I think one of the most pragmatic and sensible ideas that UEFA had…was the 
settlement agreements that they drafted into their disciplinary provisions…If you 
admit to the breach or agree to a whole host of sanctions that doesn’t include 
expulsion, ie: the nuclear option, then you can still participate in competition.  From 
the UEFA side it shows that the regulations have teeth and there are severe sanctions 
in place.  Both sides though they might begrudge it, still effectively come out on top.  
Clubs manage to still play in the Champions League; still manage to get good revenues; 
still manage to attract players because they’re in the Champions League; and UEFA’s 
regulations bite and show they have some force even if it’s not the nuclear expulsion 
option.’ (Informant 5) 
Informant 2 concurred and explained that UEFA’s application of sanctions to date showed 
exclusion was only required for the most severe breaches, 
‘I think there was a lot of scepticism before the rules came in about whether UEFA 
would…carry through the rules that they had put in place.  And so far they have shown 
that they monitor clubs and where necessary they sanction clubs and come to these 
settlement agreements…to make sure these rules are actually enforced.’ (Informant 2) 
A review of settlement agreements and the penalties imposed on clubs showed how seriously 
UEFA viewed breaches of FFP.  The number of clubs sanctioned since 2014 is shown in table 
4.33 and we can see that rather than excluding clubs from UEFA competitions settlement 
agreements have instead imposed penalties including fines, restrictions in prize monies and 
squad size, and upper limits on transfer spending (UEFA 2017). 





Where the investigatory chamber has been unable to reach a settlement agreement, cases 
have been referred to the adjudicatory chamber and up to June 2017 this had resulted in 22 
clubs being excluded from UEFA competitions for non-compliance with FFPR.  Most of these 










Exclusion from UEFA competition for 
non-compliance with: 
Break-even Overdue payments 
2014 9 9 6(i) 0 5 
2015 14 14 13(ii) 2 9 
2016 4 4 4 1 3 
2017 (up to June) 1 1 3(iii) 1 1 
Total 28 28 26 4 18 
Table 4.33: Number of clubs sanctioned for breaches of FFP rules up to June 2017 
Note:  
(i) The panel dismissed the case against FC Dnipro (UEFA 2017) 
(ii) Burnaspor and FC Honka had potential bans lifted after overdue payments were 
settled within given deadlines (UEFA 2017) 
(iii) Case dismissed against RB Leipzig / FC Salzburg (UEFA 2017) 
(Source: Summarised from UEFA 2017) 
 
Although the scale of several recent commercial transactions made it more difficult to 
question fair values, a review of settlement agreements indicated that UEFA had 
investigated and commented on the fair values of some commercial transactions.  This 
included those between Manchester City and Etihad Airways (UEFA 2017:Manchester City) 
and FC Dynamo Moscow and VTB (UEFA 2017:Dynamo Moscow). 
4.11 EPL financial regulations 
It was explained that following the introduction of FFPR and their subsequent adoption by the 
EFL,  
‘The PL was caught in a situation where above them UEFA had the FFP structure; the 
FL had financial fair play rules established; so the PL was sat in the middle without 
any financial fair play rules which didn’t really make an awful lot of sense.’ 
(Informant 8) 





The EPL initiated greater financial regulation through STCC during 2013-14 (Premier League 
2015:107) and Profitability and Sustainability rules from 2015-16 (2015:113), 
‘Ultimately we recognise that losses year after year are not a good thing.  But because 
profit is not necessarily the owner’s only motive for owning a football club, then you 
have to allow for that.  What we should assess the club on is its ability to operate 
within what is available to it, including the owner’s finances…At that time we had 
Fulham in the EPL and Al Fayed could have said “I want to put £300 million into the 
club and compete for the top honours”…They would not have been able to do that 
and still make a profit.’ (Informant 4) 
So long as there was evidence that sufficient funding was in place, EPL rules enabled clubs to 
report much larger losses over each monitoring period than under FFP.  In this way it was 
argued that they considered the sustainability of funds provided by owners,   
‘What our rules say is if you make losses of up to £15 million over three years…we will 
scrutinise budgets and financial information that we receive in advance of the season 
and establish whether these losses…impact on the club’s ability to remain a going 
concern…If it makes losses of more than £15 million up to £105 million over three 
years, the owners must provide evidence of secure funding for at least the next two 
years…So that’s how the EPL has met the challenge of clubs not necessarily making 
profit.’ (Informant 4) 
  





4.12 Case studies 
Having considered aggregate performance the next stage of this analysis looked in more 
detail at a sample of clubs that played in the EPL during 2004-15.  This allowed examination 
of the different ways in which clubs operated from a financial perspective. 
Accounting year 
ended 









 £m £m % £m   £m 
EPL aggregate         
2011 2,296.9 1582.1 69 (355.1) 0.8 2.1 465.0 
2012 2,346.4 1,626.7 69 (202.9) 0.9 2.3 712.9 
2013 2,549.1 1,776.2 70 (285.8) 0.9 2.5 536.9 
2014 3,249.4 1,884.7 58 196.3 1.2 3.5 1,047.2 
2015 3,354.9 1,881.9 60 113.7 1.2 3.2 1,281.7 
        
Manchester Utd        
2011 331.4 152.9 46 29.7 0.7 0.7 810.6 
2012 320.3 161.7 50 (4.7) 0.7 0.7 821.7 
2013 363.2 180.5 50 (3.0) 0.9 0.9 882.9 
2014 433.2 214.7 50 41.2 1.3 1.3 934.1 
2015 395.2 202.4 51 (2.3) 0.9 0.9 891.8 
        
Arsenal        
2011 255.0 124.4 49 14.8 1.0 1.0 268.0 
2012 240.1 143.4 60 36.6 1.0 1.0 297.5 
2013 278.8 154.5 55 6.7 1.1 1.1 303.4 
2014 301.4 166.4 55 4.7 1.3 1.3 310.6 
2015 343.7 192.2 56 24.7 1.5 1.5 330.7 
        
Manchester City        
2011 153.2 174.0 114 (197.5) 1.9 2.1 272.7 
2012 231.1 201.8 87 (98.7) 3.1 3.3 326.4 
2013 271.0 233.1 86 (51.6) 4.0 4.0 435.3 
2014 346.5 205.0 59 (22.9) 4.7 5.2 572.3 
2015 351.8 193.8 55 10.4 4.9 5.3 676.3 
        
Chelsea        
2011 225.2 191.2 85 (78.3) 0.3 15.2 (617.9) 
2012 259.3 172.9 67 (4.3) 0.3 n/a (622.4) 
2013 260.1 178.5 69 (57.2) 0.3 n/a (678.1) 
2014 324.4 191.8 59 14.9 0.3 n/a (664.6) 
2015 319.5 217.1 68 (33.7) 0.3 n/a (697.6) 
        
Table 4.34: Key performance indicators for four of the largest clubs in the EPL 2011-15 
(Source: Figures obtained / calculated from financial statements 2011-15 for Arsenal Holdings plc; Red 
Football Ltd (Manchester United); Fordstam Ltd (Chelsea); Manchester City Ltd) 





Table 4.34 considers the four clubs in the EPL that enjoyed most playing success during the 
sample period.    The performance indicators are those that best demonstrate compliance 
with FFP and EPL rules.  Analysis showed that a variety of financial strategies were employed 
in pursuit of playing success. 
4.12.1 Manchester United 
Since the EPL commenced in 1992 Manchester United has consistently reported the highest 
revenues and enjoyed most playing success.  We have already established that during 2004-
15 growth in revenue was driven by increased gate receipts arising from the expansion of 
Old Trafford; increased broadcasting revenue from playing success which included 
participation in the Champions League in every season between 2004-14; and spectacular 
commercial and sponsorship agreements that took advantage of the club’s global brand.  
Cash and cash equivalents of £156 million in 2015 (Red Football 2015:17) meant 
Manchester United had no liquidity issues.   
Although wages increased from £153 million in 2011 to £215 million by 2014, growth in 
revenue meant this remained at around 50% of revenue (Table 4.34).  Failure to qualify for 
the Champions League saw revenue decline by 9% in 2015 (Calculated from table 4.34) and 
underlined the importance of regular participation in European competition for the largest 
clubs.   
As we have already established servicing debt placed a huge financial burden on the club 
and meant that although Manchester United reported a PBIT in all but one-year, large 
amounts of interest payable often turned this into a small LBT (Table 4.34).  Although 
around £150 million was raised from a part-floatation on the New York Stock Exchange in 
August 2012, just £68 million (Red Football 2013:15) was used to reduce debt.  By 2015 
Manchester United’s revenue of £395 million was the highest in the EPL, however loans of 
£417 (Calculated from Red Football 2015:15) resulted in a revenue / hard debt ratio of less 
than one (the lowest in the EPL). 





Despite significant amounts of net interest payable the club continued to purchase new 
players and by 2015 players’ registrations of £238 million (2015:39) were the largest in the 
EPL, which further enhanced the club’s brand.   
In establishing break-even, FFP initially considered financial performance from the 
accounting year ended 2012.  From table 4.34 we can calculate that during accounting years 
ended 2012-15 Manchester United made a cumulative PBT of £31 million.  It should be 
noted that the profit figures in table 4.34 include all costs and revenues.  UEFA’s break-even 
calculation excludes certain expenses related to improvements in infrastructure including 
youth and community development activities.  Removing these expenses would result in 
higher profits (smaller losses) than those shown in table 4.34 and indicated that despite 
significant debt Manchester United had few problems meeting the break-even requirement 
of FFP.  Since growth in wages was funded by increased commercial revenue, Manchester 
United was also able to comply with STCC. 
Our analysis suggested that without growth in revenue the leveraged buyout model used by 
the Glazer family would almost certainly have reduced the funds available for investment in 
players, and it is likely this would have adversely impacted on both playing success and 
Manchester United’s global brand. 
4.12.2 Arsenal  
Investment in the Emirates stadium saw growth in Arsenal’s matchday receipts.  
Participation in the Champions League generated additional broadcasting revenue and 
raised further the club’s global profile helping to attract lucrative commercial contracts 
particularly with Emirates and Puma.  In addition Arsenal generated cumulative revenue of 
£448 million from the sale of property built on the site of its former stadium (Calculated 
from Arsenal Holdings plc financial statements 2004-15). 
Despite wages increasing from £124 million in 2011 to £192 million by 2015 (Table 4.34), 
growth in revenue meant the wages / revenue ratio remained below the EPL average; and 
although interest payable on debt became a significant expense after 2007, Arsenal was the 





only club in the EPL that reported a pre-tax profit in each year from 2004-15 (Arsenal 
Holdings plc financial statements 2004-15). 
Arsenal won the PL in 2004 and qualified for the Champions League in every season during 
2004-15, however supporters suggested that servicing high levels of debt prevented further 
playing success.  Others were critical that the club maintained large cash balances that could 
have instead been used to acquire new players.  By 2015 Arsenal had cash and cash 
equivalents of £228 million (Arsenal Holdings plc 2015:62), which represented 35% of the 
EPL’s total balance (Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015).  Despite 
these criticisms by 2015 players’ registrations were valued at £172 million (2015:50), the 
fourth highest in the EPL. 
Good control of key costs meant Arsenal reported a pre-tax profit and achieved playing 
success in the form of qualification for the Champions League in every year under review.  
This suggested the directors balanced playing success with good financial performance, and 
it could be argued that Arsenal was the only club in the EPL to have successfully followed 
this strategy.  Financial performance from 2012 ensured compliance with FFP, and since 
growth in wages from 2013 was funded from increased commercial revenue Arsenal also 
met the requirements of STCC.  
4.12.3 Manchester City 
During our sample period Manchester City saw the greatest changes in terms of financial 
resources and playing success.   Up to 2007 revenue stagnated at around £60 million 
(Manchester City Ltd 2007:18) as the club struggled to become established in the top half of 
the EPL; and falling attendances saw matchday receipts decline from £17 million in 2004 
(Manchester City Ltd 2005:23) to less than £14 million by 2007 (Manchester City Ltd 
2007:18).  Losses would have been much higher without a £19 million surplus from player 
trading in 2006 (Manchester City Ltd 2006:17). 
By 2007 hard debt included £44 million secured against future matchday revenue, and £42 
million related to the finance lease used to acquire the ‘City of Manchester’ stadium 





(Manchester City Ltd 2008:25).  Interest payable on this worsened losses and left the club in 
a vulnerable financial position.   
In July 2007 UK Sports Investments Ltd acquired Manchester City (2008:7) in a deal funded 
by Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Prime Minister of Thailand. However his financial 
problems meant Manchester City was sold to ADG in September 2008 (2008:7).  There 
followed a period of heavy expenditure as ADG sought immediate playing success, and this 
resulted in significant growth in revenue over a very short period of time.   
Although a large proportion of additional commercial revenue was from Etihad Airways, 
playing success including regular participation in the Champions League, enabled 
broadcasting revenue to grow to £135 million by 2015 (Manchester City Ltd 2015:43).  
However huge investment in players meant wages and amortisation exceeded revenue in 
each year from 2009-13 (Calculated from Manchester City Ltd financial statements 2009-
13), and Manchester City reported some of the largest losses seen in English football 
including £198 million in 2011 (Table 4.34). 
Rather than providing soft loans ADG funded the club’s spending through investing in share 
capital (Table 4.34).  The scale of investment was illustrated by a review of financial 
statements which showed the value of players’ registrations had increased from less than 
£10 million in 2007 (Manchester City Ltd 2007:16) to £194 million by 2015 (Manchester City 
Ltd 2015:49).  Over the same period investment in infrastructure projects meant tangible 
non-current assets increased from £182 million (Manchester City Ltd 2007:16) to £407 
million (Manchester City Ltd 2015:50). 
The strategies followed by ADG from 2008 achieved almost immediate playing success but 
required massive up-front investment in players.  Cumulative losses from 2012-14 
amounted to £173 million (Calculated from table 4.34) and even though some expenditure 
was related to improvements in infrastructure and hence excluded from break-even 
calculations, Manchester City was punished heavily by UEFA for non-compliance with FFP.  
Increased revenue and tighter control of costs meant Manchester City reported a pre-tax 





profit in 2015 (Table 4.34).  STCC was achieved as wages declined from £233 million in 2013 
to £194 million in 2015 (Table 4.34), though this exceeded the revenue of all but the six 
largest clubs in the EPL.  
4.12.4 Chelsea 
Chelsea’s strategy was similar to that employed by ADG at Manchester City in that owner 
Roman Abramovich provided the financial resources necessary to achieve playing success.  
Huge expenditure on players’ costs meant that during the period 2004-15 Chelsea made a 
cumulative pre-tax loss of £759 million (Calculated from financial statements of Fordstam 
Ltd 2004-15).  To ensure continued playing success coaching staff were changed on a regular 
basis, and termination payments during this period exceeded £68 million (Calculated from 
financial statements of Fordstam Ltd 2004-15).   
Abramovich funded Chelsea through soft loans on which no interest was payable, and when 
combined with cumulative losses meant by 2015 liabilities exceeded assets by almost £700 
million (Table 4.34). 
From table 4.34 we can calculate that between 2012-15 Chelsea reported a cumulative loss 
of £80 million, though some of this was due to players’ contracts agreed before 1 June 2010 
and improvements to infrastructure, and these amounts are excluded from the FFP break-
even calculation.  In order to at least meet the acceptable deviation, Chelsea must further 
increase revenue and demonstrate better control of key costs.  Chelsea’s proposed new 
stadium will increase matchday receipts and costs of building this will be excluded from FFP 
calculations.  FFP will also impact on the way in which Abramovich funds Chelsea, and in 
future losses above €5 million will need to be matched by a rise in equity rather additional 
soft loans.  Growth in commercial revenue from 2014 onwards enabled compliance with 
STCC. 
Now let us consider financial performance for a sample of clubs that had different measures 
of playing success.  Again the performance indicators shown in table 4.35 are those that 
best indicate compliance with FFP and EPL rules.  In addition annual surpluses and deficits 
arising from player trading are included. 






















 £m £m % £m £m   £m 
Aston Villa         
2011 92.0 83.4 91 18.8 (54.0) 0.7 7.5 (19.7) 
2012 79.8 69.6 87 26.9 (17.6) 0.5 5.4 (32.4) 
2013 81.7 71.9 88 (0.3) (51.8) 0.4 6.0 (84.2) 
2014 111.2 69.3 62 1.7 (4.0) 1.0 6.2 2.1 
2015 113.2 83.8 74 0.4 (27.8) 3.7 5.6 66.7 
         
Everton         
2011 82.0 58.0 71 7.4 (5.4) 1.7 1.7 (35.2) 
2012 80.5 63.4 79 14.1 (9.1) 1.7 1.7 (44.3) 
2013 86.4 63.0 73 15.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 (42.7) 
2014 120.5 69.3 58 28.2 28.2 2.5 2.5 (14.5) 
2015 125.6 77.5 62 3.3 (4.1) 3.1 3.1 (18.5) 
         
Newcastle Utd         
2011 88.5 53.6 61 36.7 32.6 0.6 n/a (35.9) 
2012 93.3 64.1 69 6.5 1.4 0.7 n/a (34.6) 
2013 95.9 61.7 64 10.6 9.9 0.7 21.4 (24.7) 
2014 129.8 78.3 60 14.0 18.8 1.0 n/a (5.9) 
2015 128.8 65.1 51 17.1 36.1 1.0 n/a 26.5 
         
WBA         
2011 65.1 43.9 67 5.6 18.9 14.2 26.9 22.8 
2012 66.7 50.5 76 6.0 0.4 20.4 58.5 22.5 
2013 69.7 54.0 77 3.1 6.0 9.9 14.8 27.8 
2014 86.8 65.5 75 9.6 12.8 15.1 23.9 38.6 
2015 96.3 69.8 73 5.3 3.7 44.0 n/a 39.9 
         
Wigan         
2011 50.5 40.0 79 2.3 7.2 0.69 1.64 (65.1) 
2012 52.6 37.7 72 7.9 4.3 2.00 3.62 (12.9) 
2013 56.4 43.7 77 8.2 0.8 2.73 4.6 (12.1) 
Table 4.35: Key performance indicators for a sample of clubs in the EPL 2011-15 
(Source: Figures obtained / calculated from financial statements 2011-15 for Reform Acquisitions Ltd 
(Aston Villa); Everton FC Ltd; Newcastle United Ltd; WBA FC Ltd; Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd) 
4.12.5 Aston Villa  
Following his acquisition of Aston Villa in 2006, Randy Lerner initially provided the funds 
necessary to acquire new players through a combination of equity and soft loans.  This saw 
the value of players’ registrations increase from £14 million in 2004 (Aston Villa plc 2005:29) 
to £68 million by 2010 (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 2010:20).  However from 2010 onwards the 
best players were often sold for large surpluses (Table 4.35) and by 2015 players’ 





registrations had declined to £31 million (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 2015:21). This strategy 
made playing success increasingly difficult to achieve, and as the club struggled to remain in 
the EPL matchday receipts fell from £23 million in 2009 (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 2010:16) to 
£14 million by 2015 (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 2015:16).   
In each year from 2009-13 wages and amortisation exceeded revenue, and changes in 
coaching staff from 2011 onwards cost the club over £23 million in termination payments 
(Calculated from Reform Acquisitions Ltd financial statements 2004-15).  Losses would have 
been even larger without surpluses from player trading (Table 4.35).  By 2015 broadcasting 
accounted for 63% of revenue (Figure 4.5). 
The club’s poor financial performance meant Lerner waived his right to interest of £20 
million in 2012 (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 2012:2), and in 2013 and 2014 he converted loans 
of £90 million (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 2014:27) and £85 million (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 
2015:27) into share capital greatly improving the club’s equity and liquidity positions.   
The strategies employed by Lerner were ultimately unsuccessful in terms of both financial 
performance and playing success.  Poor control of costs meant cumulative pre-tax losses 
from 2012-15 amounted to £101 million (Calculated from Table 4.35), making it difficult to 
comply with FFP.  However growth in commercial revenue and surpluses from player trading 
meant STCC was achieved.  In 2014 Lerner put Aston Villa up for sale (Reform Acquisitions 
Ltd 2014:2).  However by June 2015 no buyer had been found (Reform Acquisitions Ltd 
2015:2) which further increased financial uncertainties surrounding the club. 
4.12.6 Everton 
Declining stadium utilisation meant Everton’s matchday receipts remained static rising from 
£16 million in 2004 (Everton FC Ltd 2004:19) to £18 million in 2015 (Everton FC Ltd 2015:72).  
This meant growth in revenue was driven almost entirely by broadcasting which increased 
from £21 million (Everton FC Ltd 2004:19) to £82 million (Everton FC Ltd 2015:72).   
A review of financial statements showed that over the duration of each three-year 
broadcasting contract, growth in revenue was used to fund increased expenditure on wages 





and amortisation.  As a consequence in several years wages and amortisation exceeded 90% 
of revenue, and without a wealthy benefactor Everton was reliant on borrowed funds that 
were secured on future matchday and broadcasting revenue.  Low levels of equity 
accompanied by cumulative losses meant Everton operated with negative equity in all but 
one year. 
Although the value of players’ registrations increased from £18 million in 2004 (Everton FC 
Ltd 2005:21) to £53 million by 2015 (Everton FC Ltd 2015:75), Everton rarely purchased 
players for large transfer fees.  Instead the club preferred to pay smaller amounts for 
players with potential or nearing the end of their careers.  In addition several players were 
developed though the club’s youth academy.  The club’s weak financial position meant it 
was often forced to raise funds through the sale of players (Table 4.35) and during 2004-15 
this strategy restricted cumulative losses to £11 million (Calculated from financial 
statements of Everton FC Ltd 2004-15).  However this made it increasingly difficult for 
Everton to achieve improved playing success which brought criticism from supporters.   
A cumulative PBT of £17 million since 2012 meant compliance with FFP (Table 4.35).  
Although wages increased from £63 million in 2013 (Everton FC Ltd 2013:63) to £78 million 
in 2015 (Everton FC Ltd 2015:74), this was funded through a combination of growth in 
commercial revenue and surpluses from player trading, ensuring STCC was achieved.  
4.12.7 Newcastle United 
In terms of revenue Newcastle was consistently the largest club outside the top six.  
However playing success proved elusive and by 2013 revenue was just £6 million higher 
than 2004 (Calculated from Newcastle United Ltd 2005:22 and 2013:5), and Newcastle had 
lost touch with the six largest clubs in the EPL.   
Although in 2015 Newcastle attracted over 50,000 supporters to each home game 
(Newcastle United Ltd 2015:2), matchday receipts of £27 million (2015:13) made up just 
21% of revenue (Figure 4.5).  Broadcasting of £77 million (2015:13) accounted for 60% of 
revenue (Figure 4.5), while commercial revenue fluctuated and was adversely affected by 
the club’s relegation from the EPL in 2009.   





Until 2007 Newcastle had loans including £45 million secured against future matchday 
receipts and £17 million secured against future broadcasting and sponsorship revenue 
(Newcastle United Ltd 2007:33).  The club was acquired by Mike Ashley in July 2007 
(2007:2), and he immediately replaced this with an interest free loan.  By 2012 Ashley had 
provided loans of £129 million (Newcastle United Ltd 2012:21), though his stated intention 
for the club ‘To operate without reliance on external bank debt or additional financial 
support from our owner’ (2012:2) meant he was not classed as a sugar daddy.   
Although Newcastle did finish as high as fifth in the EPL, sustained playing success was not 
achieved.  From 2011 Newcastle’s strategy involved acquiring players for relatively small 
transfer fees; developing these players; and selling them for large surpluses (Table 4.35).  
Accompanied by tight control of wages, this enabled Newcastle to report a PBT in each year 
from 2011 (Table 4.35).  Although this strategy greatly improved financial performance and 
ensured compliance with FFP and STCC, lack of playing success brought Mike Ashley into 
conflict with supporters and he twice tried to sell the club.   Newcastle illustrated the 
difficulties in balancing playing and financial success, and that conflict can arise when 
supporters perceive that financial success is being prioritised above sporting success. 
4.12.8 West Bromwich Albion (WBA) 
Although WBA spent eight years in the EPL, the club was relegated twice before becoming 
established.  This suggested the owner was not willing to spend excessive amounts to 
remain in the EPL. 
Growth in revenue was driven by broadcasting which by 2015 amounted to 81% of total 
revenue (Figure 4.5).  Stadium capacity of around 25,000 (2015:3) meant matchday receipts 
in 2015 amounted to just £8 million (2015:12); and with the club struggling to attract the 
largest sponsors, commercial activities generated just £11 million (2015:12).  These figures 
represented a fraction of the amounts earned by Manchester United and Arsenal.   
Although wages increased from £20 million in 2005 (WBA FC Ltd 2005:11) to £70 million by 
2015 (WBA FC Ltd 2015:13), low amortisation and surpluses from player trading helped the 
club report a PBT in each season after 2011.  





For WBA playing success was becoming established in the EPL, and over time there is 
evidence that the club changed its player acquisition strategy to achieve this.  In 2006 and 
2009 the club appeared to spend relatively large amounts buying players.  However 
relegation resulted in impairment charges that saw the value of players’ registrations fall by 
£9 million (WBA FC Ltd 2006:12) and £18 million (WBA FC Ltd 2009:12) respectively. 
From 2011 onwards the low carrying value of players’ registrations indicated that WBA did 
not spend large amounts on players’ registrations, instead preferring to acquire experienced 
players on free transfers.  This enabled the club to pay higher wages (which is evident from 
the increasing wages / revenue ratio) and meant by 2015 only Burnley had a lower value for 
players’ registrations. 
Low levels of debt meant interest receivable exceeded interest payable, and cumulative 
profits saw equity increase.  Although by 2015 WBA had spent five consecutive years in the 
EPL, with limited resources to invest in players and reliance on broadcasting revenue it 
remained in a precarious financial position.  Growth was organic and relatively slow, and 
demonstrated the problems faced by promoted clubs in trying to become established in the 
EPL whilst operating within tight financial constraints.  With pre-tax profits reported in each 
year after 2011, WBA was able to comply with the requirements of FFP; and since growth in 
wages was funded by surpluses from player trading WBA was also able to comply with STCC. 
4.12.9 Wigan 
Wigan won promotion in 2005 and with average attendances of around 20,000 (Wigan 
Athletic AFC Ltd 2006:2) was one of the smallest clubs to become established in the EPL.  
Low stadium utilisation and failure to attract large commercial contracts made Wigan very 
reliant on broadcasting, which by 2013 accounted for 86% of revenue (Calculated from 
Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd 2013:16).  In each season from 2007-11, wages and amortisation 
exceeded revenue resulting in large losses that would have been even greater without 
surpluses from player trading (Calculated from financial statements of Wigan Athletic AFC 
Ltd 2007-11).  In 2013 expenditure of £56 million on wages and amortisation (2013:16-17) 
was equal to revenue. 





Throughout this period Wigan received significant funds from owner David Whelan, this was 
usually through soft debt or bank loans on which Whelan acted as guarantor.  Wigan 
reported negative equity in every year (Table 4.35) even after Whelan converted £48 million 
of soft debt into share capital in 2012 (Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd 2012:14). 
It could be argued that just remaining in the EPL represented playing success for Wigan.  The 
club won the FA Cup in 2013 but was relegated at the end of that season (Wigan Athletic 
AFC Ltd 2013:2).  Without the support of a wealthy benefactor and surpluses arising from 
player trading, it would have been very difficult for Wigan to remain in the EPL for more 
than a couple of seasons.  With stadium utilisation of around 75% (2013:5) it could be 
argued that keeping Wigan in the EPL was a vanity project for David Whelan.  Surpluses 
arising from player trading ensured that from 2012-13 Wigan’s LBT was within FFP’s 
acceptable deviation, whilst wages were below the threshold for STCC. 
4.13 Summary 
The last 20 years have seen significant growth in aggregate revenue and a change in the 
relative importance of revenue streams.  This was driven by broadcasting contracts 
negotiated collectively by the EPL.  With matches broadcast in 185 countries (Premier 
League 2015a:23) the most successful clubs attracted sizeable amounts of corporate 
sponsorship and this meant that despite consistently high stadium utilisation, from 2011 
commercial revenue exceeded matchday income.  More detailed analysis showed 
disparities in revenue earned by the six largest clubs when compared with the rest of the 
EPL.  Several clubs outside the top six were very reliant on broadcasting revenue and the 
equitable way in which this was shared between clubs. 
Despite growth in revenue, poor control of costs meant the EPL reported aggregate losses in 
every year up to 2013.  Particularly poor control of costs was demonstrated by those clubs 
supported by sugar daddies, and several incurred expenditure on wages and amortisation 
that exceeded revenue.  Analysis suggested this placed upward pressure on players’ costs 
for all clubs.   A combination of significant growth in domestic broadcasting revenue from 





August 2013 accompanied by stricter financial regulation that improved control of costs, 
enabled clubs to report aggregate profits in 2014 and 2015.  
Further analysis showed that clubs had a number of different playing objectives and these 
included becoming established in the EPL; regular qualification for the UEFA Champions 
League; and competing for the PL title.   This required different financial strategies 
depending on a club’s global fan base and the wealth of its owner.  Some clubs were reliant 
on the profitable sale of players and employed a model that involved developing players 
through a youth academy or buying players for small amounts and selling these for a profit.  
However this was likely to impact on playing success and might lead to conflict between 
owners and supporters. 
Several clubs in the EPL benefited from a wealthy benefactor, and the huge amounts 
injected into Manchester City and Chelsea showed the scale of investment necessary for 
sustained playing success.  FFP and EPL rules mean this model is no longer available to clubs 
and owners. 
Although by 2015 aggregate shareholders’ equity was £1.3 billion, seven clubs continued to 
operate with negative equity (Table 4.26).  This analysis showed that too many owners did 
not invest in equity but instead provided soft loans.  Although FFP and EPL Profitability and 
Sustainability rules will limit the use of soft loans, they won’t address existing levels of 
negative equity. 
  





Chapter 5 - Discussion of results 
5.1 Overview of chapter 
This chapter discusses key findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis and 
considers whether increased regulation was sufficient to improve financial performance.  It 
also looks at the impact of soft budgets on financial performance in other sectors and makes 
comparison with banking, where regulation was used to address soft budget constraints. 
5.2 Growth in revenue and cross subsidisation 
Analysis of published financial statements established that throughout the period 2004-15 the 
EPL proved very successful in generating revenue and increasing its global audience.  In 2015 
clubs in the EPL reported aggregate revenue of €4.4 billion (Table 4.2).  This was €2 billion 
more than Germany’s Bundesliga (the second largest league in Europe), and amounted to 
36% of revenue reported by Europe’s five largest football leagues (Table 4.2). 
This study established that growth in revenue was driven primarily through broadcasting 
contracts negotiated collectively by the EPL.  The equitable way in which broadcasting 
revenue was distributed ensured clubs were given the resources necessary to remain 
competitive, creating uncertainty in the outcome of matches which further increased 
spectator interest in the EPL. This was consistent with the findings of Sloane (1971) who 
explained that without cross subsidisation there would be a decline in the level of 
competition which would ultimately affect both the attractiveness of matches and 
aggregate revenue (1971:127). 
During the period 2004-15 clubs in the EPL invested over £1.8 billion in new and upgraded 
stadia and facilities (Calculated from Deloitte 2013:53, 2015:13, 2016:31).  Despite 
aggregate stadium utilisation remaining above 90% in every year (Deloitte 2013:13, Premier 
League 2015b), the preceding analysis showed that in relative terms the importance of 
matchday revenue declined.  Care must be taken interpreting aggregate stadium utilisation 
since this refers to attendances at EPL matches.  Clubs have just 19 home matches in the EPL 
each season.  Although during the 2007-8 season Manchester United won both the 





Champions League and EPL, just 29 home matches and the Rugby League Super League 
Grand final were staged at Old Trafford (Red Football 2008:1).   Given the huge fixed costs 
incurred by a football stadium, this represented significant under-utilisation of facilities.  By 
way of comparison The Staples Center in Los Angeles is shared by three basketball and one 
ice hockey team, which means it has at least 140 matches each year; it also stages concerts 
and even though capacity is just 19,067, it generated $345 million in 2014 (Cave and Miller 
2016).   KPMG (2013) suggested that to maximise returns stadia should include a club 
museum, conferencing facilities, leisure facilities, restaurants, and be built within mixed use 
developments that might include retail outlets, office spaces and residential homes 
(2013:23).   
The global appeal of the EPL attracted large amounts of corporate sponsorship, and since 
2011 revenue from commercial activities has exceeded matchday (Figure 4.1).  This was also 
consistent with the findings of Sloane who argued that broadcasting live matches provided 
an opportunity to promote football (1971:126).  This reflects how clubs in the EPL were 
following the Media-Corporations-Merchandising-Markets-Global model depicted by 
Andreff and Staudohar (2000:266) or had shifted towards the ‘American-style business 
model for professional sports’ (Nauright and Ramfjord 2010:432).  Growth in revenue also 
attracted wealthy investors who were not necessarily interested in a straightforward return 
on their investment (Andreff and Staudohar 2000:266).  
The scale of growth in revenue (particularly broadcasting revenue) was illustrated by the 
Deloitte Football Money League 2016 report (Deloitte 2016a) which ranked the 30 largest 
clubs in world football by revenue generated during the accounting year ended 2015.  The list 
contained 17 clubs from the EPL (Deloitte 2016a:3), highlighting how even ‘small’ English 
clubs have greater financial power than some larger European counterparts.  In the 
accounting year ended 2015 Burnley earned revenue of £79 million (Burnley FC Ltd 2015:7).  
Although this was the lowest revenue reported by any club in the EPL, it was significantly 
higher than the £51 million earned by Scottish Premiership champions, Glasgow Celtic 
(Celtic plc 2016:30). 





5.3 Disparities in revenue 
Quantitative results showed that following the EPL broadcasting contracts which commenced 
in August 2013, average revenue increased to £163 million in the accounting year ended 2014 
(Table 4.5).  Further analysis showed only six clubs earned revenue above the average, and the 
standard deviation was £104 million (Table 4.5).  Removing the six largest clubs from 
aggregate figures showed average revenue of £101 million (Table 4.5), and a standard 
deviation of less than £14 million indicated a much narrower spread of revenue around the 
mean (Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2014).  The differences in these 
figures clearly demonstrated disparities in revenue earned by the six largest clubs compared 
with the rest of the EPL.   
During the period 2004-15 it was established that the six largest clubs received around 57% 
of aggregate revenue (Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15); and 
the club with the largest annual revenue usually reported an amount that was between five 
and six times greater than that of the lowest earning club (Table 4.5). 
This research showed that commercial sponsors were mostly attracted to those clubs that 
enjoyed most playing success.  Regular participation in UEFA club competitions (particularly 
the Champions League) provided additional broadcasting and matchday revenue and raised 
the profiles of the six largest clubs which in turn generated further revenue from the global 
sale of club related merchandise.  This concurred with the findings of Peeters and Szymanski 
(2014) that regular participation in the Champions League greatly increased revenue earned 
by the elite of European club football and widened disparities ‘in spending power’ 
(2014:357).   
Rising coefficients of variation and skewness for commercial revenue (Table 4.12) confirmed 
that growth in this revenue stream mostly benefited a small number of clubs.  In 2015 clubs in 
the EPL generated aggregate commercial revenue of £983 million, 78% of which was 
received by the six largest clubs (Table 4.10). 





From the 2017-18 season onwards, in addition to a main shirt sponsor clubs can also display 
the names of sponsors on the left sleeve of shirts (Slavin 2017).  In March 2017 Manchester 
City announced that Korean tyre company Nexen would become its ‘Official Sleeve Partner’ 
for 2017-18 (Edwards 2017) in a deal worth around £5 million per year (Duncker 2017).  
Manchester United was believed to be in negotiation with dating app Tinder for sleeve 
sponsorship worth around £12 million per annum (Austin 2017).  It is likely the most 
successful clubs will attract the largest sponsorship agreements further widening disparities in 
commercial revenue. 
High values for the coefficients of variation and skewness indicated a wide spread of total 
revenue around the mean (Figure 4.6).  Although disparities in revenue remained large, they 
did not worsen in relative terms during the period under review.  This was because growth in 
broadcasting revenue and the equitable way in which this was distributed meant the 
coefficients of variation and skewness for broadcasting declined from 2011 (Table 4.12).  Since 
broadcasting made up over 50% of revenue, the coefficients of variation and skewness for 
total revenue also declined (Figure 4.6).   
The scale of broadcasting revenue meant clubs outside the top six in the EPL had average 
revenue of £104 million in the accounting year ended 2015 (Table 4.5).  This exceeded the 
average revenue of clubs playing in the top divisions in Germany (£101 million) and Spain (£78 
million) (Calculated from Deloitte 2016:9). 
Although growth in broadcasting enabled clubs to remain competitive several were very 
reliant on this revenue stream, and by 2015 it made up 73% of revenue earned by clubs 
outside the top six (Figure 4.5).  Despite elite informants recognising that overseas 
broadcasting revenue might in future be distributed using a different formula, they 
remained confident the EPL would continue to negotiate broadcasting contracts collectively 
and that revenue would grow in the short to medium term.  Consequently they were mostly 
unconcerned that so many clubs were reliant on this stream,   





‘There’s been that collective agreement embedded within the rules since the EPL first 
came into place...it’s about the strength of the competition that generates a bigger pie 
for everybody, and then you get a big piece of a bigger pie...I don’t hear or sense that 
there’s any great desire for the biggest clubs to break away from the collective 
deals…because it has been working fantastically well for the last 25 years.’ (Informant 
2) 
From 2016-17 the most recent three-year overseas broadcasting agreements generated £1.1 
billion per season (Deloitte 2016:14); a significant increase on the previous contracts which 
earned clubs £588 million in 2015-16 (Premier League 2016).  The EPL’s next domestic 
broadcasting contract commences in August 2019 and is comprised of 200 live matches 
broken down into five packages of 32 matches and two of 20 matches (Premier League 
2018).  The two packages of 20 contain all matches from one bank holiday and three 
midweek fixture programmes (Premier League 2018), allowing 10 matches to be broadcast 
simultaneously four times each season.  In February 2018 Sky and BT acquired the five 
packages of 160 matches for £4.46 billion (Conn 2018), compared with £5.14 billion paid for 
168 matches in 2016 (Gibson 2015). However the smaller packages were unsold at the initial 
auction (Premier League 2018).  Following 70% increases in each of the previous two 
domestic broadcasting agreements a slowdown was to be expected, though further growth 
is anticipated in overseas broadcasting revenue (Roan 2018).  If broadcasting revenue 
plateaus the largest clubs are likely to want changes in the way this is distributed, which is 
likely to widen disparities. 
5.4 How a soft budget constraint impacted on financial performance 
Despite growth in revenue, clubs in the EPL reported aggregate pre-tax losses in every year 
during 2004-13 (Table 4.13).  Quantitative results showed this was primarily because growth 
in revenue was usually accompanied by an even larger increase in wages and amortisation 
(Figure 4.7).  From 2019-20 clubs in the EFL will receive a share of £120 million per season 
from the sale of domestic broadcasting rights to Sky, a 36% increase on the previous 
contract (EFL 2017a).  During the accounting year ended 2016, 16 clubs in the EPL reported 





revenue above £100 million (Deloitte 2017:19).  This huge differential encouraged clubs to 
spend heavily to avoid relegation from the EPL.  In addition merit payments were linked to 
final league position and the top four clubs qualified for the Champions League, which 
meant there were significant financial incentives for clubs to invest large amounts in pursuit 
of playing success.  Analysis of financial statements showed that losses worsened as 
revenue grew and disparities in revenue increased in size.  Breaking down wages / revenue 
and profitability ratios (Tables 4.19, 4.20 and 4.22) showed expenditure on players’ costs 
was driven by those clubs that received financial support from wealthy owners. In each year 
during 2004-13, clubs supported by sugar daddies incurred aggregate expenditure on wages 
and amortisation that exceeded revenue (Table 4.19).   This agreed with the findings of 
Rohde and Breuer (2017) who explained that rising revenue differentials ‘Strengthened 
incentives to compete among Europe’s leading clubs’ (2017:267); and Dietl and Franck 
(2007) who suggested that clubs were ‘gambling on success’ (2007:663).  It also concurred 
with Fort (2000) who explained that promotion and relegation meant wealthy owners 




PBIT / (LBIT) for accounting year ended (ii) 
2015 2014 2013 2012 Cumulative 
£m £m £m £m £m 
Arsenal USA 24.7 4.7 6.7 36.6 72.7 
Aston Villa USA (26.6) (4.0) (51.8) (17.6) (100.0) 
Blackburn R. India n/a n/a n/a 4.3 4.3 
Cardiff Thailand n/a (12.0) n/a n/a (12.0) 
Chelsea Russia (33.7) 14.9 (57.2) (4.3) (80.3) 
Fulham USA / Egypt n/a (33.2) (2.3) (18.3) (53.8) 
Hull City Egypt 11.6 9.4 n/a n/a 21.0 
Leicester Thailand 26.5 n/a n/a n/a 26.5 
Liverpool USA 60.0 0.9 (49.8) (40.5) (29.4) 
Manchester City UAE 10.4 (22.9) (51.6) (98.7) (162.8) 
Manchester Utd USA (2.3) 41.2 (3.0) (4.7) 31.2 
QPR Malaysia (45.7) n/a (65.4) (22.6) (133.7) 
Southampton Switzerland (15.2) 26.3 (5.3) n/a 5.8 
Sunderland USA (25.5) (16.3) (13.1) (31.0) (85.9) 
Table 5.1: Financial performance of clubs in the EPL under overseas ownership 2012-15 
(Source: (i) UEFA 2015a:56; (ii) From financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2012-15) 
 





This level of expenditure was not sustainable without regular injections of funds.  Excessive 
spending on players’ costs, and losses funded by soft loans confirmed that several clubs 
benefited from the soft budget constraint referred to by Kornai (1979), Andreff (2007), 
Storm and Nielsen (2012), Franck and Lang (2012), Franck (2013) and Schubert and Könecke 
(2015). 
Rohde and Breuer (2017) explained that European football had gone through three stages; 
professionalism, commercialisation and internationalisation (2017:268).  The final stage saw 
the entry of wealthy foreign investors (2017:269) who pursued riskier investment strategies 
in pursuit of playing success (2017:281), and this had ‘A positive impact on wages and a 
negative impact on profits’ (2017:283).  
There was evidence of this during the sample period and by 2015, 55% of clubs in the EPL 
were under foreign ownership, the highest level in European club football (UEFA 2015a:54).   
Table 5.1 shows the financial performance of clubs under overseas ownership in the 
accounting years after FFP was introduced.  Cumulative losses (and relatively small profits) 
provided further evidence that despite considerable investment owners were primarily 
interested in playing success, and this was consistent with the findings of Sloane (1971 and 
2015), Arnold (1991), Storm (2011), and Zoccali (2012).  It also concurred with Zimbalist 
(2003), Hamil et al (2010), Millward (2013) and Madden (2014) that wealthy owners were 
less interested in a straightforward financial return from their investment in football, and 
often used their clubs as a trophy asset to promote other business interests or themselves. 
Following abolition of the maximum wage in 1961 (Banks 2002:163) and retain and transfer 
in 1978 (Szymanski and Kuypers 1999:105), the Bosman ruling in 1995 (Simmons 1997:13) 
completed a seismic shift in power from clubs to players.  The evidence from this study 
showed a strong positive correlation between expenditure on wages and league points 
attained (Table 4.16).  This was consistent with the findings of Hall et al (2002) and 
Szymanski (2010) and explained why during 2004-13 clubs supported by wealthy owners 
spent 81% of aggregate revenue on wages (Calculated from financial statements of clubs in 
the EPL supported by sugar daddies 2004-13).  In comparison during the same period clubs 





that reported a PBIT spent just 56% of aggregate revenue on wages (Calculated from 
financial statements of profit making clubs in the EPL 2004-13).   
The preceding quantitative analysis suggested that over time the soft budget constraint 
provided by wealthy owners, and rising revenue differentials between the EPL and EFL 
meant several clubs increased expenditure on players’ costs in order to remain competitive.  
In 2004 wages and amortisation amounted to 79% of aggregate revenue; by 2013 this had 
increased to 90% (Table 4.19).  These findings agreed with Lago et al (2006:7), Solberg and 



















Figure 5.1: Revenue, wages and amortisation, and profit / loss before tax 
by club ranked in terms of revenue (excludes Portsmouth) for the 
accounting year ended 2010 (Source: Financial statements of clubs in the 
EPL 2010) 
Revenue Wages and amortisation Profit before tax





Aggregate pre-tax losses for the EPL peaked at £385 million in 2010 (Table 4.13) when nine 
clubs reported expenditure on wages and amortisation that exceeded revenue (Figure 5.1); 15 
of the 19 clubs that published financial statements reported pre-tax losses (Observed from 
financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2010); and Portsmouth went into administration 
(Deloitte 2010:9) and didn’t publish financial statements.  
Figure 5.1 shows this poor financial performance by club and that the soft budget constraint 
provided by wealthy owners impacted on cost discipline by forcing all clubs to spend 
increasing amounts to remain competitive.  This is further evidence of the ‘sporting arms 
race’ referred to by Storm and Nielsen (2012), Franck (2013), and Morrow (2013).   
This research showed a strong negative correlation between profit from operations and the 
wages / revenue ratio, indicating that clubs must tightly control expenditure on wages in 
order to meet the requirements of increased regulation (Table 4.20).  It also established a 
strong relationship between profits (or losses) from operations and cash flows from 
operations (Table 4.21).  This meant those clubs that reported a loss from operations also 
experienced low or negative cash flows from operations.  Such poor control of costs made 
these clubs reliant on additional funds from owners and related parties, or from the sale of 
players. 
Failure to control costs meant by 2010 clubs had cumulative retained losses of almost £1.2 
billion (Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2010).  This 
eroded already low levels of shareholders’ funds and meant aggregate equity amounted to 
just £565 million, and 11 clubs operated with negative equity (Table 4.26).  Remember also 
that these figures excluded Portsmouth. 
The scale of losses in football leagues across Europe (Figure 5.2) meant UEFA intervened to 
address poor financial performance and the provision of soft budgets through tougher 
financial regulation.  Without this intervention it is likely that aggregate losses would have 
persisted.   
   






5.5 The impact of a soft budget constraint – evidence from other sectors 
Soft Budget Constraints are prominent in other sectors where organisations are considered 
‘too big to fail’ and there are several examples where this has reduced cost discipline.  
Kornai (2009) examined public sector healthcare in Hungary and explained that a soft 
budget constraint weakened financial discipline since organisations came to rely on 
additional funds being made available (2009:119), which often resulted in recurring 
overspends (2009:122). 
Kornai also considered the roles played by key stakeholders who were usually more 
concerned with utility maximisation (in the form of patient care) than financial performance 
(2009:129).  To reduce waiting times for procedures, patients and the public put pressure on 
the government to make available additional funds (2009:123).  Medical staff focused on 
the welfare of patients and where a bailout was expected would overspend on attaining this 















Accounting year ended 
Figure 5.2: Aggregate profit / loss reported by European football leagues 
2009-15 (Source: Adapted from UEFA 2015a:107 and 108) 
Aggregate operating profit / loss Aggregate loss after tax





provision of a soft budget constraint meant there was no incentive to achieve this 
(2009:125).  
His analysis has many features common to the EPL.  Supporters, players and senior 
managers all seek playing success, and this is achievable much faster where a wealthy 
benefactor is willing to offer a soft budget constraint that enables a club to spend excessive 
amounts in pursuit of this.  Schubert (2014) and Szymanski (2014) explained that many 
supporters welcomed investment in playing success that was funded by sugar daddies 
(2014:345). 
Kornai (1979) observed that being protected from failure encouraged inflationary 
behaviour, since any increase in supplier prices was ultimately passed onto the state (or 
other provider of a soft budget constraint) (1979:817).  There was evidence of this in the 
EPL, with excessive spending on players’ costs by those clubs funded by wealthy owners 
(Figure 4.9).  FFP and EPL rules will ensure that in future spending is more closely related to 
revenue. 
Previous studies into European club football identified several examples of government 
assistance for clubs that had overspent.  These included the decreto salva calcio in Italy 
(Baroncelli and Lago 2006:14); debt written off by the Spanish government in 1985 and 1991 
(Barajas and Rodríguez 2010:53); and more recently the Spanish government allowing clubs 
to repay tax over five years (Van Rompuy 2012:3).  Müller et al (2012:121) and Schubert and 
Könecke (2015:73) explained that sporting achievement enabled the most successful clubs 
to generate higher revenues and attract greater amounts of external investment.  They 
contrasted this with funds provided by a wealthy benefactor that were not related to 
sporting success and encouraged excessive spending on players’ costs.  This distorted 
competition and sporting integrity and could damage the financial stability of other clubs 
forced to keep up with rivals (Müller et al 2012:123, Schubert and Könecke 2015:70).  The 
preceding quantitative analysis showed that several clubs in the EPL received significant 
financial support from wealthy owners.  These clubs often reported heavy losses in pursuit 
of playing success, and this meant other clubs were also required to spend larger amounts 





on players’ costs in order to remain competitive.   As a consequence although revenue 
increased significantly between 2004-13, financial performance worsened as clubs used 
growth in revenue to fund increased expenditure on players’ costs. 
Freixas (2010) saw evidence of similar behaviour during the 2008 financial crisis.  He 
explained that government bailouts demonstrated that some large banks were seen as 
being ‘too big to fail’, and the provision of a soft budget constraint for these organisations 
resulted in unfair competition since it allowed risky investment decisions by those banks 
protected from failure (2010:389).  In the same way Lin and Li (2008) explained that state 
owned enterprises that had been privatised often remained reliant on a soft budget 
constraint from local and central government (2008:100).  This was because without 
significant restructure these companies were unable to compete in the private sector.  The 
social costs associated with restructure including redundancy and changes in pension 
entitlement, meant governments were prepared to offer a soft budget constraint (2008:93), 
which it could be argued distorted competition. 
Arts Council England (ACE) provides annual funding of around £341 million to arts and 
culture venues and organisations (Youngs 2014).   With so many demands on government 
funds many have questioned why public money supports projects that aren’t commercially 
viable, and ACE was criticised for providing £14 million of emergency cash injections to 
theatres and galleries that hadn’t generated sufficient revenue to remain in operation 
during the two years to March 2013 (Gardner 2015).  This included eight payments totalling 
£1.8 million to Hull Truck theatre (Gardner 2015) and £750,000 to Northern Ballet, both of 
which experienced higher costs and lower than forecast revenues after moving to new 
premises (Youngs 2014).  ACE (2016) reported that in 2014-15 arts and culture organisations 
received £480 million in sponsorship and donations, including £96 million from businesses 
and £245 million from individuals (2016:5).  This meant just 48% of total income came from 
the sale of tickets and merchandise (2016:8).  However like football clubs, arts and culture 
organisations are believed to have a positive impact on local communities, ‘Improve 





people’s lives, benefit our economy and attract tourists from around the world...strengthen 
communities, bringing people together and removing social barriers’ (GOV.UK).  
The impact of the defence industry on both the US economy and national security means 
several companies are considered ‘too big to fail’ (Collopy 2004:88, Hughes 2015:5).  This 
meant in 1971 Lockheed received a bailout of $195 million from the US government without 
which it was estimated 60,000 jobs might be lost (Hughes 2015:7).  More recently 
Lockheed’s F-35 programme has exceeded budget to the extent that over its life the project 
is forecast to cost around $1.5 trillion (Hughes 2015:8), however the size of Lockheed’s 
supply chain means cancelation of the programme would have a significant impact on 
employment (Hughes 2015:11).  The US government has so far agreed to purchase 2,443 F-
35 jets, however to encourage better cost control the most recent order for 90 jets was at a 
price that was around $7 million per plane lower than previous orders (BBC News 2017a). 
During the 1980s and 1990s huge losses meant several state-run airlines in Europe required 
government assistance to remain in operation (Doganis 2001:204).  In 1980 the British 
government wrote off an equity investment of £160 million in British Airways (Doganis 
2001:204).  Between 1991-94 seven state-owned airlines in the EU received over US$12 
billion in government aid including Air France ($3.6 billion), Olympic ($2.2 billion) and 
Alitalia (£1.7 billion) (Doganis 2001:202); and in 1995 the German government paid almost 
$900 million to the Lufthansa pension fund prior to the company’s privatisation (Doganis 
2001:204).  Although EU rules permitted government aid where this was part of a 
restructure that would improve operational efficiency (Doganis 2001:206), bailouts were 
criticised by private airlines since they affected competition and rewarded poor 
performance (Doganis 2001:201). 
In the UK, car and aircraft manufacturers employed so many people during the 1970s that 
companies including British Leyland, Rover and British Aerospace received huge amounts of 
public money, though this was not accompanied by radical reform and inefficiencies 
persisted (Nuttall et al 2011:1297).  In 2015 Canadian aircraft manufacturer Bombardier 
which employed around 20,000 in the UK received a $1 billion bailout from the Canadian 





government, and £135 million from the UK government (Riley-Smith 2018).  The US 
government imposed a tariff of almost 300% on Bombardier products after Boeing accused 
the company of using state subsidies to undercut US manufacturers (Riley-Smith 2018), 
however this was overturned in January 2018 (O’Neill 2018). 
Since the 1980s the provision of a number of public services in the UK has been contracted 
out to private sector companies.  This hasn’t always been successful and public funds were 
required following the collapse of Railtrack in 2001, British Energy in 2002, and operators of 
the East Coast railway services in 2007 (Nuttall et al 2011:1294).  In 2013 the National Audit 
Office (NAO) warned that the scale of work carried out by some private sector providers 
meant these were ‘”Too big to fail” and difficult [for the UK government] to live without’ 
(2013:10).  The NAO also expressed concerns that larger providers adversely impacted on 
competition and innovation (2013:14).  More recently the NAO was critical that Learndirect 
Ltd, the UK’s largest commercial provider of further education (NAO 2017:2), continued to 
receive £121 million from the government despite being rated ‘inadequate’ following an 
Ofsted inspection in March 2017 (NAO 2017:4).  The NAO concluded that the Education and 
Skills Funding Agency was worried that withdrawing funds was not in the best interests of 
Learndirect’s 75,000 students (NAO 2017:8). 
Despite a profit warning in July 2017 Carillion was awarded further government contracts 
totalling almost £1.6 billion from the Ministry of Defence and HS2 railway project (Moore 
2017a).  Carillion had around 450 public sector contracts including the provision of school 
dinners in 900 schools, hospital cleaning and prison maintenance (Davies et al 2018), and 
critics argued the additional contracts were awarded to help keep the company afloat 
(Moore 2017a).  Although many thought Carillion was ‘too big to fail’ the government didn’t 
provide a bailout package and the company collapsed in January 2018 with debts of around 
£1 billion and a pension deficit of £600 million (Davies et al 2018).  There is concern that soft 
budgets in the form of government bailouts and subsidies stifle innovation or encourage 
companies to take risks, knowing they will be bailed out with public money.  McCleskey 
(2010:22) and Moore (2017) suggested that letting Carillion fail sent a clear message to 





those organisations considered ‘too big to fail’ and should encourage more prudent 
behaviour.  
5.6 The effect of stricter financial regulation 
Given the scale of losses it could be argued that the EPL and UEFA were slow to introduce 
stricter financial regulation.  Following the EPL broadcasting contracts which commenced in 
August 2007, aggregate revenue and wages each grew by 27% during the accounting year 
ended 2008 (Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2007 and 
2008).  The contracts from August 2010 saw revenue increase by 8% and wages by 19% in 
the accounting year ended 2011 (Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs 
in the EPL 2010 and 2011). 
Year 
Clubs reporting a PBIT Clubs reporting a LBIT 
Total 
No. of clubs with 
Wages / Revenue ratio 
Total 
No. of clubs with Wages / 
Revenue ratio 
  <65% <60%  >65% >70% 
2004 11 10 7 9 5 4 
2005 14 12 11 6 4 3 
2006 8 7 6 12 7 6 
2007 7 7 5 13 10 10 
2008 10 8 7  10 8 5 
2009 7 4 4 12 10 8 
2010 6 5 4 13 11 10 
2011 8 6 5 12 12 10 
2012 9 5 4 11 10 9 
2013 10 4 2 10 8 7 
2014 15 14 11 5 2 1 
2015 15 9 8 5 4 3 
Total 120 91 74 118 91 76 
Table 5.2: Comparison of wages / revenue ratio for clubs with a PBIT and LBIT 
2004-15 
(Source: Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2004-15) 
 
STCC was a relatively straightforward method that ensured growth in EPL broadcasting 
revenue was no longer used mostly to fund a corresponding rise in players’ wages.  In 2014 
the £52 million threshold for STCC (Premier League 2015:107) impacted on all but three 
clubs in the EPL (Observed from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2014).  Although 
aggregate revenue in 2014 was 27% higher than 2013, wages increased by less than 6% 





(Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2013 and 2014).  By 
restricting growth in wages funded through central distributions STCC was a key factor in 
the aggregate wages / revenue ratio falling from 70% in 2013 to 58% in 2014 (Table 4.16).   
FFP encouraged better control of costs by requiring clubs to break-even (or achieve an 
acceptable deviation from this).  FFP also challenged excessive spending on wages since 
UEFA could request additional financial information from those clubs with a wages / 
revenue ratio above 70% (UEFA 2015:39).  Analysis showed that between 2004-15, 120 out 
of 238 financial statements published by clubs in the EPL reported a PBIT.  Of these 91 had a 
wages / revenue ratio below 65% (Table 5.2).  For those clubs that reported a LBIT, 76 out of 
118 financial statements had a ratio above 70% (Table 5.2). 
 
 
We can see from figure 5.2 that growth in broadcasting revenue combined with stricter 
regulation by UEFA and national football associations impacted favourably on the aggregate 
financial performance of European club football.  Despite combined revenues of €13 billion in 




















Accounting year ended 
Figure 5.3: Aggregate profit / loss reported by clubs in the EPL 2009-15 
(excludes Portsmouth 2009-10) (Source: Calculated from aggregated 
financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2009-15 )  
Aggregate operating profit Aggregate profit / loss before tax





and losses after tax of €1.7 billion (Figure 5.2).  By 2015 combined revenues had increased to 
€17 billion (UEFA 2015a:66) and accompanied by the introduction of FFP financial 
performance had improved significantly, and operating profits amounted to €727 million 
(Figure 5.2).  However losses after tax (€323 million) persisted, and this was largely due to the 
performance of clubs in Italy (aggregate losses of €289 million) and Turkey (€207 million) 
(UEFA 2015a:111).   
Figure 5.3 shows that although aggregate operating profits for clubs in the EPL improved after 
the introduction of FFP, pre-tax losses continued until 2013.  Compliance with increased 
regulation was greatly assisted by growth in revenue, particularly domestic broadcasting from 
August 2013.  In 2015 aggregate revenue of £3.4 billion was 58% higher than in 2010 
(Calculated from Table 4.13).  This meant that even though aggregate wages increased from 
£1.3 billion to over £2 billion (Calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in 





















Figure 5.4: Revenue, wages and amortisation, and profit / loss before tax 
by club ranked in terms of revenue for the accounting year ended 2015 
(Source: Financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015) 
Revenue Wages and amortisation Profit before tax





Figure 5.4 illustrates cost control by each club in the EPL in 2015 and shows that 14 clubs 
reported pre-tax profits, a significant improvement on 2010 (Figure 5.1). By 2015 the 
aggregate wages / revenue ratio was 60%, and this included an improvement to 66% for clubs 
supported by sugar daddies (Table 4.16). 
5.7 Levels of equity and soft debt 
Quantitative analysis showed that the capital bases of several clubs had not increased 
sufficiently to reflect growth in the scale of operations, and cumulative losses worsened 
already low levels of equity.  In 2011 clubs in the EPL had total assets of £4.9 billion 
(calculated from aggregated financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2011), however low 
levels of equity meant just 9% of this was covered by shareholders’ funds (Table 4.27).  
Although aggregate debt amounted to £2.8 billion, this included almost £1.6 billion of loans 
from owners and related parties (Table 4.13).  This indicated that too many owners and 
related parties did not invest in equity but instead provided soft loans for clubs.  It was 
explained that,  
‘A huge reason why clubs have negative equity is they [owners] haven’t bothered to 
do equity exchange for negative reserves that have built up from losses over many 
years…Most losses are covered by the owners’ investment, so negative equity is not 
covered by external debt but by owners’ debt.’ (Informant 4)   
The calculation of gearing and hard debt gearing ratios demonstrated that conversion of soft 
loans into equity would greatly improve the financial positions of several clubs.  Increasing 
levels of negative equity are classed as a breach of FFP (UEFA 2015:39), and break-even and 
EPL Profitability and Sustainability rules require that losses above acceptable deviations are 
matched by a corresponding equity contribution.  Over time this will restrict the provision of 
soft loans.  Although in recent years a number of owners and related parties had converted 
some soft debt into equity (Table 4.32), in 2015 seven clubs in the EPL operated with negative 
equity that totalled to £1.2 billion (Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 
2015). 





Berglöf and Roland (1995) made similar observations about the banking sector where low 
levels of capital and poor loan portfolios meant banks in some countries relied on frequent 
government bailouts (1995:354).  The provision of a soft budget constraint allowed these 
banks to continue take risky investment decisions (1995:355), and regulation that focused 
on capital adequacy and increased monitoring was necessary to harden budgets (1995:374).  
Du and Li (2007) concurred and suggested that effective regulation of banks should include 
capital adequacy requirements that specified a minimum ratio for equity to total assets 
(2007:116). 
5.8 Using regulation to change behaviours 
The scale of losses reported in European club football and the threat of clubs becoming 
insolvent forced regulatory bodies to intervene,  
‘It was the right thing to do to restrict losses. The PL had the experience of 
Portsmouth…where a club got into financial difficulties while in the PL.’ (Informant 8)    
‘There were concerns about…the potential for failures and UEFA needed to do 
something, as did subsequently the EPL…to try and get some financial discipline...I 
think it was all about trying to get clubs to live within their means.’ (Informant 6) 
Despite this several elite informants expressed unease about increased financial regulation, 
reasoning instead that, ‘Market forces should prevail’ (Informant 3), and ‘From our point of 
view we like the free market model because it has brought a lot of investment into football’ 
(Informant 4). 
Some speculated that FFP was introduced partly to limit the financial power of wealthy clubs 
in the EPL, particularly those supported by sugar daddies, ‘Platini was very vocal about the 
effect that the benefactor model was having on English football and they [UEFA] decided to 
try to put a stop to it with FFP’ (Informant 7).  Nauright and Ramfjord pointed out that Platini 
had warned national regulators ‘To be wary of foreign investment in their domestic leagues’ 
(2010:439).  Rohde and Breuer commented that FFP ‘Aimed to limit “overinvestments” by 
wealthy owners’ (2017:270). 





A number of elite informants were critical that FFP focused on profit since this wasn’t 
necessarily the primary objective of investors in football clubs.  Although they agreed FFP 
should limit investment funded by debt, they pointed out that focusing on profit also 
restricted sustainable investment in equity, which made it more difficult for smaller clubs to 
challenge the largest clubs, 
‘If ever the owners’ of this club want to sell…what’s the incentive of someone coming 
in and buying Club B…it’s not going to be a big oligarch coming in who can change Club 
B and move it up as a rich man’s toy.  So of course, FFP is making it more business 
savvy, but I do think it’s locking in Club B.’ (Informant 3) 
These findings were consistent with previous studies.  Peeters and Szymanski (2014) 
criticised use of the word ‘Fair’ since it was now more difficult for smaller clubs to challenge 
the elite of European club football (2014:347).  Szymanski (2014) argued FFP ignored that 
investment by sugar daddies had increased interest in matches, and the transfer fees paid 
to acquire players shared these funds with other clubs (2014:222). He pointed out that 
unlike medical doping, financial doping in the form of support from sugar daddies was not 
hidden (2014:224), and was concerned that in the long-term restricting funds might lead to 
them investing outside of Europe (2014:113).  Schubert (2014) questioned why UEFA 
‘Considered it irrational when clubs as commercial undertakings take entrepreneurial risks’ 
(2014:343).   
This study showed that FFP and EPL rules encouraged better control of costs.  It can be 
argued that by restricting investment to acceptable deviations, FFP is addressing the financial 
doping that encouraged excessive spending by clubs regardless of whether this is funded by 
soft loans or equity.  In addition, by removing from the break-even calculation costs 
associated with youth and community development and infrastructure improvements, 
owners can continue to invest large amounts provided a long-term stance is taken. 
EPL Profitability and Sustainability rules were introduced from the start of the 2015-16 
season, so did not affect this sample of financial statements.  Given their criticisms of FFP it 





was not surprising that elite informants preferred the much larger equity contribution of up 
to £105 million over three years (Premier League 2015:87) allowed under EPL rules. 
The EPL’s larger equity contribution also means those clubs that don’t compete in UEFA 
competitions potentially have an advantage over those that do.  These clubs will be able to 
report much larger losses, and owners can invest greater amounts of equity during each 
three-year monitoring period.  Though revenues earned by the six largest clubs in the EPL 
mean in the short to medium term it will remain difficult to challenge this group. 
Given the poor financial performance of clubs, disparities in revenue, and the EPL’s 
experience with Portsmouth entering administration, it was surprising that so many elite 
informants were initially averse to increased regulation.  Criticisms that FFP interfered with 
the free market model ignored that this had been damaged by the soft budget constraints 
provided by sugar daddies.  It also overlooked that clubs were part of a league and the 
overriding objective of regulatory bodies is to safeguard their competitions, ‘All UEFA is 
trying to do is monitor its own competitions’ (Informant 7).  Previous research by Neale 
(1964), Sloane (1971), Gratton (2000) and Storm (2010) explained that although owners 
sought playing success, this had to be balanced with the objectives of the leagues in which 
their clubs operated.  In this way compliance with regulation provides an example of co-
opetition referred to by Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) and Robert et al (2009). 
Although informant 3 preferred the free market model, he conceded that even following huge 
growth in broadcasting revenue, ‘Without FFP there is a possibility that clubs would make 
losses or would need to be bailed out by sugar daddies’ (Informant 3). 
FFP and EPL rules are trying to change the behaviours of football clubs and their owners.  This 
means moving away from a soft budget constraint, and balancing playing success with the 
requirements of financial regulation.  Evidence from other sectors demonstrated there was 
often resentment to reform and regulation that sought to change attitudes and harden 
budgets.  Hood (1995) examined public sector reform in the early 1990s, and explained that 
resentment by staff often stemmed from the perception that reforms reflected ‘High trust 





in the market and private business methods and low trust in public servants and 
professionals whose activities therefore need to be more closely costed and evaluated by 
accounting techniques’ (1995:94). 
Using semi-structured interviews Broadbent et al (1993 and 1996) and Broadbent and 
Laughlin (1997) examined the reaction of staff to public sector reform in the UK.  Broadbent 
and Laughlin observed that reforms were resented by staff in GP practices and schools who 
saw them as a threat to ‘Established values and…behaviours’ (1997:489).  Broadbent et al 
(1996) explained that professional staff perceived the move towards a ‘business culture’ 
(1996:261) as reducing their professional autonomy (1996:262).  Following reforms that 
devolved budgets to schools, Broadbent et al (1993) explained there was a perception among 
teachers that senior managers focused on control of costs at the expense of education 
(1993:172). 
Broadbent et al (1993 and 1996) concluded that healthcare professionals and teachers 
needed to better understand the economic rationale behind these reforms (1996:281), which 
sought to improve the use of resources by allowing decisions to be taken at a local level 
(1993:172). 
Oakes et al (1998) looked at the implementation of business planning processes in museums 
and cultural heritage sites in Canada (1998:258).  Reforms increased accountability, controlled 
spending, and meant organisations were competing for public funds (1998:260).  This resulted 
in a change in organisational culture (1998:286), which meant a greater focus on increasing 
visitor numbers (1998:284) and attracting new sources of funds (1998:286).  Oakes et al 
explained that to reduce resentment to change, staff needed to better understand the 
purpose of the business planning process (1998:287). 
Fearnley et al (2002) explained that the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) was 
established in 1991 to enforce stricter compliance with accounting standards by large 
companies (2002:110).  Fearnley et al conducted semi-structured interviews to establish how 
stricter rules had changed attitudes (2002:110).  The threat of fines and the impact on their 





professional reputation meant auditors were more likely to resist pressure from clients to 
ignore breaches (2002:135).  The possibility of negative publicity meant directors were more 
likely to comply with the requirements of the FRRP (2002:136).  Fearnley et al concluded that 
FRRP rules changed attitudes, discouraged breaches (2002:133), and improved the quality of 
published financial statements (2002:110). 
During 2008 the US government provided assistance for several large financial companies 
including Bear Stearns ($29 billion), AIG ($173 billion), and Fannie Mae and Fanny Mac ($100 
billion each) (Webel et al 2009:3).  The Dodd-Frank act was introduced in 2010 and 
increased disclosure requirements and capital balances for those banks and financial 
institutions that were considered ‘too big to fail’ (Labonte 2013:1).  Although this reduced 
the risk of failure several organisations resented stricter regulation since it lessened 
opportunities to undertake speculative risk, which affected profit (Finkle 2017).   Even 
though it was less than a decade after the financial crisis, plans to relax Dodd-Frank in 2017 
were welcomed by financial institutions and investors and saw a rise in share prices for 
affected companies (Finkle 2017). 
5.9 Comparison of FFP and EPL rules with financial regulation in the banking 
sector 
There are similarities between FFP and EPL rules and the financial regulation of banks, and a 
large body of work has looked at the effectiveness of banking regulation in addressing soft 
budget constraints.  Unlike FFP and EPL rules which focus on break-even, banking regulation 
sets out the requirement for minimum levels of shareholders’ equity.  Quantitative analysis 
showed that those football clubs provided with a soft budget constraint often followed riskier 
investment strategies in pursuit of playing success. This was evident from the excessive 
amounts spent on wages and amortisation, and cumulative losses reported by those clubs 
supported by sugar daddies.  It was also consistent with the findings of Sloane (2015:4) and 
Franck and Lang (2012:3). 
Kapstein (1989) explained that globalisation provided opportunities for banks to generate 
large profits (1989:324).  However risky investment portfolios including ‘securitisation’ 





which allowed banks to trade mortgages and loans, exposed them to large losses 
(1989:325).  This necessitated greater regulation that focused on increased monitoring and 
capital adequacy (1989:331). 
Research by Llewellyn (1999:17) and Barth et al (2001:237) showed that although a lender 
of last resort was there to support banks in times of trouble, this encouraged riskier 
behaviour since it offered a soft budget constraint that would be made available if banks got 
into difficulties.  Barth et al explained that tighter rules on capital adequacy reduced the 
likelihood of poor loans (2001:245) and risky investments, since in the event of a bank failing 
shareholders had more to lose (2001:210).  They also found that increased disclosure of 
information promoted bank stability and improved performance (2001:246). 
In the UK the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) was established in 2012 and is 
responsible for the regulation and supervision of financial institutions (Bank of England).  
PRA regulation requires that financial institutions have a minimum specified level of 
shareholders’ equity since this reduces the likelihood of them taking excessive risks (Bank of 
England).  Barth et al (2013) concurred that capital adequacy regulation ‘Results in more 
careful lending and better bank performance’ (2013:2880).   
Llewellyn (1999:21) observed that regulation could prevent ‘herd behaviour’, where fearful 
of missing out banks simply followed the actions and strategies of their main competitors.  If 
in future results showed this was the wrong decision, managers could point out that all 
banks had made the same mistake (1999:28).  It can be argued that the actions of sugar 
daddies resulted in ‘herd behaviour’ in the EPL, and the preceding analysis showed this 
increased players’ costs for all clubs.  
Lall (2012) explained that in 1988 Basel I was the first international attempt to set minimum 
capital requirements for banks (2012:612).  The rapid pace of change in the banking sector 
meant by the late 1990s regulations were insufficient, and this was evidenced by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 (2012:612). 





Basel II was issued in 2004 (2012:623) and increased minimum capital requirements, 
particularly shareholders’ equity (2012:610).  However Lall was critical that during 
negotiations large international banks used their power to influence capital requirements 
and this meant Basel II was not as robust as originally intended (2012:611).  He concluded 
that to prevent the largest banks adversely influencing the regulation setting process, 
supervisory bodies had to be sufficiently independent (2012:633).  Freixas (2010) concurred 
and explained the 2008 financial crisis had demonstrated banking regulation was not 
sufficiently robust, and capital requirements weren’t large enough for the risks attached to 
loans (2010:379). 
Drut and Raballand (2010), Geey (2011), Storm and Nielsen (2012) and Williams (2012) 
suggested the largest clubs in Europe might form their own breakaway competition if they 
were prevented from competing in the Champions League for non-compliance with FFP.   It 
is likely this influenced the content of FFPR, and that UEFA consulted with the largest clubs 
in European football to obtain their support for increased regulation.  It could also be 
argued that acceptable deviations and maximum equity contributions were put in place to 
placate clubs that preferred a free market approach. 
Barth et al (2001) found evidence to suggest diversification of revenue streams improved 
the stability of banks (2001:244).  This point was illustrated by O'Sullivan and Kinsella (2013) 
who explained that during the 2000s a significant rise in mortgage lending (2013:11) meant 
Ireland’s banks were over-reliant on loans secured on domestic properties (2013:17).  
Following the financial crisis in 2008 a slump in property prices resulted in many borrowers 
defaulting on loans (2013:13), and government intervention was necessary to support banks 
(2013:14).  In the same way analysis showed that several clubs in the EPL were very reliant 
on broadcasting revenue.  By 2015 broadcasting income equated to over 70% of revenue 
earned by ten clubs in the EPL (Figure 4.5).  In the medium-term these clubs need to secure 
more diverse revenue streams.  It should also be noted that players’ registrations were 
often the largest assets held by clubs, and a decline in market values would have a 
significant impact on their financial positions. 





This research demonstrated that until recently clubs in the EPL had been subject to little 
financial regulation, and the provision of a soft budget constraint and heavy spending on 
players’ costs was often driven by foreign investors.  This was consistent with Fort and Quirk 
(2004:22), Lago et al (2006:9) and Drut and Raballand (2012:82) that football clubs in 
England were subject to less financial regulation than those in France and Germany.  This is 
reflective of the wider economy, and Macartney (2014) observed that in terms of regulation 
UK banks had historically been subject to a ‘Light-touch’ approach (2014:828).  The 2008 
banking crisis showed that several UK banks were under-capitalised (2014:827) and 
government intervention was necessary to provide additional funds (2014:834).  Macartney 
also pointed out that a high degree of foreign ownership was a threat during economic 
crises since foreign banks often tried to repatriate their funds (2014:840).  O'Sullivan and 
Kinsella (2013) suggested that the entry of foreign banks into Ireland during the 1980s had 
increased competition but reduced credit standards (2013:10). 
UEFA and the EPL have increased the amount of financial information that must be 
submitted by clubs, and where necessary UEFA can request that an independent third party 
provides a fair value for transactions with related parties (UEFA 2015:91).  Llewellyn 
concluded that in banking the best approach was where the regulator set out precise 
requirements (1999:49), and this would usually include increased disclosure and 
transparency (1999:32).  The PRA requires that banks must provide high quality and timely 
financial information (Bank of England).  By ensuring that firms have the financial resources 
necessary to operate, PRA regulation and supervision aims to promote stakeholder 
confidence in the financial sector and ‘Facilitate effective competition’ (Bank of England).  
Franck (2013), Budzinski (2014), Peeters and Szymanski (2014), Szymanski (2014) and Sass 
(2016) were critical that FFP didn’t address competitive balance and pointed out that 
acceptable deviations made it more difficult for smaller clubs to challenge the largest clubs 
in European football even if supported by sustainable equity investment. 
Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) considered how regulation and supervisory agencies impacted 
on performance, efficiency and risk taking in the banking sector (2013:5463).  They 





established that having specialised supervision by independent regulatory bodies had a 
positive impact on risk management and innovation which increased profits (2013:5468).  
Barth et al (2013) observed that efficiency was improved where banks were monitored by a 
powerful and independent supervisory body (2013:2881).  Monitoring often required banks 
to produce detailed financial statements and other information for disclosure, and this also 
helped improve corporate governance (2013:2881). External audit and transparency in 
accounting information also improved efficiency (2013:2888), reducing the potential to 
make bad investment and loan decisions. 
In the same way Olsson (2011) explained that since national football associations and 
leagues had not been able to deal with financial doping, intervention by UEFA was necessary 
‘To safeguard the credibility of the sport’ (2011:28).    This was initially through club 
licensing and more recently through FFP.  He pointed out that increased regulation by UEFA 
had also prompted several national football associations to strengthen their own financial 
rules (2011:28). Evidence of this was provided by the EPL which introduced STCC and 
Profitability and Sustainability rules.  EPL rules also increased disclosure, requiring the 
submission of audited financial statements together with financial forecasts for the 
following season (Premier League 2015:104). 
Klomp and Haan (2012) showed that regulation and supervisory control had a significant 
impact on the behaviours of those banks that were high risk (2012:3203).  High risk included 
low levels of liquidity; high levels of expenses as a percentage of revenue; high levels of debt 
owed to central and other banks; and low levels of equity expressed as a percentage of total 
assets (2012:3198).  By changing the behaviours of high risk banks regulation and 
supervision were doing exactly what was required. 
The preceding analysis showed that FFP and EPL rules had the greatest impact on those 
clubs supported by wealthy owners, who invested heavily in short-term playing success.  
The break-even requirement compels clubs to control costs and operate within their 
revenues which will improve profitability and liquidity; STCC focuses on better control of 
wages; and FFP and EPL Profitability and Sustainability rules require that losses above 





acceptable deviations are matched with a corresponding equity contribution.  FFP also 
allows UEFA to request further information where wages / revenue and revenue / debt 
ratios exceed specified amounts, or if negative equity is worsening.  In this way FFP and EPL 
rules seek to ensure clubs are no longer able to spend excessive amounts in pursuit of 
playing success. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) explained that a bank’s ownership structure also impacted on risk 
(2009:260).  Where one large investor controlled the majority of share capital, it was more 
likely a bank would take greater risks in pursuit of higher profits (2009:269).  This meant it 
was important that regulations ensured adequate capital requirements were in place 
(2009:263), since this would reduce risky behaviour.  Comparison can be made with the 
behaviours of sugar daddies that spent heavily in pursuit of playing success and funded this 
through debt rather than equity.  Wilson et al (2013) found that foreign owned clubs had 
higher levels of debt (2013:29), and ‘”Win” maximisation outweighs any desire to run the 
club as a profitable business’ (2013:22). 
Evidence from the banking sector showed that increased regulation and the removal of a 
soft budget constraint reduced risk taking and encouraged innovation and the attainment of 
new revenue streams.  However Basel I and II showed it is important that regulation keeps 
pace with changes in the global business environment.   
Schubert (2014:338) and Dermit-Richard et al (2017:2) observed that although most 
national football licensing systems focused on solvency, requiring that losses were covered 
by equity contributions, FFPR instead limited excessive spending (2014:338).  As we have 
established from interviews with elite informants and previous studies by Madden (2014), 
Budzinski (2014) and Peeters and Szymanski (2014), this is the aspect of FFP that has been 
most criticised since it limits sustainable investment even if this is by way of equity, and 
potentially restricts the growth of clubs.  Sass (2016) commented that while FFP ‘Addresses 
the negative impacts of sugar daddy owners in terms of financial instability…it also 
potentially eliminates the positive impacts such as sugar daddy clubs increasing or 
maintaining competitive balance’ (2016:156). 





5.10 The future of FFP 
Elite informants agreed that further regulation by UEFA or the EPL was not necessary.  They 
also thought it most likely rules would be relaxed over time if clubs continued to work 
towards break-even and made losses within acceptable deviations, 
‘I think it [FFP] will be watered down...They’ve got to retain the top clubs playing in 
that competition…I think there’ll be further pressure on UEFA to acquiesce and 
certainly with a change at the top there could be changes in their views as to how they 
monitor clubs.’ (Informant 7) 
Informant 5 concurred, 
‘The more teams that are getting closer to compliance…then you’ll see a softer re-
regulation.  Clubs who are falling in line may be rewarded in other ways with slightly 
larger acceptable losses that could be made over a period of time…Now I’m not 
suggesting that is the same as being able to spend until your heart’s content, but 
there’s definitely been a softening of those regulations.’ (Informant 5) 
This was shown by UEFA (2015) maintaining acceptable deviations at €30 million after 2018-
19 (2015:38), having previously suggested these would be reduced (UEFA 2012:36).  It should 
also be noted that from 2016-17 the EFL brought in Profitability and Sustainability 
regulations after clubs in the Championship voted for more flexible rules that allow losses of 
up to £39 million over three years, with higher losses for clubs relegated from the EPL (EFL 
Appendix 5:Part 2.3).  
Despite their reservations elite informants concurred that FFP had improved cost control and 
the financial positions of European football clubs, 
‘I think they’ve done very well so far the UEFA FFPR.  They’ve been implemented; the 
financial results of clubs around Europe in general have improved.  There’s not been a 
legal challenge to them; they’re strong in that respect…stakeholders are positive about 
it.  The European Commission is supportive of it.  It’s working.’ (Informant 2) 





5.11 Transparency of FFP and EPL rules 
Although FFP and STCC impacted significantly on operating activities, published financial 
statements made little reference to compliance (or otherwise) with regulations.  In 2012 just 
six clubs in the EPL referred to FFP (Arsenal Holdings plc 2012:13, Birmingham City FC plc 
2012:3, Fordstam Ltd 2012:2, Manchester City Ltd 2012:9, Newcastle United Ltd 2012:2, and 
Wigan Athletic AFC 2012:2).  In 2014 the directors’ report stated that Manchester City had 
incurred expenses of £16 million related to a settlement agreement for breaching FFP 
(Manchester City Ltd 2014:4); though no further details were provided of either the type of 
non-compliance or the full scale of penalties imposed by UEFA.  Despite a settlement 
agreement in February 2015 that imposed a fine of £200,000 for non-compliance with FFPR 
(UEFA 2017:Hull City AFC), Hull City’s 2015 annual report made no reference to this.  
In 2015 only 10 clubs referred to FFPR and STCC in their financial statements and this was 
often hidden in directors’ reports (Observed from published financial statements of clubs in 
the EPL 2015).  Of these just four clubs specifically mentioned compliance with FFP and STCC 
rules (Arsenal Holdings plc 2015:19, Reform Acquisitions 2015:2, Leicester City Ltd 2015:3, 
and Tottenham Hotspur Ltd 2015:2).  Arsenal also explained the positive correlation 
between players’ wages and playing success, and reassured stakeholders that the club had 
sufficient resources available to increase wages whilst continuing to comply with FFPR and 
STCC (Arsenal Holdings plc 2015:19).  Chelsea’s only reference to FFP and STCC was that 
compliance would be ‘challenging’ (Fordstam Ltd 2015:2).   
One of the stated objectives of FFPR is ‘To improve the economic and financial capability of 
the clubs, increasing their transparency and credibility’ (UEFA 2015:2).  To address 
transparency, it would be beneficial if clubs included a note to financial statements 
providing confirmation or otherwise of compliance with FFP and EPL rules.  This could 
include reference to the wages / revenue and revenue / debt ratios; a brief outline of how 
growth in wages above £4 million was funded; where applicable comments on changes in 
negative equity and equity contributions; an outline of amounts spent on infrastructure 
developments; and a reconciliation of reported profit (or loss) with the adjusted figures 





used in submissions to UEFA and the EPL.  Given the magnitude of players’ salaries it is 
surprising this is not shown separately from total staff costs in a note to financial 
statements.   
5.12 Should regulations have gone further? 
Although several elite informants believed FFP and EPL rules were sufficient, it could be 
argued these didn’t go far enough.  It should be remembered that although STCC was 
introduced in 2013-14, increases in wages above £4 million that were caused by the terms 
of contracts entered before 31 January 2013 were not classed as a breach (Premier League 
2015:107).  To assist compliance with FFP, in 2014 and 2015 clubs were not sanctioned for 
losses over €45 million where cumulative losses were declining and the result of contracts 
entered before 1 June 2010 (UEFA 2012:87).  This provided a relatively gentle introduction 
to STCC and FFP.  Whilst acceptable deviations and maximum equity contributions meant 
clubs didn’t need to break-even. 
The EFL’s SCMP requires that clubs in Leagues 1 and 2 spend no more than 60% (EFL 
Appendix 5: Part 4.1) and 55% of revenue on wages (EFL Appendix 5: Part 3.1).  Such was 
the scale of losses reported by many clubs in European football it is surprising that UEFA 
didn’t impose a similar restriction on wages.  Based on figures shown in table 5.2 a wages / 
revenue ratio of for example 65% would have reduced losses and assisted compliance with 
FFP’s break-even requirement.  Stricter regulation might have required owners to convert 
soft debt into share capital, or an equity contribution to address situations of negative 
equity.  Financial regulation for banks sets a minimum level of equity, and UEFA and the EPL 
could have introduced something similar for football clubs.  
Under FFP UEFA can investigate where the revenue / debt ratio is less than one (UEFA 
2015:39) however no distinction is made between hard and soft debt.  Although Chelsea 
had a revenue / debt ratio of 0.3 in 2015 (Calculated from financial statements of Fordstam 
Ltd 2015), this was an interest free loan.  Interest cover might be a more useful ratio for 
UEFA to consider since it indicates whether a club makes sufficient profit to service its debt.  
During 2006-15 Manchester United incurred cumulative interest payable of £493 million 





(Calculated from financial statements of Red Football Ltd 2006-15), which meant that 
despite consistently high revenues interest cover remained below one in most years. 
One of the stated objectives of FFP is ‘To introduce more discipline and rationality in club 
football finances’ (UEFA 2015:2).  Given recent criticisms over the way in which some 
owners funded their acquisitions of clubs it is surprising that FFP and EPL rules don’t 
consider this aspect in more detail. 
The main criticism is that FFP hasn’t addressed competitive balance.  Sass (2016:155) 
explained that the break-even requirement meant smaller clubs couldn’t invest sufficient 
amounts to challenge the largest clubs (2016:155), and concluded this was ‘A potentially 
very problematic and probably unforeseen consequence of UEFA’s FFP’ (2016:156).  
Evidence of this can be seen at Chelsea, which during the 2017-18 season loaned 34 players to 
other clubs (chelseafc.com).  This helps Chelsea comply with FFPR since it reduces players’ 
wages.  It also shows that despite stronger regulation, Chelsea is still able to acquire the best 
young players.  If they don’t make the first team, these players can later be sold to other 
clubs. 
Perhaps the biggest test for FFP came in August 2017 when PSG bought Neymar from 
Barcelona for a world record transfer fee of £200 million (BBC News 2017).  Neymar signed a 
five-year contract and with total wages of £205 million (BBC News 2017), will cost PSG over 
£80 million per annum.  To put this into perspective, in 2015 clubs in the EPL spent on 
average £134 million on wages and amortisation; removing the six largest clubs brought this 
figure down to £87 million (Calculated from financial statements of clubs in the EPL 2015). 
During the accounting year ended 2017 PSG reported revenue of £418 million, 56% of which 
was from commercial activities (Deloitte 2018b:22).  This study previously established that 
in May 2014 UEFA imposed penalties on PSG for breaching FFPR.  As part of that settlement 
agreement UEFA significantly reduced the fair value of a commercial contract between the 
Qatar Tourism Authority and PSG (UEFA 2017).  





Towards the end of the Summer 2017 transfer window, PSG acquired Kylian Mbappe on a 
season long loan with a binding option to buy the player in July 2018 for €145 million (Burt 
2017).  This showed that the wealthiest clubs will seek ways to get around FFP in order to 
achieve playing success.     
5.13 Summary 
The preceding analysis and review of literature established that strong growth in 
broadcasting revenue and the global appeal of the EPL attracted wealthy foreign investors. 
It also showed that those clubs which enjoyed most playing success were able to generate 
higher revenues from broadcasting, matchday and commercial activities.  Several wealthy 
owners provided a soft budget constraint which enabled their clubs to invest heavily in 
players’ costs.  Investors hoped this strategy would quickly achieve playing success and 
growth in revenue.  However the significant revenue differential between the EPL and EFL 
meant several clubs were forced to spend a greater proportion of revenue on players’ costs 
to remain competitive and avoid relegation from the EPL.  This meant growth in revenue 
was usually accompanied by a corresponding rise in players’ costs.  Investment in players’ 
costs was up-front and there was no guarantee it would be successful.  This might lead to 
severe financial difficulties and ultimately relegation from the EPL where sporting success 
was not achieved or where investment was not sustained. 
Increased regulation by UEFA and the EPL meant expenditure was more closely aligned to 
revenue; restricted provision of soft loans; and limited growth in players’ wages funded 
through central distributions.  Significant growth in EPL broadcasting revenue from August 
2013 meant clubs didn’t need to reduce monetary expenditure on players’ costs in order to 
comply with regulation.  However stricter regulation meant growth in revenue was no 
longer accompanied by an equivalent rise in players’ costs.  This improved cost discipline 
and from 2014 onwards the EPL started to report aggregate profits.  However regulation has 
impacted on competitive balance since it restricts investment even where this is funded by 
equity, and means expenditure is constrained by a club’s revenue.  
 





Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
6.1 Overview of chapter 
This chapter will explain the contribution made by this study, limitations and areas for 
future research together with concluding comments.  It will also consider key developments 
that have occurred since 2015. 
6.2 Contribution 
The purpose of this study was to examine to what extent did soft budgets and increased 
financial regulation impact on the performance of English Premier League football clubs 
2004-2015?  The contribution of this study can be broken down into a methodological 
contribution, a theoretical contribution and a practical contribution. 
6.2.1 Methodological contribution 
Detailed analysis of published financial statements enabled this study to examine and 
explain the performance of clubs in the EPL during the accounting years ended 2004-15.  
This sample comprised all 238 sets of financial statements published by the 37 clubs that 
played in the EPL during the 2003/4 to 2014/15 seasons, and enabled analysis of financial 
performance before and following increased regulation.  The accounting years ended 2004-
11 established why stricter financial regulation was necessary; analysis of 2012-15 enabled 
this study to consider the effectiveness of increased regulation. 
Quantitative analysis allowed this study to ascertain the main revenue streams and examine 
how these changed during the period under review; highlighted disparities in revenue; and 
identified where clubs were over-reliant on broadcasting revenue.  The calculation of 8,300 
accounting ratios covering profitability and control of costs, liquidity, efficient use of assets, 
and reliance on debt, identified aspects of poor financial performance.  By breaking down 
analysis between clubs that reported a profit before interest and tax, loss before interest 
and tax, or were funded by a benevolent sugar daddy, this study was able to examine the 
financial performance of each category; consider how the provision of a soft budget 
constraint impacted on financial performance; and investigate whether this changed 





following stricter financial regulation.  To the author’s knowledge quantitative analysis of 
this detail has not previously been used on the EPL, and this is the first-time financial 
performance has been broken down into these categories.   
Qualitative research in the form of structured interviews with nine elite informants 
augmented quantitative findings, providing valuable information about attitudes to financial 
performance and increased regulation.  Qualitative methods are not often employed in 
accounting research, and difficulties accessing elite informants has limited the use of 
structured interviews in research into the football industry.  To the author’s knowledge 
mixed methods research of this type has not previously been used to examine the financial 
performance of clubs in the EPL. 
6.2.2 Theoretical contribution 
This thesis shows that provision of a soft budget constraint encouraged excessive spending 
by organisations in pursuit of sporting success and the revenues arising from this.  It 
demonstrates that increased regulation brought greater cost discipline.  Significant growth 
in broadcasting revenue after 2013 meant clubs didn’t need to reduce expenditure on 
wages and amortisation to comply with FFP and EPL rules.  However stricter regulation 
meant growth in broadcasting revenue was no longer accompanied by an equivalent rise in 
players’ costs, and this allowed clubs to report aggregate profits. 
Several studies have considered the financial performance of European club football and the 
need for stronger regulation including Lago et al (2006), Hamil and Walters (2010), Müller et 
al (2012) and Drut and Raballand (2012).   Further studies have used accounting ratios to 
establish the causes of poor financial performance including Panagiotis (2009 and 2010), 
Zoccali (2012), Silva and Filipe (2013), Wilson et al (2013) and Barajas and Rodríguez (2014).  
While Andreff (2007), Storm (2012), Storm and Nielsen (2012) and Franck (2013) looked at 
how the provision of a soft budget constraint impacted on European club football, and 
whether this supported increased financial regulation.  Szymanski (2014), Sass (2014), 
Schubert (2014) and Schubert and Könecke (2015) used economic theory to consider the 
likely impact of FFPR on competitive balance.    





To date most studies have considered financial performance before the introduction of FFP.  
Peeters and Szymanski (2014) used data from 2002-11 to simulate the effectiveness of FFPR; 
and although Nicoliello and Zampatti (2016) considered the problems faced by clubs in 
Italy’s Serie A in complying with FFP, their analysis was based on financial statements for the 
accounting years ended 2010-12 (2017:468). 
This study confirmed findings from previous research into the financial performance of 
European club football.  It adds to this body of work by examining the financial performance 
of clubs in the EPL before and following the introduction of increased regulation.  In this way 
it brings new knowledge in the form of qualitative and quantitative data analysis on the EPL, 
and addresses a gap in literature by demonstrating that increased regulation resulted in 
improved financial performance by clubs. 
This study established that during the period 2004-15 the EPL saw significant growth in 
revenue.  Although this was driven by broadcasting, the most successful clubs also saw 
growth in revenue from matchday and commercial activities, and from regular participation 
in European club competitions.  Growth in revenue and the global appeal of the EPL meant 
that during this period several clubs were acquired by wealthy owners.  Rising disparities in 
revenue and the revenue differential between the EPL and EFL, meant wealthy owners 
often provided a soft budget constraint that enabled their clubs to invest heavily in pursuit 
of sporting success and the increased revenues arising from this.  
Analysis of financial statements showed this encouraged excessive spending by these clubs, 
with players’ costs often exceeding revenue.  An increasing wages / revenue ratio and 
declining profitability ratios suggested this increased players’ costs for other clubs and meant 
the EPL reported aggregate losses in each year between 2004-13.  Low levels of share 
capital, soft loans and cumulative losses meant several clubs operated with negative equity 
throughout the sample period.  The close relationship between expenditure on players’ 
wages and league points attained (2011-2015 r = 0.83) explained why growth in revenue 
was often accompanied by a corresponding rise in players’ wages. 





It can be argued that the main beneficiaries of the soft budget constraint were players (and 
their agents) who benefited from increased salaries and rising transfer fees.  Although 
supporters shared in their clubs’ playing successes, this was often short-term.  In the longer 
term several clubs experienced significant financial problems when funding abruptly ended, 
including Bolton Wanderers, West Ham United, Portsmouth and Leeds United all of whom 
were relegated from the EPL.  Liverpool and Manchester City also experienced financial 
difficulties until new owners were found. 
This thesis adds to previous research by using quantitative and qualitative data analysis to 
show that increased regulation started to change the behaviours of clubs and their owners 
and addressed the soft budget constraint through encouraging improved cost discipline. 
Without increased regulation it is likely that poor financial performance would have 
persisted.  This thesis showed that compliance with FFP and EPL rules was greatly assisted 
by significant growth in broadcasting revenue after 2013 and the equitable way this was 
distributed.  
Analysis of quantitative data showed significant disparities in revenue earned by the six 
largest clubs when compared with the rest of the EPL.  Growth in broadcasting revenue and 
the equitable way this was distributed meant in relative terms disparities didn’t worsen 
during the period under review.  However it was established that several clubs were very 
reliant on broadcasting revenue.  In the medium-term these clubs need to seek new 
revenue streams, and this might involve investment in youth development so players that 
don’t make first teams can be sold to other clubs.  This is made more challenging since the 
six largest clubs have the resources available to replicate and benefit most from new 
revenue streams, which might further exacerbate disparities. 
This study established similarities with other sectors where provision of a soft budget 
constraint weakened financial discipline.  Comparison with the banking and public sectors 
enhanced our understanding of how increased regulation and reform can be used to 
address a soft budget constraint.  Public sector reform addressed excessive spending 
through devolved budgets and greater accountability.  Banking regulation focused on a 





minimum equity requirement and increased financial disclosure, which discouraged risky 
behaviours since in the event of failure investors had more to lose. 
Previous studies showed that the most powerful banks favoured a free market approach 
(Lall 2012:611).  This was similar to football where the largest clubs preferred to be allowed 
to focus on sporting success.  It could also be argued that regulation in the banking and 
football industries was only strengthened following financial crises.  
FFP and EPL rules require that clubs achieve break-even or operate within an acceptable 
deviation from this.  Although this has addressed the soft budget constraint several have 
criticised that focusing on profit restricts sustainable investment even if this is funded by 
equity.  In the short-term this makes it difficult for smaller clubs to challenge the largest 
clubs since expenditure is constrained by revenue, and in this way it is argued that FFP 
worsens competitive balance. 
6.2.3 Practical contribution 
This study showed that prior to increased financial regulation, growth in broadcasting 
revenue accompanied by the provision of a soft budget constraint resulted in excessive 
spending by clubs in pursuit of playing success.  The introduction of stricter financial rules 
helped change the behaviours of those clubs supported by wealthy owners and related 
parties.  By addressing the soft budget constraint, FFP and EPL rules curbed excessive 
spending and compelled clubs to focus on the attainment of playing success that was more 
clearly aligned with revenue.  However more could have been done to address low levels of 
equity, particularly negative equity, including the conversion of soft loans.   
Analysis of recent financial statements suggested that greater transparency is necessary 
regarding the disclosure by clubs of compliance or otherwise with FFP and EPL rules.  This 
study also established that regulation didn’t address the way in which some owners funded 
their acquisition of clubs.  The leveraged buyout model used to acquire Manchester United 
and Liverpool meant both clubs had to service significant amounts of debt.   





Elite informants were critical that FFP and EPL rules restricted sustainable investment in 
equity, arguing this adversely impacted on competitive balance.  Although growth over the 
longer term is achievable through sustained investment in infrastructure projects, the 
break-even requirements of FFP and EPL rules mean it will be very difficult for any clubs to 
join the elite of European football.  Elite informants recognised that clubs needed to be 
punished for non-compliance with FFP, but feared exclusion would devalue UEFA 
competitions and instead preferred financial penalties. 
Increased financial regulation encouraged better cost discipline, and accompanied by 
significant growth in broadcasting revenue enabled clubs in the EPL to report aggregate 
profits in 2014 and 2015.  Better financial performance might also help attract new 
investors who are satisfied to acquire a non-controlling interest in a club, similar to China 
Media Capital’s 13% stake in Manchester City (Wilson 2015). 
6.3 Limitations of this study 
This study makes use of published financial statements.  Analysis is reliant on the accuracy 
of financial statements and consistent treatment of transactions during the accounting 
periods under review.  Financial statements were prepared in accordance with GAAP and 
since all clubs in the sample were limited companies, these were independently audited 
which lessened scope for errors and omissions.   
Due to time constraints and the availability of accounting information this study focused on 
the accounting years ended 2004-15.  This was considered sufficient to identify and explain 
trends in financial performance before and after the introduction of stricter financial 
regulation.   
Analysis considered every club that played in the EPL during the accounting years under 
review.  This meant that in each year aggregated accounting information was affected by 
the impact of promotion to and relegation from the EPL.  However this enabled detailed 
analysis even if a club remained in the EPL for just one season.  Given the small number of 





clubs in this sample, in each year aggregate figures were affected by for example heavy 
expenditure on players’ costs by just a few clubs.   
The sample size is limited by the number of clubs that played in the EPL in each year under 
review.  To increase the sample size and generalisation of results, analysis could look at 
more than one elite league in European club football.   
Although only a small number of elite informants were interviewed each provided detailed, 
open and honest responses to questions.  Previous research indicated that access to elite 
informants in this sector was often difficult (King 1997:226, Moore and Stokes 2012:439).  
Responses to questions suggested that saturation was reached. 
6.4 Areas for future research 
This is a contemporary and evolving topic that offers scope for further research.  The threat of 
penalties for non-compliance with increased regulation has provided a focus on attaining 
playing success within financial constraints.  Further studies could investigate whether this 
continues or if in future rules need to be strengthened and operating ‘norms’ introduced.  This 
might for example include the introduction of a maximum level of expenditure on wages 
similar to the SCMP used by the EFL.  The impact of Profitability and Sustainability rules on EPL 
clubs could also be studied.  It will also be interesting to see whether the huge transfer fees 
and players’ wages on offer from clubs in China influence the behaviour of European clubs. 
FFP and EPL rules encourage investment in long-term infrastructure projects.  During the 
next few years it will be worthwhile evaluating whether this impacts favourably on 
investment in youth academies and other long-term projects.    
We established that there are significant disparities in the financial resources available to 
clubs in the EPL.  In addition several clubs are very reliant on the continued growth and 
equitable distribution of broadcasting revenue.  With the benevolent owner model no longer 
available, there is the potential to investigate whether clubs can seek out innovative new 
revenue streams that reduce reliance on broadcasting and assist compliance with 





regulation.  Failure to achieve this might further increase disparities in revenue and over 
time adversely impact on the competitiveness and attractiveness of EPL matches. 
6.5 Concluding comments and developments post-2015 
6.5.1 The impact of stricter financial regulation 
Improved financial performance was achieved only following sustained growth in revenue 
and the introduction of stricter regulation by UEFA and the EPL which addressed some of 
the most serious financial problems prevalent in European club football.  The break-even 
requirement tackled excessive spending forcing clubs to operate within revenue; STCC 
restricted growth in wages that was funded through central distributions of revenue; 
acceptable deviations limited assistance from sugar daddies including public authorities, and 
in doing so challenged the soft budget constraint; equity contributions for losses of more 
than €5 million under FFP and £15 million under EPL rules restricted the provision of soft 
loans.   
By excluding the costs of infrastructure projects and youth and community development 
from break-even calculations, FFP and EPL rules encourage long-term investment rather 
than short-term expenditure on players’ costs.  IAS 38 Intangible Assets does not allow clubs 
to capitalise players developed through youth academies since these do not have a reliable 
monetary value.  It follows these players do not incur amortisation costs which is another 
incentive for clubs to invest in youth academies and develop their own players.  The sale of 
players developed in this way might in future result in the creation of a valuable source of 
funds for clubs. 
One criticism might be that FFP and EPL rules haven’t tacked negative equity.    We 
established that banking regulation increased minimum levels of equity to reduce the 
likelihood shareholders would make poor or risky investment decisions.  This study showed 
that several clubs would benefit from an injection of equity and it is surprising that FFP 
hasn’t also established minimum levels of equity or insisted on the conversion of soft debt 
into equity.   





Elite informants agreed that FFP and EPL rules are trying ‘To do something for the greater 
good of the game and the communities within which they work’ (Informant 7) and were 
optimistic about future financial prospects for the EPL.  This was predominantly due to growth 
in broadcasting and commercial revenues during the last decade accompanied by better cost 
discipline following the introduction of FFP and EPL rules.  These factors ensured most clubs 
could achieve profitability in 2014 and 2015 and led Informant 2 to suggest that the days of 
the wealthy sugar daddy might be coming to an end, 
‘I don’t think these days you even necessarily need a wealthy owner in the EPL 
because there isn’t the need for them to…put in as much as they have done in the 
past; because the clubs are actually more sustainable; because the revenue is relative 
to costs whilst still paying out more in wages than any other league…in the world.’ 
(Informant 2) 
Elite informants might not have been so optimistic had interviews taken place in 2009, when 
aggregate liabilities exceeded assets; or 2010 when aggregate pre-tax losses amounted to 
£385 million (Table 4.13) and Portsmouth entered administration.  Without increased 
regulation it is likely losses would have continued despite sustained growth in revenue. 
Although a football club’s primary objective is playing success, FFP and EPL rules mean this 
must be more closely aligned to revenue.  This requires better control of costs and could 
include players’ salaries being more closely related to playing success in the same way that 
the merit award for broadcasting revenue is related to final league position. 
Despite initial doubts UEFA have enforced and penalised clubs for non-compliance, though 
to date it could be argued that none of Europe’s established elite clubs have failed to meet 
the requirements of FFPR (Manchester City and PSG are relatively recent additions to the 
elite of European club football).  Growth in revenue accompanied by stricter regulation 
meant cumulative aggregate operating profits in European club football from 2012-16 
amounted to €2.6 billion (Calculated from UEFA 2018:101), compared with cumulative 
operating losses of €967 million between 2009-11 (Calculated from UEFA 2015a:107).  UEFA 





(2018) commented that these figures showed the effectiveness of the break-even 
requirement (2018:103).  Growth in broadcasting revenue and improved financial 
performance has attracted new investment into European club football, and since 2016 
Chinese investors have been involved in more than 70% of all foreign acquisitions in 
Europe’s top 15 leagues including Aston Villa, WBA and Southampton (UEFA 2018:23).  
Everton (Iran), Swansea (USA) and Crystal Palace (USA) have also received significant foreign 
investment (Cave and Miller 2016), and at the start of the 2017-18 season 12 clubs in the 
EPL were under foreign ownership (UEFA 2018:21). 
6.5.2 Multi-club ownership 
During the last few years European club football has seen the growth of multi-club 
ownership, where corporations and individuals invest in more than one club.    Abu Dhabi 
based City Football Group has invested in Manchester City, New York City, Melbourne City, 
Girona (Spain), Yokohama F Marinos (Japan) and FC Atletico Torque (Uruguay) (UEFA 
2018:25).  Red Bull owns Red Bull Salzburg (RBS), Liefering (Austria), RB Leipzig (Germany), 
New York Red Bulls and Red Bull Brasil (MacInnes 2017); and the Pozzo family own Watford 
and Udinese (Italy) (MacInnes 2017).  There are also examples where one football club has 
invested in another, including Atletico Madrid which acquired a stake in RC Lens (France), 
and Monaco which acquired a controlling interest in Cercle Brugge (Belgium) (UEFA 
2018:25).  
More complex ownership arrangements present challenges to regulators especially 
regarding player transfers between clubs under the same ownership.  Manchester City 
acquired Aaron Mooy on a free transfer from Melbourne City in 2016 and immediately 
loaned him to Huddersfield Town (Howcroft 2017).  Huddersfield bought Mooy for £12 
million in 2017 (Kelly 2017), providing Manchester City with funds that contributed towards 
achieving its break-even requirement.  In 2016 RB Leipzig acquired Naby Keita from RBS for 
around £21 million; he was sold to Liverpool in 2017 for £50 million (MacInnes 2017). These 
types of transaction show that regulators must ensure multi-club ownership doesn’t impact 
on the integrity of competitions. 





UEFA rules state that no owner can ‘Have control or influence over more than one club 
participating in UEFA club competition’ (UEFA 2017), and when RB Leipzig and RBS both 
qualified for the 2017-18 Champions League the CFCB investigated whether this was 
breached.  It concluded that following changes in RBS’s management structure; the 
termination of loan agreements with Red Bull; changes in sponsorship arrangements with 
Red Bull; and a commitment to addressing the lease of its stadium from a Red Bull 
subsidiary; Red Bull did not have decisive influence over RBS, and both clubs were able to 
play in the Champions League (UEFA 2017).  This decision will have been welcomed by all 
multi-club owners. 
6.5.3 EPL broadcasting revenue 
During 2015-16 clubs in the EPL received €2.6 billion from broadcasting, which was €400 
million greater than the combined broadcasting revenues of the Bundesliga and La Liga 
(Calculated from Deloitte 2017:9).  This provided clubs in the EPL with a significant financial 
advantage and meant aggregate wages of €3 billion during 2015-16 exceeded the revenues 
reported by any football league in Europe (Observed from Deloitte 2017:9).  The Deloitte 
Football Money League 2018 showed the highest revenue earning clubs in world football 
during the accounting year ended 2017 (Deloitte 2018b:2).  The scale of broadcasting 
revenue meant ten clubs from the EPL were in the top twenty of the Money League, and 14 
in the top 30 (Deloitte 2018b:3), including WBA (in 27th place) and Bournemouth (28th) 
(Deloitte 2018b:5).  Despite not playing in the Champions League during 2016-17, 
Manchester United retained its position at the top of the Money League with revenue of 
€673 million (Deloitte 2018b:10).  Growth in revenue allowed clubs in the EPL to spend 
record amounts during the summer 2017 (£1.47 billion) (Newell and Scott 2017) and 
January 2018 (£430 million) (Deloitte 2018a) transfer windows. 
6.5.4 New entrants into broadcasting live matches 
The way in which supporters watch matches is changing and this was reflected in the EFL’s 
iFollow package which allowed overseas supporters to pay to live stream all 46 matches 
played by a club during the 2017-18 season (EFL 2017a).  From the 2019-20 season this 
service will be available to UK based supporters (EFL 2017).   





Amazon, Apple, Twitter, Facebook and Netflix have all expressed interest in showing live EPL 
matches (Sweney 2017a).  Amazon has already acquired UK broadcasting rights to tennis for 
five years from 2019, outbidding Sky by offering £50 million to show the APT World Tour 
and spending £30 million on the US Open (Sweney 2017).  In 2017 Amazon also paid around 
$50 million to live stream ten NFL matches in the USA (Hook and Kuchler 2017).  Previously 
Twitter had paid $10 million for the same package (Hook and Kuchler 2017).  In 2017 
Facebook was unsuccessful with a bid of $610 million for the rights to live stream matches in 
the Indian Premier League for five years (Heath 2017).  The winning bid was $2.5 billion, 
though Facebook made the second highest bid (Heath 2017).  
Growth in recent EPL broadcasting agreements was driven through competition between 
Sky and BT for the quad play market of broadband, TV, landline and mobile.  Future growth 
might be driven by on-line providers, though they will need to pay significantly more than 
the amounts Amazon paid for tennis and NFL matches.  It is also likely that on-line providers 
will compete for the future rights to broadcast matches in the Champions and Europa 
Leagues. 
6.5.5 Financial performance of EPL clubs 
During the accounting year ended 2016 aggregate revenue for clubs in the EPL increased to 
£3.6 billion, with commercial revenue exceeding £1 billion for the first time (Deloitte 
2017:16).  However wages of £2.3 billion meant the wages / revenue ratio increased to 63% 
(Deloitte 2017:18) and operating profit declined slightly to £511 million (Deloitte 2017:20).  
Although 17 clubs reported an operating profit and 12 generated a pre-tax profit, the EPL 
reported an aggregate pre-tax loss of £111 million (Deloitte 2017:20). 
Following two years of pre-tax profits these results were disappointing.  Analysis from 
Deloitte (2017) was more optimistic as they explained that failure to generate pre-tax profit 
was driven by the presence of several exceptional costs, this allied to the new broadcast 
rights deal from August 2016 should see the EPL return to profitability (Deloitte 2017:3).  
Exceptional costs included £67 million paid by Chelsea for early termination of its kit supply 





contract with Adidas (Fordstam Ltd 2016:23), and impairment of £80 million charged by 
Aston Villa (Reform Acquisitions 2016:20). 
Deloitte’s forecast proved correct and during the year ended 2017 aggregate revenue 
increased to £4.5 billion (Deloitte 2018).  Although aggregate wages increased to £2.5 
billion, the wages / revenue ratio fell to 55% and clubs reported a combined pre-tax profit of 
£500 million (Deloitte 2018).  This included all 20 clubs reporting an operating profit and 18 
a pre-tax profit (Deloitte 2018).  Without regulation it is likely that players’ costs would have 
continued to increase in line with growth in revenue. 
6.5.6 Changes in regulation 
The improved financial performance of European club football means there have been few 
changes to FFP and EPL regulations.  Since June 2015 clubs have been able to apply to the 
CFCB to enter a voluntary agreement for break-even (UEFA 2015:94).  This applies where a 
club has undergone restructure or a change in control and requires submission of a business 
plan that demonstrates sufficient equity funding will be made available to cover forecast 
deficits for the next four reporting periods (2015:95).  This was seen as a response to 
criticism that FFP restricted sustainable equity investment.  
Following commencement of the domestic broadcasting contract in August 2016, the EPL 
increased thresholds for STCC.  From 2016-17, where players’ wages exceeded £67m, 
growth was limited to £7m unless funded by non-central revenue; thresholds will increase 
to £74m in 2017-18, and £81m in 2018-19 (Premier League 2017: 117). 
From 2018-19 England, Germany, Spain and Italy will each have four teams in the Champions 
League group phase, removing the need for some clubs to go through play-offs (Saffer 2017).  
This increases earnings potential for the largest clubs in European football, guaranteeing them 
at least six games in the Champions League, but is at the expense of smaller clubs and leagues.  
FFP and STCC have not addressed disparities in revenue, and FFP has been criticised for 
maintaining the current hierarchy in European club football.  Given the power of Europe’s 
largest clubs it is unlikely that UEFA or the EPL can easily deal with this issue, and in the 





medium-term disparities are likely to widen which might impact adversely on competition in 
the EPL and other major European leagues.  At some point this might lead to creation of a 
super league comprised of the wealthiest clubs in Europe similar to that envisaged by Andreff 
and Staudohar (2000:274) and Vrooman (2007:344).  There are also concerns that too many 
clubs are very reliant on broadcasting revenue.  Any reduction in the amounts that 
broadcasters are prepared to pay or the way in which this is distributed would have a 
significant impact on the financial resources available to these clubs.   
Increased regulation by UEFA and the EPL encouraged better control of key costs and the 
attainment of break-even or losses within acceptable deviations.  However it is worth 
emphasising that clubs were fortuitous that introduction of tougher financial regulation 
coincided with significant growth in broadcasting revenue.  This meant clubs in the EPL 
didn’t need to reduce players’ costs to comply with regulations.  Without growth in 
broadcasting revenue and the equitable way this was distributed several clubs would have 



















Appendix 1: Clubs that played in the EPL 2004-2015 
 
Club Company details Accounting 
year end 
1. Arsenal Arsenal Holdings plc 31 May 
2. Aston Villa Aston Villa plc (2004-2006) 
Reform Acquisition Limited (2007-2015) 
31 May 
3. Birmingham City Birmingham City Football Club plc 30 June 
4. Blackburn Rovers Blackburn Rovers Football and Athletic plc (The) 30 June 
5. Blackpool Sugesta Limited 31 May 
6. Bolton Wanderers Burnden Leisure plc 30 June 
7. Burnley Burnley Football and Athletic Company Limited (The) 30 June 
8. Cardiff City Cardiff City Football Club Limited 31 May 
9. Charlton Athletic The Charlton Athletic Football Company Limited 30 June 
10. Chelsea Chelsea Limited (2004-2008) 
Fordstam Limited (2009-2015) 
30 June 
11. Crystal Palace Crystal Palace FC (2000) Limited (2005) 
CPFC 2010 Limited (2014-15) 
30 June 
12. Derby County The Derby County Football Club Limited 30 June 
13. Everton The Everton Football Club Company Limited 31 May 
14. Fulham Fulham Football Leisure Limited 30 June 
15. Hull City The Hull City Association Football Club (Tigers) 
Limited 
31 July 
16. Leeds United Leeds United Association Football Club Limited 30 June 
17. Leicester City Leicester City Football Club plc 31 May 
18. Liverpool The Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds 
Limited 
31 July / 31 
May 
19. Manchester City Manchester City Limited 31 May 
20. Manchester United Manchester United plc (2002-2005) 
Red Football Limited (2006-2015) 
30 June 
21. Middlesbrough Middlesbrough Football and Athletic Company 
(1986) Limited 
30 June 
22. Newcastle United Newcastle United Limited 30 June 
23. Norwich City  Norwich City Football Club plc 31 May 
24. Portsmouth Portsmouth City Football Club Limited (2007-2008) 31 May 
25. Queen’s Park 
Rangers 
QPR Holdings Limited 31 May 
26. Reading The Reading Football Club Limited 30 June 
27. Sheffield United  Sheffield United Football Club Limited (The) 30 June 
28. Southampton Southampton Football Club Limited 31 May 
29. Stoke City Stoke City Football Club Limited 31 May 
30. Sunderland Sunderland Association Football Club, Limited (The) 31 July 
31. Swansea City Swansea City Football 2002 Limited 31 May 
32. Tottenham Hotspur Tottenham Hotspur Limited 30 June 
33. Watford Watford Association Football Club Limited (The) 30 June 





34. West Ham United West Ham United Football Club Limited 31 May 
35. West Bromwich 
Albion 
West Bromwich Albion Football Club Limited 30 June 
36. Wigan Athletic Wigan Athletic AFC Limited 31 May 
37. Wolverhampton 
Wanderers 
WW (1990) Limited 31 May 
(Source: Various company annual reports 2002-15) 
 





Appendix 2: Summary of accounting ratios and formulae used 
 
a) Profitability and control of costs 
1. Wages (staff costs) / Revenue (%) 
2. Amortisation / Revenue (%) 
3. Wages (staff costs) and amortisation / Revenue (%) 
4. Profit from operations / Revenue (%)  
5. Profit before interest and tax / Revenue (%) 
6. Profit before tax / Revenue (%) 
7. Wages / Non-broadcasting revenue (%) 
8. Return on capital employed before player trading (Profit from operations / Capital 
employed) % 
9. Return on capital employed after player trading (Profit before interest and tax / 
Capital employed) % 
 
b) Capital structure and reliance on debt 
10. Interest cover (Profit before interest and tax / Net interest payable) 
11. Net interest payable as a percentage of revenue (Net interest payable / Revenue) (%) 
12. Gearing (Total debt / Capital employed) (%) 
13. Revenue / Total debt 
14. Revenue / Hard debt 
15. Profit from operations / Total debt 
16. Total assets / Total liabilities (all current and non-current assets and liabilities) 
17. Players’ registrations (NBV) / Total assets (%) 
18. Equity / Total assets (%) 
19. Total debt / Equity (where debt includes all long and short-term debt including bank 
overdrafts) (%) 
20. Hard debt / Equity (hard debt includes long and short-term funds provided by 
external lenders) (%) 
21. Hard debt gearing (%) (Hard debt / Capital employed) 
 
c) Liquidity 
22. Cash / Total assets (%) 
23. Working capital / Total assets (where working capital = current assets - current 
liabilities) 
24. Current ratio (Current assets / Current liabilities) 
25. Cash flow from operations / Profit from operations  
26. Cash flow from operations / Revenue 
 
d) Use of assets 
27. Revenue / Players’ registrations (NBV) 
28. Asset turnover (Revenue / Capital employed) 
29. Stadium utilisation (Average attendance / Stadium capacity) (%) 
 
Source: 1 Deloitte (2012:39), Morrow (1999:43) and adapted from Barros (2006:101); 2 and 3 





adapted from Deloitte (2012:39) and Barros (2006:101); 4, 5 and 6 adapted from Holmes et 
al (2008:75);     7 adapted from Deloitte (2012:39 and 2012: Appendix 9) and Morrow 
(1999:43); 8 adapted from McKenzie (2010:329); 9 McKenzie (2010:329);10 and 11 adapted 
from McKenzie (2010:307) and Morrow (1999:111); 12 McKenzie (2010:304) and Holmes et 
al (2008:180); 13 and 14 adapted from Zoccali (2011:88) and Barajas and Rodríguez 
(2010:57); 15 adapted from Gu (2002:34); 16 adapted from Gu (2002:37); 17 adapted from 
Zoccali (2011:88); 18 Zoccali (2011:88); 19 McKenzie (2010:305); 20 adapted McKenzie 
(2010:305); 21 adapted from McKenzie (2010:304) and Holmes et al (2008:180); 22  adapted 
from  Panagiotis (2009:163) and Morrow (1999:111); 23 Horrigan (1968:289); 24 Panagiotis 
(2010:21); 25 and 26 Ryu and Jang (2004:18); 27 adapted from McKenzie (2010:361); 28 
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informant 






Informant 1 CEO of a Football League X (2009-pres) 







Informant 2 Director of Sports Business Group in an 






Informant 3 CEO of EPL club B (2010-pres) 













Informant 5 Partner in law practice sports group. 
Involved in advising UEFA and clubs in 





Informant 6 Partner and national head of business 
services and accounting in an 
international firm of accountants. 
Responsible for audit of several clubs in 





Informant 7 CEO of EPL club C and previous 
experience as CEO of five clubs in the 
EPL (2002-pres).  Previously Partner in an 





















Appendix 4: Interview Questions 
 
Revenue 
Driven by broadcasting, the EPL has seen spectacular and sustained growth in 
revenue and in 2014 clubs reported aggregate revenue of £3.2b.  During the period 
2004-14 average revenue increased from £68m to £163m.  However there was 
evidence of disparity since in each year no more than six clubs earned above average 
revenue; and around 60% of aggregate revenue was received by just six clubs.  
1. In your opinion are clubs in the EPL too reliant on broadcasting revenue? 
 
2. Are you concerned that the largest clubs in the EPL might seek to negotiate 
broadcasting contracts on an individual basis? 
 
3. Commercial / sponsorship deals give some of the largest clubs a huge financial 
advantage over the rest of the EPL.  Are you concerned by disparities in revenue 
and do you think this might impact upon the level of competition?   
 
4. Are clubs finding it more difficult to obtain commercial / sponsorship revenue? 
 
5. On average what is the duration of contracts with major sponsors?  
 
6. Do contracts with major sponsors (eg: shirt sponsor, kit supplier) have bonus 
payments related to playing success?  
 
7. Will stadium sponsorship become an increasingly important revenue stream? 
 
8. Do clubs budget for or rely on funds from the sale of players? 
 
Control of costs 
Despite strong growth in revenue, in aggregate terms the EPL didn’t report a PBIT in 
any year from 2004-13.  
9. What financial information does your club use on a regular basis? 
 
10. At the start of each accounting period does your club have a budget for transfer 
fees and wages?  How is this arrived at and how strictly is it enforced?  
 





11. Does your club budget to make an annual profit (or cumulative profit over for 
example three years)? 
 
Increasing levels of soft debt  
During the period 2004-13 51% of the Statements of Financial Position published by 
EPL clubs showed negative equity (where liabilities are greater than assets) including 
2013 when 12 clubs showed negative equity.   
12. In your opinion are there valid reasons why clubs should be allowed to operate 
with negative equity over a number of accounting periods? 
 
13. What problems are caused by wealthy owners providing unlimited financial 
support for their clubs (soft budget constraint)? 
 
UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules / Financial regulation 
Introduced by UEFA in 2012 to encourage better financial management by football 
clubs. 
14. Why was it necessary for UEFA to introduce financial regulation?  Shouldn’t the 
day to day management of a football club / operations / objectives (profit or 
otherwise) be left to market forces?  
 
15. Although FFP allows clubs to invest in infrastructure it restricts the amounts 
wealthy owners / sugar daddies can invest in players and wages (investment in 
short-term costs).  Some have argued this will maintain the status quo / freeze 
the current hierarchy of European football.  Is this a valid criticism? 
 
16. Is there evidence to suggest that clubs are starting to invest more in youth 
development / academies? 
 
17. It has been suggested that clubs might get around acceptable deviations through 
sponsorship / commercial transactions with related parties (eg: Man City and 
Etihad stadium naming rights).  How can UEFA / EPL prevent this / decide the 
market value of a transaction? 
 





18. Some have suggested that FFP was an attempt by UEFA to prevent EPL clubs 
becoming too powerful in the Champions’ League.  Is this a valid criticism of FFP? 
 
19. In your opinion does financial regulation currently go far enough?  How might 
this evolve over the next decade? 
 
20. Do you think UEFA would prevent for example Barcelona, Manchester United or 
Real Madrid from playing in the Champions’ League for breaching FFP? 
 
21. During the last two years the EPL has reported an aggregate profit (aggregate 
PBT 2014 – £196 mil).  Would this have happened without increased financial 
regulation by UEFA / EPL?  
  





Appendix 5: Sample of Interview Transcript 
Informant 8 - 3 May 2016 (10.00) 
Revenue 
1. In your opinion are clubs in the EPL too reliant on broadcasting revenue? 
 
Certainly at the lower end of the PL, clubs can become reliant on broadcasting 
revenue.  Over the last few years clubs have become more focused on driving 
revenue in addition to broadcasting rights.  However with the amount of money 
that clubs receive centrally from the PL, that funds the vast majority of the costs 
of running a club in the PL which are mainly players’ costs.  Certainly for 
ourselves the PL income which includes not just broadcasting rights but also prize 
money, made up around 83% of our total turnover, on average in the eight 
seasons we were in the PL.  As you can see it’s a huge element of our income 
while we were in the PL.        
 
2. Are you concerned that the largest clubs in the EPL might seek to negotiate 
broadcasting contracts on an individual basis? 
 
3. Commercial / sponsorship deals give some of the largest clubs a huge financial 
advantage over the rest of the EPL.  Are you concerned by disparities in 
revenue and do you think this might impact upon the level of competition?   
 
I think the PL will resist that because one of the things that drives the revenues 
for the PL when they are negotiated in broadcasting agreements with BSkyB, BT 
Sport, ESPN or whoever it is they are dealing with, one of the fundamental 
qualities of the PL is the fact that there is that broad equality of distribution of 
income.  Unlike for example in Spain where the top two clubs can negotiate their 
own deals.  The collective element of the PL ensures that there is less difference 
between the amount that the bottom clubs receive and the top clubs, compared 
to other European leagues.   
 
That ensures that there is more competitiveness and there is the possibility of 
clubs in the PL over-achieving as we saw yesterday with Leicester winning the PL.  
When you look at other European leagues that becomes something that would 
be very, very unlikely, and of course it was very unlikely in the PL but I think that 
the amount of money that all the clubs receive now in the PL has levelled the 





playing field somewhat and that’s what we’ve seen this season.  Of course for 
the big clubs who’ve monopolised the top of the table for a number of years, 
that’s probably not something that is very desirable for them.  But for the league 
itself that is one of the qualities that ensures that the attractiveness and 
popularity of the PL continues and grows. 
 
Overseas broadcasting revenue is split evenly between PL clubs, which for a club 
like ours is great.  It meant that we shared the same as every other club and I 
think that’s only right because some of the bigger clubs have a view that the 
international broadcasting rights bring in so much money because of the top 
clubs.  But I also think there is the unpredictability of the PL where anybody can 
beat anybody generally.  I think that adds to the popularity of the league.  
Certainly in my dealings with the PL that was one of the things they wanted to 
maintain.  The fact that the league is stronger with 20 healthy, competitive clubs, 
rather than three or four top clubs.   
 
When you look at those four or five top clubs they generate more revenue 
anyway off the field commercially and through sponsorship and in other ways.  
So I actually think it’s a very, very good model the PL, and of course you only 
have to look at the increase in the broadcasting rights that it delivers to see how 
successful it’s been. 
 
4. Are clubs finding it more difficult to obtain commercial / sponsorship revenue? 
Having been in the PL and now having experienced the Championship and 
League 1, I can tell you it’s an awful lot easier in the PL than it is outside the PL.  
Being a PL club attracts big name sponsors whoever the club is and it really does 
allow you to generate revenue that you certainly can’t do in the Football League 
just because you get that exposure.  The actual step from a commercial point of 
view, from a media exposure point of view when you get into the PL is absolutely 
enormous and that makes you a very marketable commodity as a football club.  
Although it’s still dwarfed by the main income which is broadcasting rights. 
5. On average what is the duration of contracts with major sponsors?  
 
A shirt deal, generally you are looking at probably two to three years.  It’s 
unusual to go any longer than that.  You can do a one-year deal but generally… 
you want the flexibility to be able to change if it doesn’t work, or the sponsor will 
want the flexibility because there’s no way that you can guarantee PL survival as 





a club like ours for longer than one-year.  As long as you’ve got clauses in there 
where the income reduces if you do get relegated then the sponsors are quite 
happy to go for a two or three-year deal, which is generally the length of time 
that we did.  
 
6. Do contracts with major sponsors (eg: shirt sponsor, kit supplier) have bonus 
payments related to playing success?  
 
Yes you can negotiate those and we did do that, but generally the amounts are 
fairly insignificant compared to other streams of income.   
 
7. Will stadium sponsorship become an increasingly important revenue stream? 
 
We were in a fortunate position in that our owner was also the owner of a major 
XXXX.  So when we reached the PL that was our major shirt sponsor and stadium 
sponsor.  That ran out in 2009 when we changed shirt sponsor for the first time.   
 
It’s a large amount of money but when you compare it to broadcasting rights it’s 
not something that you can increase the percentage of your total income.  You 
can drive it a little bit but ultimately it’s fairly insignificant. 
 
8. Do clubs budget for or rely on funds from the sale of players? 
 
You certainly can do and we’ve certainly benefited from that.  In the PL it isn’t a 
strategic plan.  Once you reach the PL for a club of our size, our sole aim really 
was to improve every year.  Our first aim was survival in the PL and to maintain 
our position there, and if you plan to sell your better players then that’s a very 
difficult strategy to maintain because ultimately you’re not necessarily successful 
every time you buy a player and sell him for a higher amount.   What happens is 
you buy players at the right time in their career because they are then better 
value.  And if you’ve got the right management team to be able to develop those 
players, and they gain experience in the PL then they become attractive to some 
of the bigger clubs, which is what happened.   
 
We reached the PL with a team of players who broadly hadn’t played at the top 
level.  In our first season in the PL we over-achieved by most peoples’ 
expectations and finished in the top ten.  We were then susceptible to other 
clubs coming in and buying our players because they could pay them higher 





salaries.  That certainly happened to us after the first season where we lost 
players like…… and then you have to replace those players with players who are 
equally as good if not better.   
 
As the seasons progressed and we became a more established PL club, our 
recruitment of players became stronger and we were able to buy players from 
overseas, South America and Europe, and we were able to develop those players, 
give them experience.  For lower fees than our competitors we were able to 
produce players that became top players such as….So we were able to capitalise 
on their development and sell them for quite significant sums.  That helps you to 
invest in future players.  It also helps to balance the books when you are at a PL 
club that is competing against clubs with much, much bigger budgets. 
 
Certainly when you are trying to buy players as a PL club everyone knows the 
financial power that clubs have and all of a sudden players become more 
expensive.  But that’s one of the challenges in the PL, but at least you do have 
the money to be able to spend, whereas as a football league club it becomes very 
difficult to buy those players especially when you are competing with a PL club.  
It’s virtually impossible to buy a player if there’s a PL club in for that player as 
well.             
 
Control of costs 
9. What financial information does your club use on a regular basis? 
 
The key figures are turnover and players’ salaries and operating profits.  It’s not 
complicated to run a PL football club because the key numbers are so big and so 
significant that ultimately if you control your wage costs and drive your turnover 
then you’re going to increase your profitability.  Because they are the key 
numbers, they are the things we look at generally as key performance indicators, 
and the ratios around those numbers.   
 
(Recruiting players) is always a risk.  Recruiting players is not an exact science and 
what we’ve seen over the last few years is clubs investing a lot of money in 
software, in staff members in scouting networks, to reduce that risk.  Because if 
you get player recruitment right, generally success will follow.  There’s a lot more 
focus on that side of the business.   
 





Of course there’s still the same pool of players that we’re all trying to buy and 
the same amount of competitors all trying to buy those players.  So the quality of 
player doesn’t necessarily increase, but with the more financial power that clubs 
have in the PL, that’s driving up not only transfer fees but wages as well.  So I 
think if you can minimise the risk of the huge amounts of investment that clubs 
are now making in players.   
 
It’s all about getting a player who’s going to have an impact for you.  If you get 
that right then you’ll generally finish in the top three; if you get that wrong the 
implications can be massive.  It is very costly to recruit players so that’s the 
biggest risk and the biggest impact of that is when you suffer relegation.   
 
10. At the start of each accounting period does your club have a budget for transfer 
fees and wages?  How is this arrived at and how strictly is it enforced?  
 
11. Does your club budget to make an annual profit (or cumulative profit over for 
example three years)? 
 
Generally we’ll set budgets for the season.  As a PL club we assume a finishing 
position of 17th and we’ll budget accordingly.  Our club always aimed to break-
even over the season.  Any profit that we would make would be re-invested in 
the club in buying new players or re-contracting existing players on increased 
salaries.  Because of course that’s always a pressure when you have good players 
that you don’t want to sell, unfortunately what you sometimes have to do is re-
negotiate   their contract and pay them higher salaries.  Which is good in one way 
because the players are improving and you’re retaining them, which is good and 
what supporters want to see, but costs continue to increase.  And the biggest 
cost in running a PL football club is players’ wages.  Generally we ran around 82% 
salary to turnover level, which is quite high.  Ideally we’d look to try to get down 
to around 70% which we were heading to and we did manage in 2012.   
 
It’s so easy for clubs to over extend themselves and if you are in the bottom 
three at Christmas it’s very easy for owners, encouraged by the managers to 
invest in players that will keep you in that division because the rewards now for 
maintaining your status are huge.  So there is that temptation to improve your 
squad or think that you can improve your squad, but ultimately three clubs have 
to go down.  Our view and our strategy was always to not over extend ourselves, 
to use the PL income to pay the going rate for players but not to over extend 





ourselves to the situation where we were incurring significant losses.  Although 
that is something that we did in years three, four and five after we almost got 
relegated in our second season.  This is before my time (as CEO) but I think there 
was a targeted strategy to improve our playing squad to make sure that we 
didn’t get relegated.         
 
Increasing levels of soft debt  
12. In your opinion are there valid reasons why clubs should be allowed to operate 
with negative equity over a number of accounting periods? 
 
13. What problems are caused by wealthy owners providing unlimited financial 
support for their clubs (soft budget constraint)? 
Even if it is soft debt to the owners, we’ve seen that there is no guarantee that if 
that continuous investment at a football club stops then the football club can be 
in trouble because it’s still got costs and expenses being incurred.  When a major 
source of cash flow into the club is restricted it becomes very difficult to continue 
in the short-term. 
So as long as that investment from the owner continues then there’s not a 
problem.  But is that fair for the competition then that’s where you are going to 
get differences of opinion?   
UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules / Financial regulation  
14. Why was it necessary for UEFA to introduce financial regulation?  Shouldn’t the 
day to day management of a football club / operations / objectives (profit or 
otherwise) be left to market forces?  
 
Whether it was to try to maintain a level playing field or aspire to a more level 
playing field as some of the clubs in Europe became more and more wealthy.  
With rich owners such as PSG and Manchester City and Chelsea, and whether 
there was an element in UEFA that wanted to restrict the amount of money that 
owners could invest to improve football clubs, and I think that’s the right thing to 
do.   
 
From the PL’s point of view, the PL was caught in a situation where above them 
UEFA had the FFP structure; the FL had financial fair play rules established, so the 
PL was sat in the middle without any financial fair play rules which didn’t really 
make an awful lot of sense.  It was the right thing to do to restrict losses. The PL 





had the experience of Portsmouth in 2009-10, where a club got into financial 
difficulties while in the PL, which wasn’t a great thing for the PL.   
 
There was also a desire from club owners when the new broadcasting deal came 
in, in 2013 to try and retain some of that increased income to invest in facilities, 
to invest in the football club rather than to leave it to market forces.  Because 
what happens if you leave it to market forces is that the salaries and transfer fees 
increase, which is what we’ve seen over the years.  So that was the desire to 
bring FFP in. 
 
Ultimately it seems the right thing to do, to restrict football clubs from making 
huge losses.  Even now, outside the PL we’re seeing with Bolton Wanderers just 
this year for example, that football clubs will get into financial difficulties if that 
money from the owner stops, and that’s something that can never really be 
guaranteed.  If the owner decides to stop putting money in, the football club is 
really in trouble and FFP rules are there to try to reduce the risk of that 
happening.     
 
15. Although FFP allows clubs to invest in infrastructure it restricts the amounts 
wealthy owners / sugar daddies can invest in players and wages (investment in 
short-term costs).  Some have argued this will maintain the status quo / freeze 
the current hierarchy of European football.  Is this a valid criticism? 
 
I think that criticism will come from owners who want to invest in their football 
clubs in an attempt to make them successful.  And you’re always going to get 
that difference of opinion between the people who are trying to run football 
clubs on a balanced financial structure where the club doesn’t over-extend itself 
and maintains a healthy profitability or break-even position, against club owners 
who say well if I want to spend my money on investing in my football club and 
buying players and paying huge salaries, then why can I not do that because you 
can in any other business? 
 
I do think there is an obligation to put in some form of protection for supporters, 
for the integrity of the competition, to protect clubs from perhaps owners who 
look too short-term, who may be thinking to invest in the short-term without 
really considering the consequences long-term.    
      





16. Is there evidence to suggest that clubs are starting to invest more in youth 
development / academies? 
 
They certainly are and that’s from about 2011-12.  There was a focus not only 
from clubs but also the PL, FL and FA to develop more of our own players.  There 
was a concern, certainly in the FA that the financial power meant PL clubs were 
able to buy the best players in the world, and this was having an impact on the 
development of our younger players.  The introduction of the Elite Player 
Performance Plan (EPPP) was intended to reverse that trend, to encourage clubs 
to develop more of their own players, to improve the standard of academies, 
improve the standard of staff training programmes and facilities in the clubs.  So 
we have seen a greater focus on developing home grown players, though I think 
that will take a long time to bear fruit. 
 
For our club, in the early years in the PL, in 2005, 6, 7, the focus of the club was 
on recruiting players from all over the world and not develop our own.  There 
was a lack of investment in our academy and we didn’t develop any players apart 
from X who was already a first team player when we got to the PL.  We didn’t 
develop any until around six years later when we had a couple come through 
who we were able to sell when they became established players.   
 
For all clubs that type of policy of recruiting externally and not developing your 
own players has been reversed but there is still huge emphasis on buying the 
finished product rather than managers in the PL risking putting in younger 
players because there is always an element of risk in that strategy. 
 
FFP and PL rules allow you to lose a fairly significant sum so the actual element of 
youth development is fairly small in comparison to the rest of the costs.  But 
certainly by removing it from the FFP calculation encourages clubs, clubs don’t 
have to worry about that element of the costs, that’s extracted from the 
calculation. 
 
17. It has been suggested that clubs might get around acceptable deviations 
through sponsorship / commercial transactions with related parties (eg: Man 
City and Etihad stadium naming rights).  How can UEFA / EPL prevent this / 
decide the market value of a transaction? 
 





There is (problems) but there are rules about those kinds of transactions and as 
long as those rules are robust and enforced properly then that shouldn’t be a 
problem. 
 
18. Some have suggested that FFP was an attempt by UEFA to prevent EPL clubs 
becoming too powerful in the Champions’ League.  Is this a valid criticism of 
FFP? 
 
Yes, as we’ve seen over the last few years there’s no guarantee of success even if 
you have the biggest budgets and biggest investment into football clubs, there’s 
still no guarantee that you’ll win the top prizes.  We know there is a very strong 
correlation between the clubs with the biggest budget in terms of players’ 
salaries and transfer fees and your final league position, but there’s no guarantee 
that you will win things. 
 
Whether that was a motive for bringing in FFP, I don’t know but certainly there 
was an element when it was introduced, to try and maintain the competitiveness 
of the competition rather than allow clubs to dominate it with bigger budgets. 
 
You want to maintain competition.  One of the biggest qualities of football is the 
un-predictableness and you’ve got to maintain that so that one club doesn’t have 
all the best players at the expense of other clubs, because you’ll lose that 
unpredictability.  And I think generally that has been maintained despite the 
huge amounts of investment made by owners into the PL.   
  
19. In your opinion does financial regulation currently go far enough?  How might 
this evolve over the next decade? 
 
Personally I think the rules are adequate as they stand.  I think it’s still 
astonishing in any other business if you allowed businesses to make losses of €30 
million; when there’s a rule called FFP and you’re still allowing clubs to make 
huge losses.   
      
20. Do you think UEFA would prevent for example Barcelona, Manchester United 
or Real Madrid from playing in the Champions’ League for breaching FFP? 
 
That’s a really difficult quandary for UEFA or whoever runs competitions.  It’s a 
very difficult dilemma because you need your star names in those competitions 





so restricting them playing in those competitions is a really difficult decision for 
them to take and I’m not sure that is the right thing to do.   
 
It’s difficult because you want strong penalties for breaching the rules, but at the 
same time you also need those teams in the competition.  So financial penalties, 
restricting their ability to field players in those competitions, as long as the 
punishment is there, they have got to be sufficient but once you start suspending 
clubs from competitions it becomes very difficult and the consequences could be 
significant. 
 
21. During the last two years the EPL has reported an aggregate profit.  Would this 
have happened without increased financial regulation by UEFA / EPL?  
 
But what we’ve seen in the last couple of years is the sheer amount of increase in 
income from central funds from the PL, aligned with a higher emphasis on FFP 
and control of costs we’ve now seen football clubs in the PL are now making 
profits.  Profitability is increasing and that can only be a good thing for the 


















Appendix 6: Sample of spreadsheets showing breakdown of revenue, key data from financial statements and summary 
of accounting ratios for the accounting year ended 2012 
All clubs in the EPL 
 
  


















£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Breakdown of revenue 10 months
Revenue (Annual reports) 240,112 79,750 54,181 64,904 259,250 80,531 78,652 168,998 231,140 320,320 93,260 74,302 63,986 70,734 77,042
Gate receipts and match day revenues 95,212 12,204 5,419 5,724 77,742 16,779 11,354 42,327 21,871 98,718 23,942 11,338 8,439 7,979 14,071
Broadcasting / Media 84,701 44,159 41,141 42,562 111,019 52,790 55,408 62,774 88,153 103,991 55,565 48,930 46,732 50,135 47,040
Commercial, merchandising and sponsorship 52,515 23,387 7,621 10,164 70,489 10,962 11,890 63,897 121,116 117,611 13,753 14,034 8,815 12,620 15,931
Property development 7,684 0
Hotel revenue 6,454
Total 240,112 79,750 54,181 64,904 259,250 80,531 78,652 168,998 231,140 320,320 93,260 74,302 63,986 70,734 77,042
Gate receipts and match day revenues 40% 15% 10% 9% 30% 21% 14% 25% 9% 31% 26% 15% 13% 11% 18%
Broadcasting / Media 35% 55% 76% 66% 43% 66% 70% 37% 38% 32% 60% 66% 73% 71% 61%
Commercial, merchandising and sponsorship 22% 29% 14% 16% 27% 14% 15% 38% 52% 37% 15% 19% 14% 18% 21%
Property development 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Hotel 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
































£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Breakdown of revenue 58% 42%
Revenue (Annual reports) 65,166 144,156 66,660 52,597 60,646 2,346,387 117,319 79,223 320,320 52,597 1,363,976 982,411 2,346,387 1.42                            
Gate receipts and match day revenues 5,790 27,659 7,883 3,590 8,044 506,085 25,304 29,080 98,718 3,590 363,529 142,556 506,085 1.81                            
Broadcasting / Media 49,142 63,561 50,555 46,081 42,225 1,186,664 59,333 20,293 111,019 41,141 514,199 672,465 1,186,664 1.54                            
Commercial, merchandising and sponsorship 10,234 52,936 8,222 2,926 10,377 639,500 31,975 35,214 121,116 2,926 478,564 160,936 639,500 1.62                            
Property development 7,684 0 3,842 7,684 0 7,684 0 7,684
Hotel revenue 6,454 0 0 6,454 6,454 0 6,454 6,454
Total 65,166 144,156 66,660 52,597 60,646 2,346,387 117,319 79,223 320,320 52,597 1,363,976 982,411 2,346,387
Gate receipts and match day revenues 9% 19% 12% 7% 13% 22% 27% 15% 22%
Broadcasting / Media 75% 44% 76% 88% 70% 51% 38% 68% 51%
Commercial, merchandising and sponsorship 16% 37% 12% 6% 17% 27% 35% 16% 27%
Property development 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0%
Hotel 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%






















£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Income statement (exclu JV) (exclu JV) 10 months
Revenue (Annual Reports) (excludes player trading) 240,112 79,750 54,181 64,904 259,250 80,531 78,652 168,998 231,140 320,320 93,260 74,302 63,986
Operating profit / (loss) (before player trading but including 
exceptional items) 24,046 (32,958) (9,633) (12,471) (195) (6,402) (1,530) 7,533 (21,060) 73,443 7,545 23,697            (14,956)
Profit / loss before interest and tax 50,084 (31,138) 4,463 (16,516) (4,480) (5,113) (18,004) (36,853) (93,444) 44,872 1,425 18,045 (22,538)
Wages and salaries (143,448) (69,609) (49,976) (55,342) (172,871) (63,389) (62,257) (118,671) (201,789) (161,688) (64,097) (36,768) (58,461)
Amortisation and impairment (42,319) (25,701) (8,813) (14,449) (51,293) (12,852) (20,632) (42,665) (83,031) (38,262) (12,598) (6,298) (8,688)
Impairment (memo) (5,517) 0 0 (1,649) (1,787) 0 (2,942) (8,906) 0 0 0 (1,169) 0
Amortisation (memo) (36,802) (25,701) (8,813) (12,800) (49,506) (12,852) (17,690) (33,759) (83,031) (38,262) (12,598) (5,129) (8,688)
Termination payments included in wages and salaries (memo) 0 (5,930) 0 0 4,700 0 0 (9,579) 0 0 0 0 0
Profit / (Loss) on player trading (memo) 65,456 26,906 22,909 10,254 28,794 14,141 4,131 (1,721) 10,647 9,691 6,478 646 1,106
Interest (payable) / receivable (net) (13,496) 13,588 (205) (5,597) 156 (3,993) (311) (3,669) (5,261) (49,536) (60) (1,711) (38)
Profit before tax 36,588 (17,550) 4,257 (22,113) (4,324) (9,106) (18,315) (40,522) (98,705) (4,664) 1,365 16,334 (22,577)
Check PBT figure 36,588 (17,550) 4,258 (22,113) (4,324) (9,106) (18,315) (40,522) (98,705) (4,664) 1,365 16,334 (22,576)
Statement of Financial Position
Non current assets (excl players' registrations) 429,483 102,529 36,911 49,823 195,845 6,394 21,024 54,788 219,969 686,516 73,632 30,305 21,146
Intangible non current assets (Players' registrations) 85,708 46,589 16,506 19,038 200,454 23,927 16,681 110,520 226,244 112,399 37,034 11,339 23,433
Total non current assets 515,191 149,118 53,417 68,861 396,299 30,321 37,705 165,308 446,213 798,915 110,666 41,644 44,579
Total current assets 250,434 17,539 9,236 7,685 70,139 10,823 10,459 59,081 99,139 762,761 31,093 29,416 10,131
Cash and bank 153,625 703 401 503 16,987 0 4,317 4,923 12,600 70,603 0 16,553 1,625
Total assets 765,625 166,657 62,653 76,546 466,438 41,144 48,164 224,389 545,352 1,561,676 141,759 71,060 54,710
Current liabilities (145,159) (84,401) (16,841) (40,748) (150,626) (57,166) (20,347) (113,165) (109,657) (257,273) (38,874) (49,786) (53,837)
Bank overdraft and ST loans (5,937) (44,449) (3,785) (9,213) 0 (25,952) (15) (22,200) (5,962) (15,628) (18,343) (15,391) (29,734)
ST group loans (included above) 0 (30,190) 0 (8) 0 0 0 (22,200) (3,733) 0 (18,000) 0 (29,734)
Working capital 105,275 (66,862) (7,605) (33,063) (80,487) (46,343) (9,888) (54,084) (10,518) 505,488 (7,781) (20,370) (43,706)






















Total assets less current liabilities 620,466 82,256 45,812 35,798 315,812 (16,022) 27,817 111,224 435,695 1,304,403 102,885 21,274 873
Non current liabilities
Long term debt (loans and HP and leases) (246,606) (107,972) (21,097) (127,790) (894,592) (22,799) 0 (89,894) (68,834) (421,247) (111,000) (210) (63,300)
Intra group loans (included above) 0 (107,132) (21,000) (127,741) (894,592) 0 0 (20,001) 0 0 (111,000) 0 (63,300)
Total non current liabilities (322,918) (114,645) (24,428) (140,236) (938,215) (28,271) (12,050) (105,966) (109,337) (482,668) (137,442) (6,838) (63,300)
Total liabilities (468,077) (199,046) (41,269) (180,984) (1,088,841) (85,437) (32,397) (219,131) (218,994) (739,941) (176,316) (56,624) (117,137)
Total debt (current and non current) (Memo) (252,543) (152,421) (24,882) (137,003) (894,592) (48,751) (15) (112,094) (74,796) (436,875) (129,343) (15,601) (93,034)
Total hard debt (current and non current) (Memo) (252,543) (15,099) (3,882) (9,254) 0 (48,751) (15) (69,893) (71,063) (436,875) (343) (15,601) 0
Total assets less total liabilities 297,548 (32,389) 21,384 (104,438) (622,403) (44,293) 15,767 5,258 326,358 821,735 (34,557) 14,436 (62,427)
Shareholders' equity 297,548 (32,389) 21,384 (104,438) (622,403) (44,293) 15,767 5,258 326,358 821,735 (34,557) 14,436 (62,427)
Retained earnings 240,790 (165,507) (123,900) (127,063) (683,173) (72,345) (202,292) (128,882) (611,011) 417,273 (110,987) 3,043 (109,025)
Capital employed (Overdraft, ST and LT loans and equity) 550,091 120,032 46,266 32,565 272,189 4,458 15,782 117,352 401,154 1,258,610 94,786 30,037 30,607
Ordinary share capital issued 62 133,118 143,988 18,702 1 35 218,059 174 44,640 na 6,655 616 31,000
Stadium Capacity 60,363            42,769            31,158            28,112            42,428            40,134            25,704            45,280            47,424            75,842            52,430            27,011            18,434            
Ave league attendance 60,001            33,873            22,652            23,670            41,495            33,231            25,293            44,420            47,045            75,387            50,280            26,606            17,328            
Cash from operations 27,694 (31,385) (9,657) (12,970) (30,951) (7,167) 888 (1,090) (53,176) 80,303 11,910 30,493 (8,356)
Operating profit / (loss) (before player trading but including 
exceptional items) 24,046 (32,958) (9,633) (12,471) (195) (6,402) (1,530) 7,533 (21,060) 73,443 7,545 23,697            (14,956)





















£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Income statement
Revenue (Annual Reports) (excludes player trading) 70,734 77,042 65,166 144,156 66,660 52,597 60,646 2,346,387 117,319 79,223 320,320 52,597
Operating profit / (loss) (before player trading but including 
exceptional items) 5,760 (4,823) 22,724 14,195 5,419 8,834 9,441 98,609 4,930 21,421 73,443 (32,958)
Profit / loss before interest and tax (9,656) (30,751) 17,682 (1,605) 359 4,795 1,791 (126,582) (6,329) 29,715 50,084 (93,444)
Wages and salaries (53,223) (63,784) (34,567) (90,206) (50,493) (37,679) (38,339) (1,626,657) (81,333) 48,967 (34,567) (201,789)
Amortisation and impairment (17,387) (22,788) (5,165) (29,330) (11,073) (11,940) (9,726) (475,010) (23,751) 18,972 (5,165) (83,031)
Impairment (memo) 0 0 (505) 0 0 0 (9,726) (32,201) (1,610) 2,904 0 (9,726)
Amortisation (memo) (17,387) (22,788) (4,660) (29,330) (11,073) (11,940) 0 (442,809) (22,140) 18,853 0 (83,031)
Termination payments included in wages and salaries (memo) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (10,809) (540) 2,676 4,700 (9,579)
Profit / (Loss) on player trading (memo) 1,971 (3,140) 123 9,200 6,013 7,902 2,076 223,583 11,179 15,232 65,456 (3,140)
Interest (payable) / receivable (net) 127 (262) (245) (5,699) 40 (541) 372 (76,341) (3,817) 11,519 13,588 (49,536)
Profit before tax (9,529) (31,013) 17,437 (7,304) 399 4,254 2,163 (202,925) (10,146) 26,599 36,588 (98,705)
Check PBT figure (9,529) (31,013) 17,437 (7,304) 399 4,254 2,163 (202,923)
Statement of Financial Position
Non current assets (excl players' registrations) 819 13,370 2,275 186,693 22,969 456 48,963 2,203,910 110,196 167,665 686,516 456
Intangible non current assets (Players' registrations) 32,974 27,455 10,148 57,955 5,472 16,837 22,998 1,103,711 55,186 61,034 226,244 5,472
Total non current assets 33,793 40,825 12,423 244,648 28,441 17,293 71,961 3,307,621 165,381 207,050 798,915 12,423
Total current assets 33,084 28,357 23,981 37,040 18,360 9,437 21,544 1,539,739 76,987 166,068 762,761 7,685
Cash and bank 9,992 443 10,792 15,702 672 797 12,869 334,107 16,705 34,930 153,625 0
Total assets 66,877 69,182 36,404 281,688 46,801 26,730 93,505 4,847,360 242,368 359,637 1,561,676 26,730
Current liabilities (58,362) (96,687) (24,165) (124,764) (20,276) (31,113) (11,297) (1,504,544) (75,227) 59,852 (11,297) (257,273)
Bank overdraft and ST loans (24,407) (52,018) (5,550) (25,574) (3,271) (17,750) 0 (325,179) (16,259) 14,211 0 (52,018)
ST group loans (included above) (24,376) (40,580) 0 0 (2,132) (5,000) 0 (175,953) (8,798) 12,940 0 (40,580)
Working capital (25,278) (68,330) (184) (87,724) (1,916) (21,676) 10,247 35,195 1,760 122,452 505,488 (87,724)





















Total assets less current liabilities 8,515 (27,505) 12,239 156,924 26,525 (4,383) 82,208 3,342,816 167,141 306,999 1,304,403 (27,505)
Non current liabilities
Long term debt (loans and HP and leases) (1) (23,533) (69) (59,632) 0 (8,504) 0 (2,267,080) (113,354) 205,409 0 (894,592)
Intra group loans (included above) 0 (23,533) 0 0 0 (6,717) 0 (1,375,016) (68,751) 193,820 0 (894,592)
Total non current liabilities (9,594) (29,213) (4,894) (80,027) (4,059) (8,504) (7,337) (2,629,942) (131,497) 219,050 (4,059) (938,215)
Total liabilities (67,956) (125,900) (29,059) (204,791) (24,335) (39,617) (18,634) (4,134,486) (206,724) 263,597 (18,634) (1,088,841)
Total debt (current and non current) (Memo) (24,408) (75,551) (5,619) (85,206) (3,271) (26,254) 0 (2,592,259) (129,613) 202,734 0 (894,592)
Total hard debt (current and non current) (Memo) (32) (11,438) (5,619) (85,206) (1,139) (14,537) 0 (1,041,290) (52,065) 105,105 0 (436,875)
Total assets less total liabilities (1,079) (56,718) 7,345 76,897 22,466 (12,887) 74,871 712,874 35,644 251,762 821,735 (622,403)
Shareholders' equity (1,079) (56,718) 7,345 76,897 22,466 (12,887) 74,871 712,874 35,644 251,762 821,735 (622,403)
Retained earnings (37,500) (128,984) 6,290 30,821 18,317 (61,984) (14,701) (1,860,820) (93,041) 231,119 417,273 (683,173)
Capital employed (Overdraft, ST and LT loans and equity) 23,329 18,833 12,964 162,103 25,737 13,367 74,871 3,305,133 165,257 287,383 1,258,610 4,458
Ordinary share capital issued 35,842 30 1,000 10,655 0 48,131 78,000
Stadium Capacity 27,746            48,686            20,524            36,234            26,373            25,143            26,795            748,590 37,430 14,276 75,842 18,434
Ave league attendance 27,219            39,095            19,949            36,053            24,817            18,832            25,670            692,916 34,646 14,633 75,387 17,328
Cash from operations 8,939 21,019 26,617 6,486 10,706 70,303
Operating profit / (loss) (before player trading but including 
exceptional items) 5,760 22,724 14,195 8,834 9,441 98,013





























capital / Total 
assets
Total assets  / 
Total 
liabilities
Equity / Total 
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Arsenal 60% 18% 10% 20.9% 3.7 4% 9% 46% 14% 1.6                   39% 85% 85% 46%
Aston Villa 87% 32% -41% -39.0% 2.3 -27% -26% 127% -40% 0.8                   -19% -47% -471% 13%
Blackburn Rovers 92% 16% -18% 8.2% 21.8 -21% 10% 54% -12% 1.5                   34% 18% 116% 8%
Bolton Wanderers 85% 22% -19% -25.4% -3.0 -38% -51% 421% -43% 0.4                   -136% -9% -131% 28%
Chelsea 67% 20% 0% -1.7% 28.7 0% -2% 329% -17% 0.4                   -133% 0% -144% 0%
Everton 79% 16% -8% -6.3% -1.3 -144% -115% 1094% -113% 0.5                   -108% -110% -110% 1094%
Fulham 79% 26% -2% -22.9% -57.9 -10% -114% 0% -21% 1.5                   33% 0% 0% 0%
Liverpool 70% 25% 4% -21.8% -10.0 6% -31% 96% -24% 1.0                   2% 1329% 2132% 60%
Manchester City 87% 36% -9% -40.4% -17.8 -5% -23% 19% -2% 2.5                   60% 22% 23% 18%
Manchester United 50% 12% 23% 14.0% 0.9 6% 4% 35% 32% 2.1                   53% 53% 53% 35%
Newcastle United 69% 14% 8% 1.5% 23.8 8% 2% 136% -5% 0.8                   -24% -1% -374% 0%
Norwich City 49% 8% 32% 24.3% 10.5 79% 60% 52% -29% 1.3                   20% 108% 108% 52%
Queen's Park Rangers 91% 14% -23% -35.2% -593.1 -49% -74% 304% -80% 0.5                   -114% 0% -149% 0%
Stoke City 75% 25% 8% -13.7% 76.0 25% -41% 105% -38% 1.0                   -2% -3% -2262% 0%
Sunderland 83% 30% -6% -39.9% -117.4 -26% -163% 401% -99% 0.5                   -82% -20% -133% 61%
Swansea City 53% 8% 35% 27.1% 72.2 175% 136% 43% -1% 1.3                   20% 77% 77% 43%
Tottenham Hotspur 63% 20% 10% -1.1% -0.3 9% -1% 53% -31% 6.3-                   27% 111% 111% 53%
West Bromwich Albion 76% 17% 8% 0.5% -9.0 21% 1% 13% -4% 1.9                   48% 5% 15% 4%
Wigan Athletic 72% 23% 17% 9.1% 8.9 66% 36% 196% -81% 0.7                   -48% -113% -204% 109%
Wolverhampton Wanderers 63% 16% 16% 3.0% -4.8 13% 2% 0% 11% 5.0                   80% 0% 0% 0%
Aggregate -69% -20% 4% -5% -1.7 3% -4% 78% 1% 1.2 15% 146% 364% 32%
Standard Deviation 13% 7% 18% 21% 135.4 59% 64% 247% 37% 2.0 66% 293% 712% 234%
Min 49% 8% -41% -40% -593.1 -144% -163% 0% -113% -6.3 -136% -113% -2262% 0%
Max 92% 36% 35% 27% 76.0 175% 136% 1094% 32% 5.02 80% 1329% 2132% 1094%
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Arsenal 0.10 0.95 20% 94% 2.8 0.4 2.3 1.7 99% 11% 5.6% 0.95                 15.2% 115% 0.12
Aston Villa -0.22 0.52 0% 185% 1.7 0.7 -1.2 0.2 79% 28% -17.0% 5.28                 -22.0% 95% -0.39
Blackburn Rovers -0.39 2.18 1% 360% 3.3 1.2 -7.1 0.5 73% 26% 0.4% 13.96               7.9% 100% -0.18
Bolton Wanderers -0.09 0.47 1% 228% 3.4 2.0 -2.0 0.2 84% 25% 8.6% 7.01                 -34.1% 104% -0.20
Chelsea 0.00 0.29 4% 111% 1.3 1.0 -3.2 0.5 98% 43% -0.1% n/a -1.7% 15872% -0.12
Everton -0.13 1.65 0% 200% 3.4 18.1 -1.7 0.2 83% 58% 5.0% 1.65                 -11.3% 112% -0.09
Fulham -102.00 5243.47 9% 212% 4.7 5.0 -8.0 0.5 98% 35% 0.4% 5,243.47         -23.3% -58% 0.01
Liverpool 0.07 1.51 2% 88% 1.5 1.4 -3.1 0.5 98% 49% 2.2% 2.42                 -24.0% -14% -0.01
Manchester City -0.28 3.09 2% 137% 1.0 0.6 -22.0 0.9 99% 41% 2.3% 3.25                 -42.7% 252% -0.23
Manchester United 0.17 0.73 5% 71% 2.8 0.3 0.6 3.0 99% 7% 15.5% 0.73                 -1.5% 109% 0.25
Newcastle United 0.06 0.72 0% 164% 2.5 1.0 -12.0 0.8 96% 26% 0.1% 271.90            1.5% 158% 0.13
Norwich City 1.52 4.76 23% 127% 6.6 2.5 -3.6 0.6 99% 16% 2.3% 4.76                 22.0% 129% 0.41
Queen's Park Rangers -0.16 0.69 3% 282% 2.7 2.1 -1.5 0.2 94% 43% 0.1% n/a -35.3% 56% -0.13
Stoke City 0.24 2.90 15% 222% 2.1 3.0 -2.8 0.6 98% 49% 0.2% 2,210.44         -13.5% 155% 0.13
Sunderland -0.06 1.02 1% 190% 2.8 4.1 -1.1 0.3 80% 40% 0.3% 6.74                 -40.3% 0% 0.00
Swansea City 4.04 11.60 30% 241% 6.4 5.0 -354.2 1.0 97% 28% 0.4% 11.60               26.8% 92% 0.32
Tottenham Hotspur 0.17 1.69 6% 107% 2.5 0.9 -1.6 0.3 100% 21% 4.0% 1.69                 -5.1% 188% 0.18
West Bromwich Albion 1.66 20.38 1% 252% 12.2 2.6 -34.8 0.9 94% 12% -0.1% 58.53               0.6% 0% 0.00
Wigan Athletic 0.34 2.00 3% 387% 3.1 3.9 -2.4 0.3 75% 63% 1.0% 3.62                 8.1% 73% 0.12
Wolverhampton Wanderers n/a n/a 14% 177% 2.6 0.8 5.9 1.9 96% 25% 0.6% n/a 3.6% 113% 0.18
Aggregate -0.04 0.91 7% 130% 2.1 0.7 66.7 1.0 93% 23% 3.3% 2.25                 -8.6% 72% 0.03
Standard Deviation 22.89 1170.15 9% 84% 2.4 3.8 76.6 0.7 9% 15% 6% 1302.37 20% 3439.6% 0.20
Min -102.00 0.29 0% 71% 1.0 0.3 -354.2 0.2 73% 7% -17% 0.73 -43% -58.0% -0.39
Max 4.04 5243.47 30% 387% 12.2 18.1 5.9 3.0 100% 63% 15% 5243.47 27% 15872.3% 0.41





Clubs that reported a Profit before interest and tax 
  




















£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Income statement (exclu JV)
Revenue (Annual Reports) (excludes player trading) 240,112 54,181 320,320 93,260 74,302 65,166 66,660 52,597 60,646 1,027,244 114,138 91,469 320,320 52,597
Operating profit / (loss) (before player trading but including 
exceptional items) 24,046 (9,633) 73,443 7,545 23,697            22,724 5,419 8,834 9,441 165,516 18,391 21,991 73,443 (9,633)
Profit / loss before interest and tax 50,084 4,463 44,872 1,425 18,045 17,682 359 4,795 1,791 143,516 15,946 18,012 50,084 359
Wages and salaries (143,448) (49,976) (161,688) (64,097) (36,768) (34,567) (50,493) (37,679) (38,339) (617,055) (68,562) 45,954 (34,567) (161,688)
Amortisation and impairment (42,319) (8,813) (38,262) (12,598) (6,298) (5,165) (11,073) (11,940) (9,726) (146,194) (16,244) 13,092 (5,165) (42,319)
Impairment (memo) (5,517) 0 0 0 (1,169) (505) 0 0 (9,726) (16,917) (1,880) 3,246 0 (9,726)
Amortisation (memo) (36,802) (8,813) (38,262) (12,598) (5,129) (4,660) (11,073) (11,940) 0 (129,277) (14,364) 12,957 0 (38,262)
Termination payments included in wages and salaries (memo) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit / (Loss) on player trading (memo) 65,456 22,909 9,691 6,478 646 123 6,013 7,902 2,076 121,294 13,477 19,476 65,456 123
Interest (payable) / receivable (net) (13,496) (205) (49,536) (60) (1,711) (245) 40 (541) 372 (65,382) (7,265) 15,508 372 (49,536)
Profit before tax 36,588 4,257 (4,664) 1,365 16,334 17,437 399 4,254 2,163 78,133 8,681 12,000 36,588 (4,664)
Check PBT figure 36,588 4,258 (4,664) 1,365 16,334 17,437 399 4,254 2,163 78,134
Statement of Financial Position
Non current assets (excl players' registrations) 429,483 36,911 686,516 73,632 30,305 2,275 22,969 456 48,963 1,331,510 147,946 228,376 686,516 456
Intangible non current assets (Players' registrations) 85,708 16,506 112,399 37,034 11,339 10,148 5,472 16,837 22,998 318,441 35,382 35,637 112,399 5,472
Total non current assets 515,191 53,417 798,915 110,666 41,644 12,423 28,441 17,293 71,961 1,649,951 183,328 263,414 798,915 12,423
Total current assets 250,434 9,236 762,761 31,093 29,416 23,981 18,360 9,437 21,544 1,156,262 128,474 235,550 762,761 9,236
Cash and bank 153,625 401 70,603 0 16,553 10,792 672 797 12,869 266,312 29,590 48,606 153,625 0
Total assets 765,625 62,653 1,561,676 141,759 71,060 36,404 46,801 26,730 93,505 2,806,213 311,801 493,522 1,561,676 26,730
Current liabilities (145,159) (16,841) (257,273) (38,874) (49,786) (24,165) (20,276) (31,113) (11,297) (594,784) (66,087) 77,687 (11,297) (257,273)
Bank overdraft and ST loans (5,937) (3,785) (15,628) (18,343) (15,391) (5,550) (3,271) (17,750) 0 (85,655) (9,517) 6,737 0 (18,343)
ST group loans (included above) 0 0 0 (18,000) 0 0 (2,132) (5,000) 0 (25,132) (2,792) 5,611 0 (18,000)
Working capital 105,275 (7,605) 505,488 (7,781) (20,370) (184) (1,916) (21,676) 10,247 561,478 62,386 160,791 505,488 (21,676)


























£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Total assets less current liabilities 620,466 45,812 1,304,403 102,885 21,274 12,239 26,525 (4,383) 82,208 2,211,429 245,714 416,844 1,304,403 (4,383)
Non current liabilities
Long term debt (loans and HP and leases) (246,606) (21,097) (421,247) (111,000) (210) (69) 0 (8,504) 0 (808,733) (89,859) 140,803 0 (421,247)
Intra group loans (included above) 0 (21,000) 0 (111,000) 0 0 0 (6,717) 0 (138,717) (15,413) 34,430 0 (111,000)
Total non current liabilities (322,918) (24,428) (482,668) (137,442) (6,838) (4,894) (4,059) (8,504) (7,337) (999,088) (111,010) 165,340 (4,059) (482,668)
Total liabilities (468,077) (41,269) (739,941) (176,316) (56,624) (29,059) (24,335) (39,617) (18,634) (1,593,872) (177,097) 241,221 (18,634) (739,941)
Total debt (current and non current) (Memo) (252,543) (24,882) (436,875) (129,343) (15,601) (5,619) (3,271) (26,254) 0 (894,388) (99,376) 143,015 0 (436,875)
Total hard debt (current and non current) (Memo) (252,543) (3,882) (436,875) (343) (15,601) (5,619) (1,139) (14,537) 0 (730,539) (81,171) 147,513 0 (436,875)
Total assets less total liabilities 297,548 21,384 821,735 (34,557) 14,436 7,345 22,466 (12,887) 74,871 1,212,341 134,705 260,057 821,735 (34,557)
Shareholders' equity 297,548 21,384 821,735 (34,557) 14,436 7,345 22,466 (12,887) 74,871 1,212,341 134,705 260,057 821,735 (34,557)
Retained earnings 240,790 (123,900) 417,273 (110,987) 3,043 6,290 18,317 (61,984) (14,701) 374,141 41,571 166,218 417,273 (123,900)
Capital employed (Overdraft, ST and LT loans and equity) 550,091 46,266 1,258,610 94,786 30,037 12,964 25,737 13,367 74,871 2,106,729 234,081 396,120 1,258,610 12,964
Ordinary share capital issued 62 143,988 na 6,655 616 1,000 0 48,131 78,000
Stadium Capacity 60,363            31,158            75,842            52,430            27,011            20,524            26,373            25,143            26,795            345,639 38,404 18,372 75,842 20,524
Ave league attendance 60,001            22,652            75,387            50,280            26,606            19,949            24,817            18,832            25,670            324,194 36,022 19,385 75,387 18,832




























capital / Total 
assets
Total assets  / 
Total 
liabilities
Equity / Total 
assets





Arsenal 60% 18% 10% 20.9% 3.7 4% 9% 46% 14% 1.6                   39% 85% 85% 46%
Blackburn Rovers 92% 16% -18% 8.2% 21.8 -21% 10% 54% -12% 1.5                   34% 18% 116% 8%
Manchester United 50% 12% 23% 14.0% 0.9 6% 4% 35% 32% 2.1                   53% 53% 53% 35%
Newcastle United 69% 14% 8% 1.5% 23.8 8% 2% 136% -5% 0.8                   -24% -1% -374% 0%
Norwich City 49% 8% 32% 24.3% 10.5 79% 60% 52% -29% 1.3                   20% 108% 108% 52%
Swansea City 53% 8% 35% 27.1% 72.2 175% 136% 43% -1% 1.3                   20% 77% 77% 43%
West Bromwich Albion 76% 17% 8% 0.5% -9.0 21% 1% 13% -4% 1.9                   48% 5% 15% 4%
Wigan Athletic 72% 23% 17% 9.1% 8.9 66% 36% 196% -81% 0.7                   -48% -1.1 -2.0 109%
Wolverhampton Wanderers 63% 16% 16% 3.0% -4.8 13% 2% 0% 11% 5.0                   80% 0% 0% 0%
Aggregate -60% -14% 16% 14% 2.2 8% 7% 42% 20% 1.8 43% 60% 74% 35%
Standard Deviation 13% 4% 15% 9% 22.9 57% 42% 59% 30% 1.2 37% 62% 157% 33%
Min 49% 8% -18% 1% -9.0 -21% 1% 0% -81% 0.7 -48% -113% -374% 0%
Max 92% 23% 35% 27% 72.17 175% 136% 196% 32% 5.02 80% 108% 116% 109%














Cash / Total 
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Arsenal 0.10 0.95 20% 94% 2.8 0.4 2.3 1.7 99% 11% 5.6% 0.95                 15.2%
Blackburn Rovers -0.39 2.18 1% 360% 3.3 1.2 -7.1 0.5 73% 26% 0.4% 13.96               7.9%
Manchester United 0.17 0.73 5% 71% 2.8 0.3 0.6 3.0 99% 7% 15.5% 0.73                 -1.5%
Newcastle United 0.06 0.72 0% 164% 2.5 1.0 -12.0 0.8 96% 26% 0.1% 271.90            1.5%
Norwich City 1.52 4.76 23% 127% 6.6 2.5 -3.6 0.6 99% 16% 2.3% 4.76                 22.0%
Swansea City 4.04 11.60 30% 241% 6.4 5.0 -354.2 1.0 97% 28% 0.4% 11.60               26.8%
West Bromwich Albion 1.66 20.38 1% 252% 12.2 2.6 -34.8 0.9 94% 12% -0.1% 58.53               0.6%
Wigan Athletic 0.34 2.00 3% 387% 3.1 3.9 -2.4 0.3 75% 63% 1.0% 3.62                 8.1%
Wolverhampton Wanderers n/a n/a 14% 177% 2.6 0.8 5.9 1.9 96% 25% 0.6% n/a 3.6%
Aggregate -0.19 1.15 9% 116% 3.2 0.5 1.8 1.9 94% 11% 6.4% 1.41                 7.6%
Standard Deviation 1.36 6.60 11% 105% 3.0 1.6 109.9 0.8 10% 16% 5% 87.30 9%
Min -0.39 0.72 0% 71% 2.5 0.3 -354.2 0.3 73% 7% 0% 0.73 -1%






Clubs that reported a Loss before interest and tax 
  
2012 Financial Statements (Annual Reports) Aston Villa
Bolton 
Wanderers












£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Income statement (exclu JV) 10 months
Revenue (Annual Reports) (excludes player trading) 79,750 64,904 259,250 80,531 78,652 168,998 231,140 63,986 70,734 77,042 144,156 1,319,143 119,922 67,460 259,250 63,986
Operating profit / (loss) (before player trading but including 
exceptional items) (32,958) (12,471) (195) (6,402) (1,530) 7,533 (21,060) (14,956) 5,760 (4,823) 14,195 (66,907) (6,082) 13,004 14,195 (32,958)
Profit / loss before interest and tax (31,138) (16,516) (4,480) (5,113) (18,004) (36,853) (93,444) (22,538) (9,656) (30,751) (1,605) (270,098) (24,554) 24,532 (1,605) (93,444)
Wages and salaries (69,609) (55,342) (172,871) (63,389) (62,257) (118,671) (201,789) (58,461) (53,223) (63,784) (90,206) (1,009,602) (91,782) 48,879 (53,223) (201,789)
Amortisation and impairment (25,701) (14,449) (51,293) (12,852) (20,632) (42,665) (83,031) (8,688) (17,387) (22,788) (29,330) (328,816) (29,892) 20,745 (8,688) (83,031)
Impairment (memo) 0 (1,649) (1,787) 0 (2,942) (8,906) 0 0 0 0 0 (15,284) (1,389) 2,570 0 (8,906)
Amortisation (memo) (25,701) (12,800) (49,506) (12,852) (17,690) (33,759) (83,031) (8,688) (17,387) (22,788) (29,330) (313,532) (28,503) 20,467 (8,688) (83,031)
Termination payments included in wages and salaries (memo) (5,930) 0 4,700 0 0 (9,579) 0 0 0 0 0 (10,809) (983) 3,547 4,700 (9,579)
Profit / (Loss) on player trading (memo) 26,906 10,254 28,794 14,141 4,131 (1,721) 10,647 1,106 1,971 (3,140) 9,200 102,289 9,299 10,180 28,794 (3,140)
Interest (payable) / receivable (net) 13,588 (5,597) 156 (3,993) (311) (3,669) (5,261) (38) 127 (262) (5,699) (10,959) (996) 5,177 13,588 (5,699)
Profit before tax (17,550) (22,113) (4,324) (9,106) (18,315) (40,522) (98,705) (22,577) (9,529) (31,013) (7,304) (281,058) (25,551) 25,322 (4,324) (98,705)
Check PBT figure (17,550) (22,113) (4,324) (9,106) (18,315) (40,522) (98,705) (22,576) (9,529) (31,013) (7,304) (281,057)
Statement of Financial Position
Non current assets (excl players' registrations) 102,529 49,823 195,845 6,394 21,024 54,788 219,969 21,146 819 13,370 186,693 872,400 79,309 79,494 219,969 819
Intangible non current assets (Players' registrations) 46,589 19,038 200,454 23,927 16,681 110,520 226,244 23,433 32,974 27,455 57,955 785,270 71,388 71,768 226,244 16,681
Total non current assets 149,118 68,861 396,299 30,321 37,705 165,308 446,213 44,579 33,793 40,825 244,648 1,657,670 150,697 143,858 446,213 30,321
Total current assets 17,539 7,685 70,139 10,823 10,459 59,081 99,139 10,131 33,084 28,357 37,040 383,477 34,862 28,343 99,139 7,685
Cash and bank 703 503 16,987 0 4,317 4,923 12,600 1,625 9,992 443 15,702 67,795 6,163 6,196 16,987 0
Total assets 166,657 76,546 466,438 41,144 48,164 224,389 545,352 54,710 66,877 69,182 281,688 2,041,147 185,559 169,442 545,352 41,144
Current liabilities (84,401) (40,748) (150,626) (57,166) (20,347) (113,165) (109,657) (53,837) (58,362) (96,687) (124,764) (909,760) (82,705) 38,093 (20,347) (150,626)
Bank overdraft and ST loans (44,449) (9,213) 0 (25,952) (15) (22,200) (5,962) (29,734) (24,407) (52,018) (25,574) (239,524) (21,775) 16,199 0 (52,018)
ST group loans (included above) (30,190) (8) 0 0 0 (22,200) (3,733) (29,734) (24,376) (40,580) 0 (150,821) (13,711) 15,001 0 (40,580)
Working capital (66,862) (33,063) (80,487) (46,343) (9,888) (54,084) (10,518) (43,706) (25,278) (68,330) (87,724) (526,283) (47,844) 25,329 (9,888) (87,724)







2012 Financial Statements (Annual Reports) Aston Villa
Bolton 
Wanderers












£000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's £000's
Total assets less current liabilities 82,256 35,798 315,812 (16,022) 27,817 111,224 435,695 873 8,515 (27,505) 156,924 1,131,387 102,853 141,455 435,695 (27,505)
Non current liabilities
Long term debt (loans and HP and leases) (107,972) (127,790) (894,592) (22,799) 0 (89,894) (68,834) (63,300) (1) (23,533) (59,632) (1,458,347) (132,577) 244,279 0 (894,592)
Intra group loans (included above) (107,132) (127,741) (894,592) 0 0 (20,001) 0 (63,300) 0 (23,533) 0 (1,236,299) (112,391) 251,197 0 (894,592)
Total non current liabilities (114,645) (140,236) (938,215) (28,271) (12,050) (105,966) (109,337) (63,300) (9,594) (29,213) (80,027) (1,630,854) (148,259) 253,476 (9,594) (938,215)
Total liabilities (199,046) (180,984) (1,088,841) (85,437) (32,397) (219,131) (218,994) (117,137) (67,956) (125,900) (204,791) (2,540,614) (230,965) 278,243 (32,397) (1,088,841)
Total debt (current and non current) (Memo) (152,421) (137,003) (894,592) (48,751) (15) (112,094) (74,796) (93,034) (24,408) (75,551) (85,206) (1,697,871) (154,352) 237,981 (15) (894,592)
Total hard debt (current and non current) (Memo) (15,099) (9,254) 0 (48,751) (15) (69,893) (71,063) 0 (32) (11,438) (85,206) (310,751) (28,250) 31,962 0 (85,206)
Total assets less total liabilities (32,389) (104,438) (622,403) (44,293) 15,767 5,258 326,358 (62,427) (1,079) (56,718) 76,897 (499,467) (45,406) 212,868 326,358 (622,403)
Shareholders' equity (32,389) (104,438) (622,403) (44,293) 15,767 5,258 326,358 (62,427) (1,079) (56,718) 76,897 (499,467) (45,406) 212,868 326,358 (622,403)
Retained earnings (165,507) (127,063) (683,173) (72,345) (202,292) (128,882) (611,011) (109,025) (37,500) (128,984) 30,821 (2,234,961) (203,178) 218,080 30,821 (683,173)
Capital employed (Overdraft, ST and LT loans and equity) 120,032 32,565 272,189 4,458 15,782 117,352 401,154 30,607 23,329 18,833 162,103 1,198,404 108,946 121,383 401,154 4,458
Ordinary share capital issued 133,118 18,702 1 35 218,059 174 44,640 31,000 35,842 30 10,655
Stadium Capacity 42,769            28,112            42,428            40,134            25,704            45,280            47,424            18,434            27,746            48,686            36,234            402,951 36,632 9,641 48,686 18,434
Ave league attendance 33,873            23,670            41,495            33,231            25,293            44,420            47,045            17,328            27,219            39,095            36,053            368,722 33,520 8,891 47,045 17,328




























capital / Total 
assets
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liabilities
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assets





Aston Villa 87% 32% -41% -39.0% 2.3 -27% -26% 127% -40% 0.8                   -19% -47% -471% 13%
Bolton Wanderers 85% 22% -19% -25.4% -3.0 -38% -51% 421% -43% 0.4                   -136% -9% -131% 28%
Chelsea 67% 20% 0% -1.7% 28.7 0% -2% 329% -17% 0.4                   -133% 0% -144% 0%
Everton 79% 16% -8% -6.3% -1.3 -144% -115% 1094% -113% 0.5                   -108% -110% -110% 1094%
Fulham 79% 26% -2% -22.9% -57.9 -10% -114% 0% -21% 1.5                   33% 0% 0% 0%
Liverpool 70% 25% 4% -21.8% -10.0 6% -31% 96% -24% 1.0                   2% 1329% 2132% 60%
Manchester City 87% 36% -9% -40.4% -17.8 -5% -23% 19% -2% 2.5                   60% 22% 23% 18%
Queen's Park Rangers 91% 14% -23% -35.2% -593.1 -49% -74% 304% -80% 0.5                   -114% 0% -149% 0%
Stoke City 75% 25% 8% -13.7% 76.0 25% -41% 105% -38% 1.0                   -2% -3% -2262% 0%
Sunderland 83% 30% -6% -39.9% -117.4 -26% -163% 401% -99% 0.5                   -82% -20% -133% 61%
Tottenham Hotspur 63% 20% 10% -1.1% -0.3 9% -1% 53% -31% 6.3-                   27% 111% 111% 53%
Aggregate -77% -25% -5% -20% -24.6 -6% -23% 142% -26% 0.8 -24% -62% -340% 26%
Standard Deviation 9% 6% 14% 14% 173.8 43% 50% 299% 34% 2.2 70% 387% 947% 309%
Min 63% 14% -41% -40% -593.1 -144% -163% 0% -113% -6.3 -136% -110% -2262% 0%
Max 91% 36% 10% -1% 76.0 25% -1% 1094% -2% 2.5 60% 1329% 2132% 1094%















Cash / Total 
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Aston Villa -0.22 0.52 0% 185% 1.7 0.7 -1.2 0.2 79% 28% -17.0% 5.28                 -22.0%
Bolton Wanderers -0.09 0.47 1% 228% 3.4 2.0 -2.0 0.2 84% 25% 8.6% 7.01                 -34.1%
Chelsea 0.00 0.29 4% 111% 1.3 1.0 -3.2 0.5 98% 43% -0.1% n/a -1.7%
Everton -0.13 1.65 0% 200% 3.4 18.1 -1.7 0.2 83% 58% 5.0% 1.65                 -11.3%
Fulham -102.00 5243.47 9% 212% 4.7 5.0 -8.0 0.5 98% 35% 0.4% 5,243.47         -23.3%
Liverpool 0.07 1.51 2% 88% 1.5 1.4 -3.1 0.5 98% 49% 2.2% 2.42                 -24.0%
Manchester City -0.28 3.09 2% 137% 1.0 0.6 -22.0 0.9 99% 41% 2.3% 3.25                 -42.7%
Queen's Park Rangers -0.16 0.69 3% 282% 2.7 2.1 -1.5 0.2 94% 43% 0.1% n/a -35.3%
Stoke City 0.24 2.90 15% 222% 2.1 3.0 -2.8 0.6 98% 49% 0.2% 2,210.44         -13.5%
Sunderland -0.06 1.02 1% 190% 2.8 4.1 -1.1 0.3 80% 40% 0.3% 6.74                 -40.3%
Tottenham Hotspur 0.17 1.69 6% 107% 2.5 0.9 -1.6 0.3 100% 21% 4.0% 1.69                 -5.1%
Aggregate 0.04 0.78 3% 140% 1.7 1.1 -2.5 0.4 92% 38% 0.8% 4.25                 -21.3%
Standard Deviation 29.31 1506.99 4% 57% 1.0 4.8 5.9 0.2 8% 11% 6% 1704.90 13%
Min -102.00 0.29 0% 88% 1.0 0.6 -22.0 0.2 79% 21% -17% 1.65 -43%
Max 0.24 5243.47 15% 282% 4.7 18.1 -1.1 0.9 100% 58% 9% 5243.47 -2%















£'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000
Arsenal 143,448          70 95,212 84,701 52,515 240,112
Aston Villa 69,609            38 12,204 44,159 23,387 79,750
Blackburn Rovers 49,976            31 5,419 41,141 7,621 54,181
Bolton Wanderers 55,342            36 5,724 42,562 10,164 64,904
Chelsea 172,871          64 77,742 111,019 70,489 259,250
Everton 63,389            56 16,779 52,790 10,962 80,531
Fulham 62,257            52 11,354 55,408 11,890 78,652
Liverpool 118,671          52 42,327 62,774 63,897 168,998
Manchester City 201,789          89 21,871 88,153 121,116 231,140
Manchester United 161,688          89 98,718 103,991 117,611 320,320
Newcastle United 64,097            65 23,942 55,565 13,753 93,260
Norwich City 36,768            47 11,338 48,930 14,034 74,302
Queens Park Rangers 58,461            37 8,439 46,732 8,815 63,986
Stoke City 53,223            45 7,979 50,135 12,620 70,734
Sunderland 63,784            45 14,071 47,040 15,931 77,042
Swansea City 34,567            47 5,790 49,142 10,234 65,166
Tottenham Hotspur 90,206            69 27,659 63,561 52,936 144,156
West Bromwich Albion 50,493            47 7,883 50,555 8,222 66,660
Wigan Athletic 37,679            43 3,590 46,081 2,926 52,597
Wolverhampton Wanderers 38,339            25 8,044 42,225 10,377 60,646
Total 1,626,657
Correlation 0.82 r 0.68 0.83 0.84 0.84
r² 0.664 r² 0.47 0.69 0.71 0.70
2012 Financial Statements - Pearson's coefficient of correlation
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